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This thesis investigates if public international law manages to function as a 
coherent system in the case of deep-sea bioprospecting, where rules in three 
regimes provide seemingly inconsistent obligations for states.  
  
Based on an investigation of the development of bioprospecting and patenting 
of deep-sea genetic resources, the study explores how rules in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the World Trade Organization Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (WTO TRIPS) apply to 
such activities. It is illustrated how rules of these treaties provide different and 
seemingly inconsistent obligations for states in the context of deep-sea 
bioprospecting. This is explained by their origin in different regimes of public 
international law with distinctively dissimilar perspectives on the 
appropriation of genetic resources.  
  
It is discussed how the prima facie norm conflict in some cases can be resolved 
on the basis of the principles on treaty application and interpretation under the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In other cases, such as the 
obligations for bioprospecting of deep-seabed micro-organisms, states are 
faced with an irreconcilable dilemma; the different treaty obligations cannot 
be simultaneously applied. In order to prevent such conflicts and ensure the 
credibility of international law as a functioning system, new approaches are 
suggested, in particular the development of holistic conflict clauses and lex 
specialis. The case of deep-sea bioprospecting calls for a more state-oriented 
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There is a pleasure in the pathless woods, 
There is a rapture on the lonely shore, 
There is society where none intrudes, 
By the deep sea, and music in its roar: 
I love not Man the less, but Nature more,  
From these our interviews, in which I steal  
From all I may be, or have been before,  
To mingle with the Universe, and feel  
What I can ne'er express, yet cannot all conceal. 
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This study comprises an analysis of the rules in international law applicable to 
deep-sea bioprospecting. These rules, which concern access to, protection of, 
and patentability of deep-sea biological resources are found in three distinct 
regimes of international law. To what extent these rules are compatible or can 
possibly be made compatible through the use of established methods of 
application and interpretation of international law is the central theme of the 
study. In this way, it is a case study on fragmentation of international law and 
the ability of the system’s internal mechanisms to overcome apparent 
inconsistencies in allegedly hard cases like deep-sea bioprospecting. 
 
For deep-sea bioprospecting, international law provides inconsistent rules, 
originating from distinct regimes characterized by distinct logics and 
underlying objectives. This puts states in a paradoxical situation; it is 
impossible to implement one obligation without violating another. Rules of 
treaty application and interpretation are unable to fully dissolve this problem. 
Such cases of catch 22 of international law connect to an increasing systemic 
fragmentation into different regimes. As is shown in the case of deep-sea 
bioprospecting, regimes are based on different objectives and logics. When 
rules from several regimes apply in parallel there is a risk for norm conflicts.  
 
This dysfunctionality and the resulting lack of credibility challenges the 
legitimacy of international law as a coherent system. It puts states in a situation 
where their only option is to implement international law selectively, by means 
of norm shopping. It also increases the risk for powerful states to dominate the 
system, by circumventing a prohibitive rule in one treaty by reference to a 
permissive rule in another. The dilemma of norm conflict may be prevented, it 
is suggested, by increasing institutional cooperation and consideration of rules 
across treaty boundaries as well as the development of holistic conflict clauses 
and lex specialis. This is particularly relevant in the marine sphere, where 
different uses, activities and their implications transcend boundaries and a 
broad range of treaties provide different and partly overlapping obligations. 
Nowhere else is it more acute than in areas beyond national jurisdiction, where 









A. Approaching deep-sea bioprospecting and 
international law 
 
A.1. Introductory remarks 
 
A commercial enterprise commissions a marine research vessel and sails to the 
Mid-Atlantic, well beyond the maritime zones of Atlantic coastal states. There, 
a submarine vessel is sent down to harvest samples of organisms in an 
extremophile tubeworm community situated at a hydrothermal vent, 
ecosystems where organisms display functions which have not been identified 
elsewhere on the planet. On board the research vessel, the DNA of a retrieved 
micro-organism is sequenced. In subsequent clinical trials on land, a protein 
discovered during sequestration is demonstrated to have tumor-inhibiting 
properties. A patent application is filed, with prospects for the development of 
a commercially lucrative pharmaceutical drug.  
 
Under US interpretation, not only of its own treaty obligations, but of the 
implication of international law in general, there is nothing preventing such 
operations or the enterprise from applying for and being granted a patent, 
provided that the discovery meets standard requirements. In the view of 
Argentina, by contrast, the actual bioprospecting mission would be unlawful 
without an express permit from the International Seabed Authority. Moreover, 
the findings would have to be shared universally. Any application for or 
granting of patents or other exclusive rights based on the finding would amount 
to illegal appropriation of a global resource belonging to all of humanity. The 
European Union would consider it in line with international law to conduct the 
mission, provided that the conservation of the relevant ecosystem is not 
endangered, and much like the US, the EU would grant patent for the invention. 
They may, however, suggest that international law rules require that the 
benefits from the finding should somehow be shared. 
 
How can the different legal perspective across states be explained, considering 
that they are based on the same rules of international law? The diverging views 
on deep-sea bioprospecting, which also are reflected in domestic law, are the 
result of different understandings among states of what obligations apply to 






In this study, the rules of international law applying to such activities will be 
examined. The study will explore how, as a result of fragmentation, different 
regimes of international law have developed seemingly inconsistent 
obligations to the same activity and how deep-sea bioprospecting should be 
considered under treaty law. Deep-sea bioprospecting thus presents states with 
a legal dilemma. In order to understand the challenges this new activity 
represents for international law, a closer look at characteristics of deep-sea 
bioprospecting is required.  
 
A.2. Why investigate the legal status of deep-sea 
bioprospecting under international law? 
 
A.2.1. A difficult case under international law 
 
The status under international law of the deep sea and its resources as global 
commons beyond national jurisdiction raises legal challenges to the 
bioprospecting of genetic resources in these areas. Moreover, different sub-
fields of international law provide potentially conflicting obligations relating 
to such activities. States are both required to enable and prevented from 
allowing the appropriation of genetic resources from these areas for private 
purposes, as well as obliged to ensure their conservation.  
 
The law of the sea has been developed based on a rigid division between sci-
entific research and resource extraction as well as a narrow conception of how 
marine resources can and should be exploited, reflecting human use and scien-
tific knowledge of the 1970 and 80s, when central provisions in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 were negotiated. Yet 
these rules have a general scope of application, which in important regards 
encompasses deep-sea bioprospecting. The deep-sea areas of the oceans 
largely overlap with the areas which under the law of the sea are considered 
beyond national jurisdiction. These are divided into two distinctive legal com-
mons-concepts: The High Seas includes the water column beyond the limits of 
the maritime zones of coastal states. The Area encompasses the seafloor and 
underlying sediments beyond the continental shelf of coastal states.  
 
1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica 10 
December 1982 and became effective 16 November 1994, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (UNCLOS) 







The two zones differ considerably as legal concepts, but have important 
elements in common. Both the rules on the High Seas and the Area are based 
on the notion that no state is entitled to assert sovereignty over these areas, and 
resources contained in these parts of the oceans are generally regarded as 
global commons. However, the legal implications differ considerably between 
the two zones. The commons regime of the High seas is essentially one of 
open-access, enabling appropriation of living organisms by all states and 
private actors as the main rule. The commons regime of the Area, on the other 
hand, is built on the principle of common heritage of mankind, which implies 
that appropriation in the form of resource extraction, as well as scientific 
research, only can be undertaken for the benefit of mankind, as opposed to state 
or private interest. Indeed, under the law of the sea, no actor is granted access 
unless complex procedures and requirements have been fulfilled. 
 
In contrast to this restrictive approach to appropriation of deep-sea genetic  
resources, WTO-law has a more permissive perspective. According to the 
standard rule, states should grant patents for biotechnological inventions 
originating in deep-sea organisms provided that patent criteria are fulfilled. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)2 provides no exception from the obligation to enable claims for 
exclusive rights to biotechnological inventions originating in deep-sea 
organisms.  
 
On the contrary, states are prevented from excluding the types of organisms 
which appear to be most relevant in bioprospecting from patentability. States 
are thus not merely free to accept claims for legal rights connected to genetic 
functions of deep-sea organisms: They are required to ensure the protection of 
private claims for exclusive rights by means of patenting for the types of 






2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 15 April 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 






International environmental law represents a third approach to the 
appropriation of deep-sea resources. Much of the rules of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD)3 are geographically confined to coastal waters, 
where an advanced system for safeguarding national sovereignty over genetic 
resources applies. No restrictions are raised in relation to the appropriation of 
deep-sea genetic resources per se. It does, however, provide obligations to 
share results, not to cause damage to ecosystems, as well as duties to cooperate 
for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in their natural habitats.  
 
Bioprospecting and the genetic resources of deep-sea organisms thus represent 
an example of how different areas of international law can provide obligations 
relating to the same activity in a multitude of different and, potentially 
conflicting ways. Generally, depending on what area of international law is 
used as perspective, the legal status of organisms and the use of their genetic 
resources would be interpreted differently. As a result, across different areas 
of international law, rules are provided for distinct aspects of the appropriation 
of organisms and their genomes. This goes for terrestrial as well as marine life, 
but it is most striking and arguably most relevant on the marine side, where the 
limitations on state sovereignty are manifold and the legal status of the major 
part of the oceans as global commons highlights dissimilar perspectives. These 
differences between sub-areas of international law, in this study referred to as 
regimes, raise a multitude of questions: How do obligations across different 
regimes apply to deep-sea bioprospecting? What underlying reasons might 
explain why rules diverge? How does international law handle cases of 
potentially overlapping and conflicting norms? Can it be established what rules 
should be given priority? 
 
In this study, the emphasis is on how international law applies to deep-sea 
bioprospecting, and how inconsistency between obligations relating to such 
activities could be explained and understood under treaty law rules. The 
interest of investigating this problem is further supported by extra-legal aspects 
of deep-sea bioprospecting.  
  
 
3 The Convention on Biological Diversity, regarding the conservation of biodiversity, the 
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
thereof, signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992 and entered into force on 








A.2.2. Growing interest in marine bioprospecting 
 
The seemingly inconsistent rules for deep-sea bioprospecting in international 
law is not just a theoretical problem. Indeed, the organisms of the deep sea are 
emerging from the dark abyssal plains and mid-ocean ridges and their 
instrumental value in biotechnology development is becoming increasingly 
apparent. Technology and practical procedures relating to deep-sea 
bioprospecting have undergone dramatic changes in recent years. Genetic 
sequencing and engineering have opened new possibilities. Increased 
cooperation has blurred the lines between research and commercial 
development. The commercial potential of deep-sea genetic resources is 
closely connected to the challenges that the elements raise for the survival of 
all organisms in these parts of the biosphere. In order to withstand the extreme 
conditions in the deep sea, life has developed its most peculiar forms, with 
properties that cannot be found anywhere else. The prospects of using these 
functions in commercial development has been propelled by decreased costs 
in sequencing and submersible vehicles. The increasing commercial interests, 
technological development and the unique biological conditions of the deep 
sea and its organisms makes it evident that there are also practical arguments 
for investigating the legal status of bioprospecting under international law. 
 
Interest in deep-sea bioprospecting is indeed soaring. Discoveries in marine 
organisms are increasingly being patented for pharmaceutical purposes.4 
Already by 2007, more than 15,000 molecules from marine genetic resources 
had been isolated and described.5 Such bioactive compounds with anti-
inflammatory, anti-carcinogenic or anti-tumor functions, or those with the 
potential to treat HIV/AIDS are already being used in the biotechnology, 
biopharmaceutical and cosmetics industries.6 Since 1999, the number of 
patents originating from marine genetic resources has increased on average 12 
per cent each year, which is more than 10 times faster than the rate of 
 
4 David Leary, et al., Marine genetic resources: A review of scientific and commercial interest, 
33 MARINE POLICY (2009). 
5 Sybille Van den Hove & Vincent Moreau, Deep-sea biodiversity and ecosystems: a scoping 
report on their socio-economy, management and governance (2007). 
6 Salvatore Arico & Charlotte Salpin, Bioprospecting of Genetic Resources in the Deep Seabed: 







description of marine species.7 The increased activity in marine bioprospecting 
is mainly due to two factors. 
 
Firstly, rapid technological innovation enables a more cost-effective and 
economically viable exploration of the genetic diversity of the oceans. This 
includes not only marine equipment such as submersible vehicles. As will be 
discussed in Part B, an even more significant factor has been the remarkable 
development and lowering costs relating to laboratory technology, including 
genetic sequencing and engineering. This laboratory development has not just 
propelled marine biotechnology; the increased interest in marine genetic 
resources is part of a generally growing interest in bio-based innovation, which 
aside from technological factors can also be explained by the move away from 
synthetic-based drug development. The genetic sequencing revolution in the 
1990s prompted the pharmaceutical sector to abandon bio-based innovation 
and turn to large-scale sampling of synthetic compounds. The increasing 
realization in recent years that not even large-scale testing of synthetic samples 
can compensate for the developmental shortcuts enabled by the evolution of 
natural organisms has resulted in a resurgence of interest in bioprospecting. 
 
Secondly, in bioprospecting generally, operations target areas and species with 
a high likelihood of providing new and useful properties. Two interests are 
considered central in this regard: the diversity and novelty of genetic resources. 
This explains why the bioprospecting trend is particularly pronounced in 
relation to marine organisms. The microbial and prokaryote gene richness 
found in the oceans is expected to be orders of magnitude greater than the rest 
of the biosphere.8 Moreover, life in the seas remains largely unexplored. 
Studies indicate that bioprospecting of a marine species is twice as likely to 
result in a patent, compared to a terrestrial species. Today there are 18,000 
products with their origins in marine organisms belonging to 4,800 named 
species.9 The number of such products increases by about 4 per cent annually.10 
 
7 Jesús M. Arrieta, et al., What Lies Underneath: Conserving the Oceans’ Genetic Resources, 
107 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES (2010). 
8 VAN DEN HOVE & MOREAU. 2007; Richard J. McLaughlin, Exploiting Marine Genetic 
Resources beyond National Jurisdiction and the International Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights: Can They Coexist?, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE FOR OCEANS IN GLOBALISATION: 
IUU FISHING, OIL POLLUTION, BIOPROSPECTING, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (Davor Vidas ed. 
2010). 
9 Arrieta, et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2010). 







This development has not gone unnoticed in the political and economic sphere. 
The economic potential of blue biotechnology has been identified as one of the 
main areas in the EU Maritime Strategy. The European Commission is 
expecting substantial growth in the sector.11 As a consequence, the EU has 
allocated considerable resources for research initiatives in the marine 
bioprospecting field.12 
 
A.2.3. The genetic resources of the ocean deeps 
 
Why, then, is the legal regime for bioprospecting in the deep seas chosen as 
the subject for the present study instead of the rules applying to such activities 
in coastal waters? The first reason is connected to the legal status of the deep 
seas, as discussed above. The second reason relates to the nature of life in the 
deep sea. If genetic diversity and the likelihood of finding novel and useful 
properties is generally higher among marine than terrestrial species, these 
elements are particularly prominent in deep-sea species. 
 
The marine areas beyond national jurisdiction, of which the largest parts are 
deep seas, comprise two thirds of the total surface of the world’s oceans and 
constitute four fifths of all marine waters measured in volume. Yet these parts 
of the oceans were long believed to be biological deserts.  
 
 
11 Blue growth has been the EU long term strategy for promoting sustainable growth in the 
marine and maritime sector. This has been the maritime contribution to the realization of the 
Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, Communication from the 
Commission on Blue Growth – Opportunities for marine and maritime sustainable growth. 
(2012). See, for a specific explanation of the EU’s marine biotechnology sector and thereto 
connected research, Green Paper on Maritime Policy [COM(2006) 275]: European Commission 
Background paper No. 10 on Marine Biotechnology (2006) as well as comprehensive 
information provided at the Commission Blue Biotechnology portal 
https://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/biotechnology (site accessed November 30, 2020). 
12 Several research projects have been granted considerable contributions. For instance, Pharma 
Sea was during 2013 granted an EU financing amounting to over 9.5 million euros. The project 
focuses on bioprospecting and the development and commercialization of new bioactive 
substances from marine organisms, including deep sea sponges and bacteria, in order to 
investigate their potential for application in pharmaceuticals, nutrition or cosmetics (see: 
http://www.pharma-sea.eu/). The connecting project MaCuMBA was 2012 granted an EU 







Although the deep sea is still less explored than the surface of Mars, recent 
exploration and research has put paid to the idea that the deep sea is a lifeless 
zone. Expeditions conducted during the past two decades have established that 
life is not only abundant in the deep sea, but more diverse and endemic than in 
most places in the biosphere. It has been estimated that between 500,000 and 
100 million species live in the deep-sea portions of the world’s oceans.13 For 
example, as much as ten per cent of the total living biomass on Earth exists as 
oceanic subsurface bacteria, most of it unidentified.14 Similarly, the deep 
seafloor beneath the open ocean has a topography which is comparable in 
complexity to the terrestrial environment and hosts an abundant variety of 
organisms.15  
 
The high seas conceal some of the world’s most exceptional species and 
extraordinary habitats.16 To a large degree, this can be explained by the 
conditions for life in the deep seas, which are among the most challenging of 
the entire biosphere. In order to exist in these areas, organisms have developed 
abilities to withstand immense pressure and complete darkness. As a result, life 
exhibits its most extreme forms in the deep sea. Indeed, the challenges for life 
in these environments has made evolution take turns not seen in other 
environments. One well-known example of this is the extremophiles living in 
the proximity of deep-sea vents at mid-ocean ridges which have developed 
unique properties. These include not only the ability to withstand extreme 
temperatures and pressures, but also complete independence from 
photosynthesis. Instead, some of these organisms depend on the sulfur cycle. 
If the sun turned out from one day to the next, these organisms would be 
completely unaffected. Another, less visually documented example is the dark 
biosphere, an entire ecosystem living without light or oxygen, flourishing 
beneath the ocean floor. Similarly based on chemosynthesis, it is potentially 
one of the planet’s biggest ecosystems.  
 
13 While about three-quarters of the Earth is covered by water, only as little as 5% of the ocean 
has been systematically explored for life, JESSE H. AUSUBEL, et al., FIRST CENSUS OF MARINE 
LIFE 2010: HIGHLIGHTS OF A DECADE OF DISCOVERY (2010). 
14 McLaughlin. 2010. 
15 Robin Warner, Protecting the Oceans beyond National Jurisdiction: Strengthening the 
International Law Framework § Legal Aspects of Sustainable Development Series, No. 3, xxiv 
(2009), at 2-3. 
16 Roberto Danovaro, et al., Challenging the paradigms of deep-sea ecology, 29 TRENDS IN 







This high degree of genetic diversity and prevalence of useful functions, which 
is the result of deep-sea conditions, substantially increases the likelihood of 
valuable bioprospecting findings. 
 
The prospects for deep-sea bioprospecting are further amplified by the lack of 
previous exploration. Areas beyond national jurisdiction, the vast majority of 
which are in the deep sea, represent the largest environments on the planet, yet 
they are also the least understood.17 This world, beyond the jurisdiction of 
states, is largely unexplored. The ratio of new discoveries in the deep ocean is 
1:1 for each of the samples taken.18 The overwhelming majority of deep-sea 
species remain undiscovered and are yet to be described.19 It is thus not 
surprising that the commercial interest in and potential for genetic exploration 
of deep-sea organisms is high and rising. 
 
A.3. Approaching deep-sea bioprospecting in light of 
international law 
 
Examining the legal status of deep-sea bioprospecting under international law 
is thus relevant not only because of the implications of the legal problem, but 
also considering the increasing commercial interest and scientific and 
technological aspects. In relation to international law, three elements of deep-
sea bioprospecting appear particularly contentious. 
 
A.3.1 Role of natural compound 
 
In bioprospecting generally, the species origin and quantity of genes is less 
commercially relevant than the potential function of bioactive properties. 
Genetic diversity and lack of previous exploration are guiding indicators in 
targeting areas and ecosystems. Relevant samples may be retrieved from deep-
 
17 Eva Ramirez-Llodra, et al., Deep, diverse and definitely different: unique attributes of the 
world's largest ecosystem, 7 BIOGEOSCIENCES (2010). 
18 Salvatore Arico, Marine Genetic Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction and 
Intellectual Property Rights, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE FOR OCEANS IN GLOBALISATION: 
IUU FISHING, OIL POLLUTION, BIOPROSPECTING, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (Davor Vidas ed. 
2010). 
19 While about three-quarters of the Earth is covered by water, only as little as 5% of the ocean 






sea bacteria, fungus, fish or any other type of marine organism. In most cases, 
only the collection of a limited compound of biological material is required.  
 
Bioprospecting thereby challenges the basic premise of international law rules 
for management of living resources of the seas. Largely, these rules focus on 
the harvesting of living resources for food consumption and have been 
developed with the purpose of maintaining a maximum catch of major stocks 
of larger fish species. Such traditional marine living resource extraction – 
fisheries – collects numerous individuals of the same species in bulk, which 
are then with a few intermediate steps sold as commercial products. 
Commercial prospects in fisheries thus essentially depend on quantity, and 
little consideration is paid to genetic diversity or bioactive properties beyond 
the quality of the flesh. Accordingly, the rules which have been developed for 
managing such activities are almost exclusively concerned with the interest of 
commercial fisheries and are based on the character of such activities. Yet the 
obligations have a general character and a broad scope of application, 
encompassing all utilization of marine living resources. This represents a 
considerable legal challenge for marine bioprospecting; such activities fall 
within and must comply with rules which have been developed for 
fundamentally different uses of marine organisms.  
 
Moreover, in bioprospecting generally, the prospect for making novel 
discoveries of bioactive properties with potential for human use is the central 
guiding criterion in sampling operations. Species with these characteristics 
occur most frequently in the endemic ecosystems where even limited 
operations may have a detrimental environmental impact. In these areas, 
international environmental law rules also provide obligations on in situ 
conservation. In such cases, the objectives of the rules may be incompatible 
with the interest of bioprospecting. 
 
A.3.2. Process aspects 
 
Moreover, the bioprospecting process, as it has developed, and the different 
steps it involves lead to a range of additional challenges in relation to 
applicable rules of international law. The most burdensome and costly phases 
of bioprospecting development – and most relevant discoveries – are regularly 
performed after the relevant marine sample has been collected, in laboratories 







As will be discussed in Part B, it is increasingly common that the different 
steps of the bioprospecting process (such as physical sampling, identification 
of promising properties, patenting and product development) are conducted by 
different entities. It appears that in many cases, the entity conducting the 
physical sampling is not even aware that the compound may subsequently be 
used in the development of biotechnology products. Conversely, commercial 
actors often find it easier to access sample collections stored in research 
collections such as sample libraries or sequence data, than to engage in costly 
sampling operations. Yet the emphasis in applicable rules in international law 
is put on physical activities in the marine environment. Moreover, 
fundamentally different obligations are provided for resource extraction and 
scientific research. There is thus a discrepancy between the nature of marine 
bioprospecting processes and the rules applying to the activities involved. 
 
A.3.3. Gene technology and the role of the physical natural 
element 
 
Challenges in relation to international law are also posed by the implications 
of technology and methods employed in contemporary biotechnology. The 
natural genetic exploration in bioprospecting, as it is carried out today, 
regularly consists of only a minor collection of a genetic component which 
performs or has the potential to perform a useful function. Commonly in a 
laboratory environment, the active compound is then identified by DNA 
sequencing. According to the standard formula, the molecule performing the 
relevant function is subsequently patented and manufactured synthetically. 
Eventually, a commercial product is developed. In such cases, no physical 
component from the marine organism is used in the relevant product. 
Arguably, in this model, the genetic function of the natural organism merely 
serves as a source of inspiration for a function used in a product. 
 
Does this lack of physical natural ingredient in the final product render 
international law rules on the use of natural resources inapplicable? Or is the 
connection to a natural genetic resource sufficient for regarding the full 
process, including the relevant function and the final product, as covered by 
such rules? It may be claimed that it is irrelevant whether any natural physical 
material is used directly; the origin of the active compound is what matters 
when deciding whether the product should be considered as containing genetic 






In any event, it is clear that even if the organism is not used in direct physical 
terms, a legal right connected to its bioactive function is declared insofar as 
exclusive rights in the form of patents are claimed by the developer. In essence, 
modern genetic technology employed in bioprospecting transcends and 
challenges the conventional divisions of processes as either organic or 
synthetic. Since in bioprospecting it is increasingly difficult to ascertain 
whether an element or process is natural, it is similarly difficult to determine 
whether if falls within obligations of international law which applies to natural 
(but not artificial) elements and processes. 
 
A.4. Purpose and research question 
 
This study aims to investigate whether public international law manages to 
function as a coherent system in the case of deep-sea bioprospecting, where 
rules in three regimes provide seemingly inconsistent obligations for states. 
  
This study will thus examine international law in the context of bioprospecting 
of deep-sea genetic resources. Both sides of this relationship will be 
investigated. It is not merely an investigation of rules in international law 
relevant for deep-sea bioprospecting, but also an examination of what 
conclusions can be drawn on the nature and function of international law in 
light of how the latter relates to deep-sea bioprospecting. 
 
The aim is addressed by the means of the following research question:  
 
Could apparent inconsistencies between the three regimes be dissolved under 
treaty law rules on application and interpretation?  
 
In order to reply to the principal research question, this study is divided into 
several themes: 
 
At its core, this is an enquiry into the ability of international law to handle new 
activities. In order to understand the challenges this represents for the law, a 
closer look at bioprospecting as an activity is required. Part B therefore reviews 
what distinguishes bioprospecting for deep-sea genetic resources as an activity. 
It describes how bioprospecting has developed, as well as the technology and 
different phases that are involved, from the sampling of genetic resources 







Particular emphasis is devoted to the role of the natural compound in these 
development chains as well as the interconnections of actors involved in 
different stages of bioprospecting processes. Deep-sea bioprospecting will be 
described as a complex activity while focusing primarily on the characteristics 
that need to be considered when assessing the relationship to international law.  
 
This presentation will serve as the basis for an examination in Part C of rules 
in public international law relevant to deep-sea bioprospecting, focusing on the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. This will illustrate how the 
rules of these treaties provide different and seemingly inconsistent obligations 
to deep-sea bioprospecting. 
 
This examination in turn serves as the starting point for Part D, which examines 
why the investigated treaties raise seemingly incoherent obligations for deep-
sea bioprospecting, despite the fact that they are all part of public international 
law. Part D discusses how the substantive differences across the three treaties 
relate to their origin in different sub-fields or regimes of public international 
law with distinctively dissimilar perspectives on the appropriation of genetic 
resources. It is further investigated how these differences reflect underlying 
ideological divergences across these three regimes, as well as a lack of 
consideration for the rules in other regimes during treaty drafting and 
negotiation.  
 
Part E considers the consequences of the difference between rules applying to 
deep-sea bioprospecting across the investigated treaties. The apparent 
inconsistency between the applicable rules is more closely examined. It is 
discussed if the prima facie norm conflict can be resolved on the basis of the 
principles on treaty application and interpretation under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.20 
 
Finally, Part F discusses what conclusions can be drawn based on the case of 
deep-sea bioprospecting in the context of the debate on the fragmentation of 
international law and the development of new rules. 
 
20 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted in Vienna, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 






Taken together, the study will thus firstly show how deep-sea bioprospecting 
has developed and is conducted, secondly explore the relevant rules in public 
international law for this activity, thirdly explain why different regimes have 
developed seemingly inconsistent rules, fourthly investigate if rules of treaty 
law are able to dissolve this inconsistency, and fifthly discuss the systemic 
implications. 
 
A.5. Delimitation, material and method 
 
This study can be regarded as an investigation into a new practical activity, 
what rules international law provides in relation to said activity and the reasons 
for and consequences of how rules of international law apply to this activity. It 
focuses on the relation between international law and bioprospecting based on 
genetic resources from marine organisms in the deep-sea areas of the oceans, 
beyond the jurisdiction of coastal states. 
 
Bioprospecting is defined in this study as a process whereby commercially 
useful products are technologically derived, processed and developed based on 
the collection of marine genetic resources.21 Rather than attempting to 
encompass all applications of bioprospecting, the investigation is primarily 
concerned with bioprospecting that aims to develop products in the 
pharmaceutical sector, which not only makes up the largest type of such 
operations, but also most clearly highlights the central legal issues involved. 
This does not necessarily render the investigation irrelevant to other types of 
bioprospecting. Indeed, many of the challenges involved are common across 
sectors. Similarly, much of the discussion on bioprospecting as a process and 
activity may also be relevant to bioprospecting in coastal waters, although the 
discussion on applicable rules principally is concerned with marine areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. 
 
The study is based on a review in Part B of what characterizes marine 
bioprospecting; how it has developed, what distinguishes it from other uses of 
marine resources, conventional scientific research and synthetic approaches, as 
well as the role of the natural compound and technology in bioprospecting 
processes.  
 







The review will thus encompass the full cycle of bioprospecting development 
and not be confined to the physical sampling of bioresources in the natural 
environment and the role of the natural compound. Apart from the collection 
of marine genetic resources, this process includes technological derivation, 
processing and development of commercially useful products.22 Deep-sea 
bioprospecting is thus approached not as an isolated activity, but as a complex 
process, which may appear considerably different across cases. In addition to 
examining the bioprospecting process and its development, this review will 
thus investigate how modern genetic technology has transformed 
bioprospecting. In addition, the intricate relationships between different actors 
involved in bioprospecting processes will be particularly highlighted. 
Commonly, bioprospecting involves a multitude of actors, which may come 
from private enterprise as well as governmental and academic institutions. As 
regards material, this review uses the work of the OECD on marine 
biotechnology as a starting point.23 In addition, it connects to an inventory of 
studies on the topic.  
 
The review in Part B serves as the basis for an examination in Part C of the 
obligations under international law relevant for deep-sea bioprospecting which 
apply to states. This reflects the emphasis of this study on public international 
law, understood in a conventional sense as the body of legal norms that governs 
the relations between states and other subjects of international law.24 However, 
not all norms of international law of potential relevance for deep-sea 
bioprospecting are considered. The material scope has been limited to three 
regimes of public international law, and in each respective regime a strong 
emphasis is put on one treaty. Even if also other regimes of international law 
contain rules relevant (although more remotely) for deep-sea bioprospecting, 
the law of the sea, international environmental law and international trade (or 
 
 
23 More specifically, the review is based on the work of The OECD Working Party on 
Biotechnology (WPB) and the Working Party on Biotechnology, Nanotechnology, and 
Converging Technologies (BNCT). See, in particular, OECD, MARINE BIOTECHNOLOGY: 
ENABLING SOLUTIONS FOR OCEAN PRODUCTIVITY AND SUSTAINABILITY § No. 43 (OECD 
Publishing. 2013); OECD, MARINE BIOTECHNOLOGY DEFINITIONS, INFRASTRUCTURES AND 
DIRECTIONS FOR INNOVATION (2017). 
24 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford : Oxford University Press 






WTO) law have been selected because treaties of all these regimes contain 
obligations which concern the appropriation of deep-sea genetic resources.25 
 
Accordingly, domestic regulation and private law rules will only be indirect 
references in this study, as will patent data relating to marine bioprospecting. 
To further curtail the scope, as the result of the geographical limitation to 
activities in the deep sea, the focus is limited to rules applying in these marine 
areas. The term “deep seas” refers to the marine areas considered beyond 
national jurisdiction in international law, where the water column is referred to 
as the high seas and the seafloor and underlying sediments are referred to as 
the Area.26 In line with the broad approach to bioprospecting as an activity, 
however, the full physical process of bioprospecting would not have to be 
carried out in these areas, as it rarely is in practice. Rather, the defining 
criterion for this investigation is that the genetic material originates in the deep 
seas.  
 
Both the investigation of rules relevant for deep-sea bioprospecting in Part C 
and the discussion in Part E of how treaty law relates to potential 
inconsistencies across those rules are essentially investigations of legal norms. 
In line with the positivist approach used in these central parts of the study, the 
primary materials are legal sources and treaties in particular. Customary norms 
and case law are also investigated to a lesser degree.27 The three investigated 
treaties providing rules directly relevant for deep-sea bioprospecting comprise 
the central material in Part C.  
 
25 Deep-sea bioprospecting could also be investigated from the perspective of for instance 
international criminal law based on the notion of deep-sea bioprospecting as unlawful, in 
connection to enforcement jurisdiction under the law of the sea. Similarly, provisions on benefit 
sharing relating to genetic resources are connected to international development law. Deep-sea 
sampling may also interfere with international rules of (underwater) cultural heritage or 
international labor law. 
26 See Article 86 and 1 of UNCLOS. In Article 86, the high seas are defined negatively, ‘all parts 
of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.’ In Article 1, 
“the Area” is defined as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.” 
27 As similarly will be discussed in the next section, this is in line with the positivist sources 
doctrine, often considered to be reflected in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute which instructs the 
ICJ what material ought to apply in disputes in accordance with international law. Statute of the 








In Part E, the rules on treaty interpretation and application in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties are used as a central analytical reference 
point. 
 
Primarily concerned with the reasons for differences across the rules of 
different regimes, the investigation in Part D is based on secondary sources, 
such as travaux préparatoires, rather than treaty texts. Different perspectives 
and material are thus used to address the research question. This is also 
reflected in the theoretical approaches used in the analysis, as will be discussed 
in the next section. 
 
A.6. Fragmentation as a theoretical reference point 
 
As the result of the increasing division of public international law into different 
regimes, concerns started to become widespread at the end of the 1990s that 
specialized treaties, courts and institutions would “develop greater variations 
in their determination of general international law.”28 There was a fear that 
this increasing specialization would result in systemic inconsistencies not only 
in the incoherent practice of different tribunals but also in the development of 
conflicting norms across treaties. It was considered that this development 
would risk harming the coherence of public international law.29  
 
The debate on fragmentation initially focused on understanding, 
conceptualizing and evaluating fragmentation and later began to concentrate 
more on developing principles and procedures for coordinating and 
harmonizing, i.e. solving and preventing the unwanted consequences of 
fragmentation in order to preserve the integrity of the system.30 Largely, the 
observers involved in the discussion can be divided into two views. 
 
 
28 Jonathan I. Charney, Is international law threatened by multiple international tribunals? § 271 
(Springer. 1999). 
29 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission. No. A/CN.4/L.682(2006). 
30 As summarized by Peters, Anne Peters, The refinement of international law: From 
fragmentation to regime interaction and politicization, 15 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 






A fragmented view, taken to its extreme, would suggest that international law 
is developing into several different systems, all of which are based on different 
logics and unable to cooperate across regime boundaries. The fragmented view 
is often contrasted with the systemic view, which would hold that international 
law, despite recent developments, remains a unitary legal system, composed of 
interconnected rules and principles.  
 
In analyzing the concept, multiple causes have been referenced as contributing 
to fragmentation. On the functional side, three patterns of explanation are often 
referred to.  
 
Firstly, it is claimed, such a development is essentially built into the 
decentralized structure that is international law.  
 
Secondly, the concept is also connected to – and is a consequence of – 
arrangements on the domestic side: Different issue areas are divided between 
ministries and branches of government which are likely to take different 
positions in treaty negotiations. Even in efficient administrations, joint 
preparation rarely manages to counteract this problem.31  
 
Thirdly, it has been stressed that fragmentation is a response to globalization. 
Global challenges have increased the demand for more international and more 
specific regulation.32 On the political side, institutionalists have depicted 
fragmentation as the result of a deliberate agenda of powerful states. According 
to this conception, the bargaining power of weaker states is reduced by 
fragmentation, since only states with greater “agenda-setting power” can create 
new regimes which better suit their interests.33 Fragmentation has also been 
divided into different types. As discussed by Peters, two relevant facets seem 
to be institutional fragmentation (different treaties, organizations, bodies, 
courts, etc.) and ideational fragmentation (different objectives and values).34  
 
31 Margaret A. Young, The Productive Friction Between Regimes, in REGIME INTERACTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW - FACING FRAGMENTATION (Margaret A. Young ed. 2012), at 1. Birnie, 
Boyle and Redgwell has highlighted this lack of communication and consultation in the relation 
between TRIPS and the CBD, which were negotiated at the same time, see PATRICIA W. BIRNIE, 
et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Oxford University Press 3 ed. 2009), at 802. 
32 Peters, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2017), at 674. 
33 Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and the 
Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 595 (2007). 







How, then, does international law address issues of fragmentation? From the 
supporters of the systemic position there are mechanisms to prevent and to 
resolve inconsistencies resulting from fragmentation, embodied in the 
fundamental rules for treaty application and interpretation, as codified in Part 
III of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.35 
 
Firstly, there is a conflict-solving element in the rules on application of 
treaties, foremost expressed in Article 30, which regulates the application of 
successive treaties relating to the same subject matter. As will be further 
explored, this provision establishes alternative problem-solving models to 
resort to in cases where several treaty norms overlap. For the purposes of this 
study, paragraph 2 of Article 30, which establishes that priority should be 
decided according to so-called conflict clauses of the respective agreements, is 
particularly relevant. 
 
The rule indicates that preference should be given to treaty A in cases where 
treaty B, containing an overlapping norm, specifies that it is subject to, or not 
to be considered as incompatible with, treaty A. The rule in Article 30 thus 
makes clear that conflict clauses, provisions clearly articulating the 
relationship to other treaties, should be guiding in deciding what obligation 
applies in cases of norm conflict. This study will examine to what extent the 
investigated treaties contain provisions which can be regarded as such conflict 
clauses, and what material consequences they would yield under the rules for 
treaty application. As an alternative to the application of treaty conflict, Article 
30 provides for application of lex posterior, a model whose consequences 








35 Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging fragmentation and unity: international law as a universe of inter-
connected islands, 25 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004); Ralf Michaels & 
Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of norms or conflict of laws? Different techniques in the fragmentation 
of public international law, 22 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 







Secondly, issues of potential inconsistencies across treaties may be approached 
based on the rules on treaty interpretation in Articles 31–33 of the Vienna 
Convention. Whereas the approach based on the rules on application attempts 
to resolve apparent conflicts between norms by establishing priority or 
hierarchies between the norms involved, approaching the matter from the 
perspective of interpretation implies considering if the seemingly inconsistent 
norms can be interpreted so that conflict is prevented. In the debate on 
fragmentation, the interpretation perspective has particularly focused on 
Article 31(3)(c), commonly referred to as the Principle of systematic 
integration.  
 
The rule, which provides instruction for treaty interpretation, requires the 
interpreter to take into account “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.” The rule essentially requires 
any interpreter of international law to strive for coherence.36 According to the 
International Law Commission Study Group on fragmentation, this does not 
merely represent a possible way to interpret potentially conflicting obligations; 
rather, it is an obligation to interpret provisions of international law so as to 
preserve the coherence of the system.37 The basic presumption of the principle 
of systemic interpretation is that all treaty provisions set up rights and 
obligations that exist alongside rights and obligations established by other 
treaty provisions and rules of customary international law. None of such rights 
or obligations has any intrinsic priority against the others. The question of their 
relationship can only be approached through a process of reasoning that makes 
them appear as parts of some coherent and meaningful whole.38  
 
36 For an extensive analysis on the principle of systemic integration, see Campbell McLachlan, 
The Principle Of Systemic Integration And Article 31(3)(C) Of The Vienna Convention, 54 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY (2005). 
37 Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law - Draft conclusions of the work of the Study Group Finalized 
by Martti Koskenniemi. No. A/CN.4/L.682/Add.1(2006), para. 43, at 15. 
38 As expressed by Matz-Lück, “international law, e.g. a partial overlap of subject matters or 
common points of reference, and legal interrelation, e.g. rules on interpretation like Article 
31(3)(c) VCLT, may lead to the consideration of norms which were created by one regime by 
the institutions of another. In particular the interpretation of treaties either by the parties or 
adjudicatory bodies offers the opportunity to specify the meaning of treaty norms by referring 
to other international rules and regulations, i.e. ‘extrinsic norms’. The consideration of such 
norms as normative guidance in the process of interpretation raises a variety of questions 
concerning the reasons, the legal foundations and limits, the competent actors, the results, 







As expressed by Koskenniemi in the report of the fragmentation study group, 
the provision operates like a “master key” to the house of international law. In 
case there is a systemic problem – an inconsistency, a conflict, an overlap 
between two or more norms – and no other interpretative means provides a 
resolution, then “recourse may always be had to that article in order to proceed 
in a reasoned way.”39 Under this understanding of the principle of systematic 
integration, it appears that conflicting norms can be stretched considerably. 
Accordingly, the ILC Study Group Report prognosticated that systematic 
integration would ensure coherence of the system of public international law, 
despite regime proliferation and differences. As already stated, it is noteworthy 
that it drew these conclusions regardless of having merely anecdotally tested 
the suggestion in practical cases. The fragmentation debate has generally paid 
less attention to the relevance of other elements of treaty interpretation rules in 
addressing potential inconsistencies. As will be further discussed, other 
elements of the Vienna Convention treaty interpretation rules provide 
obligations, which essentially set limits on how far interpretations can stretch 
the meaning of terms, relating to linguistic elements, as well as context and 
purposes of the relevant treaties. 
 
In this study the possibility for dissolving apparent inconsistencies between 
norms relating to deep-sea bioprospecting will be discussed from the viewpoint 
of the rules on application and interpretation, including systemic integration. 
As previously mentioned, this case study principally aims to establish what 
rules apply to this specific activity. However, it can also be seen as a practical 
test (albeit a limited one) of the systemic qualities of international law, which 




International Regimes: Competences and Legitimacy, in REGIME INTERACTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW - FACING FRAGMENTATION (Margaret A. Young ed. 2012). 
39 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 






B. The marine bioprospecting process 
 
B.1. Marine bioprospecting – a multifold activity 
There is no generally agreed definition of marine bioprospecting in 
international law. In domestic legislation, the term is occasionally used, but 
varies significantly in meaning.40 In this study, the concept is defined as a 
process whereby commercially useful products are technologically derived, 
processed and developed based on the collection of marine genetic resources. 
Other definitions have been suggested in the literature, as well as by 
international organizations. For instance, bioprospecting has been described in 
some previous academic work as a process whereby commercially useful 
products are derived from living resources.41 A considerable weakness in this 
description is that it would include activities which, according to ordinary 
language, would be considered as other activities. For instance, it can be 
claimed that the conventional fisheries industry derives commercially valuable 
products from living resources simply by fileting, packaging and commercially 
distributing fish. Accordingly, in order to distinguish bioprospecting from 
other uses of marine resources, the technological element which is central to 
bioprospecting must be considered. 
The OECD has defined marine bioprospecting as “the application of science 
and technology to living organisms from marine resources, as well as parts, 
products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the 
production of knowledge, goods and services.”42 This definition captures many 
of the central elements of the definition used here (albeit in an overtly technical 
language); in particular, it foregrounds elements of the technological process, 
which were lacking in the previous example. Yet, like the previous example, 
the OECD definition suffers from a lack of precision. Foremost, it contains no 
reference to commercial motivations or product development.  
 
40 In some domestic legislations relating to access and benefit-sharing obligations bioprospecting 
has been defined.  
41 Joanna Mossop, Marine Bioprospecting, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 
(Donald Rothwell, et al. eds., 2015). 








Under the OECD definition, any information gathering from marine organisms 
employing science and technology would qualify as bioprospecting. This 
would include virtually all marine biological research. Including conventional 
research in the definition of bioprospecting in this manner would have at least 
one notable shortcoming, insofar as it would go against the established legal 
concept of marine scientific research. As will be discussed in section C.1.5, 
marine scientific research (as opposed to bioprospecting) is rigorously defined 
in the law of the sea, and explicitly excludes activities involving legal claims 
relating to deep-sea resources. Since it would fail to capture one of the legally 
most interesting characteristics of marine bioprospecting – namely the 
interaction between scientific and commercial activities – it would be 
impractical to utilize as broad and imprecise a definition as suggested by the 
OECD. 
Although bioprospecting has not been defined in a treaty, the Subsidiary Body 
on Scientific, Technical and Technological, a body under the Convention for 
Biological Diversity, has defined the term as the “exploration of biodiversity 
for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources, or the process 
of gathering information derived from the biosphere, regarding the molecular 
composition of genetic resources for the development of new commercial 
products.”43 By including process elements, and emphasizing commercial 
ambitions involved while excluding “pure” research, this definition is more in 
line with the definition used in this study. However, it appears to be limited to 
cases in which information is derived from genetic resources and excludes 
processes where physical components from the genetic resource are included 
in the developed product. As will be further explored, the genetic resource can 
have both roles in bioprospecting processes. 
Implicitly, the definition employed in this study thus makes a distinction: Not 
all scientific research on marine genetic resources is bioprospecting. Rather, 
there is conventional, “pure” marine scientific research on the one hand, and 
commercially motivated operations on the other. The latter may qualify as 
bioprospecting provided that they include a process of technological 
derivation. However, as will be discussed extensively, this distinction is 
difficult to maintain in practice, since results from conventional research can 
 
43 Marine and Coastal Biodiversity: Review, further elaboration and refinement of the 






be used as the basis for commercially motivated projects. Yet, this does not 
alter the fact that most marine scientific research lacks commercial ambitions 
and is never used in product development and can thus hardly be regarded as 
bioprospecting by virtue of its legal definition.  
From a legal standpoint, the definition of the concept of bioprospecting, which 
is central for the purposes of this investigation, is complex and raises 
challenges in at least four regards. Firstly, it relates to a process and not an 
isolated action, which cannot be delimited to a singular moment. Rather, 
bioprospecting involves a number of steps and actions with legal implications. 
The concept thus goes beyond the carrying out of activities in the marine 
environment and relates to a broader product development chain. The process 
aspect is also where emphasis is put in the definition of bioprospecting. It does 
not set limitations in terms of what organisms are utilized, nor does it define 
the process as such. Large species, biomolecules, DNA constructs and marine 
micro-organisms can be used in industrial processes, synthesized or replicated 
in a lab. They may also be modified by human intervention and take on 
characteristics that do not exist in nature. Irrespective of the species and 
method employed in the process, it constitutes bioprospecting. The importance 
of the process element of bioprospecting has been supported by the UN 
Secretary-General in his 2007 report to the General Assembly: 
While there is no universally agreed definition of bioprospecting (…) 
the term is generally understood, among researchers, as the search for 
biological compounds of actual or potential value to various 
applications, in particular commercial applications. This involves a 
series of value-adding processes, usually spanning several years, from 
biological inventories requiring accurate taxonomic identification of 
specimens, to the isolation and characterization of valuable active 
compounds. As a mere prospecting activity, bioprospecting is only the 
first step towards possible future exploitation and stops once the desired 
compound or specific property has been isolated and characterized.44 
 
Secondly, bioprospecting typically involves the use of derivatives or genetic 
information of living resources in product development, as opposed to selling 
organisms or parts thereof in bulk.  
 
44 See Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum, UN doc. 







As will be discussed, this element of retrieving information or derivation can 
differ between cases, ranging from directly using parts of organisms in 
products to applying one of their functions as inspiration for an element in a 
commercial product. In any event, the derivation criterion would exclude 
products for conventional food consumption from bioprospecting. Rather, 
taken together the process and the derivation elements of the definition imply 
an element of value being added between the extraction of the living resource 
and the final development of a product.  
  
Thirdly, the definition involves a requirement for the product to be based on 
the collection of a living resources. As will be examined, this collection usually 
consists of very minor extractions of natural compounds. Commonly, such 
collecting operations are undertaken in a manner which is more akin to 
sampling in marine scientific research than conventional resource extraction 
such as fisheries, oil exploitation or marine mining. This nature of resource 
collection in bioprospecting raises particular challenges when applying 
international law rules on the utilization of marine organisms, since these are 
based on large-scale operations, such as conventional fisheries. Although 
genetic material collection samples in bioprospecting are usually minimal 
when compared to fisheries, nevertheless their environmental impact should 
not be disregarded. As opposed to fisheries, the most endemic and unique 
ecosystems are regularly targeted in bioprospecting for the diversity 
represented, since this implies increased prospects for finding new and useful 
bioactive functions. In such ecosystems, even small human involvement may 
have significant detrimental impacts. The degree as well as impact of 
collections of genetic material thus vary considerably in marine 
bioprospecting. Yet the collection of marine living resources is a central 
element of the concept. 
 
Fourthly, the definition refers to a commercial ambition. This excludes projects 
with the sole ambition of advancing scientific knowledge. However, in reality, 
as will be discussed, in many cases it is difficult to distinguish exactly when a 
commercial ambition is introduced. It often appears that a collection 
undertaken for scientific purposes may subsequently be used for commercial 
purposes. The challenge of legally distinguishing the interplay between 






General in his report to the General Assembly.45 From a legal standpoint, this 
intricate relationship between science and biotechnology is particularly 
interesting in relation to how the rules on marine scientific research under the 
law of the sea apply to bioprospecting. As will be further discussed in section 
C.1.5, there are arguments for considering that these rules preclude operations 
including commercial ambitions. 
 
These four requisites of the definition of marine bioprospecting give rise to 
questions as to how such operations are carried out, as well as how they ought 
to be interpreted legally. This section will be devoted to the former issues, in 
order to facilitate discussion of the latter. The practical nature of marine 
bioprospecting will thus first be investigated, that is, how it has developed and 
is being carried out. The main focus will be on aspects of particular legal 
interest. These include why marine organisms have been the subject of 
bioprospecting interest and what sort of organisms have been used, how 
bioprospecting has developed, the technology of such operations and the 
relationship between scientific research and commercial ambitions. In 
particular, the value chain of contemporary bioprospecting will be dissected in 
order to distinguish the different elements of such process. Taken together, 
these elements will set the scene and serve as the basis for the subsequent 
examination of the relationship between marine bioprospecting and 
international law. 
 
Although products in a multitude of sectors may be developed based on marine 
bioprospecting, emphasis in this part will be on pharmaceutical development. 
This delimitation is based on practical and legal relevance. The pharmaceutical 
sector is where the most biotechnological development related to marine 
organisms has been carried out so far. It is also where the bulk of growth in 
blue biotechnology is expected to be.  
 
45 ‘It is difficult to differentiate scientific research from commercial activities involving genetic 
resources, commonly referred to as bioprospecting. In most cases, genetic resources are 
collected and analysed as part of scientific research projects, in the context of partnerships 
between scientific institutions and industry. It is only at a later stage that knowledge, information 
and useful materials extracted from such resources enter a commercial phase. The difference 
between scientific research and bioprospecting therefore seems to lie in the use of knowledge 
and results of such activities, rather than in the practical nature of the activities themselves’ See 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General, Addendum, UN doc. 







Furthermore, the role of marine genetic resources in pharmaceutical 
development is multifaceted and highlights contentious issues in relation to the 
rules of international law. 
 
As previously discussed, the predominant focus in the general investigation of 
international law in this study is the deep-sea areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. This focus will be maintained in this part too. However, 
bioprospecting processes do not differ depending on which jurisdictional zone 
marine components are collected in. Similarly, the description of historical and 
technological aspects in this part are general in nature. 
 
B.2. Marine genetic resources and the commodification 
of nature 
 
Although marine bioprospecting also involves other aspects, the exploitation 
of genetic resources for commercial purposes is a central and defining element. 
Bioprospecting thereby entails the reservation and commodification of the 
living world. Such appropriation of marine living organisms is nothing new; 
indeed, it is as old as human history. Anthropological evidence indicates that 
the direct use of the nutritional value of marine organisms may explain sapiens’ 
rapid domination over other homini species, as well as its migration from 
Africa.46 Indeed, in many cases the very same species used in bioprospecting 
have long been used in fisheries. However, the use of living organisms for 
bioactive functions enshrined in their genetic components rather than in their 
physical bodies’ value marks a shift in human exploitation of nature. As 
observed by Guilloux, it represents a transition from an extraction economy to 
a knowledge economy. It may have similarities with scientific research, which 
has explored marine organisms for a long time, but the commercial nature 
distinguishes it from such use. The concept of bioprospecting of genetic 
resources necessarily combines scientific and economic elements, but typically 
focuses on commercial value. It also requires the involvement of several 
disciplinary and semantic fields. Accordingly, for bioprospecting purposes, 
 
46 Antonieta Jerardino & Curtis W. Marean, Shellfish gathering, marine paleoecology and 
modern human behavior: perspectives from cave PP13B, Pinnacle Point, South Africa, 59 
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marine genetic resources can be interpreted as biological objects, 
biotechnological objects and legal objects.47  
 
From a biological perspective, the relevance of marine genetic resources for 
bioprospecting is strongly connected to the concept of biological diversity, or 
biodiversity as it is commonly called. This is because the rate of potentially 
interesting bioactive functions is highly dependent on and increases with the 
rate of genetic diversity. As will be further discussed in Part D, biodiversity 
has been referred to as an “umbrella term for the degree of nature’s variety.”48 
It is generally understood as it is defined in Article 2 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity: “variability among living organisms from all sources 
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part: this includes diversity within 
species, between species and of ecosystems.” As such, biodiversity signifies 
not only signify diversity of species, but diversity within species.49 Intraspecies 
genetic variability, between individuals or populations, can be considerable 
and is essential in enabling species to adapt to environmental pressures.50  
 
Accordingly, biodiversity cannot be interpreted as a fixed concept; the map of 
life is continuously transforming, as species adapt to changing environments 
or become extinct as a result of failing to modify. The diversity of life on Earth 
is thus intrinsically connected to the environment, and is developed in relation 
to it. This explains why biodiversity is not evenly divided on earth. Rather, it 
is significantly higher in certain habitats. Several such habitats with a high 
degree of biodiversity and that, remain particularly unchartered in the deep sea. 
These include the abyssal areas of hydrothermal vents, deep seabed sediments, 
cold seeps of continental margins and polar areas rich in plankton. Marine life 
is generally characterized by its significant genetic diversity. The seas and 
oceans which cover 71 per cent of the surface of the planet harbor 32 of the 34 
phyla discovered on Earth, including 12 that are exclusively marine.51 
 
47 Bleuenn Guilloux, Marine genetic resources, R&D and the law 1 Complex objects of use 
(London Hoboken, NJ : ISTE-Wiley. 2018), at xii. 
48 Jeffrey A. (ed.) McNeely, Conserving the world's biological diversity (1990). 
49 The concept of biodiversity will be further discussed in section D.2.1. 
50 Michael Bowman, The Nature, Development and Philosophical Foundations of the 
Biodiversity Concept in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION OF 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Michael Bowman & Catherine Redgwell eds., 1996), at 5. 







From a biotechnological standpoint, the interest in marine genetic resources is 
strongly connected to technological developments of the past 50 years, which 
have enabled humans to disentangle bioactive functions from their host 
organisms and use them autonomously. The recognition and the use of 
bioactive functions is certainly not new. Desired properties in organisms have 
been cultivated by humans by means of breeding long before the advent of 
modern pharmacology. Subsequently, first-generation biotechnologies, and 
particularly the second-generation biotechnology based on genetic engineering 
and molecular biology, enabled the transfer of foreign genes to a cell in a 
culture or a tissue to obtain the appearance of a new property linked to the gene 
transferred. An oftcited example is the transfer of an anti-freeze-producing 
gene from a winter flounder to strawberries. Isolated from their host organisms 
in order to be modified, replicated and inserted into new living organisms, the 
components of the genetic system can again take part in life, in new and 
artificial forms. Genetic resources thus relate to the genetic information of 
organisms rather than the organism carrying the information. Indeed, 
biotechnology has allowed the emancipation of genetic information from 
individual species, to a state of increasingly free transfer of properties between 
species. With technological progress, that transfer has become smoother and 
cheaper. This has formed a new biotechnological perspective of life, as carriers 
of genetic information which is distinct from the traditional biological focus 
on species. Bruno Latour has described this as a transformation of life science, 
which focused on the study and passive representation of a given, real world, 
into technoscience, creating worlds from reality.52 
 
Biotechnology however, has not altered the instrumental perspective of marine 
organisms. Like traditional resource extraction activities, the retrieval of 
genetic information focuses on values for human use. Yet, it has broadened 
and fundamentally transformed the instrumental value into an open range of 
possibilities. This is reflected in the definition of biotechnology used in Article 
2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity: Biotechnology refers to “any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivates thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.” 
 
 
52 Bruno Latour, Science in action : how to follow scientists and engineers through society 






As will be discussed under section B.6.1, the use of marine genetic resources 
in biotechnology can be divided into chemical substances or material produced 
by marine organisms which are used as natural products on the one hand, and 
marine genetic information of biotechnological value on the other. 
 
Many of the instruments, as well as domestic laws and other contexts, in which 
the expression genetic resources has been used subsequent to the CBD fail to 
capture both these strands of using genetic resources. Some definitions do not 
take into consideration the informative aspect and only regard these resources 
as genetic material of any biological origin containing functional units of 
heredity.53 
 
B.3. Research, development and bioprospecting 
 
Whereas bioprospecting has the appropriation element in common with 
conventional resource extraction such as fisheries or mining, its technical 
nature is, as already indicated, more reminiscent of scientific research. 
Foremost, bioprospecting is markedly different from conventional resource 
extraction by essentially being qualitative in nature. Whereas economically 
viable quantities would be a prerequisite for fisheries and mining, such aspects 
are largely irrelevant in bioprospecting. Since biotechnology enables the 
sequencing and replication of desired properties, quality in genetic material is 
the relevant criterion in bioprospecting. 
 
Should bioprospecting, then, be regarded as a type of research operation? 
Research and development includes, according to the OECD definition, any 
creative systematic activity undertaken in order to increase the stock of 
knowledge, as well as the use of this knowledge to devise new applications.54 
It is often divided into three activities: Firstly, basic research, defined as 
“experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new 
knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, 
without any particular application or use in view.” Secondly, applied research, 
“directed towards a specific practical aim or objective.” Thirdly, experimental 
development that consists of “systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge 
gained from research and/or practical experience, that is directed to 
 
53 GUILLOUX. 2018, at xvii. 
54 Frascati Manual - Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental 







producing new materials, products or devices; to installing new processes, 
systems and services; or to substantially improving those already produced or 
installed.”55 The common use of the term “research and development” is in 
itself evidence of the difficulty of distinguishing these activities. It is not just 
problematic to draw a line between the activities of fundamental research, 
applied research and experimental development. As a result of the blurred lines 
between different stages involved, it is similarly challenging to distinguish 
these research and development activities from subsequent technological 
innovation.56 As with many other activities in the nexus between research and 
development, it is difficult to establish a standardized map of bioprospecting 
development cycles (an attempt will be made in section B.6.3). It is more easily 
approached as a process, where at least central elements would qualify for the 
OECD definition.  
 
In the context of UNCLOS and its Part XIII on Marine Scientific Research, 
which will be further discussed in section C.1.5, marine bioprospecting 
highlights the difficulty of distinguishing marine scientific research from other 
activities (exploration, exploitation, prospecting). Similarly, it underlines the 
challenges of distinguishing scientific research conducted “in normal 
circumstances” from “research directly linked to the exploration and 
exploitation of biological resources.” Part XIII does not define marine 
scientific research, nor does it understand such research as an activity 
undertaken by any economic player, private company or public establishment. 
It primarily relates to and provides obligations for research undertaken by 
states and competent organizations.57 
 
This emphasis in the rules of marine scientific research in UNCLOS can be 
explained by the focus during the negotiations on procedures to be followed to 
obtain administrative authorizations required for states’ oceanographic vessels 
to conduct marine scientific research in marine areas of another state.58 The 
considerable weight devoted to such procedures is connected to the basis for 
the regulation of marine scientific research under UNCLOS: the right of 
 
55 Ibid. 
56 GUILLOUX. 2018, at xxxi. 
57 David Leary, International Law And The Genetic Resources Of The Deep Sea (Leiden - 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2010). 







coastal states by virtue of their sovereignty and jurisdiction to regulate marine 
scientific research conducted within their marine spaces. When marine 
scientific research is conducted in areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, the law of the research vessel’s flag state is applicable, in line with 
the principles of flag state jurisdiction in the law of the sea.59 
 
Considering the organization of marine bioprospecting, its funding, logic and 
directed purposes, it is often a mixed public-private partnership. Commonly, 
public research vessels and equipment are used in bioprospecting operations, 
and it is often strongly connected to public research programs, to the extent 
that it is often difficult to tell where scientific research ends and commercial 
bioprospecting begins. Similarly, its technical nature – particularly how its 
sampling and laboratory phases are carried out – is strongly reminiscent of 
traditional marine scientific research. It uses not only the same tools but the 
same knowledge. Often the same individuals involved in marine scientific 
research are also involved in bioprospecting. However, marine bioprospecting 
is not limited to physical access to genetic material. It encompasses the whole 
research and development chain, from in situ sampling and collection of 
genetic material specimens to subsequent laboratory investigation and 
development, which may occur on board research vessels, on shore and across 
borders. Moreover, it is increasingly common that marine bioprospecting 
development chains do not start with sampling in the marine environment, but 
by accessing genetic material stored in collections or libraries. A distinction is 
often made in the relationship to the genetic resources between material stored 
in vivo, in vitro, and in silico. Whereas bioprospecting in vivo, in vitro and ex 
vivo requires the supply of genetic material collected in situ and its 
conservation ex situ, the use of genetic material in silico, which appears to be 
increasingly common, implies having access to the genetic and biomolecular 
data of marine organisms that were sampled and sequenced without connection 
to the bioprospecting operation.60 Such in silico information may be held in 
databases, patent descriptions, scientific publications and research and 
development contracts. The use of such resources, which greatly facilitates 
bioprospecting by circumventing the costly requirement for the supply of 
genetic material, may be restricted by different intellectual property rights or 
 
59 GUILLOUX. 2018, at xxxii. 
60 Arianna Broggiato, et al., Fair and equitable sharing of benefits from the utilization of marine 
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scientific research law requirements.61 However, increasingly such data has 
become freely available as part of attempts to promote biotechnological 
development, as will be discussed in section B.6.  
 
It thus appears that marine bioprospecting can hardly be described as a genuine 
research operation. Rather, it is a genuine research and development activity 
and is best understood as such. Yet, perhaps counterintuitively, this does not 
necessarily imply that bioprospecting would be considered as marine scientific 
research under the definition used in UNCLOS. As will be discussed in section 
C.1.5, marine scientific research under UNCLOS is essentially confined to 
pure or basic research and excludes operations with commercial ambitions.  
 
Rather, marine bioprospecting can be interpreted as a process in which the first 
steps are often identical to or indeed represented by marine scientific research, 
as it is conventionally understood under the law of the sea. However, 
bioprospecting also involves additional steps relating to product development 
and marketing. These additional steps, in particular the commercial element, 
make it problematic to approach under the law of the sea. The commercial 
ambition is not unimportant and can be assumed to strongly influence how 
bioprospecting activities are carried out. “Pure” marine scientific research 
expeditions (lacking commercial ambition) are guided by the agendas of 
precisely defined research programs, connected to traditions at academic 
institutions and/or personal interest among central researchers, which will 
usually have gone to considerable lengths in obtaining funding for such cruises, 
a notoriously costly form of research. Marine bioprospecting, by contrast, is 
increasingly seldom based on direct physical marine sampling. Often this 
costly step can be surpassed by examining library collections and sequence 
data obtained by publicly funded programs. To the extent that marine 
bioprospecting directly engages in sampling cruises, it does not collect genetic 
material randomly. Rather, it targets specific ecosystems and species where 
previous findings indicate there is a possibility of finding commercially 
relevant genetic material. In essence, the commercial ambition of marine 
bioprospecting missions thus renders such operations comparable to a treasure 










In conclusion, it appears that marine bioprospecting falls within the OECD 
definition of research and development, as a typical cooperation between the 
public research sector and the private biotechnology sector. It would be more 
difficult to consider this activity as falling within UNCLOS rules on marine 
scientific research. In addition to the focus on jurisdiction in the convention, 
as discussed above, this can be explained by the narrow perspective of the 
negotiators of UNCLOS as to what activities represent scientific research. The 
regulation of marine scientific research in Part XIII of UNCLOS is 
predominantly focused on pure or basic research, i.e. physical research 
activities carried out in the marine elements. 
 
This reflects not only a narrower perspective of what represents scientific re-
search operations around the time of the negotiation of the convention. As will 
be discussed in section D.1.6, the general spirit at the time of the drafting of 
UNCLOS, particularly the Third conference, was influenced by the new eco-
nomic paradigm of the 1970s. At that time, large parts of the world were still 
ostensibly “socialist” politically and economically, and developing countries, 
largely lacking the technical capabilities to engage in marine scientific 
research, were unwilling to include any element of commercial ambitions in 
the definition of marine scientific research. This would not only risk resulting 
in the freeriding of commercial actors on the freedom of marine scientific re-
search in the high seas. It would also, they feared, enable such actors to bypass 
the sovereign rights of states to economic resources in their coastal waters by 
freeriding on a facilitated access of scientific research across maritime areas of 
developing states’ coastal waters. As a result, activities with commercial 
elements were excluded from the scope of marine scientific research. 
 
B.4. Evolution, diversity and the bioactive properties of 
marine organisms 
 
Why, then, are marine organisms in the deep seas beyond national jurisdiction 
the subject of interest for biotechnological product development? Marine life 
is generally more diverse and less explored than terrestrial life. This is 
particularly true of deep-sea organisms. Moreover, life in these areas has 
developed distinct characteristics because of the conditions in the deep seas. 
This section will describe the biological diversity of the deep sea and set out 
the reasons for the bioprospecting interest in such organisms. The vast ocean 







quite uniform with only rare traces of the diverse species, habitats and 
ecosystems located in the large domain. Its relatively featureless exterior and 
the seeming monotony of the deep ocean has long led scientists to believe that 
these were biological deserts. But it has now been established that these endless 
wave patterns conceal some of the world’s most exceptional species and 
extraordinary habitats.62 Moreover, the uniform high sea surface stands in stark 
contrast to the underlying seabed. The deep seafloor beneath the open ocean 
has a topography which is comparable in complexity to the terrestrial 
environment and hosts an abundant variety of living and non-living resources.63 
 
It has been estimated that between 500,000 and 100 million species live in the 
deep-sea portions of the world’s oceans. The overwhelming majority of these 
species remain undiscovered and are yet to be described.64 For example, as 
much as ten per cent of the total living biomass on Earth exists as oceanic 
subsurface bacteria, most of it unidentified. The microbial and prokaryote gene 
richness found in the oceans is expected to be orders of magnitude greater than 
the rest of the biosphere.65 This world, beyond the jurisdiction of states, is 
largely unexplored. The ratio of new discoveries in the deep ocean is 1:1 for 
each of the samples taken.66 Some deep-sea habitats appear to be particularly 
abundant in biodiversity and (consequently) of interest for bioprospecting 
purposes. These will be described in section B.6. 
 
The fact that life in the deep seas is so rich in number of species and remains 
largely unexplored is one compelling reason for the growing interest in the 
deep seas, namely for biological discovery, for both scientific and commercial 
purposes. However, there is another factor which is even more important for 
the interest in deep-sea life forms. Life in the deep seas has developed 
characteristics which are unparalleled in other areas of the biosphere. These 
characteristics of deep-sea organisms consist of bioactive functions with a high 
potential for being sourced for human therapeutic applications.  
 
62 Danovaro, et al., Trends in Ecology & Evolution (2014). 
63 WARNER. 2009, at 2-3. 
64 Richard J. McLaughlin, “Marine Genetic Resources Exploitation and Intellectual Property 
Rights Protection” in Davor Vidas, Law, technology and science for oceans in globalisation: 
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This has prompted scientists to identify organisms in these areas as most 
promising for bioprospecting.67 
 
Although numerous circumstances contribute to the development of bioactive 
properties, all of them are connected to a single overarching explanatory factor: 
Evolution. Life was born in the oceans more than three billion years ago; life 
developed on Earth only two billion years later. This means that most marine 
organisms do not have a terrestrial counterpart.68 Marine biodiversity contains 
most phylogenetic and genomic diversity on Earth – 34 of 36 animal phyla 
hitherto described, versus 17 on land.69 Marine life is markedly more diverse 
than life on land, not only in terms of number of species but equally in the 
differences between the genomes across species. Not surprisingly, peculiar 
bioactive functions are thus more common and different in marine species. 
This is mainly because of the time aspect. Evolution has had three times longer 
to develop into new species and unique functions in the sea, compared to on 
land. Moreover, the often-challenging conditions for marine life, which in 
many respects are more varied than on land, have functioned as a vehicle for 
the development of distinct bioactive properties. Nowhere else is this more 
evident than in the deep seas, where extreme pressures, temperatures, chemical 
exposure and darkness have made it necessary for organisms to develop the 
abilities not just to withstand but to thrive under such conditions. The marine 
environment has thus allowed the formation throughout evolution of complex 
organismic interactions and exceptional mechanisms in order to survive in 
extremely hostile environments. This has established a rich biodiversity, not 
only in terms of number of species, but also in terms of genetic diversity across 
species and bioactive functions.70  
 
In what form does marine bioprospecting include such bioactive functions? 
Most projects relate to the discovery and exploration of metabolites, i.e. 
substances, usually in the form of small molecules produced during or taking 
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part in the metabolism of organisms. Such metabolites can have various 
functions, including fuel, structure, signaling, stimulatory and inhibitory 
effects on enzymes, catalytic activity, defense and interactions with other 
organisms (e.g. pigments, odorants, and pheromones). In organic chemistry, a 
distinction is commonly drawn between primary metabolites on the one hand, 
and secondary metabolites on the other. A primary metabolite is directly 
involved in normal “growth,” development, and reproduction. A secondary 
metabolite is not directly involved in these processes, but usually has an 
important ecological function. Examples include antibiotics and pigments.71 
 
Metabolites with bioactive properties in organisms have been developed at 
different stages of evolution and refined for more than one billion years. Some 
metabolites are common to entire kingdoms, while others are unique to certain 
organisms. As an example of the former, it has recently been revealed that there 
are metabolites with immunosuppressant properties which appears to be 
common to all multicellular animals (metazoan phyla), including sponges, 
insects and mammals. In such cases, there is a clear indication that the relevant 
property was developed early in evolution. During the evolution of 
multicellular organisms, continuous selection made primary metabolites form 
secondary metabolites. Gradually, the metabolites have refined their function 
and become more selective and active.72 By means of evolution, metabolites 
have thereby undergone a process which has refined its characteristics. 
 
The largest number of marine-derived secondary constituents, including some 
of the most interesting drug candidates, has been provided by marine 
invertebrates that are sessile or slow moving and mostly lack morphological 
defense structures such as sponges, tunicates and certain mollusks.73 One such 
group of organisms are sessile filter feeders, organisms which have developed 
properties that are particularly interesting for bioprospecting purposes. These 
animals are immobile throughout their life cycle, permanently attached to the 
seafloor and constantly filtering water from the surrounding environment. 
 
71 Divya Arora, et al., Pharmaceuticals from Microbes - Impact on Drug Discovery, in 
PHARMACEUTICALS FROM MICROBES: IMPACT ON DRUG DISCOVERY (Divya; Sharma Arora, 
Chetan; Jaglan, Sundeep; Lichtfouse, Eric ed. 2019). 
72 Werner E. G. Müller, et al., Traditional and Modern Biomedical Prospecting, 1 EVIDENCE-
BASED COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE (2004), at 72. 
73 Peter Proksch, et al., Bioactive Natural Products from Marine Invertebrates and Associated 






Commonly, these organisms live in areas with a high abundance of life and in 
immediate proximity to other organisms, such as coral reefs and hydrothermal 
vents.74  
 
Filter feeders are thus continuously exposed to pathogens throughout their life 
cycle. Moreover, they are physically unable to move away from such exposure. 
As described by one observer, this evolutionary strategy could be successful 
only if these animals had effective protection mechanisms against pathogens.75 
Among the compounds that function as defense mechanisms against predators, 
the arguably most pharmacologically interesting findings have been made. 
These protection mechanisms are composed of secondary metabolites that they 
produce for different purposes, not only as a defense against predators, but also 
in order to find reproductive partners and to compete against other organisms 
for limited space and resources. Not only are these organisms dissimilar to 
terrestrial life; the metabolites they produce lack analogues on land and are 
unique in chemical structure and biological activity.76  
 
The reason for using the functions of organisms in bioprospecting is practical. 
Employing properties which have proved efficient in a natural environment 
over an extensive period of time as the basis for the development of 
biotechnological products allows developers to bypass basic research which 
would have been costly, if not impossible, to conduct autonomously. 
 
The unique constructions and powerful bioactivities found in marine-derived 
molecules are being investigated for a range of commercial uses, which ought 
to be mentioned despite the delimitation of the present investigation to 
pharmaceutical research. Resources of particular interest include: 
pharmaceutical compounds and molecular probes; enzymes derived from 
bacteria living in extreme conditions, which may have applications in similarly 
extreme industrial conditions; environmental remediation agents for oil or 
chemical spills or waste treatment; sunscreens, agrochemicals, anti-foulants, 
dyes, enzymes for industrial and technological applications and food additives; 
 
74 Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), at 185. 
75 Müller, et al., Evidence-based Complementary and Alternative Medicine (2004). 
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agents for manipulating desirable genetic traits to improve animal and plant 
mariculture.77 
 
Although the potential for blue biotechnology development has been 
increasingly highlighted in recent times, bioprospecting is far from new. What 
is more, its development has been far from consistent. As will be discussed in 
the next section, human use of bioactive functions from marine organisms has 
oscillated wildly throughout our recent history. 
 
B.5. The development of marine biotechnology 
 
3.8 billion years of evolution have produced a very rich library of 
natural products, and scientists have really only started exploring and 
understanding these in the last 50 years.78 
 
—Paul Wender, Stanford University 
 
The concept of marine bioprospecting is neither new nor static. Moreover, as 
discussed in section B.1, it relates to a process rather than an isolated activity. 
This process, in turn, has gradually involved more advanced technological 
tools. In light of these dynamic aspects, the concept is most easily approached 
by exploring its development. As will be established, the modern history of 
pharmaceutical bioprospecting has fluctuated, depending on technological 
developments and general trends, which from time to time have made synthetic 
approaches more popular. It will therefore be examined how the concept of 
marine bioprospecting has developed, with an emphasis on modern history 
before going into the nature of more contemporary activities. 
 
B.5.1. The origin of pharmaceutical bioprospecting 
 
Although biotechnology-based innovation in general and the application of 
marine genetic resources in particular have been subject to increasing interest 
in recent years, human use of marine living resources for other purposes than 
 
77 David Farrier & Linda Tucker, Access to marine bioresources: hitching the conservation cart 
to the bioprospecting horse, 32 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001), at 213-
239. 






food consumption is far from new. The history of human use of marine genetic 
resources is particularly long in the pharmaceutical field.79 
 
Marine natural products have been used since at least ancient times as a source 
of bioactive metabolites for human benefit. Whereas the history of synthesized 
medicine is brief, the use of living organisms as sources of medical compounds 
is documented since antiquity. The use in China and Japan of iodine-rich 
seaweeds to prevent goiter is documented as early as 1400 BC. In Ireland, the 
red algae Chondrus crispus and Mastocarpus stellatus were used as a folk cure 
for colds, sore throats, chest infections and bronchitis for several centuries.80 
Hippocrates, the “father of modern medicine,” who lived in the 400s BC, is 
recorded as describing the therapeutic effects of various marine invertebrates 
and their constituents on human health.81 Ancient use of bioactive compounds 
strongly resembles modern bioprospecting, and was based on the very same 
principles: Organisms produce metabolites as a protection against pathogens 
and humans, by means of pharmacological technology, can extract and 
concentrate such metabolites.82  
 
Already in our earlier recorded history, humans thus learned to search for 
similar and more pronounced properties in related species, once bioactive 
functions had been identified in one organism. For all practical purposes, 
humans thus successfully managed to conduct empirical biomedical 
prospecting for natural compounds based on evolutionary principles well 
before empiricism and evolution were formulated in the early modern period. 
 
Even if pharmacology until the 1950s was almost exclusively based either 
directly or indirectly on bioprospecting, using marine organisms as the basis 
for drug development was uncommon.  
 
79 Although marine genetic resources historically as well as currently certainly are used also for 
other purposes, such uses will not be discussed here in line with the general focus on 
pharmaceutical use in this study.  
80 Jaspars, et al., Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom. Journal of the Marine 
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81 Hafiz Suleria, et al., Marine-Based Nutraceuticals: An Innovative Trend in the Food and 
Supplement Industries, 13 MARINE DRUGS (2015), Eleni Voultsiadou, Therapeutic properties 
and uses of marine invertebrates in the ancient Greek world and early Byzantium, 130 JOURNAL 
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Throughout the history of pharmacology, bioactive components have 
overwhelmingly been sourced from terrestrial organisms. Exploration in the 
deep sea is a more recent endeavor. Even if deep-sea exploration started at the 
end of the 19th century with the British Challenger research expedition, it was 
not until the end of the 1970s that the long-held view that the deep seas were 
biological deserts started to come under revision.83 
 
B.5.2. The 1950s and onwards – oscillations between bio-
based and synthetic drug development  
 
Although pharmaceutical companies have long been interested in acquiring 
and examining exotic specimens that might yield interesting biochemical 
compounds, they did not begin to systematically invest in natural products 
research programs until the 1940s. It appears that the initiative for business 
involvement came from the state. In the wake of the Second World War, a 
major initiative was launched to encourage pharmaceutical companies to 
collect and test a wider variety of soil samples obtained both domestically and 
internationally for mold with more effective strains of antibiotic properties. 
Whereas interest initially focused on soil samples, natural products research 
programs gradually expanded, to include the collection of higher plants, 
animals, insects, and, increasingly, marine organisms. The natural source of 
origin was less relevant than the prospect of finding novel biochemical 
compounds. Large-scale investment in natural products research was mostly 
confined to the major pharmaceutical companies. Corporate collecting 
activities during this period has been described as informal. To a large degree, 
product development was from the start based on donations of material from 
public collections.84 
 
It was only after 1950, with the advent of modern scuba diving and new 
sampling technologies that scientists began to systematically explore the 
oceans for useful therapeutics.85 During this decade, two nucleosides were 
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discovered in sponges, which would later serve as the basis for the 
development of commercially important anti-viral drugs.86  
 
The two compounds, spongouridine and spongothymidine, would 
subsequently give rise to the synthetic molecules commercialized in various 
anti-viral medicines. These include AZT, the revolutionary first drug to treat 
HIV infection (marketed as Zidovudine and Retrovir), as well as Acyclovir, 
the active component in the blockbuster Zovirax which has long been the 
standard treatment for herpes simplex virus infections, chickenpox, and 
shingles.87 
 
The 1950s did not just mark the development of technologies which enabled 
marine bioprospecting. During the same decade, synthetic medicines, which 
had existed since the 1910s, for the first time were placed on an equal footing 
with natural product drugs, which had previously dominated pharmacology.88 
From this decade, rapid technological advancement in both synthetic and bio-
based drug development led to parallel and alternate developments between 
the two approaches to pharmaceutical research. Indeed, the modern history of 
pharmaceutical development is marked by increasing oscillations between 
these strands of drug development.  
 
Gradual and sudden technological breakthroughs and sector trends have thus, 
in a pendular movement, shifted the focus back and forth between synthetic 
and bio-based drug development since the mid-1950s. As will be discussed in 
this section, this has not only greatly impacted product development in the 





86 The first marine bioactive compounds, spongouridine and spongothymidine, were isolated 
from the Caribbean sponge Cryptotheca crypta in the early 1950s; in the mid-1960s, scientists 
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Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea - An Update on Marine Genetic Resources: Scientific 
Research, Commercial Uses and a Database on Marine Bioprospecting. (2007); Peter Proksch, 
et al., Drugs from the Sea - Opportunities and Obstacles, 1 MARINE DRUGS (2003). 
87 GUILLOUX. 2018, at xi. 
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Despite the emergence of synthetic pharmacology, bioprospecting remained 
the dominant basis for pharmaceutical research for most periods during the 
postwar decades. Initially, the organisms serving as the basis for drug 
development were almost exclusively terrestrial. As the result of increased 
accessibility of the marine environment and enhanced examination tools, 
commercial and academic actors started to actively pursue bioprospecting in 
the marine environment in the early 1960s, by searching for useful 
biomolecules by harvesting and analyzing living organisms.89 Such 
expeditions, however, were relatively limited and largely confined to coastal 
waters. In the 1970s, research on marine products accelerated and began to 
appeal to different disciplines, including biochemistry, biology, ecology, 
organic chemistry and pharmacology.90 Among the first pharmaceutical 
products based on marine bioprospecting to be approved and reach the market 
was a drug to treat leukemia and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, based on a 
compound isolated from the Caribbean sponge, which to this day remains a 
standard treatment for these diseases.91 
 
B.5.3. From the discovery of hydrothermal vents through the 
dawn of the genomics era to the launch of negotiations on 
bioprospecting treaties 
 
In 1977, scientists on board the submersible Alvin discovered sites near the 
Galapagos Islands where high-temperature fluids rich in reduced compounds 
pour out into the water column and which are host to unique seabed, or benthic, 
ecosystems.92 Later research led to the discovery of other benthic ecosystems 
characterized by energy sources other than light, such as sediment and seep 
communities. Other discoveries revealed a wealth of different benthic habitats 
 
89 Daria Firsova, Current Status and Perspectives in Marine Biodiscovery, in BIOPROSPECTING 
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90 United Nations Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea - An Update 
on Marine Genetic Resources: Scientific Research, Commercial Uses and a Database on Marine 
Bioprospecting. 2007. 
91 It was estimated that in 2007 the global revenues for cytarabine (and vidarabine) amounted to 
$93 million. Cytarabine, the active compound in the drug was originally isolated from the 
Caribbean sponge, Cryptotheca crypta., PABULO H. RAMPELOTTO & ANTONIO TRINCONE, GRAND 
CHALLENGES IN MARINE BIOTECHNOLOGY (Springer International Publishing, Cham. 2018), at 
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and biodiversity hot spots in the deep oceans, including seamounts and cold- 
and deep-water corals. Pelagic environments, which are found in the water 
column, were also found to host a wide range of micro- and macro-organisms.93 
These discoveries had important implications for bioprospecting. It implied a 
drastic shift in perspectives of deep-sea areas; previously these parts of the 
oceans had largely been considered biological deserts and thus uninteresting 
for any activity relating to living resources. It now became apparent that not 
only were they full of life; it also appeared that deep-sea ecosystems were more 
diverse and contained organisms with properties that were unlike any other 
ecosystem.  
 
The discovery of hydrothermal and other ecosystems with promising com-
pounds was the first of two breakthroughs in the 1970s, which together formed 
the basis for the first wave of bioprospecting. The realization that marine 
ecosystems were more diverse and contained more useful compounds than 
previously thought coincided with the advent of new tools for collecting and 
technology for analyzing bioactive organisms. In the 1970s, methods for 
sampling and exploring DNA began to develop, as part of broader 
advancements in organic chemistry. This marked a giant leap in the exploration 
of life in general and for bioprospecting in particular. In 1977, the first full 
DNA genome of an organism was sequenced. However, these early sequencing 
methods were costly and time-consuming. Among the tools which propelled 
progress in these early years of marine bioprospecting, the development of 
high-resolution nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometers was an important 
factor.94 Other facilitating factors were the technological evolution of scuba 
diving and underwater exploration (in particular the introduction of remotely 
operated underwater vehicles), as well as the general progress made in 
molecular biology of the late 1970s.95 Taken together, this enabled exploration 
of inaccessible areas and a research shift from large creatures to micro-
organisms. 
 
93 Marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction - Environmental, scientific 
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B.5.4. The dawn of the genomics era 
 
With the development of the second generation of high-throughput sequencing 
methods in the 1990s, DNA technology started to have a profound impact on 
commercial bioprospecting. This was chiefly because these new methods 
enabled entire genomes to be sequenced at once. In 1995, a major contribution 
to the field occurred with the availability of the complete genomic sequence of 
the first living bacterium. This marked the launch of microbial genomics.96 
Hundreds of microbial genomes have been completely sequenced and 
published since. The advent of functional genomics, which implies the study 
of DNA at the gene level with the aim of understanding the relationship 
between the genome and phenotype of an organism, enabled bioprospecting to 
go beyond merely describing genomes by actually characterizing whole 
genomes in detail. Such functional assessments are commonly conducted by 
employing large-scale studies of proteins.97  
 
Moreover, they employ devices that integrate several laboratory functions on 
a single integrated circuit.98 This marked a radical improvement for 
bioprospecting, since it was now possible to draw accurate manuals and not 
merely maps of organisms. In more concrete terms, the development of these 
technologies marked a breakthrough in three respects: quantity, quality, and 
flexibility. On the quantitative side, these new and refined methods enabled for 
the first time expedient analysis of large amounts of biological material. Where 
quality is concerned, these breakthroughs not only brought about greater 
reliability and precision in analysis, but also revealed the extent of diversity 
across selections of microbial species.99 As regards flexibility, they facilitated 
the identification of genes that are turned on or off under different 
environmental conditions on a genome-wide scale. Moreover, advances in 
gene technology have facilitated expedient screening programs for new 
compounds through the development of more advanced in vitro100 assays.101 
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As the result of these and related scientific and technological breakthroughs in 
the late 20th century, many human metabolic processes became deciphered, 
enabling understanding or founding substantiated hypotheses not only about 
the cause of disease but also in relation to how metabolic processes in other 
organisms may prevent disease. This was a seismic shift for pharmaceutical 
bioprospecting. Useful functions of natural compounds could now be identified 
and understood to an unprecedented extent. These increased possibilities 
transformed the questions set out to be investigated in the screening of 
organisms. In classical pharmacological approaches of phenotypic screening, 
it is first established what eventual effect is searched for in the cells or the 
whole organism, and the assay is set up to read out on that phenotype, without 
considering how any given compound manages to do so.102  
 
With the possibilities offered by the new technology, scientists as well as the 
pharmaceutical industry were no longer satisfied with the knowledge that a 
sample may evoke a desired biological response, the basic question of classical 
pharmacology. A growing number of projects started to investigate why and 
how organisms function in a certain way in laboratory analysis rather than 
merely establishing an effect. Analysis of bioactive compounds increasingly 
went beyond classical pharmacological approaches of phenotypic screening.103 
In addition, new biochemical mechanisms of screening were developed. These 
new methods were largely modeled in line with the “one drug – one target” 
paradigm for drug discovery, which came to dominate the development 
strategies of the biotechnology industry.104 These target-directed screening 
methods are commonly guided by the ambition to affect a protein or pathway, 
which has been considered to have therapeutic potential in previous studies. 
Assays are then set up to specifically investigate that mechanism.105 Among 
other things, the new methods enabled the isolation, measuring of activity and 
quantitative inhibition of enzymes from intact cells.  
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The initial goal when conducting laboratory analysis in bioprospecting projects 
with these modern technologies is usually to separate the interesting small 
molecules from the rest of the biomass. Equipment to perform such operations 
soon became automatized and cheaper. This development of biochemical 
assays enabled natural product research in industrial environment. Large 
screening programs were now developed with extraction protocols optimized 
for different types of organisms. This level of standardization generated 
samples with comparability to all other similar samples in the extract 
collection, enabling a rapid increase in libraries of bioactive compounds. Some 
organizations chose to retain bulk samples of all extracts in a library, ready to 
be re-evaluated as new assays were developed. Others did not store physical 
samples, but retained digitalized analytical output.106  
 
B.5.5. The bioprospecting momentum of the 1990s 
 
These technological breakthroughs and the ensuing increase in bioprospecting 
generated widespread optimism in the commercial bioprospecting sphere as 
well as in academia. A review of scientific research interest in marine genetic 
resources also reveals a rapid rise in research interest and output. Whereas there 
had been 108 publications related to marine biotechnology by 1980, there were 
700 scientific publications were published between 1994 to 1996 in USA 
alone.107 This was paralleled with and contributed to increased interest in the 
protection of biodiversity on the political side, manifested by the Rio Summit 
of 1992. Although less instrumental concerns should not be disregarded, the 
greater political interest in biodiversity protection can be explained to a large 
degree by the realization that biological diversity constituted a substantial 
value. In particular, the agreement that Costa Rica had struck with Merck in 
1991 on access to genetic resources within its jurisdiction had propelled the 
hopes among developing states for generating substantial income from 
pharmaceutical bioprospecting of their biodiversity.108 
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The Rio Summit of 1992 marked the signing of the Convention of Biological 
Diversity, which can be regarded as the legal component of the biodiversity 
boom of the 1990s.109 The dynamics and material development of these 
negotiations are discussed in more detail in section D.2. It is worth noting here, 
however, how the optimism in the biotechnology sphere in the years around 
the Rio Summit was the very impetus behind the negotiations in international 
law on rules on the use of genetic resources. 
 
At the time of its negotiation, and in the decade after its adoption, there was a 
widespread belief that a boom for bio-based innovation was imminent.110 Not 
least on the marine side, bioprospecting was expected to grow rapidly as a 
commercial sector. In 1996, Lyle Glowka published The Deepest of Ironies, 
which highlighted the potential value of the biodiversity of the deep seabed. 
Poignantly, Glowka argued that the deep-sea regime of UNCLOS, which had 
entered into force only two years earlier, was already outdated by focusing on 
managing the potential value of mineral rather than biological resources.  
 
The call for the development of new legal frameworks to regulate the benefits 
of biological resources would, however, materialize in environmental law 
before the law of the sea. In 2002, ten years after the Rio Summit, the 
negotiation of what would become the Nagoya Protocol of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity would start and eventually be adopted another decade 
later. In parallel, the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study 
issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction was established in 2006 to, 
among other things, discuss the access to marine genetic resources under the 
law of the sea.111  
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B.5.6. Downturn in bio-based drug development  
 
The heyday of bioprospecting around the end of the 20th century was to be 
short-lived. Ironically, the launching of negotiations on the regulation of 
bioprospecting and genetic resources coincided with a sudden decline in 
commercial interest. This again was predominantly the result of a 
technological shift. Around the turn of the millennium, high-throughput 
screening technology outpaced the rate of compound supply for the first time.  
 
This was not the result of a new type of technology; rather it grew out of the 
development, refinement and new application of the tools which had enabled 
the first generation of genome analysis. The same technologies which had 
facilitated the bioprospecting boom of the 1990s began to be deployed in a 
novel manner in the following decade. As sequence costs and process times 
decreased, it appeared more rational and cost-effective to screen large amounts 
of synthetic compounds for desired properties than expensive and often 
disappointing sampling of organisms. The rapid enhancement of screening 
caused product developers to question whether natural compounds were even 
necessary. Why bother collecting natural molecules with potentially interesting 
functions if synthetic molecules can be screened for the same function en 
masse?112  
 
With the refinement of the high-throughput screening methodologies, it 
became possible to synthesize and test millions of molecular constructions for 
biological activity. This method, based on chemical library screening, is 
commonly referred to as combinatorial chemistry, and thus essentially 
prioritizes quantity in synthetic compound over quality in organic samples.113 
Whereas bioprospecting is built on the screening of natural sources, 
combinatorial chemistry is thus based on the screening of synthetic libraries 
against biological targets.114 The basic approaches are thus converse. With the 
development of combinatorial chemistry, the pharmaceutical industry 
accordingly moved away from screening natural sources, in favor of setting up 
and screening huge synthetic compound libraries.115  
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In an astonishingly short period of time, major pharmaceutical companies 
decided to cancel investments in collecting natural compounds and dismantle 
bioprospecting programs, projects which had been sites for costly investments 
during the previous years. Major pharmaceutical companies such as 
GlaxoWellcome, SmithKlineFrench and Pfizer phased out their natural 
product portfolios.116 In the 2000s, most if not all in-house natural products 
programs in big pharmaceutical companies in the United States had ceased to 
exist.117 These decisions were taken despite an increase in research output in 
marine biotechnology around the early years of the decade. Between 1999 and 
2004, a host of scientific articles were published describing the anti-tumor and 
cytotoxic properties of numerous marine natural products. The marine 
pharmacology literature highlights that the discovery of novel marine anti-
tumor agents continued at the same high level between 1998 and 2004.118 
 
Other factors besides the advent of combinatorial chemistry also contributed 
to the difficulties of bioprospecting being able to compete with combinatorial 
chemistry.119 Building up and maintaining high-quality collection of natural 
product extract was considered expensive. Bio-based drug development was 
also seen to be too time-consuming in light of the difficulties in identifying the 
active component, which persisted in light of technological developments. 
Another weakness was the lack of certainty that an active natural component 
would be novel, once it was isolated, which would rule out patentability. 
Similarly, the complexity of natural compound proved a challenge to product 
development since it made it difficult to scale up minor natural components.  
Last but not least, legal intellectual property issues were raised as a hurdle to 
bioprospecting as many states became increasingly protective of their 
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More generally, this backlash against bio-based development has been 
explained as a reaction to the inability of bioprospecting to deliver on the 
exaggerated expectations formulated during the genomics boom of the 1990s. 
At least in the short term, it proved harder to develop products based on 
bioprospecting despite the breakthrough in sequencing. Not only had corporate 
expectations been inflated, the expectations of financial returns in the source 
countries for biological resources had also been widely exaggerated. In 
particular, developing countries in tropical regions had started to regard their 
biodiversity as an asset that would yield substantial income. Lack of expedient 
clinical development thus led to disappointment with bioprospecting-based 
research and a sharp turn to combinatorial chemistry in pharmaceutical 
development. In the short run, the new technologies of the genomics era failed 
to deliver pharmaceutical output as expected, leading to a backlash.  
 
Still, there were some success stories in the first wave of marine genetic 
resource-based drug development. Among marine biotechnology products 
developed, a considerable portion of which continue to be used, most were 
derived from invertebrates (sponges, tunicates, mollusks, and bryozoans).121 
The area of application for these products varies, but cancer, pain and 
inflammatory disease appear to be the most common.122 
 
B.5.7. Unfulfilled promises of combinatorial chemistry and 
renaissance of bio-based development  
 
The rapid increase in interest and investment in combinatorial chemistry bore 
some striking similarities to the bioprospecting boom of the 1990s. Ironically, 
it would also prove equally disappointing. It was assumed that provided that 
large enough libraries were screened, useful leads would emerge.  
This placed emphasis on compound numbers rather than qualitative aspects.123 
However, this shift did not reverse the trend of reduced output of pharmaceu-
tical research programs across the board. From the highpoint in the late 1980s, 
the trend in output of research programs of the pharmaceutical industry was 
disappointing. The number of new chemical entities per year went down by 
almost two thirds over the following 20 years.124  
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This was paralleled by a decline in the number of new drugs approved, going 
down from about 40 per year in 1981 to 20 in 2007. As illustrated by the 
disappointing record of development of novel products, combinatorial 
chemistry did not manage to create the multitude of successful products 
envisaged.125 One observer has described the challenge facing combinatorial 
chemistry as chemists having the building blocks but lacking the instructions 
to put them together in a manner that provides benefits.126 Though various 
factors have been blamed for this downturn, declining interest in natural 
products on the part of major pharmaceutical companies, in favor of new 
chemical techniques such as combinatorial chemistry for generating molecular 
libraries, has been raised as a major explanatory factor.127 In short, 
combinatorial chemistry failed to keep up with the capacity of nature to create 
new structures with complex molecular diversity.128 
 
Two decades after the advent of combinatorial chemistry, half of the ten best-
selling drugs in the US were still derived from secondary metabolites originally 
isolated from micro-organisms or plants.129 The realization that combinatorial 
chemistry did not render nature-based pharmaceutical development irrelevant 
caused the pendulum to swing back, in favor of bioprospecting projects in the 
late 2000s and early 2010s. Increasingly, researchers and biotech development 
actors agreed that the natural world offers a manual for pharmaceutical 
development.  
 
Whereas artificial combinatorial chemistry is efficient in exploring a multitude 
of potential functions, it does so seemingly at random. The natural organism, 
on the other hand, has conducted the same screening by means of natural 
combinatorial chemistry for hundreds of millions of years.130  
 
125 Ibid. 
126 “A small collection of smart compounds may be more valuable than a much larger 
hodgepodge collection mindlessly assembled”, See Danishefsky in Bhargava Karumudi, Natural 
Product Drug Discovery, 2 JOURNAL OF PHARMACOGNOSY & NATURAL PRODUCTS (2015); Cragg 
& Newman, BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA (2013). 
127 Cragg & Newman, BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA (2013), at 3679. 
128 Garber Ken, Peptide leads new class of chronic pain drugs, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
(2005). 
128 Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), at 190.  
129 Cragg & Newman, Biochimica et biophysica acta (2013). 







This is illustrated by the South Pacific cone snail, which uses a highly effective 
peptide toxin to paralyze its prey. The toxin is a mixture of 100 or more venoms 
produced by the combinatorial mixture of amino acids that has taken place over 
30 to 50 million years of cone snail evolution.131 Moreover, there is not one but 
over 500 species of cone snails, each able to produce more than a hundred 
unique toxins, with the possibility of being used to treat as varied conditions 
as pain, epilepsy and incontinence.132 As exemplified by the cone snails, 
evolution produces a gradual refinement of useful bioactive properties which 
are complex and difficult to develop synthetically. It has been increasingly 
recognized that in many cases, not even the highly efficient throughput of 
combinatorial chemistry can match this process of natural selection.133 The 
anti-cancer drugs Halaven/Eribulin and Aplidine are other examples of 
successful bioprospecting drugs with big market potential.134  
 
In addition to these success stories,135 another factor contributed to a renewed 
discussion around 2010 of the benefits of approaches based on marine 
organisms: The disappointment with combinatorial chemistry development 
output. Although synthetic approaches were by no means abandoned, a 
widespread recognition emerged, as expressed by Faulkner, that even if 
pharmacological research involving marine organisms is slow and has other 
disadvantages, “the number and quality of the leads generated more than 
justify research on marine pharmacology.”136  
 
131 Originating in the isolation of structurally unique secondary metabolites identified in the 
venom of the cone snail, the drug Zicotonide was made available on the market in 2004. Derived 
from the venom of the cone snail, Zicotonide is used for the treatment of severe chronic pain 
and pain management in general.  
132 Ken, Nature Biotechnology (2005). 
133 Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), at 190. 
134 After already having been used extensively on orphan basis, Halaven/Eribulin was given 
approval in 2010. The active substance originates in the demosponge Halichondria okadai. 
Aplidine was granted orphan status in 2003. This compound was isolated from the 
Mediterranean tunicate Aplidium albicans and has shown activity against certain types of tumour 
(medullary thyroid carcinoma, renal carcinoma, melanoma, and tumors of neuroendocrine 
origin) and has also been reported to inhibit the secretion of vascular endothelial growth factor 
related to angiogenesis. RUSSELL PATERSON & NELSON LIMA, BIOPROSPECTING: SUCCESS, 
POTENTIAL AND CONSTRAINTS § 16 (David L. Hawksworth, et al. eds., Cham: Springer 
International Publishing. 2017), at 9. 
135 Product development will be further discussed in section B.6.2. 






In line with this shift in perspective, a second wave of marine bioprospecting 
began, pioneered by projects in the seas around Australia and New Zeeland, 
later spreading to other regions, including Ireland, Scotland and Norway.137 In 
addition to being the result of disappointment with combinatorial chemistry, 
two major novelties facilitated the return to bio-based development.138  
 
B.5.8. Blurring the line between synthetic and bio-based 
development: The introduction of genetic engineering 
 
Firstly, the “renaissance” in marine drug discovery in recent years has, as 
discussed, occurred largely as the result of technological developments that 
have enabled developers to much faster determine the molecular structure of 
novel chemical and biochemical entities. Moreover, technological 
developments have facilitated screening and the use of marine microbial 
genomics to provide biosynthetic pathways for the production of marine 
natural products.139 Metagenomic libraries and whole-genome shotgun 
sequencing (which makes it possible to search for genetic resources directly in 
“environmental samples” rather than in individual organisms) has led to rapid 
advances in biotechnology developed from marine genetic resources and has 
been described as the most important aspect of new technologies in spurring 
the current interest in marine bioprospecting.140  
 
Moreover, further developed gene technology enabled more refined analysis 
of bioactive compounds. In particular, the return to bioprospecting was 
promoted by the advancement of recombinant DNA techniques, which enabled 




137 Firsova. 2017, at 30. 
138 See, for a brief but succinct description of the causes for the renaissance in marine 
bioprospecting Marris, NATURE (2006). 
139 Keith B. Glaser & Alejandro M. S. Mayer, A renaissance in marine pharmacology: From 
preclinical curiosity to clinical reality, 78 BIOCHEMICAL PHARMACOLOGY (2009). 
Jaspars, et al., Marine Biological Association of the United Kingdom. Journal of the Marine 
Biological Association of the United Kingdom (2016);Glaser & Mayer, Biochemical 
Pharmacology (2009), at 151. 
140 Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), at 185. 
141 Tadeusz F. Molinski, et al., Drug development from marine natural products, 8 NATURE 







Genetic engineering is the formation of combinations of heritable material by 
the insertion of nucleic acid molecules produced by whatever means outside 
the cell into (most frequently) virus or bacteria, so as to allow their 
incorporation into a host organism in which they are capable of continued 
propagation. Gene technology thereby implies the modification of the genetic 
properties of an organism by use of recombinant DNA technology.142 These 
technologies are commonly used on the basis of naturally occurring 
compounds, which are modified by using an integrated combination of 
engineering, nanobiotechnology and genetics.143  
 
Such tools have not only made bioprospecting less costly and time-consuming; 
they have also transformed the conditions for marine bio-based pharmaceutical 
research by bringing about new elements of flexibility. By enabling the 
manipulation of natural compounds at different stages of development, the new 
gene technology blurs the line between synthetic research and bioprospecting. 
The very term “synthetic” in synthetic engineering comes from the fact that the 
resulting natural product comes out of an organism where a desired compound 
has been articulated by synthetic methods. The compound is thus not entirely 
artificial. Rather, the genetic code of an organism has been manipulated so that 
the compound is exhibited in quantities or levels that are not found in nature.144  
 
In fact, in most cases of successful drug development in marine bioprospecting, 
natural compounds have been modified by means of such technologies 
according to estimates.145 From the eight compounds currently on the market, 
only three became drugs without any modification of the original natural 




142 Leary et al., “Marine Genetic Resources: A Review of Scientific and Commercial Interest, at 
191. 
143 Warzecha H. Kayser O., Pharmaceutical Biotechnology (Wiley‐VCH. 2012), at 9-11. 
144 Leary et al., “Marine Genetic Resources: A Review of Scientific and Commercial Interest, at 
192. 
145 Ana Martins, et al., Marketed Marine Natural Products in the Pharmaceutical and 
Cosmeceutical Industries: Tips for Success, 12 MARINE DRUGS (2014). 
146 The only drugs where the natural compound appears in the marketed drug without such 
modification appears to be Prialt, Yondelis and Carragelose. Products developed are further 






As the result of these developments, the contemporary return to marine 
bioprospecting is in many ways different from the first wave of bioprospecting 
in the 1990s. When bioprospecting was first addressed as an activity in the 
1990s, a clear distinction was made between purely academic and purely 
commercial ends concerning the use of biological diversity.147 Since 2002, this 
distinction has become more and more blurred, as it has become increasingly 
common for academic and private activities to include commercial aims in 
collecting and conducting research on biodiversity.  
 
Many research projects of the ongoing second wave contain elements of both 
bioprospecting and synthetic development. This has prompted some observers 
to suggest that these projects cannot be considered as bio-based, thereby 
implicitly questioning whether it qualifies as bioprospecting.148  
 
On the other hand, for purposes of the definition of bioprospecting, operations 
including an increasing artificial component would not be disqualified from its 
scope: As long as the elements of genetic engineering are introduced after a 
naturally occurring biological component has been sampled, the basis for 
innovation remains unchanged. Still, it is clear that an increasingly blurred line 
between synthetic and biology-based pharmaceutical development calls for a 
reconsideration of traditional assumptions about pharmaceutical development 
as being either synthetic or based on bioprospecting.  
 
A review of the basis for pharmaceutical product development in recent years 
supports the contention that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish 
between bio-based and synthetic biotechnology development. In a survey of 
approved agents during the period of January 1981 to June 2006 for all diseases 
worldwide, efforts were made to distinguish between six categories of drugs, 
ranging from unmodified natural products to synthetic compounds with no 





147 Morten Walløe Tvedt, Patent law and bioprospecting in Antarctica, 47 POLAR RECORD 
(2011).  







While 66 per cent of the 974 small-molecule new chemical entities were 
formally synthetic, the analysis indicated that 17 per cent corresponded to 
synthetic molecules containing pharmacophores derived directly from natural 
products. Furthermore, 12 per cent were considered to actually model or mimic 
a natural product inhibitor of the molecular target of interest. Thus, only 37 per 
cent of the 974 new chemical entities were deemed to be truly synthetic (i.e. 
devoid of natural inspiration).149 
 
Accordingly, in many biotechnology projects, the innovation chain contains 
synthetic elements although naturally occurring compounds are also involved. 
To make things even more complex, a substantial part of developed products 
contains elements which are synthetic but designed to imitate naturally 
occurring functions. As such, the line between bioprospecting research and 
synthetic pharmaceutical development is becoming blurred. As will be 
discussed in section B.6, this raises some challenges in the adoption of existing 
legal frameworks which are based on outdated perceptions of pharmaceutical 
research. Foremost, it connects to an increasingly important legal question – 
namely, whether a project in which the biological component or natural 
environment connected step is minimal and the lion’s share of the value chain 
lies in the development should be interpreted differently compared to one in 
which the processing in the product development merely amounts to the 
packaging of a genetic resource. 
 
B.5.9. An increasing role for publicly financed 
bioprospecting 
 
The resurgence of bioprospecting was also facilitated by the fact that despite 
declining commercial interest in bioprospecting around the year 2000, publicly 
funded interest in sampling marine biodiversity persisted. Paradoxically, the 
dismantling of major commercial activities in the field notwithstanding, the 
rate of discovery of interesting natural compounds increased rapidly around 
the turn of the millennium, as persistent academic interest developed and used 
ever finer diving technology and molecular biology.  
 
149 In considering disease categories, close to 70% of anti-infectives (anti-bacterial, anti-fungal, 
anti-parasitic, and anti-viral) were classified as naturally derived or inspired, while in the cancer 
treatment area, 77.8% were in this category, ERNESTO FATTORUSSO, et al., HANDBOOK OF 
MARINE NATURAL PRODUCTS (Ernesto Fattorusso, et al. eds., Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands 






For every year since, thousands of new active compounds from marine 
organisms have been extracted and described. Around 2006, a general database 
of marine natural products reported about 15,000 compounds derived from 
around 3,000 marine species. By 2009, the number of such findings had 
increased to 22,000.150 As of 2016, the number of potential compounds isolated 
from marine organisms exceeded 28,000 with hundreds of new compounds 
being discovered every year.151 It thus appears clear that the rate of description 
of new marine organisms with potentially interesting properties has been 
relatively constant, irrespective of the fluctuations of commercial interest in 
bioprospecting. Accordingly, the line of described compounds which have not 
been used in biotechnology product development trials has increased. It is 
therefore not surprising that during the recent return to bioprospecting, the 
actual sampling conducted by the pharmaceutical industry has been more 
limited. Since so many interesting compounds have already been collected, it 
may be more rational to harvest those collections than to undertake costly new 
sampling ventures. From a legal standpoint, this division of the innovation 
chain raises some thorny challenges.  
 
Where an entity distinct from biotechnology product development undertakes 
sampling in the marine environment, years before any applied trials are 
initiated and without knowledge to what extent (if any) the compound will be 
used commercially, it appears reasonable to distinguish that activity as marine 
scientific research, as discussed in section B.3. However, as discussed in the 
same section, any ambition to appropriate the resource in question would 
render the rules on marine scientific research inapplicable. Conversely, this 
raises questions as to how to legally address product development which is 
based on bioprospecting but where the natural compound is retrieved in 
collections or databases, thereby bypassing the need for physical involvement 
in the natural environment from the side of the bioprospecting actor. 
  
 
150 Maria C. Baker, et al., The Status of Natural Resources on the High-Seas (2001), at 186. 
151 Chiara Lauritano, et al., Bioactivity Screening of Microalgae for Antioxidant, Anti-
Inflammatory, Anticancer, Anti-Diabetes, and Antibacterial Activities.(Report)(Author 







B.5.10. Public collections as a basis for biotechnological 
development 
 
The relevance of these questions is highlighted by novel research infrastructure 
which has facilitated and articulated a division of marine bioprospecting into a 
sampling phase distinct from product development. In recent years, public and 
academic interest in marine genomic discovery has gone beyond isolated 
sampling and sequence projects. Research has become more systemic and 
coordinated. With the sponsoring of national research bodies supported by 
political prioritization of blue biotechnology, considerable sums have been 
allocated to setting up collections and libraries of marine organisms and 
compounds.152 Similar initiatives have also been undertaken by international 
organizations.153 
 
152 These efforts have regularly been the result of emphasis on the potential for growth in the 
biotechnology sector in national or multilateral research and growth strategies. In addition to 
being emphasized in the Blue Growth Strategy of the European Union, marine biotechnology is 
one of the focuses for the marine joint programming initiative of the European Union (JPI 
Oceans). As the result of these priorities, the European Marine Biological Resource Centre 
(EMBRC) has been set up with ambitious goals to promote biotechnological development. The 
EMBRC aims to facilitate commercial as well as academic research and training at facilities 
across Europe and provides open access to marine biodiversity by means of biobanks as well as 
associated metadata. Similar infrastructure has been established in the United States under the 
auspice of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). Likewise, Norway has enacted a national strategy for bioprospecting 
as part of the government’s strategy for regional growth in its Arctic region, with emphasis on 
international cooperation. The key objective of the strategy is to regulate marine biological 
resources and make them more accessible to researchers, industry and international participants. 
This has manifested in the establishment of a national marine biobank, MARBANK for the 
preparation and long-term storage of biological samples as well as the establishment of a 
common database for marine organisms and samples, freely accessible to all cooperating 
institutions. Institutions with similar functions have been set up in other countries, such as the 
National Bio Resource Project (NBRP) in Japan, aiming to create a systematic and complete 
collection of all biodiversity in Japan, including from marine resources. RAMPELOTTO & 
TRINCONE. 2018, at 263; OECD, Marine Biotechnology: Enabling Solutions for Ocean 
Productivity and Sustainability. 2013, at 72.; OECD, Marine Biotechnology Definitions, 
Infrastructures and Directions for Innovation 2017, at 14-38. 
153 Among the more noteworthy multilateral collections of samples are The World Register of 
Marine Species (WORMS), hosted at the Flanders Marine Institute, VLIZ. The register was 
established as a global effort to register the names of all marine species. The project, which has 
involved 270 expert taxonomists from 185 institutions in 38 countries, have database describing 
215 000 species. WORMS is freely accessible online and is broken down into sub-portals for 






Marine biobanks are similar in function to other collections of biological 
resources. Large infrastructures with considerable resources started to be built 
up around 1999 as part of a broad OECD initiative to promote research and 
commercialization of results. Commonly, such collections focus on both 
tangible (physical resources) and intangible aspects (derived information or 
innovation) of genetic resources. Generally, the legal ownership of the 
biological samples of biobanks remains with the government. These may 
consist of cultivable or non-cultivable organisms represented by tissues, cells, 
or replicable parts of organisms, such as genomes plasmids, viruses, DNA or 
RNA, which is often stored in a national collection.154  
 
Many national institutions and infrastructures also function as facilitators for 
marine biotechnology research by storing and promoting the dissemination of 
marine genome data libraries, thereby providing an even faster track for 
developers than biobanks.155 As regards genome sequence data from marine 
organisms, it appears that development is moving even quicker than the 
expansion of libraries of sample collections. The rate of sequence submission 
to archival databases has increased at a speed which has challenged storage 
capacity.156 Various databases of marine sequence data are accessible as part 
of broader research and development infrastructures. 
 
These collections are often based on open-access principles. The decision not 
to set intellectual property related limitations on the use of their information 
has been motivated by their business promotion role in general.  
 
Biogeographic Information System (OBIS) is the largest source of information on the 
distribution of marine species. It was set up as the digital legacy of the ten-year Census of Marine 
Life (COML) program. OBIS contains 32 million records from 1000 datasets and over 100 000 
marine species. The geographical coverage of OBIS has been described as good for highly 
populated regions but less so for remote regions such as the deep sea. OECD, Marine 
Biotechnology: Enabling Solutions for Ocean Productivity and Sustainability. 2013, at 72. 
154 GUILLOUX. 2018, at 51. 
155 In the EU, the ELIXIR comprises a distributed and interlinked collection of core and 
specialized biological data resources, and aims to unite Europe’s leading life science 
organizations in managing and storing the massive amounts of data. OECD, Marine 
Biotechnology Definitions, Infrastructures and Directions for Innovation 2017, at 20-21. 
156 Yuichi Kodama, et al., The Sequence Read Archive: Explosive Growth of Sequencing Data, 
40 NUCLEIC ACIDS RESEARCH (2012), OECD, Marine Biotechnology: Enabling Solutions for 







The hindrances that such requirements would entail for small and new 
biotechnological companies have been noted.157 Indeed, in assessments it has 
already been concluded that such publicly financed efforts have greatly 
facilitated biotechnology development, particularly among smaller 
pharmaceutical companies, by enabling access to samples of marine organisms 
without conducting costly expeditions. By establishing bio-bases and related 
research infrastructure as hubs, ecosystems of related activities including 
bioprospecting have been encouraged to grow.158  
 
Setting up these collections and databases has thus been part of a widespread 
strategy to spur marine biotechnological development. In line with this busi-
ness promotion emphasis, it has been commonplace not to set intellectual prop-
erty related requirements for product developers utilizing genetic information 
therein. The open-access character of collections and databases set up by public 
bodies, without restrictions on using information therein as the basis for patent 
claims and product development may raise contentious questions in relation to 
rules on marine scientific research: for instance, how to deal with cases in 
which genetic material that was collected without any direct commercial am-
bition is subsequently used as the basis for commercial bioprospecting. 
 
Indeed, the collections and databases developed as part of these efforts have 
made large amounts of marine biological compounds accessible, both as stored 
in sample collections and as sequence data. While there was also an abundance 
of promising compounds prior to the setting up of this infrastructure, the access 
provided by these tools has greatly facilitated bioprospecting. It is thus not 
surprising that contemporary bio-based marine pharmaceutical development 
focuses on these libraries rather than initiating new and costly expeditions for 
sampling of organisms. Rather than discovering and sequencing new 
organisms, the challenge in bio-based research of the 2010s has been to 
identify the function or bioactivity in organisms where the DNA has already 
been sequenced. Similarly, much of the effort on the technological side has 
been directed towards bridging that gap. It appears that this is where the major 
challenge is in contemporary bioprospecting – linking the genotype with the 
phenotype.  
 
157 Rampelotto & Trincone. 2018. 
158 OECD, Marine Biotechnology Definitions, Infrastructures and Directions for Innovation 






In other words, the genetic makeup of the genomes of marine organisms is 
commonly established and publicly available. But distinguishing their 
characteristics remains a challenge.159 
 
Successful attempts have been made to bridge the gap between genotype and 
phenotype by developing in silico models of organisms, but only for a limited 
number of marine species.160 Increasingly, the application of synthetic biology 
is proposed as an alternative to the costly development of model organisms.161 
Genetic engineering is thus increasingly used in biotechnology development, 
not to replace the input of naturally occurring genetic material, but to facilitate 
the exploration of functions in that material. At a later stage of product 
development, genetic engineering may be used to improve desired functions. 
 
Yet, so far, the increase in finding as the result of the explosion in availability 
of genetic material and data has not fully materialized in pharmaceutical 
output. Indeed, only a limited number of pharmaceutical products derived from 
marine organisms has reached the market. This is in line with a general relative 
decline for bio-based drug development. In the last century, most drugs 
approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) were from natural 
sources or derived from compounds first isolated in nature. However, in recent 
decades the proportion of approved drugs isolated from nature has decreased 
to just below 50 per cent.162 At first glance there appears to be a paradox: 
Despite facilitated access to samples from marine genetic resources, the share 
of pharmaceutical products based in nature appears to be shrinking.  
 
159 SE-KWON KIM, SPRINGER HANDBOOK OF MARINE BIOTECHNOLOGY (Springer Berlin 
Heidelberg. 2015), at 1-8, 957-965. 
160 A. Lerman Joshua, et al., In silico method for modelling metabolism and gene product 
expression at genome scale, 3 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS (2012); Nicole L. Fong, et al., 
Reconciling a Salmonella enterica metabolic model with experimental data confirms that 
overexpression of the glyoxylate shunt can rescue a lethal ppc deletion mutant, 342 FEMS 
MICROBIOLOGY LETTERS (2013). 
161 OECD, Marine Biotechnology: Enabling Solutions for Ocean Productivity and 
Sustainability. 2013, at 74.  
162 This share includes drugs marketed which have been extracted directly from sources found 
in nature or synthesized from natural-product source material or templates, Li, J., Vederas, J., 
(2009) “Drug discovery and natural products: End of an era or endless frontier,” Science, 325, 
161-165.; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (US), FROM MONSOONS TO MICROBES : 
UNDERSTANDING THE OCEAN'S ROLE IN HUMAN HEALTH (Washington, D.C.: National 







However, these numbers do not account for differences between marine and 
terrestrial bioprospecting. Also, considering the notoriously long product 
development cycles in biotechnology, it is too early for the output of the second 




To summarize the development of marine biotechnology, perspectives on 
marine bioprospecting have undergone pendular movements in recent decades. 
The hopes for a biotechnology boom after the breakthrough of large-scale gene 
sequence methods in the 1990s gave rise to widespread enthusiasm for 
bioprospecting. This also explains the focus on sovereign rights to genetic 
resources during the negotiation of the CBD, as well as the subsequent 
negotiations of the Nagoya Protocol. On the marine side, the discovery of deep-
sea ecosystems and their extremophiles boosted hopes for a biotech bonanza, 
which was a major motivation for the launching of the biological diversity 
beyond national jurisdiction process under UNCLOS. 
 
On the commercial side, an initial interest in investing in bioprospecting was 
quickly replaced with widespread disinterest, as combinatorial chemistry 
became heralded as providing a standard formula for all product development. 
However, public and academic interest would persist and manifest in the 
establishment of considerable library collections of marine samples. 
 
As combinatorial chemistry and other artificial drug development methods 
would prove unable to reverse the disappointing product development trend in 
pharmacology, attention was again turned to bioprospecting. Moreover, some 
of the commercial pharmaceutical projects which had been initiated during the 
marine bioprospecting boom years of the 1990s, and which had not been 
abolished, started to bear fruit. Two of the more highlighted marine 
bioprospecting products developed in recent years, Halaven and Aplidine, 
discussed above, are good representations of this hibernation effect from the 
first wave of bioprospecting.163 
 
163 The compound in Aplidine was isolated from the Mediterranean tunicate Aplidium albicans 
and has shown activity against certain types of tumor (medullary thyroid carcinoma, renal 
carcinoma, melanoma, and tumors of neuroendocrine origin) and has also been reported to 
inhibit the secretion of vascular endothelial growth factor related to angiogenesis, United 






As a result of the renewed interest in bioprospecting, the marine-related pre-
clinical pipeline for drug development started to grow. By 2010, there were 
over 36 marine-derived drugs in clinical development, including 15 for 
cancers. Almost half of all ongoing anti-cancer discovery efforts focused on 
marine organisms. By 2012, seven marine-derived drugs had received FDA 
approval, 11 drugs were in clinical testing, and 1,458 were in the clinical 
pipeline.164 
 
The current optimism connected to marine bioprospecting in the 
pharmaceutical sector is largely the result of technological developments such 
as genetic engineering which increases the practical advantages of basing 
product development on natural genetic resources. The benefit of 
bioprospecting in comparison with synthetic or combinatorial chemistry is that 
it enables humans to utilize the refinement and development performed by 
evolution, instead of having to start from scratch. Similarly, the advantage of 
basing pharmaceutical product development on bioprospecting, instead of 
synthetic or combinatorial chemistry, is that application has already been tried 
out in nature.  
 
While the “proof of concept” for bioactivity of secondary metabolites is clearly 
evident in nature, this is not the case for chemicals produced through 
combinatorial chemistry. Secondary metabolites produced by living organisms 
are therefore commonly superior to compounds synthesized by combinatorial 
chemistry. The challenges involved in bioprospecting are often converse 
compared to synthetic or combinatorial chemistry. Whereas the function and 
effect of bioactivity in naturally occurring secondary metabolites are often 
evident, the scientific challenge often relates to identifying the mode of action. 
In synthetic or combinatorial chemistry, the major challenge is commonly 
connected to detecting potential bioactivity in large-scale high-throughput 
technology.165 Although the challenges connected to the mode of action for 
bioactive function are still considerable, new technological tools have 
facilitated the solving of this puzzle. 
 
 
Genetic Resources: Scientific Research, Commercial Uses and a Database on Marine 
Bioprospecting. 2007. 
164 OECD, Marine Biotechnology: Enabling Solutions for Ocean Productivity and 
Sustainability. 2013;Glaser & Mayer, BIOCHEMICAL PHARMACOLOGY (2009), at 32. 







B.6. Contemporary use of marine genetic resources in 
biotechnology 
 
It has thus been established that although interest in bioprospecting has fluctu-
ated throughout history, it is currently strong. Moreover, it appears that the role 
of natural components in bioprospecting has become increasingly complex and 
ambiguous in recent years. In the next section, these bioprospecting innovation 
chains will be explored. But before going into the question of how parts or 
functions of marine organisms are turned into products, the input and output of 
the bioprospecting innovation chains will be discussed.  
 
In this section, it will firstly be described what type of genetic material 
comprise the primary subjects of contemporary bioprospecting interest. 
Secondly, estimates of what types of organisms are of interest to 
bioprospecting will be discussed. Thirdly, an inventory of products developed 
by means of marine bioprospecting will be presented. 
 
B.6.1. Genetic material used in marine bioprospecting 
 
As discussed in the previous section, marine bioprospecting for new products 
has increased significantly in recent years. The bioactive properties, which so 
far have been used in marine biotechnology product development, originate in 
an extensive number of organisms, belonging to all kingdoms of life: animal, 
plant, bacteria, fungi and protist species.166  
 
Considering the nature of the regulation, as well as the complex process of 
bioprospecting, the main issue is not just the organisms from which such 
genetic material is sourced; it is equally vital to ascertain what type of genetic 
 
166 Until recently, marine invertebrates have been the most important source. Since the 1990s, 
the sponges (Porifera) account for almost half of new natural products. Corals and jellies 
(Cnidaria) for 30%, seastars and other Echinodermata, vertebrates (Chordata) and mollusk 
(Mollusca) for each 5%, according to estimates. Further compounds have been found in 
polychaetes (Annelida), moss animals (Bryozoa), flatworms (Platyhelminthes), acorn worms 
and relatives (Hemichordata), lamp shells (Brachiopoda) and crustaceans (Arthropoda). Miguel 
Costa Leal, et al., Bioprospecting of marine invertebrates for new natural products - a chemical 
and zoogeographical perspective, 17 MOLECULES (BASEL, SWITZERLAND) (2012); Ulrike 
Lindequist, Marine-Derived Pharmaceuticals - Challenges and Opportunities, 24 
BIOMOLECULES & THERAPEUTICS (2016); Paul V. R. Snelgrove, An ocean of discovery: 






material is being used. This is because it appears to be of considerable 
importance under both the law of the sea and international environmental law 
what type of material is actually extracted and to what extent it physically 
forms part of subsequent product development. Moreover, in the practical 
development of products based on bioprospecting, the type of genetic material 
used may in some cases be more relevant than the exact species in which it 
originates. This is because the same type of genetic material is commonly 
collected with similar methods and technologies, irrespective of species. The 
type of genetic material used also highly correlates with the category of product 
developed, as will be discussed.  
 
What types of genetic material, then, are used in bioprospecting? In assess-
ments of genetic material used in bioprospecting, as carried out by Jabour-
Green and Oldham, a division has been made between three main categories:167 
 
- Genetic information (DNA, RNA and amino acid sequences and 
metabolic pathways performing particular functions);  
- Chemical compounds; 
- Raw extracts of marine organisms. 
 
The first category is probably most frequently associated with the term genetic 
resources. These resources are associated with bioprospecting that seeks to 
form the basis for the production of pharmaceuticals, medicines and enzymes. 
Normally, such bioprospecting involves the use of different research tools in 
order to decipher and analyze sequence data. 
 
Resources in the second category are also regularly associated with pharma-
ceuticals and medicines. The difference in comparison to the first category is 
that bioprospecting of chemical compounds does not depend on analysis of the 
underlying genetic structure or interactions within the organism. Rather, it may 
require repeated collections of chemical compounds from the organism of in-
terest until such time that a compound is fully characterized and a synthetic or 
semi-synthetic route is found to produce the compound of interest.168 
 
167 Julia Jabour-Green & Dianne Nicol, Bioprospecting in areas outside national jurisdiction: 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, 4 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2003);Oldham. 2014. 







The third category of raw extracts from marine organisms differs markedly 
from the previous two in one important regard. Whereas the first two categories 
of resources are of interest primarily for analysis and the potential of 
reproducing certain functions, it is the physical compound itself that is of 
interest in the third category. The collection of raw extract seeks to use the 
resources as direct intermediate goods in the production of different products, 
which can range from nutritional products to pharmaceuticals or cosmetics. 
This implies that larger quantities are usually necessary in the development of 
products based on resources in the third category. Whereas the first two 
categories are commonly sampled in limited amounts, the third are collected 
in bulk. 
 
Genetic information  
 
The first category of marine genetic resources typically focuses on DNA and 
amino acid sequences used to encode information for the expression product 
of interest, such as an enzyme, which can then be synthesized in an industrial 
host organism such as yeast or bacterium. An example of this is Green 
Fluorescent Protein (GFP), as will be discussed in section B.6.2. The gene 
responsible for GFP was first isolated in the jellyfish Aequorea victoria and is 
now widely used in biotechnology as an expression marker, produced in the 
engineered bacterium Escherichia coli.169 
 
Sampling of this category of resources has certain characteristics of legal 
importance, as will be discussed in section B.6.3. Foremost, the collection of 
DNA, amino sequences and similar genetic resources typically does not require 
large-scale and repeated consumptive use of a marine organism once the 
synthesis process has been developed.170 But there are also cases of supply-side 
challenges.  
 
169 Id, at 151. 
170 For example, Green Fluorescent Protein (GFP) is widely used in biotechnology as an 
expression marker and is widely available as a synthesised commercial product for in the region 
of $250-300 per 300 micrograms (ug). The gene responsible for GFP was first isolated in the 
jellyfish Aequorea victoria but the protein is now produced in the engineered bacterium 
Escherichia coli. (Ibid, MARTIN CHALFIE & STEVEN R. KAIN, GREEN FLUORESCENT PROTEIN: 






Often the compound of interest is present only in low amounts and can be very 
difficult to isolate.171 In the case of tissues of marine invertebrates, which 
present unique extraction-related problems due to their high water and salt 
content, this problem has been considered particularly challenging. 
Irrespective of what type of bioprospecting the compound is subsequently used 
for, several grams to hundreds of grams may be required for pre-clinical 
development, and multikilogram quantities for clinical phases.172 
 
Although there are thus cases of marine bioprospecting development based on 
DNA, RNA, and amino acid sequences where larger quantities are necessary, 
normally only limited physical samples are required, at least in comparison 
with conventional resource extraction, such as fisheries. From an 
environmental standpoint, this form of marine bioprospecting may call for less 
concern than cases in which natural compounds constitute a more direct 
ingredient, as well as compared to other forms of living resource collection in 
general. 
 
As discussed in section B.2, this type of marine bioprospecting often targets 
endemic species and fragile ecosystems, such as hydrothermal vents. This is 
because these areas and species are most likely to have extreme or unusual 
functions, useful for biotechnical product development. The same 
characteristics, however, make these ecosystems particularly sensitive to 
human activity. Even very limited operations may have a significant negative 
impact in areas comprising a high degree of endemism. The limited quantities 
sampled in bioprospecting operations does not necessarily mean that the 
collection of this category of genetic material can be conducted without the 
risk of causing detrimental environmental effects. The limited quantity of 
samples also has other consequences. Foremost, no continuous supply is 
necessary. This makes freeriding from legal requirements easier. Product 
developers less concerned with legal obligations connected to the use of marine 





171 Molinski, et al., Nature Reviews Drug Discovery (2008). 







This is closely connected to the second characteristic of sampling of DNA, 
amino sequences and similar genetic resources: Only in few cases can a 
developed product be traced back to a physical genetic component sampled at 
a specific time and location. As discussed in section B.5.10, the bioprospecting 
development chain has increasingly been divided and fragmented between 
different entities. Physical sampling is often conducted by academic scientific 
expeditions, with no direct commercial ambition. Commercial development 
may start directly once the bioactive function has been identified. However, it 
appears more common that the sample is deposited in a culture collection by 
the research institution and sourced from there by other entities for further 
study much later.173 The bioactive function may already have been identified 
before the research project is finished, but not deemed commercially viable. 
Or, more commonly, the research institution conducting the sampling has no 
direct interest in commercial development. In any event, the culture collections 
of marine genetic resources that have been established in several countries and 
are commonly freely accessible for biotechnology developers do not have a 
standardized system for indicating where and when a sample was taken.174 
Similarly, such geographic indications are commonly lacking in patent data.175 
Taken together, this makes it particularly difficult to ascertain where the 
genetic material is sourced in bioprospecting based on DNA, amino sequences 
and similar genetic resources.176 As will be discussed in section B.6, not being 
able to establish geographical origin for marine genetic resources poses a major 
challenge for the application of international law rules. 
 
Chemical compounds 
The bioprospecting interest connected to marine genetic resources is by no 
means limited to genetic information. There has been growing interest, both 
scientifically and commercially, in chemical compounds from marine 
organisms. An estimate in 2007 suggested that more than 15,000 molecules 
 
173 ARICÒ. 2015. 
174 OECD, Marine Biotechnology Definitions, Infrastructures and Directions for Innovation 
2017. 
175 Oldham. 2014., at 17. 
176 Robert Blasiak, et al., Corporate control and global governance of marine genetic resources, 






from marine genetic resources had been isolated and described.177 Although 
equally ambitious estimates appear difficult to find more recently, it can be 
assumed that the number has risen markedly in recent years. Just in 2012, 1,241 
new compounds were reported.178 This clearly identifies the marine 
environment as a rich source of bioactive molecules. 
Bioprospecting based on chemical compounds differs considerably from the 
first category by having the physical compound from or produced by marine 
organisms as the main target, rather than an underlying genetic structure. 
Whereas DNA, RNA and amino acid sequences are often gathered during an 
isolated sampling expedition, chemical compounds commonly require 
repeated collections from the organism of interest. For chemical compounds, 
it appears that the development of products for cosmetic uses generally 
requires larger quantities of natural material than is the case for pharmaceutical 
development.179  
Many natural products derived from marine organisms are complex organic 
compounds that possess unique structures, often molecularly arranged in 
complex three-dimensional formations. Such compounds cannot be duplicated 
by chemical synthesis in laboratories.180 Attempts have been made to overcome 
supply-side barriers by developing synthetic or chemosynthetic analogues, 
derivatives with more manageable properties, or by design of a pharmacophore 
of reduced complexity which can then be synthesized. However, these 
approaches face considerable challenges. Although synthesizing relevant 
chemical compounds in marine bioprospecting of chemical compounds in 
many cases is possible, it may require considerable investment and is not 
always economically viable.181 Total synthesis is by no means an easy 
undertaking, and chemistry has a very long way to go before it can make any 
molecule in a way that is practically feasible.182  
 
177 Richard J. McLaughlin, “Marine Genetic Resources Exploitation and Intellectual Property 
Rights Protection” in VIDAS. 2010, at 372.  
178 Martins, et al., MARINE DRUGS (2014). 
179 Ibid. 
180 Gregory L. Rorrer, Bioprocess Engineering of Phototrophic Marine Organisms in SPRINGER 
HANDBOOK OF MARINE BIOTECHNOLOGY (Se-Kwon Kim ed. 2015). 
181 Ira Bhatnagar & Se-Kwon Kim, Marine antitumor drugs: status, shortfalls and strategies, 8 
MARINE DRUGS (2010). 







In some cases, eventually a synthetic or semi-synthetic route is found to 
produce the compound of interest. But developing such alternatives to the use 
of natural compounds is often costly and may only be a viable option at a high 
market output, once a commercial product has already become successful.183  
 
Genetic engineering has been suggested as a solution to supply-side problems 
in bioprospecting. The principle of this method is that genetic information for 
the desired compound is transferred into host cells, which can be more easily 
cultivated. In this manner, the genetic engineering operation facilitates 
sustainable and larger scale production of the compound in the host cells.184 
However, the technology faces considerable challenges. Not only does it 
require the exact knowledge of the genetic information of the natural organism 
producing the relevant compound and the isolation and expression of that 
organism’s genes; it is also necessary to identify a viable host organism. 
Although this approach has been successfully realized on the research level, it 
has not yet been applied on an industrial scale for marine bioprospecting.185 
 
Mariculture186 and aquaculture187 have also been attempted in order to solve the 
problem of sustainable supply of macro-organisms. In other cases, the marine 
organism itself may be used as a living cell factory for the biological synthesis 
of the desired compounds. The living cell factory may be made up of intact 
organisms, as well as of tissue or cell culture derived from the organism. Once 
set up, the cell factory can be used to produce compounds of active 
metabolites.188 
 
However, the unique and sometimes exclusive conditions of the sea make 
cultivation or maintenance of the isolated samples very difficult and often 
impossible. For example, sponges and their microbiota are generally not 
suitable for cultivation. As a consequence, the only possible option for 
developers may be to extract and purify the compound of interest from 
 
183 George Frisvold & Kelly Day-Rubenstein, Bioprospecting and Biodiversity Conservation: 
What Happens When Discoveries are Made?, 50 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW (2008), at 546. 
184 Lindequist, Biomolecules & Therapeutics (2016). 
185 Ibid. 
186 The favoring by farming the growth of the organism in its natural milieu. 
187 Culture of the organism under artificial conditions. 






specimens collected in the wild.189 This type of issue is particularly prevalent 
in relation to organisms such as sea sponges and tunicates that produce highly 
complex compounds in low quantities, which even with advanced technology 
is difficult to copy synthetically. Oldham has discussed how this can raise 
conservation issues.190 A recently discussed example of this is the substance 
shark squalene-based adjuvant used in vaccine production. Conservationist 
organizations have feared that production of vaccine for COVID-19 will 
require harvesting tissue from half a million sharks.191 Supply-side constraints 
have been raised as a substantial challenge in the development of several 
marine bioprospecting-based pharmaceuticals.192 Many species of micro-
organisms produce specific metabolites at specific phases of their growth. A 
slight alteration in the culture parameters may lead to changes in the amount 
and type of metabolite produced, thus leading to insufficient supply of the 
compound.193  
 
Bioprospecting of chemical compounds can be distinguished from DNA, RNA 
and amino acid sequences and metabolic pathways in certain key respects, 
which also have legal implications. Firstly, the requirement for repeated 
collection calls for higher quantities of the marine genetic resource. Secondly, 
as a result, the bioprospecting of chemical compounds may have a higher 
environmental impact. Thirdly, since physical chemical compound is the main 
target rather than an underlying genetic structure, the use of genetic technology 
and the questions it raises are less relevant in the case of chemical compounds.  
 
 
189 A relatively well-known example of this outside the marine realm is the best-selling cancer 
drug Taxol, derived from the endangered Pacific Yew (Taxus brevifolia), which required 
government incentives to promote the quest for a semi-synthetic and fully synthetic means to 
produce the compound that did not require repeated collection of the bark of this tree. Moreover, 
it took over 20 years before the first complete synthesis of the compound was reported. Miguel 
Leal, et al., Bioprospecting of Marine Invertebrates for New Natural Products - A Chemical and 
Zoogeographical Perspective, 17 MOLECULES (2012); Frisvold & Day-Rubenstein, ARIZONA 
LAW REVIEW (2008), at 555. 
190 Such as in the case with the Pacific Yew above, see Oldham. 2014., at 151. 
191 Katherine J. Wu, Coronavirus Vaccine Makers Are Not Mass-Slaughtering Sharks, NEW 
YORK TIMES, October 13. 2020. 
192 As discussed below in section B.6.2, lack of compound supply was raised as a major 
hindrance in the studies on the marine drug Laurenditerpenol. This does not appear to be 
uncommon.  







Fourthly, similarly to DNA, RNA and amino acid sequences, bioprospecting 
for chemical compounds relates to an isolated function of a marine genetic 
resource, rather than the direct consumption of an organism. Patenting may 
thus be possible in bioprospecting involving both categories of genetic 
material. This is particularly relevant in cases where methods are established 
to synthesize or otherwise refine chemical compounds. Much like when 
employing genetic technology on DNA, RNA and amino acid sequences, this 
may fulfill the requirement for an innovative step, as called for in patent law. 
 
Raw extracts 
The third category consists of raw extracts of organisms. The commercial use 
of products based on such resources usually depends on repeated harvesting. 
The best-known example of marine genetic resources is Omega-3 fatty acids 
that are extracted from fish, as well as Antarctic krill and marine mammals, to 
serve growing markets for Omega-3 products. As opposed to the use of DNA, 
RNA and amino acid sequences, as well as chemical compounds in 
bioprospecting, the use of the physical marine component is usually a central 
element in product development involving raw extracts.194 Commonly, the 
concept of the product in this third category is human or other direct 
consumption of part of or the full marine organism, often by means of 
digestion. Raw extract product development thus lacks an equivalent to the 
sequencing and synthesizing components often used in the previous categories. 
Indeed, analysis relating to the active compound is often lacking entirely. It is 
thus often more difficult to obtain patent protection in the development of raw 
extract products. Moreover, for practical purposes, the direct consumption 
element in this category of product development makes it more akin to 
traditional uses of marine organisms, such as seafood. 
Although product development involving raw extracts in many contexts is 
labeled as bioprospecting, these characteristics also make it questionable 
whether the definition of bioprospecting as set out in section B.1 encompasses 
such products. Raw product development based on raw extracts may entail a 
process as called for in the definition. It also includes a clear commercial 
ambition, commonly from the moment of collection (which is not always the 
case in marine bioprospecting).  
 






The collection, conducted in the marine environment, is often a central element 
in the product. Three of the four criteria for bioprospecting thus pose no 
challenge for product development based on raw extracts. The requirement for 
a derivation element, by contrast, raises considerable challenges. In raw extract 
product development, the analytical step is often minimal, particularly when 
compared to the first two categories. Indeed, it can be claimed that simply 
extracting fatty acids from fish has more in common with filleting fish meat 
than bioprospecting. This also means that for legal purposes, the collection of 
raw extracts qualifies and is managed as fisheries. Accordingly, this 
investigation will not focus on product development based on marine raw 
extracts, but instead will focus on the first two categories. 
 
B.6.2. Products developed 
 
It has thus been reviewed how the marine biosphere harbors an enormous 
variety of organisms, with fundamentally more diverse characteristics 
compared to those in the terrestrial environment. In order to survive in the 
challenging conditions of the sea, some have developed adaptation 
mechanisms in the form of specific secondary metabolites. The biological 
activities of these metabolites have increasingly been regarded as possible 
drugs for human use. It was also discussed how this interest in using the 
functions of marine organisms as the basis for biotechnology development has 
fluctuated over the years. After initial discoveries in the 1950s, research on 
marine products accelerated in the 1970s, and began to appeal to different 
disciplines, including biochemistry, biology, ecology, organic chemistry, and 
pharmacology. Much as the result of developments in genetic technology, 
interest in bioprospecting appears to be high at present, having recovered from 
a downturn during the 1990s when the industry favored synthetic approaches.  
 
To a large extent, the pharmaceutical interest in bioprospecting is thus 
connected to secondary metabolites. Although this investigation focuses on 
pharmaceutical biotechnology, it should be borne in mind that marine 
bioprospecting is a broader concept, which includes a multitude of activities. 
It can be undertaken for the development of a broad range of products. 
Investigations into the unusual characteristics of organisms from the deep sea 







diverse range of applications, from the development of enzymes for industrial 
processes to skincare products.195 
 
In the pharmaceutical field, a large portion of molecules from deep-sea 
organisms are still being clinically tested. Current pharmaceutical 
bioprospecting primarily focuses on potential drugs in the field of anesthesia, 
anti-inflammation, cancer and HIV/AIDS. However, some of the deep-sea 
molecules have led to the development of products already available on the 
market. About 30,000 compounds of marine origin are known and, since 2008, 
more than 1,000 compounds are newly discovered each year.196 What sort of 
product development has this brought about? As of 2016, seven 
pharmaceutical drugs based on marine genetic resources had been approved by 
the FDA. The relatively low number reflects the difficulty of turning 
biotechnological discoveries into commercial drugs. Moreover, it can be 




In recent years, improvements in the technology of deep-sea collection and 
culture and the growing understanding of marine biodiversity have increased 
interest in exploring the oceans as a potential source of new anti-cancer 
candidates.198 The use of marine organisms in the development of cytostatic 
drugs is, however, far from new. As discussed in section B.5.2, the first marine 
bioactive compounds – spongouridine and spongothymidine – were isolated 
from the Caribbean sponge Cryptotheca crypta already in the early 1950s. In 
the mid-1960s, scientists proved that they had anti-cancer and anti-viral 
activity.199 Based on this discovery, the synthetic analogue cytosine 
arabinoside Cytarabine was developed (marketed under the name cytarabine).  
 
195 Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), at 185. 
196 Paula Kiuru, et al., Exploring marine resources for bioactive compounds., 80(14) PLANTA 
MED (2014). 
197 Out of the seven approved drugs, four are used for the treatment of cancer. Each another one 
is applicated for treatment of viral diseases, chronic pain and to lower triglyceride level in blood. 
Some other products are of interest in diagnostic and as experimental tools, Lindequist, 
BIOMOLECULES & THERAPEUTICS (2016). 
198 Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), at 186. 






The drug was approved by the FDA in 1969 and is a potent anti-leukemic 
agent.200 It is still used extensively in the treatment of acute myeloid 
leukemia.201  
 
Similarly used for cytostatic treatment, Trabectedin (marketed as Yondelis) 
was isolated from the sea squirt Ecteinascidia turbinata. The drug was 
approved by the EU in 2007 and by the FDA in 2015. Living on corals in the 
Mediterranean, the ascidians from which Trabectedin was isolated produce the 
active compound as a defense against micro-organisms.202  
 
Likewise proclaimed as a new type of drug by combining a highly cytotoxic 
compound with a tumor-specific antibody, Brentuximab vedotin (marketed as 
Adcetris) consists of the active compound monomethyl auristatin which 
functions as an antibody against tumor cells in Hodgkin lymphoma and 
systemic anaplastic large cell lymphoma. The active compound, Auristatin, is 
a synthetic analogue of the marine natural product dolastatin. The dolastatins 
are a series of cytotoxic peptides that were originally isolated in very low 
amounts from the Indian Ocean mollusk Dolabella auricularia.203  
 
The already mentioned Eribulin mesylate (marketed as Halaven) is a synthetic 
analogue of halichondrin B, an active compound isolated from the marine 
sponge Halichondria okadai used in the treatment of locally advanced or 
metastatic breast cancer which has progressed after chemotherapeutic 
regimens for advanced disease.204 Initially, the active substance of halichondrin 
was derived directly from the marine sponge.  
 
200 Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), at 185. 
201 Lindequist, BIOMOLECULES & THERAPEUTICS (2016), at 564.  
202 The active compound in Trabectedin has been described as representing a new class of anti-
tumor drugs by acting both on cancer cells and on the tumor microenvironment. This cytostatic 
activity is represented by the prevention of transcription by preventing the binding of 
transcription factors to DNA, id. at 564.  
203 However, subsequently the discovery was made that producer of dolastatins are actually 
cyanobacteria of the genus Symploca. Since it is highly toxic, the drug is administered by direct 
injection into tumor cells. The FDA approved the drug in 2011 for cases of relapse of Hodgkins 
lymphoma after stem-cell transplantation. Id. at 564.  







This led to substantial supply-side challenges; one ton was required just to 
derive 300mg of active substance. Eventually direct natural sourcing was 
replaced by chemical synthesis.205 
 
In addition to these approved drugs, many scientific articles have been 
published since 1999 describing the anti-tumor and cytotoxic properties of 
numerous marine natural products.206 These substances have been considered 
to have a high potential for developing pharmaceuticals that can disrupt tumor-
specific cell signaling, cell division, energy metabolism, gene expression, drug 
resistance and blood supply with the potential to revolutionize cancer 
treatment.207 
 
Still, drug development based on marine bioprospecting in the cancer field has 
encountered considerable challenges and few drugs have reached the market. 
Plenty of reasons have been raised as explanatory factors. Some of these are 
not connected to the marine resource or technology as such, but relate to 
government policies, lack of infrastructure and insufficient capital investment. 
 
205 The chemo-preventive and potential anticancer activity of marine sponge-derived compounds 
could be explained by multiple cellular and molecular mechanisms, including DNA protection, 
cell-cycle modulation, apoptosis, and anti-inflammatory activities as well as their ability to 
chemosensitize cancer cells to traditional antiblastic chemotherapy. Cinzia Calcabrini, et al., 
Marine Sponge Natural Products with Anticancer Potential: An Updated Review, 15 MARINE 
DRUGS (2017). 
206 Largely, these belong to four main structural types, namely polyketides, terpenes, nitrogen-
containing compounds and polysaccharides. The organisms yielding these bioactive marine 
compounds comprised a diverse group of marine animals (tunicates, nudibranchs, sponges, 
octocorals, bryozoans, etc.), algae, fungi, and bacteria. Boris Pejin, et al., Novel and highly 
potent antitumour natural products from cnidarians of marine origin, 28 NATURAL PRODUCT 
RESEARCH (2014). 
207 Prominent in the identification and development of novel anti-cancer agents from marine 
sources is the Spanish biotechnology company Pharma-Mar, which currently has a large number 
of oncology products in late pre-clinical and clinical development. In addition to the above 
described Yondelis, the anti-tumor agent isolated from the Caribbean tunicate Ecteinascidia 
turbinate which has been granted approval, a number of new products are in pipeline. These 
include Aplidin (Aplidine), a cyclopeptide cytotoxic agent derived from the Mediterranean 
tunicate Aplidium albicans. Kahalalide F, a depsi-peptide isolated from the Hawaiian mollusk 
Elysia rufescens has undergone Phase II clinical trials; and ES-285, a molecule isolated from the 
mollusk Spisula polynyma. Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), pp. 185-186.; Dale G. Nagle 
& Yu-Dong Zhou, Mechanism-based Screening for Cancer Therapeutics with Examples from 
the Discovery of Marine Natural Product-based HIF-1 Inhibitors, in HANDBOOK OF MARINE 






There are, however, also challenges relating to the use of marine genetic 
resources as the basis for development. These include lack of sufficient amount 
of natural product, difficulties in accessing the source of the samples, problems 
associated with harvesting of the product, troubles in synthesizing the 
necessary amounts of the compound, difficulties in isolation and purification 
procedures, high toxicity of the active compound.208 Many species of micro-
organisms produce specific metabolites at specific phases of their growth. A 
slight alteration in the culture parameters may lead to changes in the amount 





Together with Cytarabine described above, the anti-viral drug Vidarabine is 
the oldest pharmaceutical drug based on marine genetic resources that is still 
in use. Like Cytarabine it results from active functions in sponge nucleosides 
discovered in the 1950s. The drug inhibits the DNA synthesis of herpes and 
other viruses. In the EU, it is used in the form of eye drops for the treatment of 
acute eye infection, recurrent epithelial keratitis caused by herpes simplex type 




Among the relatively newly discovered chemical entities with biological 
activity is the conotoxin found in the cone snail, as discussed in section B.5.7, 
whose venom, which is usually lethal to humans, may be used for anesthesia, 
analgesics or as drugs for the treatment of conditions such as epilepsy, 
cardiovascular disease, and psychiatric disorders.211  
 
208 For example, studies om the promising marine HIF inhibitor Laurenditerpenol were hindered 
by a lack of compound supply. Dale Nagle & Yu-Dong Zhou, Marine Natural Products as 
Inhibitors of Hypoxic Signaling in Tumors, 8 PHYTOCHEMISTRY REVIEWS (2009) Bhatnagar & 
Kim, MARINE DRUGS (2010), at 2711. 
209 Bhatnagar & Kim, MARINE DRUGS (2010), at 2711. 
210 Martins, et al., MARINE DRUGS (2014). 
211 These molecules (conotoxins) have a strong commercial interest, and more than 100 patents 
and patent applications with the term ‘‘conotoxin’’ reflected in their title may be found in the 







The first conotoxin-based medicine, the pain medication Ziconotide (also 
marketed under the name Prialt), was approved by the US Federal Drug 
Agency in December 2004.212 Many other molecules have shown similar 




Whereas fish oil is used extensively as a food supplement, there are also 
approved drugs based on marine natural acids. The drug Lovaza is produced 
through derivation of natural acids and is used to normalize triglyceride levels 




Whereas all pharmaceuticals previously mentioned in this section are based on 
marine organisms that can be retrieved from marine areas relatively close to 
the coasts, hence in maritime areas under national jurisdiction, the important 
enzymes Taq polymerase and Pfu have been isolated from the bacterium 
Thermus aquaticus and the marine thermophile Pyrococcus fuiosus (an 
extremophilic species of Archaea). Both these types of organisms live around 
hydrothermal vents. As discussed in Part A, such vents are biological hotspots 
and commonly occur in mid-oceanic areas, at the intersection of tectonic 
plates, far from the continental shelves of coastal states. Both Taq polymerase 
and Pfu have become vital tools in polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a method 
for greatly amplifying the quantity of short segments of DNA. This method has 
been vital for developing modern genetic analysis. In such laboratory 
operations, the same bioactive function in the bacterium which enables it to 
thrive at extreme temperatures in the vicinity of deep-sea vents is employed to 
facilitate various forms of genetic sequencing and engineering.  
 
212 Developed as an alternative to conventional chronic pain treatments such as opioids, the ac-
tive component of Ziconotide is a synthetic peptide derivative based on the toxin of the common 
Indo-Pacific marine cone snail Conus magus, originally collected from Indonesia. The snails use 
the peptide as toxin for defense and prey capture by injecting it into fish, resulting in paralysis. 
Ziconotide is approved for patients with severe chronic pain and is administered by direct injec-
tion into spinal fluid. A considerable advantage to morphine is that the analgetic effect maintains 
over months without causing tolerance. Equally important, it does not lead to dependency or 
respiratory depression. Lindequist, BIOMOLECULES & THERAPEUTICS (2016), at 566. 
213 Leary, et al., MARINE POLICY (2009), at 185. 
214 Alexandros Tsoupras, et al., Bioprospecting for Antithrombotic Polar Lipids from Salmon, 






Similarly used as a tool in laboratory analysis, green fluorescent protein (GFP) 
has been isolated from the jellyfish Aequorea victoria. The protein functions 
as a biological marker for labeling cellular structures. Also commonly 
employed in laboratory analysis, Phycoerythrin and other pigments from 
photoautotrophic cyanobacreria can be used both in vitro and in vivo as a 
fluorescence-based indicator and for labeling antibodies.215  
 
Current development pipeline 
 
In addition to the developed products discussed above, there is a considerable 
number of potential products in the pipeline, as the result of the interest in 
marine bioprospecting in recent years. As already stated, current 
pharmaceutical bioprospecting primarily focuses on potential drugs in the field 
of anesthesia, anti-inflammation, cancer and HIV/AIDS.216 Some marine 
products have been shown to have potent anti-inflammatory action. Many 
marine compounds have been investigated for such anti-inflammatory 
properties.217 In the field of HIV/AIDS, more than 150 natural products with 
promising levels of anti-HIV activity have been isolated from marine 
organisms.218 
 
In addition, outside the four categories of disease mentioned, marine organisms 
are being used in drug development. Anti-fungal functions in sponges have 
been considered useful in the treatment of certain infection disease.  
 
215 The substance Limulus-Amoebocyte-Lysate (LAL) originating in the crab Limulus 
polyphemus is also worth noting. It is used in standard tests for sensitive detection of pyrogenic 
lipopolysaccharides (LPS) from gram-negative bacteria. Moreover, Keyhole limpet hemocyanin 
(KLH) is a large metalloprotein which is harvested from cultures of the giant keyhole limpet 
Megathura crenulata, a marine mollusk living off the coasts of Western United States. It is used 
as a vaccine component and is also clinically used for the treatment of bladder carcinoma. 
Lindequist, BIOMOLECULES & THERAPEUTICS (2016), at 568. 
216 Marris, NATURE (2006). 
217 For instance bolinaquinone and petrosaspongiolide M are two marine products with potent 
anti-inflammatory action, which may have potential in treating intestinal inflammatory diseases. 
Jérôme Busserolles, et al., Protection against 2,4,6-trinitrobenzenesulphonic acid-induced 
colonic inflammation in mice by the marine products bolinaquinone and petrosaspongiolide M, 
69 BIOCHEMICAL PHARMACOLOGY (2005). 
218 These includes proteins from alga, various sulfated polusaccharides from seaweeds, peptides 







Similarly, testing of compounds based on marine genetic resources is currently 
being carried out in the context of tuberculosis and for anti-bacterial, anti-
parasitic and anti-coagulant agents. There appears to be a particular interest in 
research relating to the marine cyanobacteria, which are associated with 
hydrothermal vents. A derivate is already used in the treatment of migraine.219 
 
B.6.3. The bioprospecting development cycle  
As has been established, the way in which marine bioprospecting has been 
conducted has altered throughout history. Generally, the competition with 
other approaches in pharmaceutical development has caused the interest in 
bioprospecting to fluctuate. Likewise, the role of the physical genetic material 
in the final product has shifted. In the early years, organisms with useful 
properties were used more or less directly. Gradually, the physical organisms 
have become less directly used in bioprospecting products. In more recent 
product development, the marine genetic resource has in many cases merely 
provided information, which has subsequently been mimicked or re-
engineered in bioprospecting processes. But this is not the case in all processes. 
Rather, contemporary bio-based pharmaceutical development is characterized 
by considerable variations. In some of the cases discussed in the previous 
section, the natural component merely represents a source of inspiration for 
biotechnology development. In other cases, large physical quantities of marine 
genetic resources are collected in bulk, to form a major part of or even the full 
substance in the final product. These differences in the role of the genetic 
resource in bioprospecting processes represent challenges in relation to law. In 
particular, cases where the connection between the final product and the natural 
genetic resource is remote could be complicated to address under legal rules 
focusing on natural source. In order to identify how international law rules 
apply to bioprospecting, further examination of the bioprospecting 
development cycle is necessary.  
Attempts to track the path from the discovery of an organism with interesting 
properties to the final development of products and processes have been made 
in the past, but they have run into difficulties.220  
 
219 Id. at 187. 






Firstly, product and processes are often marketed under different names, with 
ambiguous references to the link to marine organisms. Secondly, 
transformation, manipulation and application of the material originating in 
marine organisms is seldom fully disclosed. Thirdly, companies are generally 
reluctant to publicize information relating to product development. Taken 
together, this situation poses considerable challenges to investigations of 
marine bioprospecting development cycles. 
 
Indeed, in assessments of how these resources are turned into commercial 
products, the picture appears quite complex. Data indicates that as a main rule 
in contemporary development, the developer obtains the marine genetic 
resource through an intermediary.221 That is to say, in most cases, the actual 
extraction stage of the bioprospecting process has been undertaken by a 
different entity than the one filing the patent application. This supports the 
suspicion expressed in section A.3.2 that the entity extracting a marine genetic 
resource may not be aware that the resource could subsequently become an 
input in the development of a commercial product, or even that the resource 
will be subject to bioprospecting.222 In many cases, it can be assumed that the 
resource has been extracted during missions conducted for other purposes, 
such as marine scientific research cruises, or even fishing.223  
 
In this section, the nature of contemporary marine bioprospecting will be 
examined more closely and its development cycle dissected. This relates to 
four problems connected to the status of deep-sea bioprospecting under 
international law: 1) the relationship of scientific research activities to 
bioprospecting; 2) at what stage of the bioprospecting development cycle the 
intention to privatize a biological function is introduced;224 3) how to relate to 
development which is in part synthetic and in part bio-based; 4) the scope of 
claims for exclusive rights to bioactive functions in deep-sea marine genetic 
resources by means of patents.225  
 
221 Oldham. 2014., at 147. 
222 Muriel Rabone, et al., Access to Marine Genetic Resources (MGR): Raising Awareness of 
Best-Practice Through a New Agreement for Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ), 
6 FRONTIERS IN MARINE SCIENCE, 2019, VOL. 6 (2019). 
223 Mossop. 2015. 
224 Is the aim to use findings commercially present from the first step in the bioprospecting cycle 
or is it introduced at a later stage, subsequent to the sampling? 







Before starting this examination, the relevance of pursuing this analysis for 
legal purposes will be briefly elaborated. The law of the sea, as discussed in 
section C.1.5, has an established framework for and far-reaching freedom of 
marine scientific research, which extends to the deep seas. However, as noted, 
this precludes appropriation and claims for exclusive rights.226  
 
For marine bioprospecting, the commercial element (commonly connected to 
patent claims) is an integral part of what distinguishes it as an activity. The 
incompatibility between these elements of bioprospecting and the law of the 
sea has prompted some observers to argue that it would go against international 
law rules to base bioprospecting on the freedom to conduct marine scientific 
research, and that bioprospecting by virtue of its definition ought to be 
considered a distinct activity.227  
 
Accordingly, it has been claimed that utilizing marine scientific research 
findings for bioprospecting purposes goes against international obligations. 
Moreover, it has been implied that there is a risk that commercial actors may 
disguise bioprospecting operations as marine scientific research to reap the 
benefits of the permissive rules on marine scientific research.228 
One problem with the idea that these activities are separate is that it 
presupposes that bioprospecting as an activity can be distinguished from 
marine scientific research. In reality, it is difficult to identify what projects 
contain the defining commercial intention. Under the understanding of 
scientific research and bioprospecting as distinct legal concepts, an activity 
would lose its status as scientific research and legally be considered 
bioprospecting if or when an intention to patent a marine genetic resource and 
develop a patent is introduced.229 
 
226 The term bioprospecting is, as similarly discussed in Part C.1 however unfamiliar to the law 
of the sea. 
227 This issue, and in particular the difference between the rules of the high seas and the Area is 
further discussed in section C.1.5. See in particular Tullio Scovazzi, Bioprospecting on the Deep 
Seabed: a Legal Gap Requiring to be Filled, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Tullio Scovazzi & Francesco Francioni eds., 2006). 
228 Also this issue is developed in section C.1.5, See foremost FERNANDA MILLICAY, A LEGAL 
REGIME FOR THE BIODIVERSITY OF THE AREA (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2007). 






There is reason to investigate when such commercial motives are introduced 
in marine research projects, if it precedes or is introduced after the sampling of 
genetic resource and whether a clear-cut division can be made between marine 
scientific research and bioprospecting based on how contemporary develop-
ment cycles actually function. As will be established, the general trend is one 
of increasing interaction and integration between what has traditionally been 
regarded as pure research and commercial development. It has become more 
common that the commercial intention is not introduced until after the physical 
operation in the marine environment has been carried out. In an increasing 
number of cases, bioprospecting is based on material in collections, which 
were sampled as purely scientific activities. 
 
This development challenges the conception of bioprospecting and scientific 
research as distinct and separate activities. Rather, as will be discussed below, 
an investigation of contemporary development cycles in bioprospecting gives 
reason to suspect that even in cases where samples collected as part of scientific 
research expeditions are subsequently used for bioprospecting purposes, it is 
common that no commercial intention is present at the time of sampling. 
Should the activity in such cases up to the point where commercial ambitions 
are introduced230 (but not after) be regarded as marine scientific research? Or 
does the commercial ambition retroactively transform the preceding activities 
in the value chain into bioprospecting? In other words, can the use in 
bioprospecting of a marine genetic resource sample collected in scientific 
research retroactively disqualify the sampling operation from benefiting from 
the scientific research regime? Or should the use of scientifically collected 
samples simply be prohibited from being used in bioprospecting? As will be 
discussed in this section, this would not be in line with the function of the 
bioprospecting development cycle, with its increasing and liberal exchange 
between publicly funded research and commercial development.  
 
Rather than following the perceived distinction between marine scientific 
research and commercial activities in international law rules, bioprospecting 
effectively functions as applied research, building on and integrating pure 
research, which provides the basis for biotechnology innovation. 
 







Moreover, deep-sea marine bioprospecting is often described as involving the 
appropriation of common resources, as discussed in section C.1.4. This 
appropriation can be made up by directly selling genetic material from deep-
sea organisms as products. More commonly, however, such appropriation is 
made up by claiming exclusive rights to the bioactive function of marine 
organisms. The investigation of the bioprospecting development cycle will 
highlight the role of marine genetic resources in product development, ranging 
from natural ingredients to inspiration for synthetic development. The role of 
patents relating to marine genetic resources in bioprospecting product 
development will therefore be a particular focus of the discussion.  
What, then, characterizes the process whereby a living resource is turned into 
a commercial product by means of derivation, as required by the definition of 
bioprospecting? As already indicated, the long journey from sampling of 
marine organism to putting a fully developed product on the market is rarely 
an exclusively private venture conducted by a single legal entity. Rather, it is 
ordinarily the result of an interaction between public research and private 
interests. 
 
Although the process of bioprospecting for marine organisms may differ 
considerably from one case to the next, it can be divided into different phases. 
Examining the nature of this value chain, with particular regard to the 
involvement of private and public interests, will facilitate a discussion on its 
legal nature.231 
 
Based on a procedural description, bioprospecting has previously been 
described as typically consisting of four steps occurring in a linear sequence: 
sampling, isolation, screening and product development.232 Firstly, any 
bioprospecting venture would typically start with the collection of samples, 
although such operations may be preceded by years of identifying target 
organisms.  
 
231 In the present investigation, the emphasis will be less on the final parts of the bioprospecting 
cycle and more on the former, since the central legal issues are more connected to the first stages. 
In particular, the connection to the naturally occurring genetic resource will be discussed, both 
in terms of how it is retrieved (sampling) and explored (laboratory isolation and screening). 
Moreover, the role of patents in the development cycle will be discussed. Final product 
development and marketing are considered less relevant in this context.  






Secondly, the relevant bioactive component is isolated, characterized and 
cultured. Usually, this is conducted in a laboratory environment. Thirdly, the 
bioactive component is screened for pharmaceutical activity. Fourthly, the 
often lengthy product development phase starts with the patenting of a 
function, development of a product, trials, marketing and sales.233 Of these 
steps only the sampling is conducted in a natural environment. Isolation, 
screening and connected analytical work is undertaken in a laboratory 
environment. Final product development is undertaken outside of the 
laboratory environment, once a function of interest has been screened.234 
In addition to these steps, prior to the sampling mission it is necessary to obtain 
the consent of the coastal state of the marine area where the activity is to be 
carried out in case it is located within national jurisdiction, in line with the 
Nagoya Protocol of the Convention on Biological Diversity.235 For operations 
in the high seas, requirements for such procedures do not apply given the lack 
of coastal state sovereign rights. Depending on interpretation of the rules for 
the Area under the law of the sea, bioprospecting in the deep seabed may, 
however, involve a requirement for permit by the International Seabed 
Authority, as will be discussed in section C.1.4. From the perspective of 
bioprospecting actors, the possibility of avoiding the costs involved in 
negotiating coastal state access could represent an incentive to target deep-sea 
areas.236 
Setting aside preparatory work and formal preparations, the bioprospecting 
development cycle stricto sensu has been estimated to last about 15 years all 
in all. Out of this period, the research part comprised of sampling, laboratory 
exploration and screening as well as clinical phases typically lasts around 13 
years, leaving two years for the registration and marketing authorization, as 




234 GUILLOUX. 2018, p. xxvi. 
235 As discussed in Part C.2, bioprospecting requires the prior consent of the coastal state of 
origin of the genetic resource and negotiation regarding the access and fair and equitable sharing 
of benefits (which regularly ranges up to two years). 
236 However, potentially decreased costs relating to procedure and sharing of benefits must of 
course be balanced with the considerable investments required for research cruises far off shore. 







B.6.4. Phase 1 – Sampling 
 
In the sampling phase, which can be regarded as the start of the bioprospecting 
cycle, parts of or whole marine organisms are gathered. Identification or 
collection of a sample is, however, commonly preceded by an extensive 
preparatory phase, where target function or organism may be identified. If the 
intent to use the sample for bioprospecting purposes already exists at the outset 
of the project, sampling is not conducted randomly, but with the aim of 
targeting habitats and ecosystems where there is an increased likelihood of 
finding organisms with pharmaceutically relevant functions. The targeting may 
be more or less specific. Many recent projects have been based on an indication 
that a group of species contains or is likely to contain bioactive functions with 
potential utility in a certain pharmaceutical field, such as pain, cancer or 
inflammation.238  
 
Generally, it is recognized that organisms with bioactive functions with a 
potential to be used in pharmaceutical development are more likely to develop 
among organisms existing under extreme conditions, such as high pressure, 
acidity, darkness, or temperatures.239 A large proportion of such areas are 
located beyond the bounds of national jurisdiction. This explains the high level 
of interest in bioprospecting in the deep seas. This is also part of the reason for 
this investigation focusing on these parts of the ocean, as set out in the 
introduction. However, bioprospecting in the deep seas did not start until 
recently, as both knowledge of their biodiversity and the technology to harvest 
their genetic resources are relatively recent developments, as discussed in 
section B.5.  
 
The nature of the sampling may vary considerably across cases. Around the 
deep-sea hydrothermal vents, which have attracted considerable attention for 
their richness in organisms with interesting bioactive compounds, sampling 
has focused on microbial species.240 In the sampling of micro-organisms, very 
limited quantities are regularly collected. In the collection of organisms for the 
purpose of extracting target compounds, the samples may be considerably 
larger.241  
 
238 KIM. 2015. 
239 Jabour-Green & Nicol, Melbourne Journal of International Law (2003). 
240 LEARY. 2010, at 165. 






Whereas sample collection is different across cases, the technical challenges 
are common to most marine bioprospecting. Foremost, depth, temperature, 
salinity and darkness set high technological requirements. In the case of deep-
sea bioprospecting involving sampling from hydrothermal vents, such 
expeditions face additional difficulties. Most hydrothermal vents are located at 
depths greater than 1,500 meters (the average depth of the world’s oceans is 
estimated to be 3,688 meters).242 Only high-technology submersibles and 
remotely operated vehicles are able to collect samples of deep-sea microbes. 
Only a handful of research institutions have the necessary technology.243  
 
Naturally, this means that such research can only be undertaken by countries 
with sufficient capital to invest in such technology. Moreover, it implies that 
most necessary equipment for deep-sea bioprospecting is owned by academic 
research institutions. As such, private companies conducting sampling for 
bioprospecting purposes must, in most cases, cooperate with public research 
institutions.244 However, it appears that private sector involvement seldom 
starts before the laboratory stage (see phase 2, below). Private involvement in 
the sampling phase appears to be limited to funding, whereas the actual 
operation is conducted by public institutions.245 Accordingly, it appears that in 
most cases, sampling is conducted as part of academic or other research 
projects, aiming to describe new species or explore the biological diversity of 
a certain marine region.246  
 
It is not just the collection of deep-sea organisms that require sophisticated 
technology. Extracting samples of microbes from the deep sea requires 
adherence to strict protocols in order to prevent contamination of samples, 
which is a considerable risk when being brought to the surface and in the 
laboratory.  
 
242 Matthew A. Charette & Walter H. F. Smith, The volume of earth's Ocean, 23 OCEANOGRAPHY 
(2010) 
243 LEARY. 2010, at 165. 
244 ARICÒ. 2015, at 201. 
245 Jabour-Green & Nicol, MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), United 
Nations Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea - An Update on Marine 
Genetic Resources: Scientific Research, Commercial Uses and a Database on Marine 
Bioprospecting. 2007. 
246 Indeed, assessments indicate that the majority of activities are scattered, small-scale, 
independent research activities and programs, ongoing in many universities and research 







Scientific research expeditions in these parts of the ocean therefore have 
developed detailed protocols. Another challenge is represented by the actual 
sampling and cultivation of micro-organisms extracted from extreme 
environments. This challenge has been described as particularly burdensome 
in the development of enzymes from extremophiles, where it appears to 
represent the biggest obstacle to further developments in biotechnology.247 
Another challenge in biotechnology development is to mimic the extreme 
environments from which such microbes have been extracted.248  
 
More ambitious programs relating to the exploration of deep-sea organisms are 
often built on extensive scientific cooperation, as well as joint ventures 
between public and private institutions, such as universities and private 
companies.249 While most of these activities are of an exploratory nature and 
are not directly commercially oriented, the scientific information output of 
such projects represents the backbone of any commercial application of deep 
seabed genetic resources.250 This supports the notion that samples extracted for 
“pure” scientific research purposes, without any commercial ambitions, are 
later employed in a bioprospecting context.251  
 
All bioprospecting development cycles, by definition, involve a connection to 
genetic material which at some point has been sampled in the natural marine 
environment. But the connection to the physical sampling differs considerably 
across cases. In this regard, marine bioprospecting projects can be placed on a 
continuum ranging between two extremes: On the one hand, cases where the 
physical sampling in situ is an integral part of the bioprospecting development 
and carried out by the bioprospecting entity; on the other, cases where the 
bioprospecting developer uses genetic material information preserved ex situ.  
 
247 Chiara Schiraldi & Mario De Rosa, The production of biocatalysts and biomolecules from 
extremophiles, 20 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY (2002). 
248 LEARY. 2010, at 166. 
249 One such example is the Census of Marine Life, which resulted in over 2,600 scientific 
publications, more than 6,000 potential new species, 30 million species involved 2,700 
scientists, 80+ nations, 540 expeditions, US$ 650 million. See N. Vermeulen, From Darwin to 
the Census of Marine Life: Marine Biology as Big Science, 8 PLOS ONE (2013). 
250 ARICO & SALPIN. 2005, at 15-17. 
251 As will be discussed in section B.6.3, there are also indications that the bioprospecting chain 
is becoming increasingly fragmented as the result of biotechnology development being based on 






Where genetic material ex situ is used in bioprospecting, this may have been 
retrieved in a collection, database or library. Ex situ genetic material can also 
be used in different forms, either in vivo (tested on whole, living organisms or 
cells), in vitro (samples to be tested are obtained from a repository), or ex vivo 
(on tissue from an organism in an external environment with minimal alteration 
of natural conditions).  
 
It seems increasingly common that not even physical connection to genetic 
material ex situ is necessary. Where the genetic and biomolecular data of 
marine organisms have been sequenced in databases, electronic information of 
the marine genetic resource may be sufficient for bioprospecting 
development.252 Marine bioprospecting projects often lack direct connection to 
physical sampling and instead are based on sampling conducted by other 
actors, often prior to the bioprospecting project.253 Often the sampling has been 
conducted by public research projects, representing pure or basic research. Yet, 
it also appears commonplace that the line between public research institutions 
conducting sampling and bioprospecting actors becomes blurred, that 
bioprospecting represents a spin-off in relation to academic research, where 
the intellectual property rights connected to a bioactive finding may be kept by 
either actor, or licensed.254 
 
B.6.5. Phase 2 – Laboratory exploration, isolation and 
screening 
 
The laboratory phase of bioprospecting is important to distinguish for two rea-
sons. Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, this is often where private 
sector involvement starts. Thus, in many cases, this is the phase where scien-
tific research transcends into bioprospecting. Secondly, this is the phase in 
which the refinement component, one of the defining criteria for bioprospect-
ing, is undertaken. This refinement can vary considerably. Increasingly, bio-
prospecting uses genetic engineering and related technologies which not only 
replicate bioactive functions in marine organisms, but modify them.  
 
 
252 GUILLOUX. 2018;Broggiato, et al., MARINE POLICY (2014), at 177. 
253 KIM. 2015, FATTORUSSO, et al. 2012. 







The use of methods involving technologies that modify the natural component 
raises questions as to whether it still should be regarded as bioprospecting, or 
purely synthetic development. Can the level of refinement in bioprospecting 
reach a threshold where the active function becomes so different compared to 
the naturally occurring bioactive function that the process and resulting product 
should no longer be regarded as bioprospecting, but rather as synthetic product 
development? Based on reviews of existing cases, it appears difficult to 
provide an unequivocal answer to this question. Most cases of product 
development relating to functions originally found in the marine environment 
contain both natural and synthetic elements, as discussed in section B.6.1. In 
order to explore at what stage, if any, the marine genetic resource component 
is so minimal or remote that a product should be considered as purely synthetic, 
it is necessary to assess the technologies employed. The level of procedure 
during the laboratory process can vary considerably across a broad spectrum, 
ranging from minimal to complete refinement. The role of the natural organism 
component can range across a broad spectrum: 
 
• raw genetic material; 
• direct replica of naturally occurring bioactive functions; 
• refined bioactive function; 
• synthetic molecule inspired by a natural function. 
 
As already established in section B.1, products built on raw genetic material, 
which are lacking a refining component, should not be regarded as 
bioprospecting, by virtue of the definition used in this study.255 In contrast, 
since there is no requirement for physical components from the genetic 
resource to be included in bioprospecting products, cases where the natural 
element merely consists of inspiration from a naturally occurring bioactive 
function would qualify under the definition used in this study. 
 
The second phase of the bioprospecting development cycle starts with the 
transferring of the collected specimen to a laboratory. In the laboratory 
environment, the characteristics of the specimen are then analyzed. The 
analysis may employ various technologies and differ in focus. Microbes may 
be isolated, characterized and cultured.  
 
255 As discussed in that context, bioprospecting is defined in this study as a process whereby 
commercially useful products are technologically derived, processed and developed based on 






A common trait is that irrespective of the method employed, the aim is to 
isolate a part of the genome containing a function, which has been considered 
potentially useful, either when observing the organism in its natural 
environment or in the laboratory phase.256 A bioactive function in a marine 
organism may be identified prior to the analytical laboratory process. But it is 
during the laboratory phase that the biological mechanism performing the 
relevant function is deciphered and the possibilities for repeating and scaling 
up the function are explored. 
 
It usually contains advanced laboratory analysis of the bioactive compound of 
interest, by means of genetic sequencing or other biochemical method. As a 
result, information in the form of sequence data or a map of the chemical 
structure is retrieved. One study indicated that there are considerable 
differences in how the isolation, characterization and culture of deep-sea 
genetic resources are conducted, depending on whether they are used by a 
public research institution or by commercial interests.257 Similar to the what 
was found in the case of sampling, it has become increasingly common that the 
isolation, characterization and culture of microbes are undertaken not by 
individual institutions, but as part of major collaborative research projects 
across different academic research institutions and across different countries.258 
 
Often the laboratory phase is thus conducted as a collaboration between several 
research institutions without any private interest involvement, at least not 
before a commercially interesting component has been found.  
 
256 Mossop. 2015. 
257 Jabour-Green & Nicol, Melbourne Journal of International Law (2003). 
258 Such examples include the European Union research programs on extremophiles as part of 
the Biotechnology Program of the European Union, including 39 academic and industrial 
laboratories. The project yielded a substantial scientific output, including 270 scientific 
publications. More recently, the EU PharmaSea project, an SME-academia-driven project were 
initiated by 24 partners in 2012 to discover novel products based on deep-sea genetic resources. 
To date the PharmaSea project has cultivated and extracted more than 1400 microbial strains 
from extreme marine environments, with the majority being fungi and actinobacteria. Alfredo 
Aguilar, Exploring the last frontier of life: R & D initiatives of the European Union, 11 WORLD 
JOURNAL OF MICROBIOLOGY & BIOTECHNOLOGY (1995); Alfredo Aguilar, et al., Thirty years of 
European biotechnology programmes: from biomolecular engineering to the bioeconomy, 30 
NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY (2013); LEARY. 2010; Jaspars, et al., MARINE BIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. JOURNAL OF THE MARINE BIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED 







There are, however, also cases where isolation, characterization and culture 
has been made in cooperation between academia and industry.259 Whereas 
deep-sea sampling is almost exclusively conducted by public institutions, the 
isolation, characterization and culture of microbes and other organisms can 
occur in both academic institutions and commercial laboratories. Generally, 
the stage in the laboratory phase at which private interests become involved 
varies from case to case.260 
 
Where this research is funded by the public sector, results are regularly made 
public through regular scientific publishing, and in line with academic tradition 
it is likely that specimens will be made available to other researchers on 
request.261 In cases where the research is funded by the private sector, results 
are generally kept confidential and are regularly not disclosed until after the 
filing of patent applications.262 Instead of publishing results, researchers in 
private financed research report discoveries and provide extracts cultured from 
micro-organisms to their commercial partner.263 In some cases, patent 
applications are filed already after this initial laboratory step of isolation. 
However, this is limited to cases and jurisdictions where patent criteria can be 
fulfilled by mere characterization. As indicated in section C.3, in particular 
requirements for innovation and application in many jurisdictions call for more 
advanced refining actions than mere isolation of bioactive function. 
 
Commercial interests commonly gain access to samples collected through 
publicly funded institutions, where comprehensive collections of samples are 
often collected. It is thus not only possible for any academic researcher to 
access such a collection of samples funded by the public sector. In most cases, 
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Indeed, spurring commercial development in biotechnology has been raised as 
a principal reason for the setting up of collections of samples and data relating 
to marine genetic resources.265 Marine compound and sequence data libraries 
have thus been established in several countries, and granted substantial funding 
as recognition of the potential for economic growth in bioprospecting has 
become more widespread.266 
Many public institutions thus allow for open access to such libraries, without 
any limitations on developing patents or commercial products based on their 
resources. However, there are also cases where contractual arrangements have 
been set up, stipulating that ownership of any intellectual property created from 
the processes of isolating and extracting will be assigned to the commercial 
partner. In return, public institutions, researchers, or their employers may be 
entitled to a share in the royalties from future products. There are also contract 
models where the public institution retains the background intellectual 
property but licenses its use to the developer of bioprospecting-based 
products.267  
 
265 For instance, in the PharmaSea project referred to above, a major motivation for the program 
was to overcome bottlenecks in biodiscovery process by improving the quality of marine 
resources available for biotechnological exploitation, shorten time to market, and develop 
sustainable modes of supply of raw materials for industry. Similarly, the French public research 
institute Ifremer which has been extensively involved in deep-sea sampling and genetic 
exploration has the mission of promoting the development of technological and commercial 
applications related to the identification and sustainable exploitation of marine resources and 
explore possibilities for the economic development of maritime activities. Jaspars, et al., MARINE 
BIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. JOURNAL OF THE MARINE BIOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (2016), at 155; ARICO & SALPIN. 2005, at 16. 
266 The biggest such collection is the Natural Products Repository of the Developmental 
Therapeutics Program at the US National Cancer Institute, which consists of over 600 000 
natural compounds and samples of 10 000 marine organisms. Other important libraries for 
marine bioprospecting include the MARBANK, which has collections covering more than 1,200 
species of marine invertebrates, 110 species of microalgae. Manoj Monga & Edward A. 
Sausville, Developmental Therapeutics Program at the NCI: molecular target and drug 
discovery process, 16 LEUKEMIA (2002); C. C. Thornburg, et al., NCI Program for Natural 
Product Discovery: A Publicly-Accessible Library of Natural Product Fractions for High-
Throughput Screening, 13 ACS CHEMICAL BIOLOGY (2018); Kristin Rosendal, et al., Access and 
Benefit Sharing Legislation for Marine Bioprospecting: Lessons From Australia for the Role of 
Marbank in Norway, 19 JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2016). 
267 In spite of such arrangements, it is however regularly still possible for other researchers to 







As such, it is clear that the isolation of bioactive functions in marine genetic 
resources has been largely carried out as part of broad public research 
initiatives and that a lot of effort and resources have been allocated to the 
setting-up of library collections of both isolated samples and sequence data 
relating to marine genetic resources. Furthermore, a major motivation behind 
such efforts has been the promotion of biotechnology development and the 
attempt to enable it to bypass the cumbersome first phases in the 
bioprospecting development cycle. As a result, bioprospecting increasingly 
starts in laboratories or library collections, rather than in sampling expeditions. 
Likewise, it is commonly the result of a close and complex interaction between 
public research and commercial actors. This goes against established 
conceptions of how bioprospecting is conducted, as well as basic assumptions 
in the regulation of relevant legal concepts. During the first wave of 
bioprospecting in the 1990s, when it was first addressed as an activity in 
discussions on international environmental law, a clear distinction concerning 
the use of biological diversity was made between purely academic and purely 
commercial ends. Based on how bioprospecting has developed since the turn 
of the century, this distinction has become increasingly blurred, as it has 
become more common for academic and private activities to include 
commercial aims, or at least facilitate commercial aims, in collecting and 
conducting research on biodiversity.268  
 
Once isolation has been successful, the next step in bioprospecting develop-
ment can be initiated: the screening of relevant bioactive functions. The aim 
with any screening process in bioprospecting is to identify the potential for a 
product to be developed from organism samples.269 Whereas laboratory analy-
sis until the screening stage is focused on investigation of the organic com-
pound, screening contains an equal emphasis on targets, essentially attempting 
to pair functions in an isolated compound with the desired function.270  
 
organisms. The regulation of micro-organisms deposited at library collections is regulated under 
the Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purposes 
of Patent Procedure, see also Jabour-Green & Nicol, MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2003), at 86. 
268 Tvedt, POLAR RECORD (2011). 
269 Sonia Giubergia, et al., Screening Microorganisms for Bioactive Compounds, in THE MARINE 
MICROBIOME (Lucas J. Stal & Mariana Silvia Cretoiu eds., 2016). 
270 Although methods vary, a standard sequencing procedure involves culturing samples in 






Extensive numbers of natural extracts may be assessed in such processes, 
where merely one isolated compound is identified as potentially pharmaceuti-
cally active.271 Increasingly, such procedures have become automatized. 
Screening methods which were first used to sequence extensive libraries of 
synthetic compounds are now being utilized for screening extensive collections 
of natural samples.272 Whereas laboratory operations until this step, including 
isolation, characterization and culturing, are largely carried out by public 
research institutions, screening for pharmaceutical activity is in bioprospecting 
usually carried out by commercial actors using samples from the original 
material.273 Companies attempting to develop products based on bioactive 
marine compounds have in many cases developed their own screening facili-
ties on specific targets.274 Although screening by private actors is more 
common, it may be carried out for a broad range of ends, ranging from strictly 
academic or taxonomic research to the highly commercial search for econom-
ically valuable traits for the biotechnological or pharmaceutical industry.275  
 
B.6.6. Phase 3 – Patenting, trials and final product 
development 
 
Successful screening of a marine compound is a major achievement in any 
bioprospecting project. Establishing that a function originating in a marine 
genetic resource achieves a desired target, such as a cytostatic or oranesthetic 
effect, has a huge potential value. In order to safeguard that value, and to ensure 
 
done by setting up a culture collection of relevant natural samples. The collection is then 
screened for a specific target, such as cytotoxic anticancer activities. Firsova. 2017. 
271 Jabour-Green & Nicol, MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), p. 87. 
272 Foremost, the application of high-throughput phenotype screening to bioprospecting, has 
greatly facilitated processes, as described in section B.5.8, and has now become the major meth-
odological strategy. OECD, Marine Biotechnology: Enabling Solutions for Ocean Productivity 
and Sustainability. 2013, at 33; J.P. Hughes, et al., Principles of Early Drug Discovery, 162 
(2011); Pooja Bhatia & Archana Chugh, Role of marine bioprospecting contracts in developing 
access and benefit sharing mechanism for marine traditional knowledge holders in the 
pharmaceutical industry, 3 GLOBAL ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION (2015); Firsova. 2017. 
273 Giubergia, et al. 2016. 
274 These efforts and the investments involved have also resulted in an increasing will to finance 
expensive expeditions to investigate the world’s oceans and collect a large diversity of marine 
species. Bhatia & Chugh, GLOBAL ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION (2015); Firsova. 2017. 
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exclusive rights to product development, application for patent protection is 
usually filed after successful screening has been achieved, if such protection 




Among actors involved in bioprospecting, the notoriously high investments 
required to bring a bioprospecting-based pharmaceutical drug project through 
the development cycle can only be offset by the prospect for financial returns 
by means of exclusive rights to discovery.276 Exclusive rights can subsequently 
be used to develop final products marketed as monopolists. Alternatively, the 
discovery may be licensed to other entities. The prospects of gaining exclusive 
rights to discoveries by means of patents is thus a central element of bio-based 
pharmaceutical development, as in most other bioprospecting product 
development.  
 
Indeed, the intellectual property rights connected to bioactive functions 
retrieved in marine genetic resources are central in the marine bioprospecting 
development cycle, highlighting the significance of patent law. As discussed 
in section C.3, the requirements for achieving patent rights are usually divided 
into three criteria. The invention must be new (novelty), involve an inventive 
step (non-obviousness), and it must be possible to utilize the invention 
industrially (usefulness). 
 
Although marine bioprospecting, like most product development, may face 
challenges involving all these criteria, the most controversial aspect of 
bioprospecting patents relates to the non-obviousness requirement. More 
specifically, the most debated aspect of bioprospecting in the context of 
intellectual property rights has concerned whether genetic material and 
functions should be patentable. At the heart of this discussion has been the 
question of whether the identification or discovery of naturally occurring 
functions or material, such as bioactive metabolisms, can be considered to 
represent an innovation. As will be further discussed in section C.3, the 
compatibility of such patents with international law essentially depends on 
what type of organism is patented.  
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As discussed in that context, Article 27 of TRIPS enables states to exclude 
from patentability “animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes.”277 
 
In light of this ambiguous rule, which enables states to exclude patentability 
for some but not all marine organisms, it appears particularly relevant to 
examine what types of marine organisms are referenced in patents. This 
connects to the broader discussion of how bioprospecting patents relate to 
marine genetic components and at what stages of bioprospecting development 
patents are filed. It can be assumed that the earlier in the development cycle 
patents are filed, the closer the discovery relates to the genetic resource. 
 
The connection between marine organisms and bioprospecting can be ad-
dressed by investigating final marine biotechnology products marketed, as dis-
cussed in section B.6.2. However, products do not always openly declare their 
marine genetic component. Patent data may therefore be more informative for 
practically assessing the extent of claims for exclusive rights based on marine 
bioprospecting discoveries. The availability of patent information is a conse-
quence of the disclosure requirement, sometimes referred to as the rationale of 
patent regulation; patent protection is granted in exchange for distributing 
knowledge by disclosing the invention in the application.278  
 
The information, which is published under the disclosure requirement, con-
nected to discoveries can be assumed to provide representative data about ma-
rine bioprospecting, at least of the projects that surpass preceding phases in the 
development chain. It could be expected that assessments of different aspects 
of marine bioprospecting can be made easily based on patent data. In reality, 
such analysis is difficult since there is no general consensus on how to describe 
biological material in patent filings. Moreover, patent data is not collected in a 
comprehensive manner globally. This leads to differences across jurisdictions.  
 
277 In reality, most industrialized states do not expressly exclude plants and animals either, 
although a number of European states exclude plant varieties. See Jabour-Green & Nicol, 
MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003). 
278 Ane Jørem & Morten Walløe Tvedt, Bioprospecting in the High Seas: Existing Rights and 
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Trends over time are also difficult to discern for methodological reasons, such 
as changes in reporting. For instance, US patent data series do not take into 
account that the United States Patent and Trademark Office only published 
granted patents prior to 2001. From 2001 patent applications began to be used 
in statistics, leading to challenges with reporting effects.279 
 
These challenges arise in part because patent law uses the term “disclosure” 
with two different meanings: the regular disclosure requirement as a basic 
principle in patent law; and the highly disputed requirement for disclosure of 
origin (source and legal provenance) for the biological material used in the 
invention.280 Lacking a clear rule on disclosure of origin of biological material 
in domestic law, it can thus not be ascertained that biological components in 
patent applications are fully disclosed. Nor can geographical origin always be 
established. The ambiguities and differences in regulation of disclosure across 
national jurisdictions is paralleled in international law.281 As will be discussed 
in section C.3, the disclosure requirement is vaguely formulated in TRIPS, 
calling on states to establish requirements for applicants to disclose the 
invention in a way that is adequately clear and exhaustive so that a person with 
skills in the art can execute the invention.282 
 
It will now be examined what evaluations of patent data have provided on 
central issues addressed in this investigation. These include three elements of 
central importance for the legal status under international law rules: Firstly, 
relating to the criteria for patentable subject matter, it is relevant to investigate 
what types of marine organisms are referenced in patents as well as how such 
filings relate to the marine genetic components. Potentially, patent data could 
indicate to what extent direct samples or libraries have been used;  
 
279 Oldham. 2014., at 90-91. 
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281 For long, discussion have however been ongoing on including a requirement for disclosure 
of geographic origin. See The Relationship Between the Trips Agreement and the Convention 
On Biological Diversity. (2002). 
282 See Article 29(1), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). In addition to TRIPS, the Budapest Treaty enables applicants for patenting of living 
organisms to deposit biological material as a supplement to, and replacement for, the written 
description requirement. In reality, however, very few countries have implemented an obligation 
to provide such information in patent applications. Budapest Treaty on the International 
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure, Signed in 
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Secondly, patent data could indicate to what extent sample origin in maritime 
zones within domestic jurisdiction versus the deep-sea areas of the high seas 
and the Area have been references in patent filings; Thirdly, it could show at 
what stages of the cycle patents are filed, as well as which actors file and own 
patents in marine bioprospecting. Moreover, patent data could evaluate the 
assumption that marine bioprospecting is generally increasing. 
  
Marine organisms and genetic material in patent data  
 
A survey, which involved a breakdown of marine bioprospecting patents into 
phylogenetic group, revealed sponges as the largest source (52%), followed by 
marine bacteria (16%), marine algae and fungi (respectively 6% each), 
tunicates, cnidarians, echinoderms and mollusks (5% each).283 Another general 
assessment of marine species in patent applications conducted in 2014 counted 
the number of times specific species occurred in patent documents.284 The 
results indicate that the most frequent species referenced was the yeast-like 
fungus Aureobasidium pullulans used extensively in the production of 
different enzymes as well as biological control of plant diseases.285 The 
jellyfish Aequorea victoria was the second most referenced species, used as 
the source of two proteins involved in bioluminescence, as discussed in section 
B.6.1. Most of the frequently used species found in the study were fungi, which 
appear to go against the trend identified in the previous study. Although no 
distinction is made based on marine areas, some of the names are generally 
associated with deep-sea habitats, such as the marine hydrothermal vent 
thermophile Pyrococcus fuiosus (an extremophilic species of Archaea) which 
is the source for important enzymes used as diagnostic tools, as mentioned in 
section B.6.2.  
 
It appears that many but far from all of the frequently used species highlighted 
in the investigation can be regarded as micro-organisms under the terminology 
used in TRIPS, depending on biological classification.286  
 
283 Montserrat Gorina Ysern, International law of the sea, access and benefit sharing agreements, 
and the use of biotechnology in the development, patenting and commercialization of marine 
natural products as therapeutic agents, OCEAN YEARBOOK (2006), at 236. 
284 Oldham. 2014. 
285 Zhenming Chi, et al., Bioproducts from Aureobasidium pullulans, a biotechnologically 
important yeast, 82 APPLIED MICROBIOL BIOTECHNOLOGY (2009). 
286 As will be discussed in section C.3.1, there is no generally agreed definition of the different 







A growing number of patents have been filed for gene sequences and proteins 
derived from what are commonly regarded as micro-organisms. In some 
instances, even the micro-organisms themselves have been patented.287 
Generally, it seems that marine bioprospecting patents relate to a broad number 
of phyla. There are, however, reasons for not drawing too far-reaching 
conclusions based on the indicated species name, since it appears to be more 
common to include explicit references to higher species’ name in patent data 
compared to less complex organisms.288 
 
Distinguishing deep-sea bioprospecting patents from coastal patents 
 
It is notoriously difficult to precisely assess how many patents are based on 
genetic material retrieved in the deep-sea areas because of the lack of stringent 
requirement for geotagging sample sites. In lieu of other sources, the infor-
mation on marine genetic resource component disclosed in patent filings, 
paired with the known occurrence of the species, is the best available source 
for making such distinctions between bioprospecting within and beyond na-
tional jurisdiction. Indeed, studies indicate that at least rudimentary estimates 
can be made based on a combination of references to species names and known 
distribution of the same species. However, in many cases the organism refer-
ence is vague, entailing the family or genus rather than species. Moreover, 
marine organisms commonly migrate and occur in vast geographic areas. Thus, 
in many cases, referenced names can be assumed to provide limited indication 
of origin. The origin of marine genetic components in bioprospecting cannot 
be established with certainty on the basis of patent data.289  
 
In the studies that have attempted to identify geographic origin of marine 
bioprospecting patents, it has been affirmed that most such innovations appear 
to be based on organisms collected from within national jurisdiction.290 
 
considerable discretion in interpreting for instance micro-organisms. See CARLOS M. CORREA & 
ABDULQAWI A. YUSUF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE : THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT (3 ed. 2016), chapter 8. 
287 Irrespective of whether or not patents are taken out, the parties may be bound by 
confidentiality requirements to keep their discoveries secret. Jabour-Green & Nicol, 
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289 Many observers have referred to these aspects as reasons for attempting to make such 
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However, based on evaluations of Patent Office Databases, it is clear that 
several deep-seabed organisms also have been used for commercial 
application. One overview established that most of these inventions concern 
the genomic features of deep-seabed species, based on the isolation of active 
compounds and sequencing methods. Others relate to the isolation of proteins 
that present enzymatic activity of potential for industrial applications, as 
discussed in section B.6.2. Several inventions concern the cell components and 
biological compounds themselves, which offer interesting properties for use in 
biomedical applications. However, for many of these patents, it has been 
considered difficult to demonstrate whether and to what extent practical 
applications have been developed.291 In another extensive survey it was 
established that references to deep-sea marine organisms are increasing in 
patent data.292  
 
Both these studies generally found data on geographic origin of specific 
samples deficient or unspecific. This confirms the picture that the combination 
of a lack of geographic coordinates for sampling sites in patent applications 
and the fact that many marine organisms, including deep-sea species, occur in 
habitats across different sea areas acts as a major hindrance to determining the 
allocation between areas beyond and within national jurisdiction in samples 
used in bioprospecting patents.  
 
In light of this lack of geographic information, as well as legal requirements to 
include such information, a second study considered that it would be difficult 
to prove with certainty in what maritime zone sampling used in bioprospecting 
had been conducted. Despite the lack of geographic indication in patent data, 
an attempt was made to distinguish patents related to deep-sea genetic 
resources by analyzing where species referenced in patent data were known to 
occur geographically.293 Approximately 1,800 out of 4,759 marine species 
identified in patent data were identified as known to occur in the deep-sea areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. However, many marine species occur in different 
marine areas. Accordingly, only 42 of these species were identified as only 
occurring outside of national jurisdiction.  
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Although geographic origin was difficult to ascertain in many cases, this 
evaluation based on the available taxonomic information supported the 
suggestion that species sampled were predominantly distributed in marine 
areas within national jurisdiction.294  
 
Patenting in the bioprospecting development cycle 
 
Based on indications in the lack of comprehensive data, it has been generally 
assessed that patents are not limited to inventions at the far-end of product 
development, but relate to discoveries at different phases of the bioprospecting 
development cycle. Many patents relate to bioactive functions of marine 
organisms with vague references to application. Distinction has been made 
between two types of patenting of genetic resources: Firstly, there is direct 
patenting of a source material, whereby the patent claims genetic resources or 
organisms obtained from a separate source as an invention on the basis of their 
novel physical, chemical or biological properties. For such discoveries, the 
patent system does not grant ownership in the traditional sense. Rather, it 
grants the exclusive use, by the patent holder, of that naturally occurring 
material or the products derived thereof for a limited time.295 
 
Secondly, there is patenting of inventions derived from the source material, 
whereby a patent claims an invention derived from or using genetic resources 
or organisms.296 A distinction has also been made between product-oriented 
and process-oriented patents.297 Product-based patents relate to the isolation of 
compounds from deep-seabed samples and the creation (through molecular 
engineering techniques) of new organisms of potential use in pharmaceuticals 
and many other fields, such as food processing. Process-based patents relate to 
the isolation or creation (also through molecular engineering techniques) of 
compounds and derivates (usually proteins having an enzymatic function) that 
improve the pace of industrial processes and/or the quality of ensuing products. 
It is noteworthy that both types of patents can result in per se claims over the 
source organisms.298 
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Sequence-wise, patents are often filed in the wake of successful screening. This 
may seem self-evident, since the purpose of screening is to make a discovery 
of a biological function. However, as discussed, patents can be and indeed are 
filed during any of the phases of the bioprospecting development cycle. It 
appears that commercial actors in many cases delay patenting until 
pharmaceutically active products have been isolated. Patents and contractual 
confidentiality requirements commonly limit access by other researchers to 
basic research results.299 Upstream patenting is generally more likely to secure 
a return on investment, as opposed to downstream patenting (patenting of a 
product such as a medicine). This is because it is more likely that an organism 
as close as possible to its natural state will be sought after for further 
investigation and licensing would be required for its use.300 
 
Public and private patenting, actors and ownership 
 
The marine bioprospecting patents identified in studies are held by private 
companies as well as by governmental and academic institutions.301 Whereas 
private ownership of marine bioprospecting patents is more common, there has 
been increased expectations in certain countries for universities and public 
research institutions to live up to governmental pressure to justify public 
funding by developing a biotechnology patent portfolio.302 In other regions, the 
trend has been reversed. As the result of explicit policy objectives of promoting 
growth in the private biotechnology sector, public research institutions have 
decided not to seek to patent their findings.303 
 
299 Irrespective of whether or not patents are taken out, the parties may be bound by 
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Actors and ownership 
 
As regards ownership, the same study found that private claims associated with 
marine genes originate in just 31 of the 194 countries in the world. Among 
ownership deposited with marine genes, 90 per cent belongs to companies 
originating in ten countries, with 70 per cent of the associated patents 
belonging to companies in the top three states of the United States, Germany 
and Japan. 304  
 
In a study on ownerships of patents restricted to deep-sea bioprospecting, it 
was established that the companies owning patents were predominately North 
American and European-based. These include some of the world’s largest 
biotechnology companies. Six of these companies already market products 
derived from deep-sea genetic resources sourced both within and beyond 
national jurisdiction.305 In another evaluation focusing on patents connected to 
species associated with deep-sea ecosystems, it was estimated that the German 
company BASF alone had registered 47 per cent of all marine sequences 
included in gene patents, exceeding the combined share of 220 other 
companies.306 Universities and their commercial partners registered 12 per 
cent. Actors located or headquartered in 10 countries registered 98 per cent of 
all patent sequences, and 165 countries were unrepresented.307 
 
Sampling and library collection references in patenting 
 
Similarly, it appears difficult based on patent data to ascertain to what degree 
samples used in marine bioprospecting are retrieved from direct sampling or 
libraries. In assessments it has been estimated that in the majority of cases it 
appears likely that applicants referencing deep-sea locations obtained genetic 
material or data from commercial sources, public collections or databases 
rather than field collections.308 The difficulty of distinguishing connection to 
library collections relates to the lack of any requirement for indicating such 
connections. 
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The number of patents filed based on marine organisms in general has grown 
steadily by 12 per cent each year, with 95 per cent of patent claims having been 
filed after 2000, according to a recent assessment. The same study found that 
among 677 international claims of marine gene patents deposited between 
1991 and 2009, 8,648 sequences from 520 species were found. Gene patent 
claims from marine organisms make up only 2 per cent of the WIPO gene 
patents.309 The rising trend is supported by another study published in 2014, 
indicating a steady rise from the year 2000, with a peak of 1,645 filings in 
2008. In the wake of the global financial crisis, a temporary downturn was 
observed in patent filings in general and this is likely to be reflected in data for 
2009–2010. Data from 2011 onwards will be affected by a lack of data arising 
from the delay in the publication of patent documents. 
 
A more specific assessment of patent filings referencing species occurring in 
the deep-sea marine areas beyond national jurisdiction between 1990 and 2010 
identified a rising trend in observable filings from the late 1990s with 369 
filings records in 1999 rising to a peak of 731 filings in 2009 before declining 
to 643 in 2010.310 However, since most of these species do not only occur in 
deep-sea areas, the number should not be mistaken as indicating cases where 
sampling has been conducted in the deep seas. 
 
Moreover, in a closer examination of the patents referencing species occurring 
(but not necessarily exclusively) in deep-sea areas, the same study identified a 
trend of intensification of patent activity of the genetic component of a limited 
number of marine species rather than a dramatic increase in the number of new 
species entering the patent system.311  
  
As regards application, one study assessed that the biological activity 
properties in marine bioprospecting patents issued in the pharmaceutical field 
include anti-cancer (50%), anti-fungal and anti-bacterial (9% each), anti-
inflammatory (5%), anti-viral (4%) and other (23%).312  
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This appears to be in line with the areas of use for the final products identified 
in section B.6.2.313 If these indications are correct, the interest in deep-sea 
genetic resource patenting has risen in recent years, as has marine 
bioprospecting patenting more generally. This is not surprising considering the 
returned interest in marine bioprospecting since the turn of the millennium, as 
discussed in section B.5.7. Moreover, it seems clear that many patents are 
controlled by a small number of private actors in an equally small number of 
countries. 
 
Yet, it would be wrong to assume that positive screening results or patent 
protection is evidence of successful bioprospecting product development. As 
shown by the minuscule number of developed marine pharmaceutical products 
in comparison with patent numbers, the vast bulk of marine bioprospecting 
patents fail to reach commercial application. This is because two of the most 
cumbersome steps in the bioprospecting development cycle remain: trials and 
final product development. 
 
Trials and product development 
 
Like successful screening, attaining patent protection is often a major objective 
in bioprospecting development cycles. Intellectual property rights represent 
substantial values in marine bioprospecting.  
 
313 In another assessment which evaluated marine biotechnology patents more broadly, it was 
observed that certain patents pertain to scientific discoveries of bioactive compounds of 
biological properties, while others pertain to inventions related to technology and techniques 
such as scientific methods. Many of the patents describe scientific information such as a given 
genetic sequence or the structure of a given enzyme. The filing of patents on genetic sequences 
commonly anticipate the detection of the intellectual property of products likely to be developed 
from certain genetic sequences or enzymes, the functions of which are still unknown, but which 
hold potential for applications. Moreover, contrary to the assumption that pharmacological use 
is dominant it was established that the chemistry sector is characterized by the greatest number 
of patents 53.5 per cent, followed by the pharmacology sector with 32.2 per cent of the patents. 
The food sector corresponds to 5.7 per cent of the patents identified. In total, 1.7 per cent of the 
patents identified correspond to the agriculture sector. The cosmetics sector corresponds to 1.2 
per cent of the patents found; the description of their potential applications was vague and 
therefore could not be reported. Around 5.7 per cent of the patents identified correspond to other 
applications such as devices allowing the sampling or rearing extracts of marine species. Several 
patents found concern species living in extreme environments such as Antarctica and the deep 






However, far from all patents become applied in products. Bridging the gap 
between discovery and commercialized product is particularly difficult in 
pharmaceutical development.  
 
Establishing that a function originating in a marine genetic resource achieves 
a desired target often has a value in itself, particularly if exclusive rights to 
such discoveries can be ensured by means of patents. Finding such links and 
connected intellectual property rights is, however, of more limited value unless 
pharmacological effect and safety can be validated in trials. Without success 
in trials, values connected to patent rights fail to transform into the much more 
valuable incomes from commercialized products.  
 
But even before trials can be initiated, a difficult challenge is faced by the need 
to scale up the quantities of active compounds. The trials necessary in all 
pharmaceutical development require much larger supplies of the active 
compound than in previous laboratory steps. As discussed in phase 1 in this 
section, physical samples, whether collected in the marine environment or 
retrieved in libraries are often small. This scaling up regularly faces the same 
supply-side challenges as previously discussed, and the variety of different 
methods discussed in that context may be employed to overcome such 
challenges, which are not always manageable.314  
 
Whereas preceding phases of product development deviate considerably from 
other forms of pharmaceutical development, the clinical trials element in ma-
rine bioprospecting is associated with the same challenges, aside from the par-
ticular challenges of scaling up active compounds. A recent data study of the 
success rate and duration in general clinical trials in pharmaceutical develop-
ment estimated that almost 15 per cent of new compounds pass clinical trials.315 
Accordingly, a more specific assessment of trial success rate in marine phar-
maceutical bioprospecting indicates that research interest does not always 
result in successful product development.316  
 
314 Attempt may be made to culture micro-organisms. Unless that already has been done prior to 
screening, the DNA of the relevant function is often sequenced. Jabour-Green & Nicol, 
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315 Chi Heem Wong, et al., Estimation of clinical trial success rates and related parameters, 20 
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Between 2004 and 2013, 28 marine natural products were in clinical trials but 
18 of the trials were discontinued.317 The main reasons for the withdrawals of 
development in clinical phases I–III were mainly a lack of efficacy (43%) and 
drug toxicity (33%).318 Accordingly, in spite of the large number of active 
compounds isolated from marine organisms, many of them with pronounced 
biological activity, the great majority does not surpass the pharmaceutical pre-
clinical trials and only a very few have been marketed as pharmaceutical 
products.319 In order to safeguard the value of the few candidates, and to ensure 
exclusive rights to product development, application for patent protection is 
often filed as soon as successful screening has been achieved, if such protection 
has not been established previously. Indeed, not all patents result in 
commercialized products and subsequent profits. For example, in the field of 
pharmaceuticals, thus far, only 1–2 per cent of pre-clinical candidates have 
become commercial products.320 
 
B.7. Conclusions on bioprospecting processes 
 
The review of the development of marine bioprospecting has shown that the 
particular interest in the genetic resources of the deep-sea is recent, as the result 
of the late discovery of the pharmaceutical potential of deep-sea ecosystems in 
combination with the technological challenges associated with conducting 
activities in these parts of the oceans. The inhospitable nature of the deep seas 
also partly explains the relatively high prevalence of relevant bioactive 
properties. The challenges posed to survival in these environments, coupled 
with the longer history of marine life, have prompted organisms in the deep 
seas to develop unique functions by means of evolution. The commercial 
interest has been far from constant, but has fluctuated in recent decades. The 
advent of DNA technology in the 1990s created expectations for a boom in 
bioprospecting, which also explains the negotiations of central elements of 
TRIPS and the CBD. Yet, at least in the short run, the output turned out to be 
disappointing. This resulted in the abandoning of many bio-based projects in 
favor of synthetic approaches. Recent years have seen a renewed interest in 
marine bioprospecting. 
 
317 Martins, et al., MARINE DRUGS (2014). 
318 D. Schuster, et al., Why drugs fail - a study on side effects in new chemical entities, 11 
CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL DESIGN (2005). 
319 Martins, et al., MARINE DRUGS (2014). 






Contemporary bioprospecting is characterized by increasing involvement of 
genetic technology. In many cases, refinement and interaction with synthetic 
approaches have made the biological component in many projects less direct. 
This connects to the type of genetic material used in bioprospecting processes. 
Increasingly, genetic information is the only connection to the organism that 
forms the basis for the invention. Chemical compounds and raw extract from 
genetic material, however, also remain to be used, as the result of the difficulty 
in mimicking natural function. It has also become more difficult to distinguish 
pure scientific research projects from bioprospecting, as the result of greater 
exchange with and dependence on public research in bioprospecting 
development cycles. In particular, the establishment of biobank collections and 
sequence libraries as part of political ambitions to promote biotechnology has 
enabled developers to bypass costly sampling missions and base 
pharmaceutical development on samples originally collected without 
commercial intentions. This raises difficult issues in relation to law of the sea 
rules on marine scientific research. As will be further discussed in the next part, 
these rules provide far-reaching freedoms to carry out marine research 
missions but prevent their use as the basis for appropriation.  
 
Many pharmaceutical products based on deep-sea organisms can be 
distinguished. In other cases, it is less clear in what marine area the genetic 
resource has originated. This is the result of the combination of a lack of 
requirement for geographic indication in patent data and the fact that the same 
species often occur in different locations, both within and beyond national 
jurisdiction. The challenges represented by the lack of geographic traceability 
also make it difficult to establish deep-sea origin in investigations of data from 
patent applications. Based on species name, it appears that a broad range of 
organisms are used in bioprospecting. A considerable share of species 
identified in patent data could be considered as micro-organisms. This has far-
reaching implications for the application of TRIPS, as will be discussed in 
section C.3. Yet, it generally appears difficult to divide genetic material in 
patent data into different categories of organisms and biological processes in 
the TRIPS rule on patentable subject matter. Even if governmental and 
academic institutions hold patents connected to deep-sea genetic resources, the 
overwhelming majority of them remains in private ownership, with the lion’s 
share being controlled by companies in a small number of countries.  
Among patents associated with deep-sea species, it is noteworthy that a single 







C. Rules on deep-sea bioprospecting under 
three regimes of international law 
 
In the previous part it was established that marine bioprospecting should be 
regarded as a process, which encompasses an extensive research and 
development chain, ranging from physical sampling to marketed products. At 
all stages of this cycle, regulation sets conditions for such operations. By 
commonly involving many different legal entities, as well as cooperation 
between public and private actors, contractual relations are central in these 
development chains. Moreover, different strands of domestic public law 
regulation are applicable to the utilization of marine genetic resources, 
simultaneously or successively, complementarily or concurrently. With few 
exceptions, such rules have not been drafted with marine bioprospecting in 
mind. No regulation in a comprehensive manner considers the full 
development chain involved in bioprospecting, or the challenges raised by such 
use of marine genetic resources. This lack of a holistic approach in domestic 
legislation is paralleled by – and may partly be the result of – apparent 
normative inconsistencies in international law, where the three regimes of the 
law of the sea, international environmental law and WTO law all provide 
obligations for states in relation to bioprospecting for marine genetic resources.  
 
The relationship between the obligations of these regimes appears to be 
particularly contentious in relation to deep-sea bioprospecting, genetic 
exploration and commercial use of functions from organisms in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction (an activity which will be further legally contextualized 
below). Not only do the rules of the three regimes relevant for bioprospecting 
in these areas appear to be inconsistent; in some regards they seem to be 
contradictory. These deep-sea areas are legally significantly distinguished 
from the marine areas where coastal states exercise varying degrees of 
exclusive or sovereign rights. Under one regime of international law; the law 
of the sea, two commons regimes with different geographical scope and 
material implications have also been established for resource extraction and 
scientific research in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Depending on physical 
location, and the scope of legal principles involved, such activities could be 
encompassed by the principle of high seas freedoms or the common heritage 







In this chapter, the rules relating to deep-sea bioprospecting in the law of the 
sea will be discussed and compared with the perspective of genetic resources 
in WTO law and international environmental law. As will be discussed, the 
commons regime of the law of the sea could be interpreted as conflicting with 
WTO law, which not only lacks restrictions on appropriating genetic functions 
in organisms by means of patenting, but also with some exceptions it even 
obliges states to allow for the protection of such intellectual property rights. 
International environmental law sets requirements for such claims, but only in 
areas within national jurisdiction. Beyond national jurisdiction, the regime 
appears to allow claims to genetic functions of organisms but imposes 
obligations applicable to bioprospecting, foremost relating to in situ 
conservation of biological diversity. 
 
The peculiarities of deep-sea ecosystems, and the organisms with bioactive 
functions not found in other parts of the biosphere, on top of the resulting 
commercial interest as discussed in Part B, are thus matched by a similarly 
unique legal environment that is radically different from areas within national 
jurisdiction. 
 
This potentially conflicting situation in international law – where three regimes 
of international law provide obligations relevant for parts of the bioprospecting 
cycle without any of them in a comprehensive manner considering the full 
development chain or the distinct qualities of marine genetic resources – has 
been referred to as legal compartmentalization.321 It represents a practical 
example of the fragmentation of international law, as discussed in section A.6. 
The reasons for as well as consequences of the disintegrated regulation of 
bioprospecting in international law will be the focus of the investigation in 
Parts D and E respectively. But before entering into this discussion, the specific 
rules applicable to deep-sea bioprospecting in the three regimes will first be 
examined, in order to highlight what rules are applicable to deep-sea 
bioprospecting, as well as the material basis for potential conflict.  
 
Whereas some of these rules explicitly instruct states how to deal with bio-
prospecting of genetic resources in a marine context, the application of other 
rules is perhaps less apparent based on their formulation. But considering their 
scope and impact, they can be equally important as more issue-specific norms.  
 







It should also be borne in mind that the selection of legal regimes investigated 
in this study is not exhaustive. Rather, as stated in section A.5, the selection is 
the result of a qualitative assessment, based on what norms appear to be most 
influential in relation to states in these parts of the oceans. 
 
C.1. The Law of the Sea 
 
C.1.1. An operative constitution for the oceans – Regulation 
under UNCLOS 
 
C.1.1.1 UNCLOS – a natural starting point for marine bioprospecting 
 
Since this investigation is focused on bioprospecting of genetic resources in a 
marine context, there are two reasons which make it logical to start any 
discussion of relevant international law rules in the 1982 United Nation 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Firstly, it was the explicit 
ambition of the drafters of the convention to endow it with status as the relevant 
framework for regulating human activity in relation to the oceans. This follows 
already from the preamble of UNCLOS, where the ambition is clear:  
 
Establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the 
sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which 
will facilitate international communication, and will promote the 
peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient 
utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, 
and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment. 
 
Similarly, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and individual states have on 
repeated occasions declared that UNCLOS “sets out the legal framework 
within which all activities in the sea must be carried out.”322 
 
Not only does this aspiration make UNCLOS a natural starting-point for any 
investigation of marine activities in international law; it also indicates a 
 
322 The formulation has been standard language in the preamble of the yearly so-called omnnibus 
resolution of the Oceans and the Law of the Sea, most recently in United Nations General 
Assembly resolution 74/19, Oceans and the law of the sea, A/RES/74/19 (10 December 2019), 






presumption that all marine activities fall within the scope of the convention. 
Even if many marine activities, including marine bioprospecting, are not 
explicitly mentioned in the convention, there is thus reason for assuming that 
the rules also encompass such uses. As will be discussed, the general 
formulation of many of the central parts of the convention, which enables 
application also to uses not considered during the drafting phase, reflects the 
ambition to provide a complete law for the seas. 
 
Moreover, the preamble indicates a holistic objective to consider ocean spaces 
as interrelated and as a whole. It can be questioned to what extent this holistic 
ambition is actually reflected in the convention. Whereas the preamble 
underlines the fundamental need for such approaches, it is poorly reflected in 
many of the operative provisions. Paradoxically, the convention came to cast 
in cement and even strengthen the pre-existing division of marine areas into 
different sectors, which involved limited regard for the need for holistic 
management.  
 
Leaving little leeway for integrated approaches, UNCLOS thus established a 
handful of different maritime zones. In this division of the seas, the full 
sovereignty of coastal states in internal waters and territorial sea was 
complemented with exclusive rights for exploitation of economic resources in 
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. Not only were 
integrated management approaches complicated by the clear division of sea 
areas between states. Even more challenging from this perspective is that the 
rules for the sea floor and pelagic waters beyond the territorial sea are markedly 
different, as if there were no connection between the ocean floor and the water 
on top of it. This lack of genuine overlap, not only between maritime zones but 
also in many other legal approaches under the convention, leads to challenges 
when addressing activities and resources such as bioprospecting of marine 
genetic resources, which transcend the conventional division of the seas into 
maritime zones as well as marine management into different activities. 
 
It is thus clear that the drafters intended for UNCLOS to represent a complete 
framework for marine regulation that would also hold a status of primacy in 
relation to other, pre-existing norms of international law relating to the oceans. 
This ambition to provide the relevant rules for all marine activities, coupled 
with the general formulation of many rules, presents some challenges when 
addressing new activities such as bioprospecting, which was not considered at 







Does all this mean that UNCLOS is an exclusive and fully comprehensive 
treaty, which contains all relevant legal rules for all marine activities? Despite 
the negotiators’ intention to bestow UNCLOS with a status as the 
comprehensive, holistic and primary convention for the law of the sea, other 
treaties, both beyond and within the law of the sea, provide relevant obligations 
for marine activities.323 Moreover, even in cases where the convention provides 
no obligations relating to an activity specifically, this does not necessarily 
mean that UNCLOS lacks applicable rules for this use of the sea. Indeed, there 
is nothing indicating that the activities explicitly referred to in the convention 
are exhaustive. The convention may still contain rules which are relevant to 
activities not explicitly mentioned, by virtue of the general formulation of 
obligations. Potentially, rules drafted for other uses of the seas could also be 
relevant by means of analogy. The activity examined in this study, deep-sea 
bioprospecting, represents such a case of a new activity, not explicitly referred 
to in UNCLOS. As will be further discussed, the concept of biotechnology was 
certainly not unknown to science when UNCLOS was drafted in the 1980s. As 
discussed in section B.5, marine bioprospecting predates the convention. But 
bioprospecting was not foreseen to become a substantial commercial interest 
in the use of marine resources.  
 
C.1.1.2 A framework convention 
 
The law of the sea certainly existed prior to the 1980s, and already at that time 
contained a rich and diverse flora of treaties. The negotiators did not intend to 
terminate those obligations. Rather, in addition to developing new norms 
where there had previously been ambiguity and uncertainty, a major 
motivation for UNCLOS was to organize this pre-existing legal regime. 
Effectively, the convention was meant to function – and effectively functions 
– as a framework convention for this area of international law.  
 
323 It appears to have been a widely shared understanding among the negotiators, and is also 
expressed in the preamble, that UNCLOS “establishes a comprehensive framework for the 
regulation of all ocean space, conscious that its problems are closely interrelated and need to 
be considered as a whole.” The status of UNCLOS as the relevant framework for all uses of the 
sea is also regularly stated in the UN General Assembly resolutions on Oceans and the Law of 
the Sea. Most recently, it was included in the Resolution (72/73) adopted by the General 
Assembly on 5 December 2017 (“Emphasizing the universal and unified character of the 
Convention, and reaffirming that the Convention sets out the legal framework within which all 






This role of UNCLOS in relation to the law of the sea has also been compared 
to that of a constitution in domestic law.324  
 
The reference to constitution is in certain regards an appropriate description of 
the convention by virtue of its ambition, as discussed above, to be 
comprehensive in scope, without regulating all matters of the law of the sea in 
detail. Rather, like domestic constitutions, UNCLOS established principles 
with varying degree of specificity, allowing for detailed regulation to be drafted 
in other treaties and co-operations. However, unlike domestic constitutions, 
UNCLOS does not aspire to establish distinct hierarchies in relation to these 
other, more specific treaties. This circumstance, which is connected to the 
formal status of international law treaties as equal, disproves the occasionally 
expressed view that UNCLOS somehow should have precedence in relation to 
other treaties, as regards marine activities and phenomena. This point is 
relevant already at this stage, although the relationship between the law of the 
sea including UNCLOS and other regimes of international law will not be 
discussed extensively until Part E. 
 
Rather than establishing hierarchies, UNCLOS brought pre-existing treaties 
under its umbrella by implicitly and explicitly referencing other co-operations 
and treaties as the relevant fora for certain issues. This was the case, for 
instance, with the management of marine mammals, where UNCLOS simply 
referenced the International Whaling Commission as the relevant organization 
for managing such activities. Correspondingly, UNCLOS acknowledged a 
strong regional dimension in marine management. Regional fisheries 
management organizations were thus implicitly granted an extensive role in 
the management of fish stocks migrating across boundaries. This was also the 
case in the rules for the protection of the marine environment, where a strong 





324 Tommy Koh, ’A Constitution for the Oceans’, in The Law of the Sea - Official Text of the 







The comparison with domestic constitutions also has considerable weaknesses. 
In many areas UNCLOS functions as much more than an umbrella for issue-
specific agreements and organizations. Indeed, in some areas the language is 
surprisingly operative. One such area is the rules for the management of living 
resources, which will be discussed in more detail in section C.1.5. Although 
these have been subsequently developed in the second implementing 
agreement to UNCLOS, the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
(UNFSA)325, as well as in rules under different regional fisheries management 
organizations (RFMOs), highly operative management rules relating to the 
concepts of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and total allowable catch 
(TAC) are set out in UNCLOS. Primarily designed to deal with conventional 
fisheries, these rules arguably have implications for bioprospecting of marine 
genetic resources, and there are reasons for returning to these criteria. 
 
More specific obligations are thus provided for some activities, in treaties 
focusing on a specific activity (often referred to as sectoral treaties) as well as 
regional agreements. For other activities, including bioprospecting, more 
detailed obligations in agreements outside UNCLOS are lacking. In these 
cases, the general obligations in UNCLOS may effectively provide the only set 
of binding law of the sea rules for states, in lieu of more detailed and operative 
agreements. The applicability to deep-sea bioprospecting of two such sets of 
generally formulated rules of UNCLOS, relating to marine scientific research 
and marine living resources, will be further elaborated in this part. 
 
It is fair to say that in many regards – and certainly in the case of bioprospecting 
of marine genetic resources – UNCLOS functions as much more than a consti-
tution for the oceans. Indeed, the convention contains very different types of 
obligations. It provides general principles, detailed operative rules, as well as 
implicit and explicit references to other agreements. The relationship between 
the rules in UNCLOS and deep-sea bioprospecting will now be investigated.  
  
 
325 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 4 August 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 (UN 






C.1.2. The maritime zone approach of UNCLOS 
 
It has already been mentioned that a major challenge to the ambition of the 
convention to provide a holistic framework is the sharp division of the world’s 
oceans into different maritime zones. This maritime zone approach, which is a 
central theme in the convention, is essentially the result of an act of balance 
between, on the one hand, exclusive and sovereign rights of coastal states and, 
on the other, the rights of other states. Throughout the history of the law of the 
sea, coastal states have expanded their claims for exclusive rights. This gradual 
development of exclusive coastal states rights, which has been referred to as 
creeping jurisdiction, will be further discussed in section D.1. 
 
As a result of this balancing between the interest of coastal and other states, 
rules in UNCLOS thus differ across maritime zones. In this part, it will first be 
generally explained how this division, which essentially provides different sets 
of rules for bioprospecting across maritime zones, plays out in the convention. 
This will form the basis for a discussion on how marine bioprospecting relates 
to two central concepts or in the convention: The rules on marine living 
resources and marine scientific research. It will be discussed how and to what 
extent the rules provided for these two concepts apply to marine 
bioprospecting. This in turn will enable a more informed discussion on how 
the law of the sea relates to the genetic resources of the deep seas.  
 
C.1.3. Marine areas within national jurisdiction 
 
For reasons discussed in Part A, this investigation is confined to bioprospecting 
of genetic resources in the deep-sea areas beyond national jurisdiction. It is 
nevertheless necessary to briefly describe the rules for the maritime zones 
where coastal states exercise sovereign rights. Not only will this illustrate the 
differences across maritime sectors and the importance of the distinction 
between marine bioprospecting within and beyond national jurisdiction. It will 
also develop the explanation in relation to the particular interest in 










As the convention is drafted, the sovereign and exclusive rights of the coastal 
states essentially decrease for every maritime zone, viewed from the shoreline. 
The most relevant maritime zones for the purpose of bioprospecting are the 12 
nautical mile territorial sea, the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone, the 
continental shelf, the high seas and the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, 
known as the Area.  
 
C.1.3.1. Internal waters and territorial sea 
 
Internal waters constitute the maritime zone closest to the shore, the waters 
“which lie landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is 
measured.”326 The baseline thus serves as the seaward limit of the internal 
waters. Conversely, it functions as the landward limit of the territorial sea, 
which extends 12 nautical miles measured from the baseline.327 Within both 
internal waters and the territorial sea, the coastal state enjoys full 
sovereignty.328 The difference between the two zones is that unlike internal 
waters, other states may exercise the right of innocent passage in the territorial 
sea.329 For bioprospecting purposes, this difference appears to be of limited 
importance. It appears that any activity relating to bioprospecting of marine 
genetic resources would render a passage non-innocent.330  
 
326 As provided by Article 8(1) of UNCLOS. For legal purposes, internal waters under Article 7 
thus include parts of the sea along the coast down to the low-water mark, ports and harbors, 
estuaries, landward waters from the closing line of bays. It also includes waters enclosed by 
straight baselines, which the coastal state is allowed to draw in localities where the coastline is 
deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate 
vicinity. 
327 UNCLOS Article 2-3. 
328 UNCLOS Article 2(1). 
329 UNCLOS Article 17. 
330 By definition, innocent passage should be innocent, i.e. continuous and expeditious. Based 
on the criteria in Article 18 and 19, which includes a number of specified activities including 
fishing and carrying out of research and surveys as well as other activities not having a direct 
bearing on passage, it appears clear that carrying out sampling or similar activities for 
bioprospecting purposes would disqualify an activity from benefiting from the status as innocent 
passage. Potentially, legitimate uses of innocent passage could result in detriment environmental 
impacts affecting marine ecosystems and their genetic resources. Such detriment impacts could 
however be prevented by exercise of the coastal state’s legislative jurisdiction relating to 
innocent passage, which includes inter alia measures aiming to conserve the living resources of 






Accordingly, it is difficult to dispute that bioprospecting falls within coastal 
state sovereignty in internal waters and the territorial sea.331 
C.1.4.1. The Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf 
 
Whereas the coastal state thus exercises full sovereign rights for bioprospecting 
purposes in internal waters and the territorial sea, the situation is different in 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf. In these legal 
twilight zones, the coastal states do not enjoy full sovereignty, but exclusive 
rights in some (but not all) regards. The coastal state must thus tolerate a 
considerably higher degree of involvement by other states. It could even be 
questioned if it is accurate to describe the EEZ as a zone within national 
jurisdiction. It would be more accurate to describe the rules for these zones as 
providing a delicate balance between the interests of coastal and other states. 
 
The limited spatial jurisdiction of coastal states in the EEZ  
 
Not until rather late in the negotiations of UNCLOS did it become clear that 
the EEZ would become a distinct maritime zone. Many observers and 
negotiators had long held the view that the EEZ would essentially be the high 
seas with an exception for only certain, rather limited coastal state rights.332 
When the focus turned to a proposal for a text, a discussion unfolded on how 
extensive exclusive rights should be granted to coastal states and whether the 
EEZ should be considered a maritime zone under national jurisdiction.333  
 
331 State practice appears to be in conformity with these codified rules, although there are 
variations in how the right of innocent passage is implemented. See YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (Cambridge University Press. 2012), at 90-96. 
332 The gradual enclosure of oceans commons and the role of coastal states in this development 
is further discussed in Part D.1. See also MYRON H. NORDQUIST, et al., UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY VOL. III [SECOND COMMITTEE: 
ARTICLES 86 TO 132, AND SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS] § III (1995), at 66.  
333 While the need for drafting special rules for the areas which would become EEZ was widely 
recognized early on in the negotiations, it was “not at first sight clear whether the EEZ is 
essentially the high seas with a special EEZ regime superimposed upon it” (this has been referred 
to as ‘high seas minus’ view) or whether the EEZ is a “new […] [sovereign] zone of the coastal 
state in which the high seas freedoms are the equivalent of the right of innocent passage in the 
territorial sea” (the ‘EEZ minus’ view). Philip Allott, Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea, 77 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983); ALEXANDER PROELSS, UNITED NATIONS 







The fact that the EEZ would eventually become considered as a sui generis 
zone, which was thus far from certain during the negotiations, had far-reaching 
implications.334 Even if the material scope of the exclusive rights of coastal 
states was limited, creating the EEZ as a distinct maritime zone effectively 
gradually reinforced the understanding (initially only held by coastal states) 
that this zone, which would make up huge ocean spaces, ought to be considered 
as an area under national jurisdiction.335  
 
Rights of coastal and other states in the EEZ 
 
The creation of the EEZ as a zone sui generis did not mean that all high seas 
freedoms ceased to exist in those areas. Although the high seas were 
geographically diminished by the establishment of the EEZ, high seas 
freedoms persist in the EEZ, to a considerable degree.336 As formulated in the 
convention, the freedoms of the high seas “and other pertinent rules of 
international law apply to exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not 
incompatible with the rights and jurisdiction granted to coastal States in the 
EEZ.”337 
 
334 For a period, views remained quite divided between the high seas minus and the EEZ minus 
approaches. According to negotiation documents, the generally accepted view that emerged in 
the 1976 Revised Single Negotiating Text was that the EEZ ‘is neither the high seas nor [an 
extension of] the territorial sea. It is a zone sui generis’ and as such it was one in which the high 
seas regime applied to the extent it was not displaced by rights specifically allocated to the 
coastal state. UNCLOS III, Revised Single Negotiating Text (Part II), UN Doc. 
A/CONF.62/WP.8/REV.1/PART II (1976), OR V, 151, 153 (para. 17). 
335 In the debate and negotiations on the development of new rules for areas beyond national 
jurisdiction (which generally is considered to relate to the high seas and the Area, the maritime 
zones where coastal states have no special rights) the EEZ has together with the zones where 
coastal states exercise full sovereignty been excluded from the scope of discussions. This 
division of maritime zones as either within or beyond national jurisdiction has reinforced the 
perception of the EEZ as ‘belonging’ to the coastal state rather than representing a hybrid zone. 
Regarding the EEZ as a coastal state maritime zone involves an important change in 
presumption, as compared to considering it as high seas with special EEZ rights for coastal states 
as the exception. It may accordingly be theorized that the inclination among states to avoid risks 
to interfere with the rights of other states effectively has made states refrain from carrying out 
activities in the EEZ of other states to a higher degree than they might have, if these areas would 
have been considered as high seas with special coastal state rights. 
336 As provided in UNCLOS Article 58 and 86.  
337 Article 58(2) makes clear that (the high seas freedoms of) ‘Articles 88 to 115 and other 






Some observers consider the continued application of these provisions to the 
EEZ a safeguard to preserve the essential elements of the high seas regime, 
even if former freedoms of the high seas relating to natural resources became 
abrogated in favor of the coastal state.338 However, for practical purposes, the 
continued application in the EEZ was only safeguarded for a limited set of 
specified freedoms.339 As succinctly formulated by Treves, “the EEZ has a 
specific legal regime that includes the application to it of a specified group of 
the freedoms of the high seas, but admits no presumption of a residual rule of 
freedom.”340 Rather, as will be discussed below, only some of the high seas 
freedoms found in Article 87 (navigation, overflight and the laying of cables) 
apply in the EEZ.  
 
As regards geographic scope, the EEZ may at a maximum extend 200 nautical 
miles from the baseline.341 The right of coastal states to an EEZ does not follow 
ipso facto from the convention. Instead, coastal states must declare such a zone 
and publish its coordinates for it to have legal force.342 This means that in some 
cases, marine areas which could potentially become EEZ have the legal status 
of high seas (and thus as an area beyond national jurisdiction), awaiting coastal 





incompatible with’ the rights and jurisdiction granted to coastal states in the EEZ. See PROELSS. 
2017, at 677. 
338 NORDQUIST, et al. 1995, at 70. 
339 In UNCLOS, this reference is made between Article 86 and 58. 
340 See Treves, Tullio, “High Seas” in RÜDIGER WOLFRUM, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (MPEPIL) (Oxford : Oxford University Press. 2008). 
341 See Article 57. Effectively, this means that the breadth of the EEZ at a maximum could 
amount to 188 nautical miles, since it is situated outside of the territorial sea. In many cases, 
however, the EEZ will never reach its full potential extent since the configuration of the coastline 
of other states makes delimitation necessary. The modalities for such delimitation are provided 
in UNCLOS Article 74. 
342 UNCLOS Article 75 
343 In some regions, such as parts of the Mediterranean, political concerns have made states 
reluctant to make such declarations. 
344 Robin R. Churchill & Allan V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester : Manchester 







The concept of EEZ gained status as customary international law in the 1985 
ruling in the Libya/Malta Case, where the ICJ stated that the “institution of the 
exclusive economic zone, with its rule on entitlement by reason of distance, is 
shown by the practice of States to have become a part of customary law.”345 
 
Like the territorial sea, the sovereign rights of the coastal state to explore and 
exploit the resources of the EEZ appear to follow relatively clearly from the 
convention, as articulated in Article 56:  
 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-
living, of the waters suprajacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its 
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation 
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds;  
 
The sovereign rights of the coastal state over the EEZ are thus essentially 
limited to economic exploration and exploitation.346 With regards to other 
relevant interests, including marine scientific research (which will be further 
discussed below), as well as the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, the right of coastal states is not formulated as exclusive but 
simply as jurisdiction in the same provision: 
 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this 
Convention with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
 
345 Continental Shelf (Libya-Malta), ICJ Rep 13, ICGJ 118 (International Court of Justice 3 
June), at 33, para. 34. 
346 As pointed out by Tanaka, it is important to distinguish sovereign rights from territorial 
sovereignty. Moreover, it may be argued that the sovereign rights in the EEZ essentially are 
exclusive in the sense that no one may undertake such activities or make a claim to the EEZ 
without the express consent of the coastal state. See TANAKA. 2012, at 127. As will be further 
discussed in the context of marine living resources other states may nevertheless have the right 
to natural resources in the EEZ under certain conditions. This is however conditional upon the 
agreement with the coastal state and does not challenge the character of the coastal state’s 






This duality relates to the legitimate interest of other states in the exclusive 
economic zone, which should be balanced against the rights of the coastal state: 
	
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this 
Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have 
due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a 
manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.  
 
The rights and duties of other states in the exclusive economic zone are spelled 
out in Article 58. Most importantly, the provision indicates that the coastal state 
must tolerate the exercise by other states of at least some of the freedoms of 
the high seas prescribed in Article 87.347 None of these freedoms explicitly 
referred to as applicable in the EEZ include high seas freedoms of direct 
relevance for bioprospecting. In particular, the freedoms to conduct marine 
scientific research and fisheries, as will be discussed in section C.1.5, appear 
to be limited to the high seas.348 Moreover, despite the rights of other states, the 
coastal state exercises both legislative and enforcement jurisdiction in the 
EEZ.349 Although enforcement jurisdiction is more clearly articulated, the 
provision is regarded as also encompassing legislative jurisdiction, by virtue 
of the reference to “the laws and regulations by it.”350 It thus appears that even 
if the coastal state must accept the exercise of at least some of the high seas 
freedoms in its EEZ, the coastal state maintains influence over how those 
freedoms are carried out. What about other high seas freedoms, which are not 
explicitly mentioned in Article 58 as applicable in the EEZ?  
 
347 This reference to high seas freedoms applicable in the EEZ is thus not open-ended but limited 
to some of the freedoms, namely the freedom of navigation, overflight and laying of submarine 
cables and pipelines as well as other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms. 
348 Article 58 also provides that in the exercise of the freedoms in the EEZ, exercising states 
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state. The requirement for due regard 
works both ways, and any conflict over activities not falling within either exclusive and explicit 
rights of coastal states or other states should be resolved on the basis of equity and in light of all 
relevant circumstances, see Article 59. 
349 As provided in Article 73(1) The coastal state may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to 
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take 
such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be 
necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with 
this Convention. 







It follows, albeit perhaps not clearly, that the list of high seas freedoms 
applicable in the EEZ, as referred to in Article 58, is exhaustive. This is not 
just because only some – though not all – high seas freedoms are explicitly 
mentioned as applicable in the EEZ. More importantly, the segments of the 
high seas rule in Article 87, which is not referred to as applicable within the 
EEZ, contains the central term inter alia in the chapeau. This term indicates 
that there may be other activities not mentioned, and that in the high seas also 
these fall within the scope of the high seas freedoms. For the EEZ, however, 
there is no indication that such other activities are included.351 The lack of 
reference to inter alia in Article 58 thus implies a major legal difference 
between the two zones for activities such as bioprospecting. For the high seas, 
as will be discussed below, inter alia entails that the list of explicitly referred 
freedoms is not exhaustive. The presumption in the high seas thus appears to 
be that states are free to also carry out activities not mentioned. In the EEZ, on 
the other hand, other activities, not explicitly listed, such as bioprospecting, 
are implicitly excluded from applicable freedoms of other states.352 
 
In conclusion, despite the preservation and analogous application of certain 
high seas freedoms, there is a clear preference for coastal state interests in the 
rules on the EEZ. Rather than establishing a balance between the interests of 
coastal and other states, the introduction of the EEZ transformed large ocean 
spaces into coastal state waters, with limited rights for other states which do 
not extend to bioprospecting or other activities not explicitly referred to.353 The 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea appears to support a restrictive 
interpretation of the application of high seas freedoms in the EEZ.354  
 
351 PROELSS. 2017, at 444-457. 
352 In other words, whereas freedom for activities of all states is the main rule in the high seas, 
it is thus the exception in the EEZ. Consequently, only a narrow selection from what is otherwise 
a non-exhaustive list of high-seas freedoms thus applies in the EEZ. 
353 This interpretation is further supported by the rules in the convention applicable in the event 
of conflict between coastal states rights and high seas freedoms in the EEZ. UNCLOS provides 
prima facie no clear presumption in favor of either coastal state rights or other states freedoms 
in the event of conflict but sets out a principle of ‘due regard’ (See Articles 56(2), 58(3) and 
Article 59). In reality, however, the EEZ rules still favors the coastal state in the event of conflict. 
This follows not only from the wording of Article 58(2) (“in so far they are not incompatible 
with” the EEZ regime). Alexander Proelss, The Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone in 
Perspective: Legal Status and Resolution of User Conflicts Revisited, 26 OCEAN YEARBOOK 
ONLINE (2012). 
354 In the “The M/V ‘Virginia G’ Case” the tribunal considered that the freedoms of other states 






Although support may be widespread for this understanding of the nature of 
the EEZ, the status of high seas freedoms in the EEZ and its relationship to the 
high seas has by no means always been generally accepted.355 However, after 
the entry into force of the convention, the understanding of the EEZ as an area 
based on an intricate dichotomy between high seas and coastal state economic 
zone rights appears to have gradually come to be replaced with an 
understanding of the EEZ as a maritime zone under national jurisdiction.356 
 
In sum, the consideration of the EEZ as a maritime zone under national 
jurisdiction, as it has increasingly been referred to as, may give the impression 
that the rights of the coastal state amount to open-ended exclusivity or even 
full sovereign rights.  
 
that the right of the coastal state to regulate fisheries includes refuelling of fisheries vessels, 
refusing to regard the bunkering as encompassed by the high seas freedoms applicable in the 
EEZ. The M/V "Virginia G" Case (Panama/Guinea-Bissau) (ITLOS Case 19) (International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 14 April). 
355 Indeed, based on a reading of the opening provision in UNCLOS’ part on the EEZ, Article 
55 (The exclusive economic zone is (…) subject to the specific legal regime established in this 
Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of 
other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention) it could be claimed that 
the EEZ should be interpreted as entailing more of a balance between rights of coastal and other 
states. Similarly, the provisions on the rights, jurisdiction and duties on coastal states and other 
states, Articles 56 and 58 respectively, prescribes due regard in the exercise of rights and duties 
in similar language, which also could be understood as prescribing more of a balanced regime. 
Based on negotiation documents, it also appears that at least a large group of states aimed for an 
EEZ concept less dominated by coastal state influence. Under this view, the language of Articles 
56 and 58 reflects a widespread belief among negotiators that the EEZ would be a ‘an overlay 
on the high seas’ rather than a coastal state maritime zone. There are also observers who contend 
that the EEZ ought to be regarded as at the same time both high seas and a sui generis zone. The 
argument is made based on the observation that the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal state are not associated with the zone in a territorial sense, but mainly derive from its 
economic potential. This position thus contends that the EEZ ought to be interpreted as high seas 
solely in terms of territory whereas in terms of function it is a sui generis zone. An advantage 
with this interpretation is, as formulated by Proelss, that it “accommodates the risk that the 
economic dimension of the EEZ, taking into account the quality and quantity of the pertinent 
rights allocated to the coastal state may otherwise ultimately turn into a ‘territorialisation’ of the 
EEZ.” PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 
408-436, 444-457. See also TANAKA. 2012, at 124-131; Bernard Oxman, The third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 1976 New York sessions, 71 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977); Proelss, OCEAN YEARBOOK ONLINE (2012). 
356 To use the terminology of Proelss, a ‘territorialization’ of the EEZ has occurred. Proelss, 







Rather, the EEZ regime is based on a delicate balance between the rights of 
coastal states and other states, which should not be mistaken for complete 
coastal state control. It would be most correct to refer to the concept of EEZ as 
a limited spatial jurisdiction, as suggested by Tanaka. The result of the 
negotiation between interests of coastal and other states, as provided by 
UNCLOS, is certain sovereign rights for coastal states, in the sense that other 
states cannot engage in associated activities without the consent of the coastal 
state. These are, however, limited ratione materiae, as defined by international 
law, essentially to natural resources and should thus be distinguished from 
territorial sovereignty.357 The extent of high seas freedoms preserved in the 
EEZ regime are, however, limited and it is clear that bioprospecting does not 
fall within the applicable freedoms of other states.  
 
The inherent coastal state continental shelf rights 
	
Reference to the regime of the continental shelf is made already in the last part 
of the EEZ rules, implying that the rights and duties of the coastal as well as 
other states in the seabed and subsoil of the EEZ should be interpreted under a 
different set of rules than those relating to the EEZ. The rules for the 
continental shelf are provided in Part VI of UNCLOS.358  
 
According to the opening provision of Part VI, Article 76, the spatial scope of 
the continental shelf is defined as: 
 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its 
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory 
to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the 
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental 
margin does not extend up to that distance. 
 
357 Moreover, the rights are spatial in nature, and may only be exercised in the EEZ. In spite of 
these limitations and the rights of other states, the coastal state may exercise both legislative and 
enforcement jurisdiction over all people in the EEZ, regardless of nationality. The sovereign 
rights are thus not limited as regards personal jurisdiction, but open-ended ratione personae. 
TANAKA. 2012, at 128. 
358 As stated in Article 56, The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil 






The continental margin, in turn, comprises “the submerged prolongation of the 
landmass of the coastal state, including the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the 
continental slope and the continental rise.” However, crucially, it does not 
include the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.359 
UNCLOS provides two alternative criteria for establishing the outer limits of 
the continental shelf: either to the outer edge of the continental margin 
(geological criterion) or a distance of 200 nautical miles (distance criterion).360  
 
Unlike the EEZ, the coastal state does not have to proclaim a continental shelf. 
Rights over the continental shelf exist ipso facto (“by itself”) and ab initio 
(“from the beginning”).361 There are areas where no EEZ has been proclaimed, 
but coastal state continental shelf rights apply in the underlying seabed. In such 
areas, a concurrent overlapping regime of continental shelf within coastal state 
jurisdiction and overlying high seas areas beyond national jurisdiction 
applies.362 The same type of mixed regime arises in the more common cases in 
which the continental shelf extends beyond the 200 nautical mile line.363 
 
359 UNCLOS Article 76(3). 
360 Insofar as the distance criterion is applied, the continental shelf overlaps with the EEZ (or 
more correctly, underlaps). Coastal states thus have the legal right to a continental shelf up to 
200 nautical miles, irrespective of the configuration of the seabed, which similarly has gained 
support as customary law by the ICJ. See Libya/Malta, ICJ Reports 1985, p. 33, para. 34. 
361 See Article 77(3). As a consequence, approximately 36 per cent of the total seabed is now 
under national jurisdiction of coastal states. It also follows logically that all EEZ for legal (but 
not geological purposes) has a corresponding continental shelf. CHURCHILL & LOWE. 1999, at 
148. 
362 This is the result of the difference between the requirement for proclamation of the EEZ and 
the inherent nature of the continental shelf.  
363 The continental shelf may where the configuration of the seabed qualifies under the complex 
legal criteria in Article 76, extend well beyond the limits of the EEZ, although 350 nautical miles 
from the baseline is set as an absolute maximum. According to Article 76, the continental shelf 
extends at least 200 nautical miles measured from the baseline (irrespective if the geological 
continental shelf, as is the case in many areas, lies closer to shore). In cases where the continental 
shelf extends beyond that point, the same provision provides for two different methods for 
measuring its extent. The first method, commonly referred to as the Gardiner formula, is based 
on measurement of sedimentation and its distance from the foot of the continental slope. The 
second method, called the Hedberg formula, is based on a maximum distance of 60 nautical 
miles from the foot of the continental slope. These calculations are made difficult by the 
notoriously difficulty of ascertaining the foot of the slope. It appears that the coastal states have 








As the result of overlapping claims and the unclear status of many submissions 
for continental shelf, the future status for extensive seabed areas remains 
unclear.364 In cases where the continental shelf does not overlap with EEZ, 
Article 78 makes clear that the right of the coastal state over the continental 
shelf does not alter the legal status of the suprajacent waters or of the air space 
above those waters. Similarly, the exercise of the rights of the coastal state must 
not infringe or result in unjustifiable interference with navigation and other 
rights and freedoms of other states provided for under the convention.365 
 
The continental shelf is thus a maritime zone distinct from the EEZ, even if it 
commonly lies under EEZ waters. In cases where coastal states either have the 
right to an extended continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit of the 
EEZ or have not yet proclaimed an EEZ, the continental shelf may, however, 
be overlapped by high seas. 
 
As regards ratione materiae, the coastal state, similarly to the EEZ, has 
sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of the continental 
shelf, which should not be interpreted as territorial sovereignty.366 The 
sovereign rights of the coastal state in the continental shelf, as formulated in 
Article 77, however, are more unconditional compared to the EEZ.  
 
364 Presently, the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is 
processing the scientific basis of submissions of extended continental shelf claims filed by a 
large number of coastal states. Due to the overwhelming workload, it will take long time before 
this commission has evaluated assessments hitherto submitted. Taken together, these 
submissions add up to vast areas. Moreover, the scope of the submissions in many cases overlap. 
Two additional factors further complicate this task. Firstly, submitted coastal assessments 
overlap in many areas. For instance, the geographic North Pole is considered by at least three 
coastal states to be within their continental shelf. Secondly, only state parties to UNCLOS have 
to make scientific assessments of their continental shelf and not all states with potential for 
extended continental shelf claims have ratified the convention. Among others, this leaves out 
the United States. Even if the US would become a party to UNCLOS, there is a 10 year-deadline 
for filing extended continental shelf claims connected to the date of ratification. The mandate 
for the Commission is provided in Article 4 of Annex II to UNCLOS. 
365 It is apparent that there is a potential for contention between activities in the continental shelf 
and the high seas in such areas, where the exclusive economic interests of the coastal states in 
the continental shelf overlaps with the open-access regime of the high seas (as will be discussed 
below). 






Whereas the coastal state under certain conditions should provide access to 
other states for resources in the EEZ, lack of exploitation of natural resources 
in the continental shelf does not result in corresponding rights to access for 
other states.367 Natural resources, in the continental shelf context, include, 
firstly, mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil.368 
Exploitation of hydrocarbons has accordingly been the most important exercise 
of continental shelf rights. The coastal states’ exclusive right in the continental 
shelf, however, also extends to natural resources where such resources are 
situated in or beneath the seabed. For these so-called sedentary species – that 
is, “organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under 
the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the 
seabed or the subsoil” – the coastal state similarly has sovereign rights.  
 
The definition of sedentary species may appear difficult to reconcile with the 
biological characteristics of the many species which spend part of their life 
cycle as sedentary species and other parts as pelagic. The sharp division 
between the seafloor regime of the continental shelf on the one hand and the 
rules for the overlying pelagic zone on the one raises challenges in the 
management of such organisms, which include species identified in section B.6 
as interesting for bioprospecting purposes.369 With respect to the rights of third 
states on the continental shelf, Article 79 establishes principles similar to the 
freedom of the seas-rights applicable in the EEZ.370 As for legislative and 
enforcement jurisdiction in the continental shelf, such rights appear to follow 
from the sovereign rights of the coastal state to exploit natural resources, 
although this is less explicit than in the case of the EEZ.371  
 
367 Article 77(2). 
368 Moreover, but less relevant for the purposes of this investigation, the coastal state has 
exclusive jurisdiction over the construction of artificial islands, installations and structures as 
well as drilling on the continental shelf. See Article 80-81. 
369 Under the discussion on marine living resources in section C.1.5, this problem will be further 
discussed. 
370 Foremost, all states are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines, although this right is 
subject to coastal state consent as regards the delineation of the course. Similarly, the coastal 
state has the right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf, the 
exploitation of its resources and the prevention of pollution from pipelines. 
371 Also similar to the EEZ, the sovereign rights does not have any limits ratione personae and 







In conclusion, the EEZ and the continental shelf regimes can be regarded as 
the twilight zones of the law of the sea, where the coastal state in certain 
regards exercises unlimited powers and sovereign rights. Yet, these must be 
balanced with the rights of other states, which in comparison with the territorial 
sea must be regarded as far-reaching. Viewed from the other side, the freedoms 
of the seas apply in these areas, but are limited by an exhaustive list of 
exclusive coastal state interests. As regards the right to conduct marine 
bioprospecting, as will be further discussed in section C.1.5, this appears to be 
limited to the coastal states, in line with the exclusive right to harvest living 
organisms (in the EEZ) and sedentary species (in the continental shelf), as well 
as the limited possibilities of other states to conduct marine scientific research 
(and to conduct bioprospecting sampling as part of such operations). 
	 	
C.1.4. Marine areas beyond national jurisdiction 
 
In the previous section it was discussed how UNCLOS establishes far-reaching 
rights for coastal states, with exclusive rights to economic resources in the 
water column up to 200 nautical miles measured from the baseline and a 
maximum of 350 nautical miles on the seafloor and underlying sediments372, 
which appear to encompass bioprospecting for genetic resources. Areas 
beyond those points were deliberately left beyond national jurisdiction. Under 
the convention, the water column beyond the EEZ (or beyond the territorial sea 
where no EEZ has been proclaimed) is referred to as the high seas and the 
seafloor beyond the continental shelf as the Area.373 In lack of sovereign or 
exclusive coastal state rights, these deep-sea areas are collectively referred to 
as areas beyond national jurisdiction. The spatial relation between these areas 
largely correspond to the relationship between the EEZ and the continental 
shelf, as discussed in the previous section. As regards ratione materiae, 
however, the difference between the regime for the water column and the 
seabed is much larger beyond national jurisdictions, compared to the 
relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf, as will be further 
discussed below. 
 
372 Where the continental shelf extends that far under the legal criteria, as discussed above. 







From a scientific standpoint, much of the marine waters encompassed by EEZ 
and continental shelf zones discussed in the previous section would be 
regarded as deep seas. Conversely, coastal seas where no EEZ has been 
proclaimed would, from a legal standpoint, be regarded as beyond national 
jurisdiction, as discussed above. There is thus a considerable discrepancy 
between oceanographic and legal understanding of the deep seas.374 This is due 
to an inability of the negotiators of UNCLOS to fully reflect the multifaceted 
oceanographic and other scientific aspects of the marine environment beyond 
national jurisdiction in the rules of the convention.  
 
Instead, UNCLOS establishes a rigid dichotomy of marine spaces beyond 
national jurisdiction which largely but not fully reflect the configuration of the 
oceans; the pelagic realm of the deep seas roughly corresponds to the high seas. 
The seabed and ocean floor and subsoil of the deep seas, on the other hand, 
approximately corresponds to what under the convention is defined as the 
Area.375 Neither the scope of the high seas nor that of the Area are positively 
defined under UNCLOS. Instead, these maritime areas are made up by what is 
left over once all other claims are subtracted. In the water column this can be 
assessed relatively easily. States can claim a maximum of 200 nautical miles 
of EEZ, measured from the baseline.376 Effectively, once this proclamation has 
been made, the relevant sea area is appropriated and the high seas are delimited 
in a corresponding manner.  
 
374 The vast ocean expanse beyond waters which under normal circumstances would be under 
the jurisdiction of coastal states is classified by marine scientists and oceanographers as the open 
ocean and the deep seabed. Furthermore, the water column of the open ocean or pelagic realm 
is often divided into vertical layers and horizontal regions. The seabed has also been divided into 
zones based on depth from the surface and benthic fauna. The deep seafloor beneath the open 
ocean has a topography which is comparable in complexity to the terrestrial environment. 
WARNER. 2009, at 2. 
375 UNCLOS Article 1(1). A geological definition of the deep-seafloor would include larger 
parts of seabed area than the Area. This is the result of the formulation of the criteria for the 
continental shelf, as discussed in the previous section, which enables coastal states to include 
also areas beyond the geological continental shelf in the legal continental shelf. Similarly, an 
oceanographic perspective would consider large parts of EEZ areas as deep-seas.  
376 In line with Article 57, states can only claim 200 nm EEZ where the geographical 
circumstances so permit. In many cases, adjacent coastlines limit the geographic scope of EEZs. 
In case a state desires to proclaim an EEZ, the coordinates of the zone should be published in 







For the Area, the same assessment is in many areas much more complicated, 
as the result of the complex formula for ascertaining the extent of the 
continental shelf under the convention.377  
 
Whatever the claims for continental shelves of coastal states add up to in total, 
the rest of the seabed will remain beyond national jurisdiction and referred to 
as the Area under the convention. In the areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
UNCLOS sets up distinct regimes, as compared to areas within national 
jurisdiction. For both the high seas and the Area, no state can claim exclusive 
rights. The rules for both these regimes thus contain elements of a commons 
regime. Still, the basic principles of the high seas and the Area are considerably 
different. As will be discussed, high seas resources are common (in the sense 
that they do not belong to any particular state and that every state can make use 
of them) and freedoms are exercised for the benefit of individual actors 
(although, admittedly, with due regard for the rights of others). For the 
resources of the Area, the situation could be regarded as the opposite. No state 
can claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over them.378 
 
It would thus be wrongful to regard the marine areas beyond national 
jurisdiction as a terra nullius leftover, after all coastal states have grabbed their 
share of the seas. Rather, the high seas and the Area are distinct legal concepts, 
where the traditional principles of equal rights and access for all states have 
not been circumscribed by the creeping coastal state jurisdiction. Most of the 
rules relate to the challenge of managing resources where the rights of all states 
are equal. As will be established, in the two maritime zones beyond national 
jurisdiction, this fundamental commons problem has been approached very 
differently, with far-reaching implications for deep-sea bioprospecting. 
 
377 As discussed under the continental shelf above, the criteria for assessing the extent of the 
extended continental shelf are open to relatively subjective interpretation, and it is not easy to 
foresee how the precise final delineation will be established based on geographic or geological 
factors. To complicate things further, many claims for extended continental shelf will be 
scrutinized by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for the foreseeable future. 
In some cases, submissions are disputed or overlapping, requiring delimitation. Some states with 
sizeable continental shelves, notably the United States have prepared but not yet submitted any 
claim for continental shelf, as the result of remaining a non-party to UNCLOS.  
378 Konrad Jan Marciniak, New Implementing Agreement under UNCLOS: A Threat or an 







C.1.4.1. The high seas 
 
The relatively restrictive regime of marine areas within national jurisdiction 
stand in stark contrast to the high seas, which are governed by the principle of 
freedom. Yet, this does not imply that the high seas are a void lacking legal 
order. Rather, much of the rules in UNCLOS on the high seas aims to ensure 
an ordered management of this in principle free access regime. Instead of 
bestowing certain states legislative or enforcement jurisdiction to ensure that 
these rules on high seas management are upheld, UNCLOS establishes the 
principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction as the basis for exercising rights 
and obligations in the high seas.379 
 
The geographic scope of the high seas in relation to other maritime zones 
	
In contrast to the pelagic maritime zones within national jurisdiction, which 
are established based on precise measures in relation to the baseline, the 
geographic scope of the high seas is defined negatively: “all parts of the sea 
that are not included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters 
of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.”380 
 
This geographical scope builds on the definition applied already prior to 
UNCLOS. During the drafting of the high seas regime of UNCLOS, the 
International Law Commission started from the widely accepted categorical 
position that “the waters of the sea belong either to the high seas or to the 
territorial sea or to internal waters.”381 With the advent of the exclusive 
economic zone regime in UNCLOS, the scope of the high seas was only further 
circumscribed. As described in Part D, this can be regarded as the biggest step 




379 TANAKA. 2012, at 149. 
380 UNCLOS Article 86. 
381 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission: commentaries to the Articles Concerning 
the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/3159 (1956), GAOR 11th Sess. Suppl. 9, 12, 23 (Art. 26); 








The commons regime of the high seas 
 
Whereas coastal state influence is extensive within national jurisdiction, there 
is no preference for individual states in the high seas, which are to be reserved 
for peaceful purposes.382 No state may validly purport to subject any part of the 
high seas to its sovereignty. This principle of non-appropriation, as formulated 
in Article 89, means that all claims of sovereignty over the high seas are 
invalid.  
 
However, this does not imply that the high seas and its resources cannot be 
used by states. On the contrary, every state (both coastal and landlocked) has 
the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high seas.383 Moreover, in Article 87 
the convention provides that all states are free to carry out activities, including 
using high seas resources, as part of the high seas freedoms. Taken together, 
the principles of non-appropriation and the freedom of the high seas function 
as the legal basis for the high seas regime.  
 
From a material standpoint, the principle can thus be divided into two parts: 
Firstly, the principle implies that the high seas are free from national 
jurisdiction;384 Secondly, as a consequence of the freedom from state 
jurisdiction, the freedom of the high seas implies an equal freedom for all states 
to carry out activities in the high seas which are compatible with international 
law.385 The consequences of these basic principles for the high seas regime will 
be further discussed below. First, however, the issue of regulating jurisdiction 





382 UNCLOS Article 88. 
383 UNCLOS Article 90. 
384 UNCLOS Article 89. 







The exclusive jurisdiction of flag states 
 
By virtue of being open to all states, no state has the right to deny other states 
access to the high seas. It follows logically that all states have equally limited 
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction. Instead, states have exclusive 
jurisdiction over and responsibility for the behavior and actions of ships flying 
their flag in the high seas. Formulated in Article 92 of UNCLOS, the principle 
of the exclusive jurisdiction is also well established in customary international 
law:  
 
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional 
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in this 
Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. 
 
The exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state may thus be subject to exceptions, 
but only as expressly provided in UNCLOS or other treaties. The principle 
comprises both legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over ships on the high 
seas. The flag state thus exercises enforcement jurisdiction over all people 
within ships flying its flag, irrespective of their nationality.386 As pointed out 
by Tanaka, the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state plays a 
dual role. Firstly, the principle hinders other states from interfering with 
vessels flying flags of other states. By ensuring this, the principle ensures the 
freedom of activities of vessels on the high seas. Secondly, the flag state has 
the responsibility to ensure compliance with national and international law 
concerning activities of ships flying its flag on the high seas.387 
 
386 As stated by ITLOS, ‘the ship, every thing on it, and every person involved or interested in 
its operations are treated as an entity linked to the flag state. The nationalities of these persons 
are not relevant.’ The M/V "Saiga” (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) (ITLOS Case 
2) (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 1 July), para. 106. 
387 In particular, the flag state is responsible for ensuring safety, in different regards, as well as 
prevention of marine pollution as provided in Articles 94 and Part XII of UNCLOS. See 
TANAKA. 2012, at 153. There are two explicit exceptions to the exclusive jurisdiction of flag 
states, relating to the right of visit and so-called hot pursuit, as provided in Articles 110-111. 
These are however of limited relevance for the purposes of this investigation. This does however 
not mean that enforcement by other states than the flag state is ruled out, only that it is limited 
to cases where there are legitimate grounds for the enforcing state to exercise jurisdiction in 
relation to the violating subject. This follows from Article 92, which clearly rule flag state as the 







States are thus free not only to exercise jurisdiction for violation of high seas 
regulations, but in relation to any other regulation, for that matter, in relation 
to vessels sailing under their flag.388 Even if flag state may be the presumptive 
jurisdictional nexus on the high seas, a state can still assert jurisdiction to 
punish or regulate the conduct of its own nationals for acts committed aboard 
foreign vessels.389  
 
The exclusive flag state jurisdiction has important consequences for 
bioprospecting, where sampling cruises commonly involve people and private 
entities from many different states. Insofar as the responsibility for activities 
in the high seas is concerned, UNCLOS puts the primary jurisdiction as well 
as the responsibility for such operations on the flag state of the relevant ship. 
Moreover, in line with the precedent, other states are not entitled to hamper 
such activities.  
 
Another important consequence of the exclusive flag state jurisdiction is 
connected to restrictions of high seas freedoms, which will be further discussed 
below. Such restrictions may be decided in other treaties, according to 
UNCLOS Article 87. However, as the result of the exclusive flag state 
jurisdiction, enforcement of such restrictions is in principle only possible in 





international treaties.” Flag states may thus effectively limit their exclusive jurisdiction by 
means of treaties. Moreover, they may of course wave their exclusive sovereignty in individual 
cases on a bilateral basis. They are also free to exercise enforcement in relation to state parties 
which in agreements have allowed such actions. Moreover, as noted by Proelss, despite its 
wording, Article 92 creates no absolute prohibition on states extending their prescriptive or 
regulatory jurisdiction to events occurring aboard a foreign vessel. PROELSS, United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017. 
 
389 There is no rule in international law that two national judicial orders cannot exist in the same 
space at the same time. PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A 
Commentary. 2017. 
390 As elaborated under Limitations in other treaties below, for non-parties to treaties limiting 
high seas freedoms, the general rules of unmodified high seas freedom will remain applicable. 
The difficulty of making obligations in such treaties effective also stems from the limitation of 







High seas freedoms 
 
The freedom of the high seas was not introduced by UNCLOS, but was 
formulated already in the early 1800s.391 That in turn was based on a much 
older, traditional understanding of the status of the seas, dating back to the 
dictum of Grotius from the early 17th century.392 This idea, that the high seas 
are inalienable and open to all states, is commonly referred to as mare liberum, 
as discussed in section D.1.393  
 
As a descendant of Grotius’ concept, Part VII of UNCLOS spells out a far-
reaching freedom of navigation and fishing. But the convention also expands 
the freedoms to activities that were not previously codified. Article 87 clarifies 
that the freedoms of the high seas, in addition to navigation and fishing, 
comprise the freedom of navigation, the freedom of overflight, the freedom to 
lay submarine cables and pipelines, and the freedom to construct artificial 
islands and other installations permitted under international law, as well as the 
freedom to carry out scientific research. There is nothing indicating that this 
list is exhaustive. In fact, as already discussed above in the context of the EEZ, 
the term inter alia in the chapeau of Article 87 indicates that the listed freedoms 
are merely examples of high seas freedoms.394  
 
 
391 CHURCHILL & LOWE. 1999, at 205. 
392 Heavily influenced by the Dutch commercial interests in trade with East India, Grotius 
formulated in reaction to claims by Spain and Portugal to domination over extensive marine 
areas his doctrine that “The sea is common to all, because is it so limitless it cannot become 
become a possession of any one, and because it is adapted to the use of all, whether we consider 
it from the point of view of navigation or fisheries.” PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 679; HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR, 
THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (Kitchener, 
Ont. : Batoche. 2000); Andrea Weindl, Grotius’s Mare Liberum in the Political Practice of 
Early-Modern Europe, 30 GROTIANA (2009); Helen Thornton, Hugo Grotius and the Freedom 
of the Seas, 16 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARITIME HISTORY (2004). 
393 The convention thereby confirms what followed from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas, that the water column beyond national jurisdiction is a global common. As a concept 
in international law, the high seas as well as the broader doctrine of the freedom of the seas thus 
date back to Hugo Grotius. WARNER. 2009, at 27. 








The convention is thus open to the possibility that there may be other freedoms. 
Indeed, an examination of negotiation documents makes clear that the intent 
of the drafters was that Article 87 would provide a non-exhaustive list.395 This 
is because the negotiators of UNCLOS considered the freedom concept of the 
high seas, including its restrictions, to be the default rule for activities in these 
areas.  
 
The freedom of the high seas may thus entail much more than the enumerated 
activities. Indeed, several activities were discussed at the time of negotiation 
of Article 87. High seas tourism and activities in outer space conducted from 
the high seas, such as the launching of satellites, were both considered by the 
drafters of the convention. Not considered sufficiently relevant to be explicitly 
referenced in Article 87, the drafters still considered both to fall within the 
remit of the freedoms of the high seas. Similarly, uses of the high seas for 
military purposes, such as training and other military exercises, though 
restricted in other maritime zones, fall within the scope of the freedoms of the 
high seas.396 
 
Based on preparatory works, there is a clear presumption that activities not 
mentioned are also encompassed by the scope of high seas freedoms.397 There 
is reason to believe that this includes a freedom to conduct bioprospecting, to 
the extent that such activities are not already encompassed by the freedom of 
fishing and scientific research (these relationships will be further examined 
below). This is not simply because there is no indication to the contrary; the 
negotiating documents of the convention make clear that there was widespread 
agreement that future activities would be encompassed by the freedoms. This 





395 NORDQUIST, et al. 1995, at 73. 
396 Id., at 84-85. 
397 Alexander Proelss, ABS in Relation to Marine GRs, in GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE AND THE LAW (2009). 
398 For over 20 years, samples of marine genetic resources have been taken in areas beyond 







Under this freedom, marine genetic resources from the high seas would thus 
be possible to exploit on a first come first serve basis. Yet, this does not mean 
that the exploitation could be carried out in a completely unrestricted 
fashion.399 Nor does it mean that UNCLOS lacks legal rules applicable to high 
seas bioprospecting. As will be discussed below, the freedom to conduct 
bioprospecting would be coupled with restrictions and obligations. Moreover, 
the free-access regime implies that each state may implement legal rules for 
marine bioprospecting in the high seas. However, the rules only apply insofar 
as states can assert jurisdiction, i.e. primarily in relation to ships under their 
flag, but also individuals and corporate entities, as discussed above.400 
 
As regards the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas, UNCLOS explicitly 
provides, in line with the commons nature of the high seas regime, that it may 
be used by all states, whether coastal or landlocked.401 Article 87 thus not only 
makes clear that high seas resources are common (in the sense that they do not 
belong to any particular state and that every state can make use of them). It 
also implies that the freedoms are exercised for the benefit of individual actors 
(with due regard for the rights of others). 
 
Two important elements should thus be borne in mind when approaching the 
freedoms of the high seas: Firstly, the freedoms listed in the convention are not 
without limitations; Secondly, there is nothing indicating that the list of 
freedoms is exhaustive. The first reservation, that of conditions and obligations 
in the exercise of high seas freedoms, effectively restricts the exercise of the 
freedoms. The second element, the open-ended nature of activities 
encompassed by high seas freedoms, has a contrary function and expands the 
scope of the principle. These two countervailing forces in relation to the 
freedom of the high seas will now be discussed in turn. 
 
 
399 Natalie Y. Morris-Sharma, Marine Genetic Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: 
Issues with, in and outside of UNCLOS, 20 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 
ONLINE (2017). 
400 It should however be noted that the status of bioprospecting as falling within high seas 
freedoms is not undisputed. Within the BBNJ process, arguments of the contrary position have 
been raised on several occasions. See meeting reporting at https://www.un.org/bbnj/ (site 
accessed 12/11 2020). 








Limitations on high seas freedoms 
 
The high seas freedoms are not without limitations. Firstly, high seas freedoms 
must be examined in light of the principle of non-appropriation. Secondly, a 
number of limitations are expressed as explicit exceptions to the listed 
freedoms. According to Article 87, the exercise of the freedoms is qualified by 
other rules in UNCLOS. Thirdly, as already noted, there is nothing in 
UNCLOS preventing further limitations of high seas freedoms in lex specialis 
treaties. Fourthly, limitation is expressed in paragraph 2 of Article 87 as a duty 
of due regard to the interests of other states, in the exercise of the freedom of 
the high seas as well as activities in the Area. This underlines that the high seas 
freedoms should by no means be interpreted as an absence of law (vacuum 
juris).402 Rather, the extensive explicit qualifications by references to other 
parts of UNCLOS make clear that the freedoms are coupled with limitations 
and obligations. 
 
Limitations resulting from the principle of non-appropriation 
 
As discussed at the outset of this section, the commons management regime of 
the high seas is based on two principles: Firstly, the principle of the freedom 
of the high seas including the obligations to take into account explicit 
obligations and the requirement for due regard; Secondly, and equally relevant, 
Article 89 sets out the principle that “no State may validly purport to subject 
any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.” This second principle, which has 
been referred to as the principle of non-appropriation, complements the rules 
on the exercise of high seas freedoms.403 The concept of non-appropriation of 
the high seas is central in the context of bioprospecting, since such processes 
involve legal claims relating to high seas resources. How far, then, does this 
principle go in preventing claims for legal rights to the high seas? Is it limited 
to sovereign or territorial claims, or does it include other claims for legal titles 
to marine resources? 
 
 
402 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 679. 
403 David Joseph Attard, et al., The IMLI manual on international maritime law. Vol. 1, The law 






Not only does the principle of non-appropriation prevent the annexation of 
high seas areas by states. Regarded in light of the high seas freedoms, the status 
of all states as equal on the high seas and the obligation to pay due regard to 
the activities of other states (as will be discussed below), the principle also 
invalidates claims of sovereign powers in a broader sense. This means that no 
individual state can exercise sovereignty by regulating how the freedoms of 
the high seas should be exercised by other states.404 States are thus not allowed 
to control the activities of other states on the high seas.405  
 
Thereby, effectively, even if Article 89 makes reference to sovereignty and not 
sovereign rights of natural resources (as used in corresponding regulations 
relating to the EEZ, the continental shelf and the Area)406, the principle of non-
appropriation in the high seas implicitly also prohibits claims of sovereign 
rights to control the use and exploitation of natural resources.407 In the context 
of bioprospecting for genetic resources, no individual state can thus assess 
jurisdiction over the management or use of such resources in certain high seas 
areas, since it would go against the principle of non-appropriation to make such 
claims. Moreover, it would be counter to the principle of exclusive flag state 
jurisdiction if individual states set regulations or requirements for such 
activities in relation to other states. 
 
The principle of non-appropriation can be regarded as a logical complement to 
the freedom of the high seas, since the freedoms would be circumscribed if the 
high seas or its resources were to be subjected to the judicial order of a 
particular state.408 Accordingly, in lack of the principle of non-appropriation, 








404 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 687. 
405 CHURCHILL & LOWE. 1999, at 205, 220. 
406 See articles 56, 77 and 193 respectively. 
407 NORDQUIST, et al. 1995, at 96. 







This is in line with the notion that the commons status of the high seas should 
not be interpreted as the result of a legal vacuum nor should the high seas 
freedoms be interpreted as the absence of regulation, as mentioned above. 
Rather, the exercise of sovereign powers, national claims and regulation are 
explicitly prohibited by the principle of non-appropriation.409 The high seas 
regime, including its freedoms, should be regarded as a carefully designed 
balance between rights and duties for high seas utilization. The high seas are 
thus an area where activities may be exercised in line with regulated freedoms. 
Based on the explicit prohibition on raising sovereign claims, the UNCLOS 
rules of the high seas has been regarded as establishing what can be described 
as a minimally regulated space where states may act only if expressly 
‘authorized by international law’.410  
 
In sum, the principle of non-appropriation extends beyond merely preventing 
claims for territorial sovereignty over high seas areas. As a consequence of the 
high seas regime, also sovereign claims to special rights to resources or 
aspirations to regulate the extraction of resources are prohibited. Not only 
would such claims go against the principle of non-appropriation as well as the 
basic premise that all states are equal on the high seas; they would also 
compromise the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction. This implies that 
no state can make claims for concessions or other special rights to 
bioprospecting in certain areas. Nor is it compatible with UNCLOS to prevent 





A second type of limitation of high seas freedoms follows from direct 
qualifications provided by UNCLOS. The second line of Article 87 first 
establishes that the high seas are open to all states, and that the freedom of the 
high seas is “exercised under the conditions laid down by the convention.” The 
high seas freedoms are thus not unqualified in the convention. There are 
explicit exceptions and interests that should be respected.411  
 
409 Id. at 688. 
410 DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA. VOL. 2 (Ivan Anthony 
Shearer ed., Oxford : Clarendon Pr. 1984), at 792. 
411 Article 87 explicitly makes clear that there are limitations to the freedoms of navigation and 






These requirements are not to be regarded as vague concerns to be considered 
by states engaged in operations in the high seas; the high seas freedoms cannot 
be exercised lawfully by states without observing these obligations.  
 
Of these explicit obligations relating to the exercise of high seas freedoms, the 
exceptions on the freedom of fishing and scientific research on the high seas 
appear particularly relevant in the context of bioprospecting. These will be 
examined below, in the discussion of the general concepts of marine living 
resources and marine scientific research in the law of the sea. Also relevant are 
the limitations to the freedom of navigation, on which all ship-based 
bioprospecting activities in the high seas are dependent. The most relevant 
limitations in this respect are the duties to protect life (Articles 94 and 98), the 
environment (Article 192) and to control pollution (Part XII).412 The 
obligations to prevent pollution of the marine environment may be particularly 
relevant in bioprospecting, which is often conducted in sensitive ecosystems, 
as discussed in Part B. 
 
Limitations in other treaties 
 
Aside from making reference to explicit conditions provided in other parts of 
UNCLOS, Article 87 provides that the high seas freedoms are exercised under 
the conditions laid down in other rules of international law. This makes clear 
that it is compatible with the convention to limit high seas freedoms by means 
of rules in other treaties. Such restrictions in other treaties will, however, apply 
only in relation between the parties to the relevant agreement.413 The 
unmodified freedoms of the seas, as provided by UNCLOS, remains in force 
for non-parties purposes. The difficulty of making obligations restricting high 
seas freedoms in such treaties effective also stems from the limitation of 
enforcement jurisdiction on high seas to flag states.414 
 
to construct artificial islands and other installations (Part VI), the freedom of fishing (Parts VI 
and XIII) and the freedom of scientific research, (Parts VI and XIII). 
412 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 683. 
413 It follows already from the general international law maxim pacta tertiis that treaty 
obligations only apply to subscribing states. The regulatory challenges resulting from this 
principle are amplified by the limitation of enforcement jurisdiction on high seas to flag states. 
In so far agreements involving restrictions of high seas freedoms would be claimed to apply also 
to non-parties, it would arguably also violate the principle of non-appropriation. 
414 There is thus a risk that undertakings in such other treaties limiting high seas freedoms could 
be circumvented by means of flags of convenience. This calls for further examination of 







Treaties limiting high seas freedoms have been entered into in different areas, 
but have in effect been most far-reaching in respect of the freedom of 
navigation.415 Taken together, the two treaties MARPOL and SOLAS have 
streamlined global standards on pollution and safety, which apply to all ships 
conducting operations, including bioprospecting, in the high seas as well as in 
any other maritime zone. The freedom of fishing was substantially 
circumscribed in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which entered into force in 
2001 as the second implementing agreement of UNCLOS.416 The agreement, 
which will be further discussed under marine living resources below, limits the 
freedom of fisheries in several important regards, which are also highly 
relevant to bioprospecting. However, the other high seas freedom of most 
relevance to bioprospecting – namely, the freedom to conduct scientific 
research – has not been limited in special agreements. 
 
A potential future implementing agreement on biological diversity beyond 
national jurisdiction (BBNJ) may provide additional obligations relating to 
deep-sea bioprospecting.417 Within that agreement, but also separately, greater 
cooperation aiming to set up marine protected areas in the high seas may result 
in restrictions to the exercise of bioprospecting in the high seas, at least in some 
areas.418 Such measures have already been implemented by groups of states in 
 
415 The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) seeks 
to achieve the complete elimination of international pollution of the marine environment by oil 
and other harmful substances and the minimization of accidental discharge of such substances 
(see the preamble of MARPOL). The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) sets minimum safety standards in the construction, equipment and operation of 
merchant ships. See International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 
November, 1973, 3407, 1340 U.N.T.S. 61 (MARPOL) ; International Convention for the Safety 
of Life At Sea (SOLAS), 1 November 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 3 § 1184 U.N.T.S. 3. 
416 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. 1997. 
417 Based on documentation from the negotiation process, these may include measures directly 
connected to bioprospecting, relating to management and conservation of deep-sea genetic 
resources. These measures may effectively limit the freedom of fishing or scientific research, or 
the implicit freedom of bioprospecting, depending on interpretation. Moreover, the agreement 
is expected to provide modalities for establishing marine protected areas beyond national 
jurisdiction to protect sensitive and fragile ecosystems. Declaration of marine protected areas 
may imply different levels of restrictions, including preventing or restricting bioprospecting. A 
broad inventory of documents from the BBNJ-process is available at https://www.un.org/bbnj/ 
(site accessed 12/11 2020). 
418 Declaring marine protected areas in high seas areas with particularly sensitive ecosystems is 
however not a novel concept. States have cooperated for well over a decade in establishing such 






some areas.419 A considerable limitation in such approaches is that in line with 
the pacta tertiis principle, high seas marine protected area measures only apply 
to the parties of the treaty upon which the measures have been based.  
 
In line with the exclusive flag state jurisdiction, such measures cannot be 
applied in relation to ships flying the flag of non-parties, not even in cases 
where a very broad group of states agree to conserve marine biological 
diversity on the high seas by establishing a marine protected area.420  
 
Biological Diversity. The CBD conference of parties stated in 2006 that “marine protected areas 
are one of the essential tools to help achieve conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in 
marine areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Subsequently, the 2010 COP adopted 
the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. Among the 
strategic objectives, target 11 provided that ‘by 2020, at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland 
water areas, and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, especially areas of particular 
importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through effectively and 
equitably managed, ecologically representative and well connected systems of protected areas 
and other effective area-based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscapes 
and seascapes.’ It can thus be expected, that marine protected areas will increase and encompass 
also considerable high seas areas. See Convention on Biological Diversity, COP Decision 
VIII/24, Protected Area, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VIII/24, 15 June 2006, para. 38.; Convention 
on Biological Diversity, COP Decision X/2, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, 
including Aichi Biodiversity Targets, UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2, 29 October 2010. Under the 
high seas regime provided by UNCLOS, establishing marine protected areas is however 
problematic since such measures may set limits for the exercise of a broader range of high seas 
freedoms, including the freedom of navigation. Accordingly, proposals for marine protected 
areas measures affecting the freedom of navigation have been met with opposition from naval 
powers. Stuart Kaye, Implementing high seas biodiversity conservation: global geopolitical 
considerations, 28 MARINE POLICY (2004). 
419 UNCLOS lacks specific reference to marine protected areas and other area-based measures 
for the protection of sensitive sea areas. It is therefore not surprising that objectives to establish 
high seas marine protected areas have been particularly challenging to implement in the high 
seas. In line with the possibility in Article 87 of UNCLOS to make exceptions from the freedoms 
of the high seas in other treaties, measures providing special rules for designated high seas areas 
have been based on specific treaties binding state parties to apply the measures insofar as their 
jurisdiction extends. Legal support for such measures has also been based on the general 
obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment in Article 192 of UNCLOS, as well 
as Article 194(5), which provides for measures necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile 
ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species and other forms 
of marine life. States have also argued that such measures are allowed under the obligation to 
cooperate in the conservation and management of living resources under Articles 117 and 118 
(as will be further discussed under marine living resources below). 
420 Erik Molenaar, Managing Biodiversity in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 22 THE 







Both regional and sectoral instruments have been used as the basis for 
declaring marine protected areas.421 Although such different measures for the 
protection of high seas areas rarely mention bioprospecting or genetic 
resources specifically, many contain measures which effectively involve 
restrictions of such activities. Of less direct effect for bioprospecting so far (but 
with the possibility of involving restrictions to bioprospecting), sectoral 
instruments with global scope of application also provide for measures which 
effectively function as the basis for high seas marine protected areas. Under 
the auspices of the IMO, the concepts of Special Areas (based on MARPOL) 
and the more far-reaching Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas have been 
developed, resulting in special measures for vast sea areas.422  
 
421 Examples of high seas areas where regional sea convention organizations have declared 
marine protected areas include inter alia the North East Atlantic and the Antarctic ocean. In the 
North East Atlantic, The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-
East Atlantic (OSPAR) had already by 2010 declared six high seas marine protected areas 
comprising 286,200 square kilometers, within the OSPAR management area. This decision was 
preceded by the designation in 2009 by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (the CCAMLR Commission) of The South Orkney Islands Southern 
Shelf MPA in the Antarctic Ocean, covering around 94,000 square kilometers high seas within 
which fishing, scientific research related to fishing, and discharges and dumping from fishing 
vessels are regulated. Also on the regional side, Regional fisheries management organizations 
(RFMOs), which will be further discussed under marine living resources below, have 
possibilities to apply area based measures which in effect limits the freedom to fish. Under the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement, RFMOs are mandated to decide that certain areas, including high 
seas areas within the geographical mandate of the RFMO, are closed to fisheries. Importantly, 
such measures bind not only members to the RFMO, but also other states, insofar these are 
parties to UNFSA. This circumvention of the pacta tertiis principle follows from Article 19 of 
UNFSA which obliges flag states to ensure that vessels respect measures applied by RFMOs, 
including closed areas, as provided in Article 21. TANAKA. 2012, p. 331-332; Karen N. Scott, 
Conservation on the High Seas: Developing the Concept of the High Seas Marine Protected 
Areas, 27 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2012). 
422 Annexes to MARPOL 73/78 define certain sea areas as Special Areas in which the adoption 
of special mandatory methods for the prevention of sea pollution and discharges is required. A 
PSSA, on the other hand, can be protected also by additional measures such as ships routing 
measures – including as an area to be avoided: an area within defined limits in which either 
navigation is particularly hazardous or it is exceptionally important to avoid casualties and which 
should be avoided by all ships, or by certain classes of ships. Whereas Special Areas rules apply 
to high seas areas of the Meditarrenan as well as the Antarctic Ocean, PSSAs have hitherto been 
limited to waters within national jurisdiction, even if there is nothing hindering from applying 
such measures to high seas areas. MARKUS KACHEL, PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE SEA AREAS: THE 
IMO'S ROLE IN PROTECTING VULNERABLE MARINE AREAS § 13 (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 






UNCLOS thus provides for far-reaching possibilities for making exceptions 
from high seas freedoms in other agreements. Such limitations have been 
adopted in relation to the freedom of navigation under the auspices of the IMO. 
Moreover, different area-based management measures, including marine 
protected area measures which may affect bioprospecting, are increasingly 
used to protect sensitive high seas areas based on regional instruments and 
sectoral treaties.  
 
Although specific legal bases for such measures are lacking in UNCLOS, legal 
basis is commonly claimed in UNCLOS provisions on the protection of the 
marine environment. In addition to restricting the freedom of navigation, such 
treaties have resulted in limitations of the freedom of fishing in certain areas, 
as well as (less commonly) special rules for marine scientific research. More 
such restrictions of high seas freedoms are likely to follow from the expected 
BBNJ agreement. Agreements involving restrictions on high seas activities are 
highly relevant to bioprospecting, since much of the commercial interest 
relates to the diverse and endemic ecosystems which are also commonly 




In addition, the limitations resulting from the principle of non-appropriation 
and the explicit exceptions to the freedoms of the high seas listed in the first 
part of Article 87, paragraph 2 establish that “these freedoms shall be exercised 
by all States with due regard for the interest of other States in their exercise of 
the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this 
Convention with respect to activities in the Area.” 
 
It is thus made explicit that a requirement for due regard not only applies in 
relation to other high seas activities, but is equally relevant in relation to 
activities on the underlying seafloor of the Area.423  
 
423 This is based on the logic that each state must accept restraints on its own freedom of action 
arising from other states having the same freedom of action. As formulated by the International 
Law Commission, “Any freedom that is to be exercised in the interests of all entitled to enjoy it, 
must be regulated. Hence the law of the high seas contains certain rules… which are designed 
not to limit or restrict the freedom of the high seas, but to safeguard its exercise in the interests 
of the entire international community.” NORDQUIST, et al. 1995, at 80; PROELSS, United Nations 







It is far from certain what this duty to exercise due regard entails, and what 
standard is relevant. The International Law Commission has discussed this 
obligation as a norm of customary international law, which the commission 
appears to consider has been codified by UNCLOS (although the latter is not 
stated explicitly): “States are bound to refrain from acts which might adversely 
affect the use of the high seas by nationals of other States.”424 In equally general 
terms, Koskenniemi has defined the requirement for due regard as: “The full 
determination of the duty of due regard is always necessarily referred to its 
application to the specific circumstances of a particular case, when the 
relevant competing interests can be taken into account and balanced.”425 More 
tangible definitions of the obligation to pay due regard appear to be lacking, 
and it has been described as notoriously elusive.426 
 
In the context of bioprospecting, due regard thus indicates an obligation for 
states to conduct operations with regard given to the interest of other states. 
Importantly, this does not just relate to other states conducting bioprospecting 
but includes other activities too. Accordingly, due regard calls for 
bioprospecting to be conducted in a manner that does not compromise inter 
alia high seas shipping or fisheries.  
 
A more difficult question is how the obligation of due regard applies in relation 
to measures applied by other states which do not directly concern exercise of 
high seas freedoms. As discussed above, an increasing number of states have 
in recent years called for declaring marine protected areas to ensure the 





424 NORDQUIST, et al. 1995, at 81. 
425 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Hart Publishing. 2011), at 
339. Other observers have discussed due regard as “requiring a balancing of interests in the use 
of the seas”; PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, 
at 681. 
426 GEORGE K. WALKER, DEFINITIONS FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA: TERMS NOT DEFINED BY THE 
1982 CONVENTION (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 2011), at 179–188 (187). The question has been 
posed whether this is an obligation “so indeterminate that its application by different decision 
makers will necessarily be unpredictable.” LOUIS B. SOHN & JOHN NOYES, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (Brill 2 ed. 2014); at 79; Julia Gaunce, On the Interpretation 






Based on the pacta tertiis principle, discussed above, such measures only apply 
insofar as subscribing states can assert jurisdiction. However, it can be argued 
that the obligation of due regard would imply an obligation for other states not 
to undermine such measures.427 
 
In conclusion, the commons regime of the high seas provides far-reaching 
freedoms to conduct a broad range of activities, including bioprospecting, 
which all states have equal rights to carry out. Yet, these freedoms are not 
without limitations. The principle of non-appropriation prevents individual 
states not only from raising territorial claims to high seas areas, but also from 
demanding preferential access to resources, including organisms relevant for 
bioprospecting. UNCLOS also provides specific limitations relating to the 
different freedoms, including scientific research and fishing. Moreover, the 
convention allows for high seas freedoms to be restricted in other treaties. This 
serves as the legal basis for several limitations relevant to bioprospecting, 
provided in regional and sectoral treaties. More are likely to follow in light of 
the BBNJ process, as well as political ambitions to set up high seas marine 
protected areas. The principle of due regard calls for exercising the freedoms 
without compromising the exercise of high seas freedoms by other states. It is 
unclear how far the obligation of due regard extends, but most likely it does 
not require non-parties to follow high seas measures adopted in separate 
treaties, such as instruments establishing marine protected areas. 
 
Enforcement of violations of restrictions of high seas freedoms is limited by 
the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction. Accordingly, if limitations to 
the freedoms are agreed in special treaties, those will in principle only be 
enforceable in relation to flag states parties to the relevant instrument. This 
does not hinder states from enforcing violations based on other jurisdictional 
grounds, such as based on nationality. The value of restrictions in any future 
agreement relating to bioprospecting is thus highly dependent on ratification 
by relevant flag states, as well as on what jurisdictional nexuses are employed 
by parties in enforcing obligations. 
  
 
427 A literary reading of Article 87 would however limit the obligation of due regard to the 









C.1.4.2 The Area 
 
While the UNCLOS rules on the water column of areas beyond national juris-
diction have now been explored, it is time to turn to the seabed and underlying 
sediments beyond the continental shelf, which in UNCLOS are referred to as 
the Area. Based on the finding that much commercial interest relating to deep-
sea genetic resources is related to seabed organisms, as discussed in Part B, the 




It appears as more than coincidental that the Area occupies the first 
subparagraph of the first Article of UNCLOS. No other concept introduced 
under the convention can be considered more innovative or indeed 
revolutionary than the regime for the deep-sea floor. The Area is defined under 
UNCLOS as the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction. This implies that like the High Seas regime of the water 
column, the Area is defined conversely: The Area is what is left over once all 
coastal states have made their legitimate claims for continental shelves. 
 
However, as previously discussed, contrary to the EEZ which states must 
claim, the coastal states’ right to continental shelf is inherent and does not need 
to be declared. Consequently, the geographic extent of the Area should in 
theory be easier to assess than that of the High Seas. In practice, however, at 
least for the foreseeable future, it is much more difficult to make that 
assessment because of the complex criteria for assessing the extent of the 
continental shelf, as well as the large number of unprocessed submissions.428 
 
Implicitly, the extent of the Area is thus dependent of the definition of the 




428 This situation has the consequence that it is uncertain what regime will apply in the long term 
for substantial parts of the sea floor between 200 and 350 nm from base lines. In such areas, 
which potentially but not with certainty will be regarded as part of the continental shelf it is 






Similar to the continental shelf, the Area is thereby based on a judicial rather 
than a geological definition, which implies that its extent does not necessarily 





Whereas the drafting of UNCLOS Part VII on the High seas was an exercise 
in balancing different freedoms and interest, the corresponding negotiation on 
the deep seabed was more dominated by one interest: the assumed fortunes in 
the form of marine minerals. Part XI sets out a regime for supranational 
governance of the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction and the 
equitable distribution of its resources among developed and developing 
states.430  
 
For practical purposes, the relevant commercial interest in the deep seabed was 
until the relatively recent dawn of the bioprospecting sector considered as 
exclusively relating to minerals. Despite being based on considerations relating 
to the mining of marine minerals, the rules for the Area, as expressed in Part 
XI of UNCLOS were coined in a general manner, which could render the 
regime applicable also to other activities. 431 
 
The interest in commercial exploitation of the mineral resources of the deep-
sea dates back at least to the 1960s. At the outset, the interest was confined to 
manganese nodules. Already at that time, well before the convening of the 
drafting conferences for the law of the sea convention, the legal status of these 
resources was debated, as will be further discussed in section D.1.432 
 
429 Alvar Braathen & Harald Brekke, Characterizing the Seabed: a Geoscience Perspective, in 
THE LAW OF THE SEABED - ACCESS, USES, AND PROTECTION OF SEABED RESOURCES (Catherine 
Banet ed. 2020). 
430 WARNER. 2009, at 40. 
431 Part XI is then in turn elaborated in the Part XI agreement, which constitutes the first so-
called implementing agreement to UNCLOS. 
432 Developing states were of the opinion that merely the wealthier developed states had the 
capacity to engage in deep-sea mining. At the time, many developing states were also in the 
process of developing extraction of their own terrestrial mineral resources. Often regarded as 
key to economic development, there was a widespread conception that unregulated development 







The vision behind the system for the management of the seabed and its 
resources was presented by the Maltese ambassador Arvid Pardo at the third 
UNCLOS negotiation conference. As one of the more dramatic events of the 
negotiation of UNCLOS, he proposed that the seabed and the ocean floor 
beyond national jurisdiction be declared the common heritage of mankind.433 
 
Although Pardo’s proposal came to gain acceptance, it was by no means 
uncontested. The debate on the legal status of minerals was largely divided into 
three different positions.  
 
Firstly, there were states emphasizing the notion of sovereign rights to the 
resources of the continental shelf. This position was essentially part of the same 
credo as the Truman Proclamation of 1945.434  
 
A second position was more moderate with regards to the sovereign rights of 
the coastal states, limiting them to the geological continental shelf. This view 
held that the abyssal plains of the sea floor were res communis, meaning that 
the Area and its resources could be used by any state, but no state could 
appropriate or make claims for exclusive title or other rights to the Area.  
 
Thirdly, there were states considering that the deep seabed should be treated as 
res nullius. In line with this reasoning, these states claimed that utilization of 
the seabed by mining states was not only a legal right, but also effectively gave 
the state legal title over the relevant seabed area.435 Somewhat simplified, most 
industrialized states favored a free-access regime for deep seabed mining, with 
only limited international involvement. The developing country group G77, on 
the other hand, supported a centralized international authority which would 
control the access to the mineral resources of the deep seabed and distribute 
the profits fairly and equitably.436 
 
433 Malta: Request for the Inclusion of a Supplementary Item in the Agenda of the Twenty-
Second Session, UN Doc A/6695 (18 August 1967). 
434 Stephen Vasciannie, Resource entitlement in the Law of the Sea: some areas of continuity 
and change, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 
(Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999). 
435 CHURCHILL & LOWE. 1999, at 225. 








Managing the Deep-Sea Floor – a global commons under the principle of 
common heritage of mankind 
 
Despite the opposition, Pardo’s vision for a new deep-sea regime prevailed in 
the lively debate on the management of the seafloor resources. A specific 
Seabed Declaration437 was adopted by the UNGA, which essentially reflected 
the principles in Pardo’s statement. The seabed and the ocean floor beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction or “the Area” were declared as the common 
heritage of mankind. Furthermore, the declaration provided that no state or 
person, natural or juridical, was able to claim, exercise or acquire rights with 
respect to the Area or its resources which were incompatible with the 
international regime to be established for the Area. The Seabed Declaration 
made clear that exploration of the Area and the exploitation of its resources 
were to be carried out “for the benefit of mankind as a whole taking into 
particular consideration the interests and needs of developing countries.”438 
This declaration came to serve as the foundation for the deep seabed mining 
regime in Part XI of UNCLOS, which came to be laid out in Section 2 of 




Common heritage of mankind 
The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind. 
 
Essentially a development of the same principle, Article 137 affirms that all 
claims or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area 
or its resources are prohibited. All rights in the mineral resources of the Area 
are vested in mankind as a whole.440  
 
437 United Nations General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV), Declaration of Principles 
Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction, A/RES/25/2749 (12 December 1970) (1970). 
438 Ibid. 
439 WARNER. 2009, at 41. 
440 Article 138 provides that the general conduct of all states in relation to the Area must be in 
accordance with the provisions of Part XI. Article 140 also requires that such activities be carried 
out for the “benefit of mankind”, while Article 141 obliges states to use the Area exclusively for 







Taken together, this provides strong explicit fundaments for a commons regime 
for the resources of the Area. The resources are not commons in lack of 
regulation: The common heritage of mankind principle does not provide that 
the resources of the area belong to no one. By no means should it be mistaken 
for the principle of res nullius. Rather, it explicitly states that these resources 
belong to all of mankind. As a logical consequence from this presumption, 
appropriation by individual states is impossible: The resources are already 
owned by all of mankind. 
 
Whereas the sketch for the management of the deep seabed – notably the 
common heritage of mankind principle – was drawn out in UNCLOS when it 
was adopted in 1982, it was not until 1996, with the entry into force of Part XI 
agreement441, that the full deep-sea mining regime was established.442 
 
How, then, should the rules on the common heritage of mankind principle be 
interpreted in a broader context?443 Some observers have considered that the 
principle should be understood as expressing a principal, symbolic legal status 
with limited operative normative content.444  
 
 
rights granted or exercised pursuant to Part XI shall affect the legal status of the waters 
suprajacent to the Area. 
441 Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3. 
442 With the status of an implementing agreement to the convention, the Part XI Agreement has 
150 parties and can thus be characterized as global. To a higher degree than the second imple-
menting agreement to the convention, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (which will be further 
discussed in the context of marine living resources in section C.1.5), the Part XI Agreement 
effectively functions as a part of the same treaty as the convention. It is also a globally applicable 
agreement for all practical matters, with the United States as a notable non-party. 
443 As provided in Article 136 and the subsequent provisions of Section 2 of UNCLOS Part XI. 
444 In the words of Vöneky and Höfelmeier, “given the substantial vagueness of Article 136 
compared to the detailed provisions in the subsequent articles, it could be questioned whether it 
has more than a merely symbolic role.” Adding to the description of the concept of common 
heritage of mankind as intangible, it has been claimed that it is still, despite its employment in 
several international instruments is “subject to vivid discussion as to its scope and elements. 
Thus, a clear normative content cannot be established, which is also reflected in the different 
terms used to describe the concept.” PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 951; KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE 






Others disagree. For instance, Wolfrum appears to regard the common heritage 
of mankind principle as expressed in Article 136 as central in clarifying the 
aims pursued by the drafters in creating a regime for the deep seabed area: 
Instead of national or individual freedom of use, Part XI aims to 
internationalize the deep seabed and its utilization.445 
 
If the discussion on its operational value is set aside and focus instead is put on 
its components, Vöneky and Höfelmeier have summarized the principle as 
encompassing five major elements: ‘first, the prohibition of private and public 
appropriation or sovereignty; second, concerted management and exploitation 
by representatives from all nations; third, equal sharing of benefits acquired 
from exploitation of the region; fourth, the prohibition of military uses or 
installations; and fifth, the preservation for future generations’.446 
 
The preservation for future generations is more an objective than an operative 
rule.447 
 
The principle has been interpreted as counter-balancing the freedom of the high 
seas in Article 87(1).448 The latter ensures that all states have access to the high 
seas; however, according to the obligation of due regard in Article 87(2), this 
freedom is limited by the rights of other states in regard to both the high seas 
and the Area. Both regimes also share some features, such as the principle of 
non-appropriation.449  
 
445 See Rüdiger Wolfrum, Hohe See Und Tiefseeboden in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum (ed.), 
Handbuch des Seerechts (2006) as referenced by Vöneky and Höfelmeier in PROELSS, United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 950. 
446 Scott J. Shackelford, The tragedy of the common heritage of mankind, 28 STANFORD 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL (2009); Jennifer Frakes, The common heritage of mankind 
principle and the deep seabed, outer space, and Antarctica: will developed and developing 
nations reach a compromise?, 21 WISCONSIN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (2003). 
447 All these normative elements can be found in the convention: while Article 136 proclaims 
the employment of the principle, the subsequent articles introduce the different aspects. John E. 
Noyes, The common heritage of mankind: past, present, and future, 40 DENVER JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2011); Bradley Larschan & Bonnie Brennan, The Common 
Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law, 21 THE COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1983). 
448 Myron H. Nordquist, et al., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: A 
Commentary Vol. VI [Second Committee: Articles 133 to 191, Annex I, Resolution II, 
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI. Documentary Annexes] § VI (2002). 







However, in the more operative language of Article 137, the difference from 
the commons regime for the high seas becomes evident. 
 
Article 137 
Legal status of the Area and its resources 
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part 
of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person 
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or 
sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized. 
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on 
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to 
alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be 
alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures 
of the Authority. 
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights 
with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance with 
this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise of such rights shall 
be recognized. 
 
Article 137(1) prohibits the exercise of sovereignty over or appropriation of 
any part of the Area, both by states and natural or legal persons. The application 
of the principle of non-appropriation in the Area may be interpreted as a 
material outflow of the common heritage of mankind principle expressed in 
the previous article. Compared to the high seas, it is formulated differently and 
more broadly, including not only a prohibition to make sovereign territorial 
claims; the exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the Area 
or its resources is also prohibited. 
 
In the Area, the principle of non-appropriation also has other material 
implications compared to in high seas. Articles 136 and 137 prevent all states 
from accessing the resources of the Area, unless permitted under the 
convention. As discussed above, the resources of the high seas are similarly 
described as a commons area by the convention. However, in the high seas 
regime, the material implication of the commons status is converse: entailing 
open access for all states (albeit with restrictions). Article 137 thus draws a 
major difference in the regime for the Area as compared to that of the high 
seas. Both maritime zones are oceans commons, but the legal status of their 
resources is radically different: high seas resources are open for anyone’s 






In fact, the prohibition of appropriation of resources of the Area goes even 
further. Complementarily, Article 137 obliges state parties not to recognize any 
such act. This obligation of non-recognition provides a strong safeguard for the 
principle of non-appropriation in the Area. Moreover, all states (instead of 
merely state parties) are included in the group of addressees of Article 138.450 
 
The International Seabed Authority and the bioprospecting of marine genetic 
resources 
 
Already at the time of the drafting of the Convention it was decided that this 
new management regime for the deep sea would be spearheaded by a novel 
and fully dedicated international institution. As the managing institution for the 
resources in the Area encompassed by the common heritage of mankind 
principle, Part XI established the International Seabed Authority (ISA).451 
 
Individual actors can, indeed, undertake “activities in the Area” but these shall 
be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole according to Article 140, 
which also provides that it is the ISA that shall provide for equitable sharing of 
economic benefits derived from activities in the Area. Under Article 157(1) the 
ISA shall “organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view 
to administering the resources of the Area”. This formulation is important and 
will be examined more closely in the context of bioprospecting in the next 




450 In view of the limits imposed by the pacta tertiis principle of applying treaty obligations to 
non-parties, the use of the term (all) states may be interpreted as a reference to parallel customary 
international law provisions. 
451 Article 156 of UNCLOS establishes the International Seabed Authority (ISA) as a specific 
entity with responsibility for managing deep-seabed mining in the Area. It also provides that all 
parties to UNCLOS ipso facto are parties to the new authority. Consequently, also states that 
have been unwilling or unable to become parties to the Part XI agreement remain within the 
realm of ISA. UNCLOS is clear on the exclusivity of the Authority’s role. The ISA acts on 
behalf of mankind as a whole, who has the rights to the resources of the Area according to Article 







How this objective is to be pursued is elaborated in more detail in Article 150 
of UNCLOS.452 This provision suggests that the ISA has a broad mandate, with 
almost indiscriminate abilities to regulate activities on the deep-sea floor 
beyond national jurisdiction.453 In addition to its resource management 
mandate, the ISA has a responsibility to function as a focal point for marine 
scientific research in the Area and to ensure effective protection of the marine 
environment from harmful activities in the Area.454 But how does this mandate, 
which seemingly extends to controlling activities in the Area, administering its 
resources, as well as central roles in scientific cooperation and environmental 
protection, apply to bioprospecting of marine genetic resources? 
 
452 Article 150 on ‘Policies relating to activities in the Area’, provides that ‘Activities in the 
Area shall, as specifically provided for in this Part, be carried out in such a manner as to foster 
healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth of international trade, and to 
promote international cooperation for the over-all development of all countries, especially 
developing States, and with a view to ensuring: (a) the development of the resources of the Area; 
(b) orderly, safe and rational management of the resources of the Area, including the efficient 
conduct of activities in the Area and, in accordance with sound principles of conservation, the 
avoidance of unnecessary waste; (c) the expansion of opportunities for participation in such 
activities consistent in particular with articles 144 and 148; (d) participation in revenues by the 
Authority and the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and developing States as provided for 
in this Convention; (e) increased availability of the minerals derived from the Area as needed in 
conjunction with minerals derived from other sources, to ensure supplies to consumers of such 
minerals; (f) the promotion of just and stable prices remunerative to producers and fair to 
consumers for minerals derived both from the Area and from other sources, and the promotion 
of long-term equilibrium between supply and demand; (g) the enhancement of opportunities for 
all States Parties, irrespective of their social and economic systems or geographical location, to 
participate in the development of the resources of the Area and the prevention of monopolization 
of activities in the Area; (h) the protection of developing countries from adverse effects on their 
economies or on their export earnings resulting from a reduction in the price of an affected 
mineral, or in the volume of exports of that mineral, to the extent that such reduction is caused 
by activities in the Area, as provided in article 151; (i) the development of the common heritage 
for the benefit of mankind as a whole; and (j) conditions of access to markets for the imports of 
minerals produced from the resources of the Area and for imports of commodities produced 
from such minerals shall not be more favorable than the most favorable applied to imports from 
other sources. 
453 No doubt the ISA appears to maintain this position. The secretary general of the Authority 
has asserted that the ISA has a broad “regulatory role with respect to the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment (including its biodiversity) in the Area generally”. See 
International Seabed Authority, Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed 
Authority under Article 166. Paragraph 4 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the 
Sea, 7 June, 2002, UN Doc. ISBA/8/A/5, 12.  






Does the phrase “activities in the area” imply a mandate to regulate not merely 
mining but all activities including other activities regulated in the convention, 
such as marine scientific research and activities not mentioned, including deep-
sea bioprospecting? Based on a close reading of the UNCLOS provisions 
defining key concepts, arguments have been made against such an 
interpretation. Interestingly, the expression “activities in the area,” which is 
used so liberally in many provisions of Part XI, is narrowly defined in the 
defining provisions in Part 1. Article 1(3) defines resources to mean “all 
activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.” 
Perhaps even more pointedly, resources are defined under Article 133(a) of 
UNCLOS as “all solid, liquid, or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area 
at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules.” 
 
Many observers claim that the defining terms clearly indicate that the mandate 
is limited not only to mineral resources, but also to the exploration and 
exploitation of such resources. Despite declarations by ISA endeavoring to 
exercise its mandate more broadly, the same observers regularly claim that the 
facilitation and management of commercial mining of deep-sea mineral 
resources has also been the de facto objective of the ISA.455  
 
Others consider that the mandate provided in Article 157 does not limit the role 
of the ISA to issues of marine mining. Supporters of this position agree that 
mineral mining was no doubt the main activity borne in mind by the drafters 
of Part XI of UNCLOS, but they were not so naïve as to believe that no other 
human activity would ever occur in these areas. Accordingly, the mandate for 
the ISA was not explicitly limited to mineral mining, but was rather formulated 
open-endedly. Thereby, it has been argued, the ISA should have an important 
role in organizing other activities in the Area, such as bioprospecting. 
 
455 Indeed, some have gone so far as to claim that until a wider mandate is bestowed upon the 
ISA, it may only regulate activities associated with the exploration for, and exploitation of 
mineral resources of the Area and not activities associated with bioprospecting or other activities 
relating to living organisms. Along the same lines, it can be argued that the mandate of ISA for 
environmental regulation would be limited to pollution resulting from the exploration and 
exploitation of mineral resources. See, for an inventory of these objections Lyle Glowka, The 
Deepest of Ironies: Genetic Resources, Marine Scientific Research, and the Area, 12 OCEAN 







These arguments are in turn regularly refuted with the argument that the 
emphasis on the administration of resources in the second half of the mandate 
provision indicates an element of limitation in the mandate of the ISA. Taken 
together, this calls for a thorough investigation of what the central term 
resources actually entails under the convention. This is not only called for by 
the formulation of the mandate of the ISA; importantly, it also coincides with 
one of the questions left unanswered under the general discussion on the 
principle of common heritage of mankind. Moreover, in the context of that 
discussion, it was clear that the common heritage of mankind concept was 
closely tied to the term resources.  
 
The definition of resources under UNCLOS Part XI – the applicability of the 
common heritage of mankind principle and the mandate of the ISA to marine 
genetic resources 
 
In the previous section, the basic elements of the principle of common heritage 
of mankind and the mandate of the International Seabed Authority were 
discussed. A central question, however, remains unanswered, namely, what 
resources actually fall within the scope of application of this principle, and 
does the principle encompass bioprospecting for marine genetic resources? In 
other words, does bioprospecting for genetic resources fall within the scope of 
Part XI of UNCLOS? 
 
This is central for the legal status of deep-seabed bioprospecting under the law 
of the sea, since the term resources is indicative of what is covered by the rules 
for the Area in general and the principle of common heritage of mankind in 
particular.456 Investigating this matter is complicated by the lack of references 
to, for example, “marine genetic resources” as well as “bioprospecting” under 
UNCLOS, despite its ambition to provide comprehensive rules, for all uses of 
the seas, as discussed in section C.1.1. 
 
Where genetic resources are found on the seabed and in the sediments of the 
Area, the legal status has been subject to a rather vivid dispute. Observers seem 
to be divided along two positions.  
 
456 Whether the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which (at least) is mandated to manage 
the mining for minerals in the Area would have a corresponding role for deep-sea genetic 






Either genetic resources are comprised by the detailed regime of Part XI of 
UNCLOS.457 Or they ought to be regarded as a global common in the meaning 
of open access, similarly to the resources in the overlying water column (the 
high seas).458 The dispute primarily relates to the interpretation of the opening 
provision of Part XI: 
 
Article 133 
Use of terms 
For the purposes of this Part: 
(a) "resources" means all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in 
the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic nodules; 
(b) resources, when recovered from the Area, are referred to as "minerals". 
  
At first glance, it appears that the convention defines the term resources in a 
manner that could appear counterintuitive linguistically. Article 133 both 
establishes that resources refer to the minerals situated in the Area and that 
resources recovered there are referred to as minerals. It could be argued that 
the drafters wanted to include all resources but made reference to minerals, 
since mineral resources were the only valuable resource known at the time and 
thus formed the main focus during the negotiation of the convention. The 
general ambition of UNCLOS as declared in its preamble, to encompass all 
uses of the sea, speaks in favor of this interpretation.459 The terminological 
definition could, however, be used against this reasoning. Why specifically 
declare that the term resources means minerals if the aim was to include all 
resources?  
 
The restrictive interpretation 
 
Some observers thus claim that Article 133 implies that the regime merely 
encompasses the substances specified in (a) when geographically located in the 
Area and that these resources in line with (b) should be referred to as minerals.  
 
457 See UNCLOS Part XI and Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
458 The fundamental principle for the area is formulated in Article 136: “The Area and its 
resources are the common heritage of mankind.” 
459 For an extensive review of the discussion, see PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the 







Accordingly, supporters of this restrictive interpretation of resources hold that 
the management provisions for the Area in Part XI, including the principle of 
common heritage of mankind, should be limited to mineral resources.460 This 
implies, conversely, that the regime for the exploration and exploitation of 
resources of the Area is not applicable to the living resources of the deep 
seabed.461 
 
Arguing that living resources should be included in this definition faces at least 
three difficulties.  
 
Firstly, living resources can hardly be regarded as mineral. Even for living 
resources with biomass or shells relatively high in mineral content, such as 
clams and corals, it would be both counterintuitive and scientifically incorrect 
to refer to them as mineral resources. Marine living resources would be 
referred to as organic or biological. Accordingly, supporters of the restrictive 
understanding have claimed that it would be unreasonable to extend the 
application of the principle of common heritage of mankind to living 
organisms. Essentially, they claim, it would be manifestly absurd to interpret 
non-mineral resources such as marine genetic resources as included in the term 
“minerals” under Article 133.  
 
The second argument against including living resources in the definition of 
minerals is essentially functional. There is clear evidence that the rules for the 
management of resources under the principle of common heritage of mankind 
are designed to handle minerals. Especially the provisions on the International 
Seabed Authority are in many regards ill-equipped to handle the management 
of living resources.462 
 
460 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 941. 
461 The relationship between marine genetic resources and marine living resources will be further 
explored in section C.1.5. 
462 Moreover, the modalities for electing members to the principal organ of the ISA, the Council, 
is explicitly based on different kinds of mineral interests. The rules provide that the council 
should be composed of member states’ representatives, in particular those states that have a 
leading role in the polymetallic nodule industry. See in particular Article 161, UNCLOS. As 
previously has been established, there is reason to believe that mining will be difficult to 
combine with bioprospecting in relevant areas. Rather, it can be assumed that these interests 
often will collide. Accordingly, observers of this position claim that it would be inappropriate to 
let a group elected solely based on concerns relating to mineral mining manage the 






The third and most common argument invoked by observers who support a 
more restrictive interpretation of resources is that the only resources taken into 
consideration when UNCLOS was negotiated were indeed mineral 
resources.463 The common heritage of mankind regime cannot encompass, it 
has been argued, issues which were unknown to the negotiators. This would 
rule out living resources from the scope of application of the principle.464 
Arguments against accepting an interpretation that includes genetic resources 
in the scope of the common heritage of mankind principle could also be built 
on the Lotus principle. Sovereign states have the freedom to act as they wish, 
unless they choose to bind themselves by a voluntary agreement or there is an 
explicit restriction in international law.465 Under this understanding, it would 
be difficult to accept the notion that restrictive treaty rules could develop to 
encompass completely new activities, without explicit state consent.  
 
Accordingly, Matz-Lück and Wolfrum interpret “resources” as defined in 
Article 133 of UNCLOS to mean only mineral resources.466 They base this 
exclusion on the limited knowledge of deep-sea genetic resources and focus on 
polymetallic nodule extraction at the time of negotiation. This, they claim, 




risks in biotech patent disputes: which role for ordre public before the European patent office, 
3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF RISK REGULATION (2012). 
463 Most likely at least partly the result of exaggerated expectations of the economic potential of 
those resources, their legal status was one of the most contentious areas during the negotiation 
of the convention. The possible economic value of the living resources of the deep seabed and 
in many cases even their existence was unknown at the time. Tullio Scovazzi, The negotiations 
for a binding instrument on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity 
beyond national jurisdiction, 70 MARINE POLICY (2016); Angelica Bonfanti & Seline 
Trevisanut, TRIPs on the high seas: intellectual property rights on marine genetic resources. 
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights), 37 BROOKLYN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011), at 194. 
464 Scovazzi, Tullio, “Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal Framework for All 
Activities in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting” in VIDAS. 2010, at 316. 
465 An Hertogen, Letting Lotus Bloom, 26 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015). 
466 According to Matz-Lück and Wolfrum, the reference to “resources” in this provision has to 
be understood in the light of the legal definition in Article 133 (a) of UNCLOS which limits the 
scope of Part XI, and, consequently, the jurisdictional power of the International Sea-bed 







As a result, they claim that the high seas regime on management and 
conservation of marine living resources should be regarded as the relevant 
regime for marine genetic resources, despite the challenges in applying these 
rules to deep-seabed organisms.467  
 
Similarly, Scovazzi considers that the convention text excludes genetic 
resources. He further argues that UNCLOS cannot be considered to provide 
rules for activities and resources that were unknown during its negotiation.468 
Instead, he suggests that a legal gap exists for genetic resources, both in the 
high seas and in the Area.469 Indeed, a reading of Article 133 e contrario 
supports this understanding: By defining resources as “all solid, liquid or 
gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, 
including the polymetallic nodules,” organisms are implicitly excluded. 
 
 
467 Rüdiger Wolfrum & Nele Matz, The Interplay of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diversity, 4 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED 
NATIONS LAW (2000), at 455. 
468 (The convention) “cannot be supposed to regulate those activities that its drafters did not 
intend for the simple reason that they were not foreseeable in the period when the treaty was 
being negotiated. At that time (1973-1982), very little was known about the genetic qualities of 
deep seabed organisms. The term ‘genetic resources’ does not appear anywhere in the UNCLOS. 
If this perspective is followed, the conclusion can be that a legal gap currently exists for the 
genetic resources found in both the Area and the high seas.” Scovazzi, Bioprospecting on the 
Deep Seabed: a Legal Gap Requiring to be Filled. 2006, at 93. In another context, referring to 
the negotiators, he has argued that “When they were discussing research of significance for 
natural resources, they had goods intended for consumption such fish, oil, polymetallic nodules 
and little else in mind.” Furthermore, Scovazzi claims that “it is extremely difficult” to go against 
the plain text of Article 133 that excludes non-mineral resources, such as genetic resources, from 
the application of Part XI. However, some general principles of the UNCLOS should be taken 
into consideration when envisaging any future and more specific regime for marine genetic 
resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction.” 
469 Scovazzi does thus not agree with Matz and Wolfum that the freedom of the high seas should 
apply to genetic resources on a “first come first served” basis since this “would lead to 
inequitable and unacceptable consequences.” Rather, he claims that such approaches would go 
against central formulations in preamble of UNCLOS (in particular paragraph 5) on “equitable 
economic order” and “the interests of mankind as a whole.” Similarly, he reminds that open and 
unrestricted access to genetic resources “would go against the principle of fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources set forth by the CBD.” 







The extensive interpretation 
 
This view can be contrasted with a more extensive interpretation of Part XI and 
its management rules, which holds that it encompasses all resources, including 
not only minerals but also genetic resources of living organisms. It has thus 
been stressed by some observers that even if the central role of Article 133 in 
defining the scope of the resources of the Area is accepted (as suggested by the 
supporters of the restrictive interpretation), the reference in that provision to 
mineral resources is not necessarily exhaustive.470 
 
Supporters of the extensive interpretation have also disputed the more 
restrictive interpretation based on Article 133 by noting that Article 134 
explicitly states that “Activities in the Area shall be governed by the provisions 
of this Part.” Similarly, Article 136 declares that both the Area and its 
resources form part of the common heritage of mankind. The broad scope of 
the rules of the Area are further underlined by the formulation of Article 140, 
which states that “Activities in the Area shall, as specifically provided for in 
this Part, be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole” and that “The 
Authority shall provide for the equitable sharing of financial and other 
economic benefits derived from activities in the Area.”  
 
Independent of the definition of resources in Article 133, supporters of the 
extensive interpretation claim that these terms indicate that the regime of the 
Area is meant to apply extensively, by virtue of the open-ended reference to 
activities. According to this understanding, arguing that the definition in 
Article 133 rules out other resources than minerals from the regime would 





470 As considered by Oude Elferink, the provision’s reference to mineral resources cannot be 
read as excluding all other resources from its scope. Alex Oude Elferink, The Regime of the 
Area: Delineating the Scope of Application of the Common Heritage Principle and Freedom of 







Furthermore, Article 133 is not the only provision containing a definition of 
central importance for assessing the status of genetic resources in the Area. As 
noted above, Article 1 of UNCLOS provides that the “Area” means the seabed 
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
The terms “seabed,” “ocean floor” and “subsoil” are not defined in the 
Convention.471 As pointed out by Oude Elferink,  
In principle, the ordinary meaning of the terms “seabed”, “ocean floor” 
and “subsoil” comprises the living and non-living resources that are 
found in those areas. These are general terms that have a specific spatial 
application that does not exclude certain natural components from that 
spatial scope of application because they differ from surrounding areas. 
The same applies to all other maritime zones. All resources located in a 
zone form part of that zone.472  
Accordingly, the declaration in the preamble of the Convention makes clear 
that it was the intention of states parties to establish “a legal order for the seas 
and oceans” which will, in particular, promote the equitable and efficient 
utilization of their resources, as well as the conservation of the living resources. 
The implication that genetic resources in UNCLOS would represent a legal 
lacuna, as suggested by supporters of the restrictive view, would also be 
incompatible with the notion of UNCLOS as a comprehensive convention, as 
discussed in section C.1.1.473  
 
471 As will be further explored in section E.5.2, it is therefore logical to resort to the principal 
rule of treaty interpretation under international law, that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 
1969 (1155 UNTS 331), Article 31(1). 
472 Oude Elferink, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2007), at 150. 
See also Tullio Scovazzi, Mining, Protection of the Environment, Scientific Research and 
Bioprospecting: Some Considerations on the Role of the International Sea-Bed Authority, 19 
see id. (2004), at 391. 
473 As stated in section C.1.1, it appears to have been widely shared among the negotiators, and 
also is expressed in the preamble, that UNCLOS ‘establishes a comprehensive framework for 
the regulation of all ocean space, conscious that its problems are closely interrelated and need 
to be considered as a whole.’ As observed by Armas-Pfirter, “pursuant to the convention, ocean 
space is divided into jurisdictional zones and different issues are governed on a geographical 






Under this understanding, Article 1 of UNCLOS thus defines the Area not as 
a specific concept for mineral resources but as a geographically defined space, 
much like other maritime areas.  
This is further explicitly confirmed, it is claimed, by the reference to “the 
natural resources of the Area” in Article 145(b) of the Convention. The dual 
inclusion of references to the geographic area and its content was apparently 
considered so important by the negotiators that it was even given the priority 
of being reiterated in the relatively short preamble of the convention.474 
The extensive view has been further supported by analogy to the continental 
shelf regime.475 As will be discussed in section C.1.5, the rights of the coastal 
state over the continental shelf include rights with regard to sedentary species. 
It has been suggested that this definition could be applied by analogy to the 
living resources of the deep seabed beyond the continental shelf.476 
Moreover, the drafting history of Part XI includes references to both living and 
mineral resources. By no means does it suggest that an agreement existed 
whereby the living resources of the Area would be excluded from the scope of 
application of Part XI of the Convention. Rather, as examined by Amras-
Pfirter, many references to living resources of the Area as encompassed by the 
common heritage of mankind principle are found in the documentation of the 
negotiations on how to enforce the principles in UNGA Resolution 2749 
(XXV).477  
 
a given marine area.” Frida Armas-Pfirter, How Can Life in the Deep Sea Be Protected?, 24 see 
id. (2009), at 281. 
474 The sixth preambular paragraph refers to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) 
Resolution 2749 of 19703 that declared, inter alia, that the area of the seabed and ocean floor 
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are 
the common heritage of mankind. (G.A. Res. 25/2749, Declaration of Principles Governing the 
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (Dec. 12, 1970). 
475 F.M. Armas Pfirter, The Management of Seabed Living Resources in “The Area” under 
UNCLOS (Report presented at the Tenth Session of the ISA, 27 May 2004), at 26, as cited in 
Oude Elferink, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2007), at 152. 
476 The implication of this argument would be that genetic resources, as living, sedentary species 
of the Area would fall under the regime of Part XI of UNCLOS and not under its Part VII. 
477 As discussed above, this resolution forms the basis for the rules relating to the common 







A number of delegations expressed that the seabed regime should cover both 
living and non-living resources, and that sedentary species should be included. 
The reason for the lack of explicit provisions on the matter does not appear to 
be disagreement with this position, but rather that no significant living seabed 
resources were considered to exist beyond the continental margin. This 
exclusion was thus approved, not based on a rejection of its material content, 
but because the existence of significant resources in the deep sea was then 
unknown. When hydrothermal vents and their ecosystem were discovered in 
1977, the definition of “resources” in the Area regime had already been 
adopted.478 Thereby, it is claimed, the common heritage of mankind principle, 
as well as Part XI generally, ought to be applied on all activities and resources 
in the Area, including marine bioprospecting on marine genetic resources.479 
Indeed, the ambition of the negotiators of UNCLOS to create a comprehensive 
convention speaks against accepting the notion that living organisms would be 
regulated in a detailed manner in all other maritime zones but left in an anarchic 
state of legal lacunae in the Area. In light of the elaborate rules of marine 
organisms in all other sea areas, which include detailed rules on management 
and conservation480, it would seem unreasonable to accept the notion of the 
living organisms of the deep seabed as left completely outside the scope of the 
convention.481 It would be more in line with the intention of the negotiators to 
 
478 Armas-Pfirter, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2009), at 303-
304. As noted by Armas Pfirter, some countries also suggested an explicit inclusion of the living 
resources of the superjacent waters in the common heritage of mankind-principle. But as 
fisheries freedom might be affected, many delegations banned the inclusion of any living 
resources in the principle. 
479 Louise Angélique de La Fayette, A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of 
Marine Biodiversity and Genetic Resources Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, see id. 
at 268-170; MILLICAY. 2007, at 804-812; Oude Elferink, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF 
MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2007), at 147-154. 
480 As will be discussed in section C.1.5. 
481 Francioni supports the extensive interpretation based on practical implications by reasoning 
that the differences of bioprospecting compared to fishing precludes the application of the 
freedom of fishing to marine genetic resources of the high seas. Similarly, he considers 
bioprospecting as falling outside the marine scientific research regime since the latter prevents 
the legal claims involved in bioprospecting. Moreover, sovereign claims are precluded both in 
the high seas and the Area. The logical conclusion, of these three aspects, he argues, is to 
consider genetic resources the subject to the principle of common heritage of mankind. 
Francesco Francioni, Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights: The International 
Legal Framework, in BIOTECHNOLOGIES AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Francesco 






provide a comprehensive framework for all uses of the oceans to consider 
UNCLOS as a dynamic treaty, which encompasses also activities and 
resources where the full potential was not fully considered at the time of 
drafting.482 Under the approach of evolutionary interpretation, which has 
gained support in case law483, it is claimed that where the parties have used 
generic terms in a treaty, the parties must be regarded as having been aware 
that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the 
treaty has been entered into for a very long period, the parties must be 
presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving 
meaning.484 Accordingly, it appears reasonable to claim that relevant terms 
have developed, by means of evolutionary interpretation, so as to clearly 
include bioprospecting within the regulation of the Area (to the extent this was 
not already included). It appears particularly fruitful to argue that the definition 
of resources of the Area ought to be considered as having developed by means 
of evolution to include genetic resources, since the value of bioresources has 
become evident subsequent to its formulation. Similarly, the common heritage 
of mankind principle was clearly drafted to encompass the economic values of 
the deep seabed. Since these values have turned out to be connected to genetic 
rather than mineral resources, it would from an evolutionary standpoint be 
unreasonable to exclude genetic resources from its scope. 
 
Furthermore, the argument that the high seas regime should also be considered 
as encompassing genetic resources in the seabed would be difficult to reconcile 
with other parts of the convention. Foremost, such an interpretation would go 
against the logic of the UNCLOS maritime zone regime. The freedom of the 
seas is a high seas concept, which in certain regards explicitly applies mutatis 
mutandis in the exclusive economic zone. But extending the principle to the 
Area, where there is no mentioning of such freedoms would be unorthodox 
under the convention. The high seas and the Area are two distinct normative 
concepts and it appears difficult to accept the notion that a legal concept should 
be understood as implicitly transplanted from one maritime zone to another. 
 
Principles, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tullio Scovazzi & Francesco 
Francioni eds., 2006), at 12. 
482 Evolutionary interpretation will be further discussed in Part E.5.1. 
483 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Merits, ICJ 
Rep 2009, ICGJ 421 (International Court of Justice 13 July). 
484 EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES (Oxford: Oxford 







Detaching genetic resources from the regime of the Area would also go against 
the concept of sedentary species, which the negotiators of the convention made 
efforts to distinguish from other living resources, as will be further discussed 
in section C.1.5.485 Moreover, seen in light of the rules of environmental 
protection, it would be difficult to accept an interpretation that the living 
resources of the Area would be disconnected from the activities related to the 
mineral resources in the same marine zone.486 In further support of the 
extensive view, there are also more formal legal arguments for considering the 
mandate of the International Seabed Authority as extending to genetic 
resources.487  
 
Another argument in favor of the extensive interpretation is based on the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) Resolution 2749 of 1970.488 In 
the preamble, the resolution declared, inter alia, that the area of the seabed and 
ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 
as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind.489 Based on this 
language, it appears difficult to dispute that all resources of the Area are 
encompassed by the principle of common heritage of mankind. Effectively, the 
resolution can be regarded as a binding declaration under international law that 
genetic resources – like any other resource of the geographically defined Area 
– fall within the common heritage of mankind principle. As previously stated, 
the resolution is also cited in the preamble of the convention itself. 
 
485 As examined by Armas-Pfierter, it also follows from negotiation documents that as a 
consequence of extending coastal state sovereignty in the continental shelf to sedentary species, 
these organisms were also subtracted from the high seas-regime. Armas-Pfirter, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2009), at 281. 
486 Francioni, Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights: The International Legal 
Framework. 2007. 
487 As discussed under the International Seabed Authority, earlier in this section, the provisions 
on environmental protection and marine scientific research in the Area, as well as the explicit 
and implicit powers and functions of the International Seabed Authority allow it to take an active 
role in the protection of these resources. Indirectly, this also supports the perspective of 
bioresources as belonging to the Area.  
488 United Nations General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV), Declaration of Principles 
Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction, A/RES/25/2749 (12 December 1970). 1970. 
489 Marciniak, Konrad Jan, “Marine Genetic Resources: Do They Form Part of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind Principle?”, in LAWRENCE MARTIN, et al., NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE 
LAW OF THE SEA: EXPLORATION, ALLOCATION, EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN AREAS 






In conclusion, the argument can be made – and indeed is regularly made – that 
the drafters of UNCLOS aimed to create a holistic regime for the Area 
including genetic resources in living organisms, where the ISA was bestowed 
the responsibility for management as well as other aspects of regulation, guided 
by the principles of non-appropriation and common heritage of mankind. The 
status of all resources as encompassed by this principle is further underlined 
by the reference in the convention to Resolution 2749 of 1970 and a contextual 
reading of relevant provisions in Part XI of UNCLOS. Furthermore, this 
extensive understanding is supported by an evolutionary interpretation of the 
convention, as well as preparatory works which clearly indicate that states did 





In addition to academic discussion, the legal status of marine genetic resources 
in the Area has been debated in the BBNJ process of the UN General 
Assembly. In statements as well as written submissions, states have addressed 
the relationship between the common heritage of mankind principle and deep-
sea genetic resources. When the subject for the discussions of the international 
regime was debated in the working group in 2006, some states took the position 
that the principle of common heritage of mankind ought to be interpreted as 
encompassing genetic resources.490 Other states relied on the principle of the 
freedom of the high seas (Article 87), which in their understanding would 
imply a right of freedom of access to, and unrestricted exploitation of, deep 
seabed genetic resources.491 These positions appear to have been relatively 
consistent since.  
 
490 “Several delegations reiterated their understanding that the marine genetic resources beyond 
areas of national jurisdiction constituted the common heritage of mankind and recalled article 
140 of the Convention, which provides that the activities in the Area shall be carried out for the 
benefit of mankind and that particular consideration shall be given to the interests and needs of 
developing States, including the need for these resources to be used for the benefit of present 
generations and to be preserved for future generations.(…) A number of delegations also 
mentioned that the International Seabed Authority constituted an existing mechanism in this area 
and that consideration should accordingly be given to the possibility of broadening its mandate.” 
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group 
to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity 
beyond areas of national jurisdiction, UN Doc. A/61/65 (2006), para. 71. 
491 “Other delegations reiterated that any measures that may be taken in relation to genetic 







Similarly divergent positions were expressed during the working group 
meetings of 2008 and 2010.  
 
The statement of the co-chairs of the 2008 meeting succinctly formulates the 
division: 
 
In that regard, divergent views were expressed on the relevant legal 
regime on marine genetic resources beyond areas of national 
jurisdiction, in particular whether those marine genetic resources were 
part of the common heritage of mankind and therefore fell under the 
regime of the Area, or were part of the regime for the high seas.492 
 
Although many states during the working group phase suggested that the 
implementation of existing agreements instead should be strengthened, the 
working group in the end suggested that a new treaty should be negotiated. The 
General Assembly endorsed this recommendation in 2015 and established a 
preparatory committee tasked with elaborating the elements of a draft treaty by 
addressing the ‘package’ of issues493 which also had been the focus of 
discussions during the working group.494 The preparatory committee phase has 
since turned into an intergovernmental conference, but the isolated positions 
have remained intact. Similar to the working group sessions, some delegations 
have supported common heritage of mankind-related concepts while others 
have favored the regime of living resources in the high seas as the starting point 
 
including freedom of navigation. In their view, these resources were covered by the regime of 
freedom of the high seas, which provided the legal framework for all activities relating to them, 
in particular marine scientific research. These delegations did not agree that there was a need for 
a new regime to address the exploitation of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction or to expand the mandate of the International Seabed Authority.” Id. at para. 72. 
492 Letter dated 15 May 2008 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal 
Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of marine 
biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction addressed to the President of the 
General Assembly, UN Doc. A/65/68 (2010), paras. 70-72. 
493 The utilization of genetic resources beyond areas of national jurisdiction and the sharing of 
benefits derived therefrom; marine protected areas and other area-based management tools; 
environmental impact assessment; capacity building and marine technology transfer. 
494 United Nations General Assembly resolution 69/292, Development of an international legally 
binding instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 






for regulating genetic resources.495 Draft texts do not indicate that states are 
getting any closer to an agreement on the issue.496 
 
There are thus different positions on the matter, on both the political and the 
academic side, and it appears unlikely that a consensus in the interpretation 
will emerge in the foreseeable future.  
 
Consequences for the status of genetic resources and bioprospecting 
 
In determining the legal status of bioprospecting of seabed genetic resources 
under the law of the sea, interpretation of what resources fall within the scope 
of the common heritage of mankind principle is central. If genetic resources 
are considered as encompassed by the term resources within the meaning of 
Part XI of UNCLOS, the principle extends also to such resources. This would 
imply that private and sovereign appropriation of seabed genetic resources is 
precluded under the convention, which effectively would prevent seabed 
bioprospecting, possibly with the exception of cases in which a license has 
been granted by the International Seabed Authority.497 It would also have 
important implications for bioprospecting associated with marine scientific 
research operations in the seabed, as will be further discussed in section C.1.5. 
 
By contrast, if the restrictive interpretation were accepted, the consequence 
would be that the bioprospecting of seabed genetic resources should be 
considered a new activity under the convention, which falls beyond the scope 
of the common heritage of mankind-principle. As discussed above this could 
either imply that the convention lacks specific rules for this activity, and that it 
represents a legal lacuna under UNCLOS.  
 
495 Ornella Ferrajolo, The Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law: A Great Past but 
No Future?, MARITIME SAFETY AND SECURITY LAW JOURNAL (2018). 
496 See Revised draft text of an agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, available at: https://www.un.org/bbnj/news/revised-draft-text-agreement-
under-united-nations-convention-law-sea-conservation-and (site accessed November 13 2020).  
497 This could also imply that the comprehensive system for exploration and exploitation applied 
to mining in the Area also encompasses deep-sea bioprospecting. This includes a far-reaching 
and exclusive management regime for the ISA and the applicability of an extensive set of rules, 
provided in UNCLOS as well as the 1994 implementation agreement on the Area. Among other 
requirements, a granted license sponsored by a state would be required for any commercial actor, 







The consequence would be that all states are able to access seabed genetic 
resources on a first come first served basis. 
 
Alternatively, it would imply that bioprospecting falls within the scope of the 
high seas freedoms also when conducted in the seabed.498 The implication of 
considering seabed bioprospecting as part of the high seas freedoms (by 
analogy or direct application of high seas rules) would be that all states are free 
to conduct such activities, although general obligations under the convention 
would apply, similar to what was described for the high seas under section 
C.1.4. 
 
It should be underlined that even under the restrictive view, which considers 
deep-sea bioprospecting as compatible with UNCLOS, the exploitation could 
not be carried out in a completely unrestricted manner. The Area-regime 
contains general obligations, which arguably would remain applicable even if 
genetic resources would fall outside of the common heritage of mankind 
principle and be freely accessible on a first come first served basis.499 
Moreover, Article 145 provides a far-reaching responsibility for the ISA with 
regards to protection of the marine environment, which arguably remains 
applicable under the restrictive interpretation of resources and the scope of the 
common heritage of mankind-principle.500 This broad environmental mandate 
indicates that the role of the ISA, in addition to its role as institution for 
managing mining in the deep sea, effectively extends to functioning as the 
 
498 This would be based on the presumption, as discussed under high seas, that the list of 
activities in Article 87 is not exhaustive by virtue of the term inter alia and that bioprospecting, 
as a new activity falls within the scope of high seas freedoms. 
499 These include inter alia the responsibility to ensure compliance and liability for damage 
(Article 139) and taking reasonable regard for other activities in the marine environment (Article 
147).  
500 Article 145 provides that “Necessary measures shall be taken in accordance with this 
Convention with respect to activities in the Area to ensure effective protection for the marine 
environment from harmful effects which may arise from such activities. To this end the 
Authority shall adopt appropriate rules, regulations and procedures for inter alia: (a) the 
prevention, reduction and control of pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, 
including the coastline, and of interference with the ecological balance of the marine 
environment, particular attention being paid to the need for protection from harmful effects of 
such activities as drilling, dredging, excavation, disposal of waste, construction and operation or 
maintenance of installations, pipelines and other devices related to such activities; (b) the 
protection and conservation of the natural resources of the Area and the prevention of damage 






responsible body for deep-sea environmental protection.501 Based on the 
formulation of Article 145, there is nothing indicating that the mandate of the 
ISA in this field is limited to marine mining or mineral resources.502 It instead 
references activities in general.503 Further support for an ISA mandate as 
regards environmental protection in relation to bioprospecting follows from 
the qualifying inter alia in the chapeau of Article 145.504 Moreover, as regards 
the material scope of the mandate, paragraph (b) does not merely mention the 
marine environment in general. Rather, it makes reference to e.g. the natural 
resources of the Area and the flora and fauna of the marine environment.505 
Since it appears clear that genetic resources as living organisms fall within the 
scope of the flora and the fauna it can hardly be disputed that the environmental 
mandate of the ISA extends also to genetic resources and is relevant for deep-
sea bioprospecting.506 Yet, so far, the ISA has in principle confined its 
environmental program to the detrimental impact of mining.507  
 
501 Interestingly, no organization is mandated with a corresponding role for the High seas. There, 
adverse impact of human use was only remotely regulated by mechanisms such as flag state 
jurisdiction and port state control. WARNER. 2009, at 28. 
502 With regards to the mandate to protect the marine environment under Article 145, it appears 
difficult to ascertain to what extent these powers for the ISA are confined in geographic scope. 
In any event it appears clear that ISA can prescribe environmental rules on activities in the Area 
which are environmentally harmful, even if the harm affects other maritime areas. If nothing 
else this follows from the referencing of the coastline in Article 145. 
503 Moreover, under (a) it lists a number of potentially harmful activities. The list does not 
mention bioprospecting. Yet considering the extent of activities mentioned, it does not appear 
remote to consider that it would have been explicitly referenced if the activity had been 
considered during the drafting of the convention. 
504 Similar to the listing of freedom of the high seas, as discussed above, this indicates that the 
list is non-exhaustive and effectively includes new activities, such as bioprospecting. 
505 The term natural resources arguably imply a wider scope than resources, which is the usual 
term in other provisions in Part XI. By using this different, and broader term, it would even 
under the restrictive interpretation have to be admitted that the drafters desired a wide scope for 
this environmental mandate. 
506 As already has been mentioned, the secretary general of the Authority has asserted that the 
ISA has a broad “regulatory role with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment (including its biodiversity) in the Area generally.” See International Seabed 
Authority, Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under Article 
166. Pargraph 4 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, 7 June, 2002, UN Doc. 
ISBA/8/A/5, 12. The consequence of this mandate for bioprospecting in the Area are difficult to 
foresee, and it depends on how willing the ISA will be to exercise it. 
507 But potentially, the Authority could set stringent environmental requirements for 
bioprospecting of marine genetic resources in the Area, whether in connection to or remote from 







Moreover, the central role of the ISA in cooperation on marine scientific 
research in the Area is relevant to bioprospecting, and will be further discussed 
in section C.1.5. 
 
In conclusion, the legal implications for deep-sea bioprospecting range widely, 
depending on the interpretation of resources, the scope of the common heritage 
of mankind principle and the more general applicability of the UNCLOS 
regime on the Area to genetic resources. Although there are strong arguments 
favoring a restrictive interpretation of the common heritage of mankind 
principle, foremost the declaration in Article 133 that resources mean mineral 
resources, it appears difficult to reject the arguments favoring an interpretation 
which includes bioprospecting for seabed genetic resources. Not only are there 
other, connecting provisions in Part XI indicating a wider scope of the regime 
of the Area which should be considered under contextual interpretation; the 
ambition of the drafters of the convention to encompass all uses of the sea 
would also be difficult to reconcile with regarding living resources as regulated 
in all other marine areas but left in a complete legal vacuum in the seabed. 
Likewise, it would be difficult to accept the notion of genetic resources as 
excluded, considering that preparatory works indicate no such intention among 
negotiating states and the references in the preamble of the convention, both to 
the implementation of the common heritage of mankind principle per se and to 
Resolution 2749 of 1970. 
 
The application of the Area regime in general and the common heritage of 
mankind principle in particular represent a considerable challenge to deep 
seabed bioprospecting. By virtue of its commercial elements and central 
connection to appropriation of genetic resources by means of patenting, such 
activities would essentially be precluded under the law of the sea, save for 
cases where the International Seabed Authority, by virtue its central role in 
relation to different uses of the Area, would grant license. 
 
effectively would give the ISA a central role in considering possible bioprospecting projects. 
This would for instance be the case if the ISA set mandatory licensing procedures connected to 
requirements for environmental impact assessments for bioprospecting in the Area. Such 
requirements have already been set in relation to deep-sea mining, and there appears to be 
nothing in Article 145 preventing the ISA from requiring similar measures for other activities. 
Laura E. Lallier & Frank Maes, Environmental impact assessment procedure for deep seabed 








C.1.5. The rules on marine scientific research and living 
resources 
 
The maritime zone regime of UNCLOS and its implications for bioprospecting 
has now been examined. Its differentiated balance between the rights of coastal 
and other states as well as commons concepts raise fundamentally different 
requirements and challenges depending on where genetic resources are 
retrieved. In addition to the maritime zone regime, there are general horizontal 
concepts in the convention of direct relevance to bioprospecting, which 
hitherto have been left out: The regulation of living resources and scientific 
research. Bioprospecting involves elements that are related to both concepts. 
The convention provides differentiated rules for scientific research and living 
resources across maritime zones, but there are also distinct elements which 
apply in all areas. The rules for these concepts will now be examined in order 
to assess their relevance for bioprospecting. The examination will cover both 
the general rules for these concepts, and the specific rules applying in different 
maritime zones. 
 
As discussed in Part B, the line between sampling conducted for 
bioprospecting and scientific purposes has become blurred. Increasingly, 
samples collected for scientific purposes subsequently serve as the basis for 
biotechnology development. Moreover, it would be impossible to distinguish 
these forms of sampling based on technological differences. Rather, marine 
bioprospecting can be characterized by the purpose or objective of the 
operation. In this part, the nature of the regulation of marine scientific research 
in UNCLOS will be explored. It will be discussed to what extent these rules 
apply to bioprospecting. A central question in this regard is whether the 
commercial elements of bioprospecting render the rules inapplicable or if 
bioprospecting nevertheless ought to be regarded as scientific research as 
defined in the convention. The consequences will be evaluated, to the extent 
that bioprospecting falls within the scope of this concept.  
 
Secondly, UNCLOS provides a set of rules for marine living resources, relating 
to management and conservation, as well as the rights of states to harvest such 
resources across different zones. As will be discussed, these rules were drafted 







As a result, the UNCLOS rules for living resources establishes formulas for 
management which are difficult to adapt to other uses of marine organisms, 
such as bioprospecting. Yet it appears that the drafters aimed for a wider scope, 
encompassing all uses of marine organisms. Like the discussion on marine 
scientific research, the implications of the rules on marine living resources for 
marine bioprospecting will be examined. 
 
C.1.5.1. Bioprospecting and scientific research 
 
As discussed in Part B, by virtue of its nature, marine bioprospecting has 
similarities with both conventional resource extraction, such as fisheries or 
mining, and scientific research. In both contexts, physical compounds are 
regularly extracted. But at least the technical way in which bioprospecting is 
carried out, with elements of sequencing and laboratory processes, arguably 
shares more in common with marine biological exploration than fisheries or 
mining. Both marine bioprospecting and scientific research relate to the 
exploration of the seas. Compared to conventional pure marine scientific 
research, however, there is a considerable difference in that bioprospecting 
involves a commercial element, most commonly manifested as a desire to 
patent, develop products, and make profits on innovations based on findings. 
This commercial motivation is more reminiscent of other types of resource 
extraction. There is a reason why bioprospecting is often referred to as genetic 
mining.508 It is not only in a legal context that there are similarities between 
bioprospecting and marine mining. Importantly, some of the hotspots for 
marine genetic resources, notably the hydrothermal vents, also overlap with 
mining interests. But marine bioprospecting also differs in important regards 
from conventional marine resource extraction. Perhaps the most significant 
difference is that bioprospecting rarely involves an interest in collecting large 
quantities of marine genetic resources in bulk. Small samples are regularly 
collected, and then sequenced. In this regard, there are apparent areas of 
commonality with marine scientific research.  
 
The technological aspects of bioprospecting – how it is carried out – thus recall 
marine scientific research more so than other activities referred to in UNCLOS. 
Yet, bioprospecting also diverges from traditional marine scientific research in 
some key respects. One apparent difference is that bioprospecting is 
 
508 See for instance Kristie Tanner, et al., Bioprospecting challenges in unusual environments, 






undertaken in order to attain economic gain. This is rarely the primary goal in 
marine scientific research.509 As regards purpose, bioprospecting has more in 
common with mining or fishing.  
 
The right to conduct marine scientific research under UNCLOS 
 
Early on in the negotiations of UNCLOS, a strong separation was established 
between different forms of resource extraction on the one hand, and marine 
scientific research on the other.510 As discussed in sections C.1.3 and C.1.4, 
resource extraction, whether relating to living or other resources, is generally 
regarded as a sovereign or exclusive right of the coastal state in the maritime 
zones where it exercises jurisdiction. Beyond national jurisdiction, extraction 
of such resources is either part of the high seas freedoms or highly regulated 
by the common heritage of mankind principle, depending on interpretation and 
whether it is retrieved in the deep seabed or the water column. 
 
There are two challenges in examining how the rules on marine scientific 
research in UNCLOS relate to bioprospecting. Firstly, it is obvious that a major 
reason for the difficulties in positioning bioprospecting in relation to marine 
scientific research under the convention is that marine bioprospecting is a 
research and development process in which the actual extraction element is a 
limited part of the operation. The UNCLOS regime on marine scientific 
research, on the other hand, focuses on activities conducted in situ and does 
not encompass the full research and development chain.511 The provisions on 
 
509 See, for a discussion on the difference between marine bioprospecting and marine scientific 
research Glowka, OCEAN YEARBOOK ONLINE (1996); Jørem & Tvedt, THE INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2014). 
510 Whereas most issues relating to resource extraction and the jurisdictional issues involved 
were discussed in the Second Committee, marine scientific research was together with the 
marine environment negotiated in the Third Committee. This explains why both marine 
scientific research and the protection of the marine environment resulted in dedicated parts in 
UNCLOS, rather than just being integrated in the respective chapters of the maritime zone 
regime. See MYRON H. NORDQUIST, et al., UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, 1982: A COMMENTARY VOL. IV [THIRD COMMITTEE: PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF 
THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT, MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER 
OF MARINE TECHNOLOGY] § IV (Dordrecht : Nijhoff. 1990). 







marine scientific research are thus predominantly aiming at a distribution of 
jurisdictional powers.512  
 
A second problem in investigating how the rules on marine scientific research 
apply to bioprospecting is that UNCLOS lacks a general definition of marine 
scientific research in spite of numerous rules on how and under what conditions 
such activities may be conducted.513 Instead of establishing a clear scope of the 
concept, negotiating states focused on jurisdictional aspects, where widespread 
agreement could be reached.514 Strangely, the convention essentially provides 
a detailed framework for marine scientific research, without clarifying what it 
is.515 It is thus uncertain what activities are encompassed by marine scientific 
research, and in particular if bioprospecting is covered by the concept.516 
 
Even if marine scientific research is not defined in UNCLOS, the convention 
does provide indications for the nature of such activities. According to some 
observers, the purpose of marine scientific research may be inferred from its 
Article 246. This provision, which applies to the exclusive economic zone and 
the continental shelf, distinguishes between two types of marine scientific 
research projects: Those carried out “to increase scientific knowledge of the 
marine environment for the benefit of all mankind” (Article 246(3)) and those 
“of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources, whether living or non-living” (Article 246(5)(a)).  
 
512 Based on this reasoning, it could be claimed that the convention is simply not concerned with 
what marine scientific research findings are used to, once the findings are remote from the 
physical marine environment. See Article 239, Wolfrum & Matz, MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF 
UNITED NATIONS LAW (2000), at 458. 
513 Indeed, the negotiation documents indicate that the drafters of the convention were 
intentionally vague as regards the material extent of marine scientific research, as the result of 
lack of agreement on the matter. SOONS. 1982. 
514 NORDQUIST, et al. 1990. As pointed out by Wolfrum, “the provisions of the Convention on the 
Law of the Sea on marine scientific research are predominantly aiming at a distribution of 
jurisdictional powers rather than at the protection of the research object and at the distribution 
of benefits resulting from such research.”, WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International 
Environmental Law. 2003, at 28. 
515 Still, different observers have attempted to define the concept more precisely. Tanaka thus 
claims that marine scientific research “covers any scientific investigation, however and wherever 
performed, which concerns the marine environment as well as its organisms” but that it should 
“be distinguished from the exploration of marine natural resources, because the latter is 
governed by a legal framework different from that regulating marine scientific research.” 
TANAKA. 2012, at 336. 






Firstly, as observed by Wolfrum and Matz, this provision indicates that it was 
not just basic fundamental research that was considered during drafting.517 
Although this provision only applies to the exclusive economic zone, it 
dismisses the notion of applied scientific research as falling entirely outside 
the scope of the convention.  
 
Whatever the concept includes, all states may conduct marine scientific 
research.518 Although the convention imposes conditions and possibilities for 
states to hinder such projects within their jurisdiction, the convention generally 
encourages marine scientific research.519 
 
Non-recognition of marine scientific research activities as the legal basis for 
claims 
 
Among the rights and duties established in Part XIII of UNCLOS, which 
provide the rules for marine scientific research, Article 241 in particular 
appears to raise potential challenges to bioprospecting, by declaring that 
“Marine scientific research activities shall not constitute the legal basis for 
any claim to any part of the marine environment or its resources.” In this way, 
the provision is similar to and complements the principle of non-appropriation 
of the high seas in Article 89 and the Area in Article 137, as discussed above.  
 
In cases where bioprospecting is based on samples retrieved during scientific 
research operations, as was increasingly found to be the case under Part B, it 
would have far-reaching consequences if Article 241 were considered to 
prevent private claims for exclusive rights by means of patents. As discussed 
in Part B, patenting and other claims for private rights to genetic resources 
form an integral part of most bioprospecting projects.  
 
517 Wolfrum & Matz, MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2000), p. 470. 
518 In Article 238, the opening provision of the UNCLOS part XIII on marine scientific research, 
it is declared that all States, irrespective of their geographical location, and competent 
international organizations have the right to conduct marine scientific research subject to the 
rights and duties of other States as provided for in this Convention. 
519 According to article 239, “States and competent international organizations shall promote 
and facilitate the development and conduct of marine scientific research in accordance with this 
Convention.” Similarly, UNCLOS encourages cooperation for promoting such activities, as well 







Negotiation documents indicate that rather than aiming to provide rules for 
intellectual property rights claims, the states involved in drafting the provision 
primarily considered more extensive claims for sovereign rights to physical 
resources in the marine environment found during research operations. In fact, 
no concrete proposals to include a reference to prohibiting intellectual property 
rights into Article 241 were raised during the negotiation.520 Even if 
preparatory work indicates that the legal rationale of the provision was to 
prevent sovereign claims based on marine scientific research, some observers 
support a more extensive interpretation, claiming that the principle also 
encompasses intellectual property rights claims. Indeed, the subject remains 
debated.521  
 
If the prohibition applies to intellectual property rights, “patents and other 
means of protection of the commercial value of applying human intellect to 
findings from marine scientific research would effectively be void,” as 
observed by Mossop.522 Gorina-Ysern holds that Article 241 also prohibits the 
exclusive exploitation of data and samples which are related not to marine 
resources but to the marine environment, regardless of whether this data is used 
for commercial purposes.523 However, as noted by Matz-Lück, who appears to 
favor a more restrictive interpretation of the scope of Article 241, to make such 
claims effectively amounts to filling a gap in the convention by widening the 
scope of a provision beyond what is allowed for under established treaty law, 
since “neither the wording nor the drafting history give indications as to 
conclude that any subsequent result of research or development which is based 
upon data or samples must be included in the scope of Article 241 and hence 
prevents any intellectual property rights.”524  
 
520 Montserrat Gorina-Ysern, Marine Scientific Research Activities as the Legal Basis for 
Intellectual Property Claims?, 22 MARINE POLICY (1998), at 343. As established by Matz-Lück, 
the purpose of Article 241 is rather to make explicit that marine scientific research activities, 
irrespective of where they are carried out, “cannot form the basis for legal titles of occupation 
of territory, nor for the delineation of maritime boundaries, nor for legally relevant claims to 
the exploitation of living or non-living resources”. See PROELSS, United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 1625. 
521 See in particular Gorina-Ysern, MARINE POLICY (1998);PROELSS, United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017. 
522 Mossop. 2015. 
523 This would mean that the provision prevents any kind of proprietary title or rights to exclusive 
use of results of marine scientific research. Gorina-Ysern, MARINE POLICY (1998), at 345. 






Although there is considerable support for this restrictive interpretation, which 
would consider patent claims as falling beyond the scope of the provision, it 
has considerable weaknesses according to its opponents. Firstly, it appears to 
ignore that UNCLOS establishes a clear-cut separation between marine 
scientific research and resource extraction. Under the extensive interpretation 
of the scope of Article 241, this dichotomy is safeguarded by making clear that 
activities aiming to collect resources to make legal claims fall outside the scope 
of marine scientific research.525  
 
Francioni appears to consider that the convention provides little guidance on 
the material content of marine scientific research. Rather, the rules on marine 
scientific research relate to an activity, in the sense that they establish rights 
and obligations applicable to the conduct of marine scientific research 
activities.526 Indeed, based on negotiation documents, there appears to be 
considerable support for understanding the rules as primarily relating to how 
this activity is to be carried out. In the context of bioprospecting, Article 241 
should thus be interpreted as underlining this emphasis; that the rules relate to 
the conduct and do not establish a legal status of genetic resources in the high 
seas and the Area.527 Article 241 simply ensures that marine scientific research 
cannot be conducted so as to make sovereign claims. 
 
A more extensive interpretation of Article 241 would also be problematic since 
it would go against the generally accepted view that the legal ownership of 
physical samples belongs to the researching state. Under the conventional 
understanding of the provision, claims for exclusive intellectual property rights 
over the exploitation of samples, data, and results would be compatible with 
the regulation in Article 241.528 Formal legal titles to samples collected during 
marine scientific research operations are thus not excluded, at least not in state 
practice. Importantly, however, they cannot be used to exclude other states 
from accessing the findings, according to Articles 242 and 244.529  
 
525 SOONS. 1982. 
526 Francioni, International Law for Biotechnology: Basic Principles. 2006, at 12. 
527 SOONS. 1982. 
528 Ibid; CHURCHILL & LOWE. 1999, at 411. 
529 This is because UNCLOS establishes a clear principle of transparency in relation to research 
findings. As discussed above, Article 242 establishes that states are under obligation to “promote 
international cooperation in marine scientific research for peaceful purposes.” Similarly, 
according to Article 244 states should make available knowledge from marine scientific 







The use of the terms knowledge and results in these provisions make clear that 
the understanding of the marine scientific research regime under UNCLOS as 
only encompassing fundamental basic research is wrong. At least the principle 
of transparency clearly has a wider scope, encompassing applied research too.  
 
However, obliging states to be transparent about research findings is not the 
same thing as preventing exclusive rights to applications of marine scientific 
research findings, such as exclusive intellectual property rights. As discussed 
in Part B, the research forming the basis for biotechnological innovations is 
commonly freely accessible; practical cases of marine bioprospecting 
operations are often the result of cooperation between academic and 
commercial sectors, based on freely accessible data. Indeed, in many cases, 
samples collected for genuine scientific research purposes become stored in 
collections and libraries, and are subsequently used as the basis for 
biotechnological development. As such, the principle of transparency in 
research does not stand in conflict with, but often effectively functions as the 
basis for bioprospecting. Moreover, patenting does not imply secrecy. To the 
contrary, publication of patent data aims to promote transparency in relation to 
the invention. 
 
Thereby, requirements for transparency in the convention can hardly be used 
as evidence for claiming that intellectual property rights claims are generally 
incompatible with the law of the sea. Nor would the understanding that 
collecting states have the right to claim legal titles to samples be incompatible. 
In line with the principle of transparency, such ownership is accepted, provided 
that free access is granted. 
 
Taken together, it appears difficult to accept the notion that making claims for 
intellectual property rights based on marine scientific research is precluded by 
the rule on non-recognition of marine scientific research activities as the legal 
basis for claims. Rather, this provision and other general rules on marine 
scientific research are focused on the conduct of such activities, and the 
promotion of transparency regarding research results, which increasingly 
forms the basis for marine bioprospecting. 
 
research would go against the convention. Within national jurisdiction, states do however have 
the possibility to maintain exclusive rights to scientific research of marine resources and the 
possibility to exclude the access to such resources to researchers from other states. Authorization 
by the coastal states is required in the territorial sea as well as in the exclusive economic zone 






Marine scientific research across maritime zones  
 
The remainder of Part XIII provides the rights and duties for the exercise of 
scientific research. Similar to the rules on other activities in the convention, a 
considerable part of the rules concerns the relation between exclusive rights of 
coastal and other states.530 UNCLOS thus provides that the coastal state has the 
exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct marine scientific research in 
their territorial sea.531  
 
In the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, on the other hand, 
coastal state rights are more balanced with the interests of other states. 
Compared to marine living resources, which clearly are part of the exclusive 
right of coastal states within these zones (as will be discussed below), foreign 
states should in normal circumstances be granted consent for scientific research 
activities in the EEZ and the continental shelf.532 However, a number of 
grounds for withholding coastal state consent are provided.533 These include 
inter alia projects involving exploration and exploitation of natural resources, 
drilling, and other activities with high environmental impacts. Wolfrum and 
Matz see the objective of this provision as to ensure that the regime on marine 
scientific research is compatible with the rules on the use of resources in the 
EEZ and the continental shelf.534 It indicates that the negotiators of the 
convention intended to preclude the use of marine scientific research as a 
backdoor to resource extraction.535  
 
530 Section 3, Articles 245-257. 
531 According to Article 245, “Marine scientific research therein shall be conducted only with 
the express consent of and under the conditions set forth by the coastal State.” As will be 
discussed in the next section, this rule is similar to the regime on marine living resources, which 
also is part of the coastal state sovereignty over its territorial sea. 
532 According to Article 246, the coastal state has “the right to regulate, authorize and conduct 
marine scientific research” also in these zones. Furthermore, A distinction is made in Article 
246 between on the one hand projects “to increase scientific knowledge of the marine 
environment for the benefit of all mankind”, where the coastal state in normal circumstances 
shall grant consent (Article 246(3)). For those “of direct significance for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources, whether living or non-living” (Article 246(5)(a), on the other 
hand, states may withhold consent (under certain conditions). 
533 Subparagraph 5 a-d in Article 246. 
534 Wolfrum & Matz, MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2000), at 457-458; 
Gadtan Verhoosel, Prospecting for Marine and Coastal Biodiversity: International Law in Deep 
Water?, 13 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (1998), at 100. 
535 Farrier & Tucker, OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001); Scovazzi, 







It has been argued by Tanaka as well as Churchill and Lowe that this provision 
indicates a dichotomy in the convention between fundamental scientific 
research (where consent should be granted) and applied scientific research 
(where consent may be withheld).536 Other observers have claimed that if 
exploration activities aiming to commercially exploit resources, such as 
bioprospecting, fall within the rules on marine scientific research, they 
represent the latter type of scientific research and are more dependent on the 
consent of coastal states than pure scientific research.537 In any event, it is clear 
that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, which are necessary 
elements in bioprospecting, provide a legal basis for coastal states to withhold 
consent and thereby prevent scientific research operations of foreign states 
with bioprospecting purposes in the EEZ and continental shelf.538 
 
The rules for marine scientific research in the high seas are considerably less 
complex. There, the right of all states to conduct marine scientific research is 
unconditional.539 This provision reiterates the status of marine scientific 
research as part of the freedoms of the high seas.540 
 
The liberally regulated regime for marine scientific research in the high seas 
stands in stark contrast to the corresponding rules for the deep seabed and 
underlying sediments.  
 
536 States would have far-reaching possibilities for carrying out the former type of operations in 
the EEZ and continental shelf of other states. Operations of the latter type, on the other hand, 
may only be conducted with the consent of the coastal state in the EEZ and continental shelf of 
other states. See TANAKA. 2012, at 337; CHURCHILL & LOWE. 1999, at 405. 
537 Tullio Scovazzi, Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal Framework for All 
Activities in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE FOR 
OCEANS IN GLOBALISATION : IUU FISHING, OIL POLLUTION, BIOPROSPECTING, OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF (Davor Vidas ed. 2010), at 312. 
538 After all bioprospecting operations necessarily involves elements of exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources. However, even if these exceptions provide the coastal state 
some discretion, it does not alter the default rule that permission should be granted to scientific 
research of other states. Rules are also set up for cooperation, communication and conditions 
between the coastal and other states in such projects. For the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf, a rather delicate balance between the rights of coastal and other states is thus 
provided. It should also be underlined that it is not because of the commercial nature of 
bioprospecting coastal state consent is necessary. 
539 Article 257. 






All states have the right to conduct marine scientific research also in the 
Area.541 However, this liberty is conditioned on a requirement for it to be 
carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as 
a whole, in accordance with the special regime on the Area provided in Part 
XI. Scientific research is thus encompassed by the principle of common 
heritage of mankind, similar to the general rules on the use of deep-seabed 
resources, as discussed above. Moreover, since mankind includes all living 
humans as well as future generations, the provision entails an obligation to 
consider long-term implications and different aspects of sustainable 
development when conducting marine scientific research in the Area, as noted 
by Vöneky and Beck.542 Moreover, Article 143(2) provides that the 
International Seabed Authority has the central role not only in the management 
of resources of the Area, but also as regards coordination and promotion of 
scientific research.  
 
In discussions on whether the marine scientific research reference to the 
common heritage of mankind principle extends to bioprospecting, observers 
appear to be divided along the same lines as for the application of the same 
principle to resource extraction, even if an overlap in the meaning of the terms 
between the two contexts cannot be taken for granted. Some observers have 
thus claimed that marine bioprospecting, by definition, falls outside the scope 
of marine scientific research.543 There is, however, a clear indication that basic 
fundamental research was not the only consideration during the drafting 
process.544 Indeed, preparatory works indicate that the negotiators also 
 
541 As provided by Article 143 and 256. 
542 As discussed in PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 
2017, at 997. 
543 Foremost, the position that all activities involving elements of bioprospecting falls beyond 
the scope of the rules on marine scientific research has been based on the argument that 
bioprospecting involves legal claims. Based on this, it has been argued, marine bioprospecting 
is an activity that is distinctly different from marine scientific research. Consequently, it would 
be without specific regulation under the existing framework. See Arianna Broggiato, Marine 
Genetic Resources beyond National Jurisdiction - Coordination and Harmonisation of 
Governance Regimes, 41 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW (2011); Glowka, OCEAN 
YEARBOOK ONLINE (1996); Jørem & Tvedt, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND 
COASTAL LAW (2014). 
544 As discussed in the context of the EEZ and the continental shelf above, see Wolfrum & Matz, 







intended to include applied research within its scope. As a type of applied 
research, bioprospecting should be considered as included.545 
 
It appears difficult to dispute that this rules out scientific research for 
commercial or other private purposes in the Area. As noted by Vöneky and 
Beck, “as long as the primary aim of bioprospecting is not a serious and 
systematic attempt to achieve knowledge and as long as there is not the 
primary aim to disseminate this knowledge to a scientific community, 
bioprospecting does not constitute marine scientific research that can be 
carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, as required by Article 
143(1).”546 Yet, as similarly noted by Vöneky and Beck, this does not mean 
that “any intent of economic gain” or “any time there are prospects of profit” 
automatically changes the “nature of the marine scientific research activity” 
under the regime of the convention, as has been suggested by Scovazzi.547 
Rather,  
 
the decisive factor for deciding whether an activity is marine scientific 
research or not is the main or primary purpose of the activity: that is, 
whether it is to increase human knowledge or to achieve financial gain. 
If the main intent is to increase human knowledge, the discovery of 
commercially valuable information does not change the character of the 
activity: that is, whether it is to increase human knowledge, the 
discovery of commercially valuable information does not change the 
character of the activity.548  
 
In line with this reasoning, it appears that Article 143 precludes research 
operations with commercial intent, such as bioprospecting, in the Area.549 But 
this does not imply that the convention categorically prevents bioprospecting 
on the basis of findings from scientific research operations, as was considered 
increasingly common in Part B. Indeed, it may appear more difficult to 
consider cases where information or material from samples collected in 
operations without such commercial ambitions have been collected in biobanks 
and databases and subsequently used in bioprospecting.  
 
545 Scovazzi, Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal Framework for All Activities 
in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting. 2010, at 312. 
546 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 994. 
547 Scovazzi, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2004), at 402. 
548 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 994. 






As established in section B.6, it is increasingly common that material or 
information in such collections form the basis for bioprospecting. Oude 
Elferink considers that the limitation of scientific research operations in the 
Area to projects conducted for the common heritage of mankind does not 
necessarily rule out the subsequent use in bioprospecting of discoveries made 
in a scientific context.550 
  
In line with this reasoning, it appears to assume that Article 143 does not rule 
out the subsequent use of findings in bioprospecting (or other commercial 
projects) as long as the scientific operation has been carried out on the basis of 
scientific (and not commercial) motives. Regarded conversely, however, it 
follows logically that if it is an ambition of the research operation to promote 
commercial development, it could be considered as precluded in the Area. This 
is problematic for many of the contemporary research and development 
initiatives discussed in section B.6. Indeed, many of the large-scale efforts to 
build biobanks and library collections of genetic resources material and 
information are intrinsically connected to the promotion of blue biotechnology 
and bioprospecting. Under the law of the sea, sampling operations with such 
purposes would be precluded in the deep seabed. 
 
For the Area, it is thus clear that states have a right to carry out marine scientific 
research, but only so long as it is compatible with the principle of common 
heritage of mankind and respects the coordinating role of the ISA. Similar to 
what was established in the context of the extraction of resources, the common 
heritage of mankind principle thus prevents operations with commercial 
objectives. This seemingly precludes scientific research operations in the Area 
aiming to form the basis for bioprospecting, since the development of patents 
or other claims to resources would qualify as private ends.  
 
In conclusion, by entailing a broad understanding of research, including 
different types of applied research, the rules on marine scientific research under 
UNCLOS may appear beneficial to bioprospecting. The convention generally 
promotes and calls upon states to encourage scientific research. Even within 
the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of other states, under normal 
circumstances it should be permitted to conduct such operations according to 
the convention. 
 
550 States appears to have different positions on the implications of Article 143 in this regard. 







However, even if bioprospecting would not formally fall beyond the rules on 
marine scientific research, different operative provisions limit the possibility 
of conducting bioprospecting sampling under a scientific research pretext. The 
element of exploitation of natural resources, which is an intrinsic element of 
bioprospecting, permits coastal states to withhold consent to such operations 
in the EEZ and continental shelf.  
 
Similarly, beyond national jurisdiction, the consequences of falling within the 
marine scientific research regime appear less conducive to bioprospecting 
when examined closer. In the high seas, this would imply that bioprospecting 
falls within the far-reaching freedom to conduct marine scientific research. 
However, as indicated under C.1.4, if the bioprospecting is not considered 
scientific research, the alternative is no different: Freedom of the high seas is 
the default rule for activities not mentioned and the implicit freedom to conduct 
bioprospecting would be no less extensive than that of scientific research. 
 
In the Area, all states formally have the possibility to conduct scientific 
research. However, this right is conditioned on the principle of common 
heritage of mankind, which effectively prevents operations aiming to conduct 
bioprospecting, by virtue of the commercial element involved. Importantly, 
however, it does not appear that the subsequent use in bioprospecting of 
findings from scientific missions in the deep seabed without commercial 
motives is precluded by the same principle. Thus, it does not appear that the 
rules on marine scientific research exclude the development of commercial 
products based on findings from research cruises per se.  
 
The interlinkages between scientific exploration and commercial ventures, 
which appear increasingly common in bioprospecting development, as 
discussed in section B.6.3, do not appear to be precluded by the convention. 
Rather, there is nothing preventing samples collected during a research 
endeavor aimed at enhancing human knowledge to be used as the basis for 
biotechnological product development. Deep-seabed research operations with 
a commercial intent, as is the case in many contemporary research initiatives 
aiming to promote commercial biotechnology, on the other hand, appear to be 








From the perspective of actors involved in biotechnological development 
based on marine organisms, it can thus be concluded that the law of the sea 
prevents bioprospecting of genetic resources in the Area, not merely under the 
rules on resource extraction, but also based on the rules on scientific research 
operation with commercial purposes. In the high seas, bioprospecting 
operations would be permitted under the freedoms of scientific research. 
Within the EEZ or territorial sea of coastal states, consent would be required. 
 
C.1.5.2. Bioprospecting and marine living resources  
 
How to approach the concept of marine organisms and human exploitation of 
such organisms is central in the law of the sea. Bioprospecting of marine 
genetic resources represents one form of such exploitation. However, in many 
respects, such as how it is carried out as well as what organisms are targeted, 
it differs from more conventional exploitation of marine living resources. This 
is particularly apparent in relation to fisheries, the most important form of 
exploitation of marine organisms. Compared to fisheries, the purpose of 
bioprospecting is distinctively different. Whereas marine bioprospecting 
searches for genetic resources contained in marine organisms for their 
biotechnological value, organisms are exploited for nutritional purposes in 
fisheries.551  
 
Not only do the two activities differ in purpose, but they also represent different 
forms of appropriation. A catch of a fish bestows the fisherman with the legal 
title to the fish. Yet, it does not, as pointed out by Francioni, “entail 
appropriation of the wealth of genetic information the catch may yield; any 
more than the purchase of a house designed by an architect entails the 
appropriation by the buyer of the talent and know-how that the architect 
bestowed in it.”552 
 
As the result of technological development, often only limited samples of 
organisms are required to retrieve the genetic information relevant in 
bioprospecting.553  
 
551 Scovazzi, Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal Framework for All Activities 
in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting. 2010, at 312. 
552 Francioni, International Law for Biotechnology: Basic Principles. 2006. 








As discussed by Scovazzi, “for this kind of almost non-consumptive activity 
there is normally no need to harvest large quantities of living resources.”554  
 
Accordingly, the qualitative aspects of genetic resources are determinative in 
bioprospecting whereas quantity remains largely irrelevant.555 As discussed in 
Part B, most of the energy and costs entailed in bioprospecting relate to the 
added value work on genetic material, which is commonly carried out in a 
laboratory setting. In fisheries, on the other hand, the quantity of stocks and 
species is central for the commercial viability. Moreover, the relevant species 
for biotechnological exploitation, where novel bioactive properties are the 
central elements, is commonly (if not always) different compared to fisheries. 
Whereas bioprospecting may be conducted in relation to any part of the 
ecosystem, encompassing all marine phyla, fisheries are only conducted in 
relation to a limited number of fish and shellfish species used as food 
commodities, either directly or indirectly. 
 
In approaching the concept of bioprospecting under the law of the sea, these 
differences from fisheries raise a number of challenges, foremost because the 
convention has one set of rules, arguably encompassing all exploitation of 
marine organisms, irrespective of purpose, referred to as marine living 
resources. This is clearly one of the central concepts in UNCLOS. Yet the term 
marine living resources is, like marine scientific research, undefined in the 
convention. Different approaches have been taken in suggesting definitions of 
the concept.556  
 
 
554 Scovazzi, Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal Framework for All Activities 
in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting. 2010, at 312. 
555 Typically, the active substances used in bioprospecting constitute a miniscule part of the 
organism. In such cases, a single specimen or sample is often sufficient, for enabling the scaling 
up in laboratories. In some cases, however, as discussed in under raw extracts in section B.6.1, 
genetic resource material cannot be reproduced artificially but must be collected in bulk. Such 
species include sponges, which are difficult to cultivate or conserve. To obtain 300 mg of pure 
halichondrin B, one ton of sponges of the species Halichondria okadai is needed. See Report of 
the workshop on bioprospecting in the high seas. (2005). 
556 Similar to marine living resources, the for bioprospecting central term marine scientific 
research, discussed in section C.1.5 is similarly not defined in UNCLOS. In fact, not even an 
explicit definition of ‘fish’ is provided by UNCLOS. A definition is however included in Article 






A broad definition suggested by Sands refers to “bony fish, sharks and rays, 
cephalopods, crustaceans, and other invertebrates, such as corals” as well as 
“birds, turtles, and marine mammals.”557 A narrower notion emphasizes the 
denomination as “resources,” stressing economic exploitation and monetary 
value. This perspective excludes many birds and other species which depend 
upon marine ecosystems, but are not of commercial interest (e.g. polar 
bears).558  
 
The establishment of one set of rules which, at least according to conventional 
understanding of marine living resources, encompasses all marine organisms 
is in line with the ambition of the convention to include all uses of the sea 
within its scope. However, the objective to establish a general regime for the 
management of marine organisms was not paralleled with the introduction of 
generic rules. Paradoxically, despite the wide scope of the rules for marine 
living resources, the management provided by the regime was exclusively 
based on considerations relating to fisheries. This is evident when studying 
negotiation documents, which are essentially focused on the extent of 
exclusive coastal rights to fisheries.559 It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
rules on marine living resources do not appear to be well adapted to 
bioprospecting and other interests relating to genetic quality rather than 
quantity.  
 
Moreover, the regime on marine living resources is not merely based on a 
narrow form of use: namely fisheries. It reflects the understanding of how fish 
stocks ought to be efficiently managed at the time of the drafting of 
UNCLOS.560  
 
557 PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Cambridge University 
Press 4 ed. 2018) Another broad definition is provided by 1980 Convention on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Art 1(2). 
558 Nele Matz-Lück & Johannes Fuchs, Marine Living Resources, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF THE LAW OF THE SEA (Donald Rothwell, et al. eds., 2015), at 493. 
559 As is evident when studying the preparatory works as well as convention commentaries, such 
as NORDQUIST, et al. 1995. 
560 Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, adopted in Geneva, 29 April 1958, 450 
U.N.T.S. 11 establishes a link between marine living resources and marine food products, and 
focuses on the prevalence of “a supply of food for human consumption.” In UNCLOS, fisheries 
is the only activity explicitly mentioned in referral to the exploration, exploitation and 
conservation of marine living resources. No less than thirty articles refer to fisheries (notably 
Articles 56, 60 and following, Article 277 etc). Moreover, Article 69 mentions “the nutritional 







Most biologists would describe this scientific basis, which importantly is 
reflected in central formulas on management, as overly simplified and 
inaccurate. As a result, central elements of the rules for the management of 
marine living resources, which will be discussed in more detail below, are from 
a scientific standpoint unsatisfactorily functioning as the basis for modern 
fisheries management. This situation risks creating decisions on viable harvest 
levels that are inaccurate or unsustainable in the long term. 
 
For bioprospecting of marine genetic resources, the implications of these rules 
on management of marine organisms are even worse, and in many regards 
completely inapt. The shortcomings include an exclusive focus on major 
harvested species, disregarding the consequences and side-effects on species 
less relevant to fisheries. This includes a lack of concern for systemic 
interaction with other species, but also a lack of consideration of the side-
effects of fisheries, such as the impact of trawling on the benthic and sediment 
species, organisms which in recent years have been at the center of 
bioprospecting interest due to their bioactive properties. Moreover, the 
UNCLOS regime on marine living resources generally fails to consider genetic 
diversity within species.  
 
The lack of functionality in relation to bioprospecting has led some observers 
to deem it illogical to apply the fisheries-based rules on conservation and 
management of the living resources to activities directed at the genetic material 
of the sea.561 The primary argument against applying the regime on marine 
living resources to bioprospecting thus relates to the difference in use of the 
organism between the two activities, where bioprospecting regularly requires 
only small samples, as discussed above.562 
 
This argument is commonly supported by claims that the limited perspective 
of UNCLOS is the result of other uses of living resources not known at the 
time of the convention’s drafting.  
 
561 See for instance Scovazzi, Bioprospecting on the Deep Seabed: a Legal Gap Requiring to be 
Filled. 2006, at 83. 
562 Scovazzi and others considers it unreasonable to apply the regime on marine living resources, 
rules which are based on large scale harvesting: “(…) it would be totally unreasonable to apply, 
to activities directed at the genetic materials of the sea, the law of the sea convention regime 
relating to fishing and conservation and management of the living resources, which is based on 
the concept of allowable catches.” Scovazzi, Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the 






True, in the preparatory work discussions on fisheries are certainly dominant. 
Although their scientific and economic value was demonstrated as early as the 
1970s, marine genetic resources did not draw the attention of the states at the 
third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.563 Similarly, little 
consideration was given to genetic resources in the development of the deep-
seabed regime of the Area, which instead came to focus on marine mining.564 
 
There are thus a number of essentially functional aspects against applying the 
regime on marine living resources to bioprospecting. There are, however, also 
arguments supporting the contrary position. Foremost, the terminology used in 
the convention is an argument for including the bioprospecting of organisms 
in the scope of the rules on marine living resources. Indeed, the use of living 
resources instead of fisheries makes clear that the negotiators strived to 
encompass all uses of living organisms by this part of the convention, 
irrespective of use. Indeed, the regime for marine living resources in UNCLOS 
was intentionally drafted generically, disregarding the use of or purpose for 
harvesting organisms. This is also in line with the general holistic ambition to 
include all uses of the oceans in the regulation of the convention, as declared 
in its preamble. Irrespective of what uses of living resources were envisaged 
by the negotiators, as well as the lack of adaptation to the peculiarities of 
bioprospecting, there are thus convincing arguments for interpreting the term 
to include all uses, including bioprospecting of marine genetic resources.  
 
Similarly, it appears that widespread state practice has developed for regarding 
marine living resources as including most (if not all) species of the marine 
ecosystem. Accordingly, the argument could be made that even if other aspects 
of living resources than fisheries, such as genetic resources, were not 
considered during the drafting of the convention, the negotiation of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, to which state parties to UNCLOS are 
also parties, has resulted in an evolutionary interpretation of marine living 
resources.565 Accordingly, the term has come to encompass all aspects of 
marine biodiversity.566 
 
563 GUILLOUX. 2018, at 63. 
564 The irony of basing the regulation of the Area on marine mining instead of the more valuable 
genetic resources later came to be criticized by Glowka, OCEAN YEARBOOK ONLINE (1996). 
565 Evolutionary interpretation is extensively discussed in BJORGE. 2014. 
566 See, on the relationship between UNCLOS and its rules on living resources and the 
connecting rules in CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, CHARLOTTE SALPIN, CHAPTER 5. THE LAW 







Moreover, even observers holding that bioprospecting should not be 
considered regulated as marine living resources agree that “also the search for, 
and collection of, organisms for genetic purposes may cause some risk to the 
preservation of biodiversity in the deep seabed.”567 The relevance of the 
argument that even limited sampling may result in substantial impact is 
amplified by the sensitivity of many of the ecosystems where marine genetic 
resources are collected. Many of the relevant deep-sea ecosystems have not 
previously been subject to human activity and may be very sensitive. 
Moreover, the endemic character of many of the deep-sea biodiversity hotspots 
increases the risk of detrimental impacts. For certain species, the impact of 
even a small sampling may be as detrimental as large-scale harvesting of more 
numerous species.568  
 
Moreover, for some product development in bioprospecting, sampling can 
hardly be regarded as limited. There are bioprospecting cases which deviate 
considerably from the stereotype of a small sample being developed into a 
biotechnology in a laboratory environment. For some marine biotechnology 
development, considerably larger amounts of natural raw materials are 
collected, as discussed in section B.6.1. 
 
As such, there are reasons to disagree with the notion that genetic resources 
should be excluded from the scope of marine living resources, as regulated in 
UNCLOS. There is indeed some merit to the argument that these rules in 
certain regards are ill-suited for bioprospecting. Observers attempting to 
exclude bioprospecting from the regime on marine living resources, however, 
make the mistake of claiming that this dysfunctionality in itself is evidence of 
inapplicability of the rules.  
 
W. BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Alan E. Boyle & Catherine Redgwell 
eds., Oxford : Oxford University Press 3. ed. ed. 2009), at 750; YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, A DUAL 
APPROACH TO OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE CASES OF ZONAL AND INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (2009). 
567 Scovazzi, Is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea the Legal Framework for All Activities 
in the Sea? The Case of Bioprospecting. 2010, at 312. 
568 There is thus no evidence that the impact of bioprospecting always is negligible. The notion 
that bioprospecting somehow should be excluded from the management of marine living 
resources because of its innocent character is thus difficult to support. It would also undermine 
the prospects for a holistic management of marine organisms and ecosystems to allow some 
types of use to go unnoticed, in particular if bioprospecting increases as projected. These aspects 






Lack of functional precision, however, cannot in itself disqualify treaty rules 
from being binding. This is underlined by the lack of exclusion by the drafters 
of the convention. All documentation of the negotiation process indicates that 
the states involved sought a holistic regulation of all marine organisms.569 
 
Indeed, the harvesting of marine genetic resources for biotechnology purposes 
is, and will most likely remain, encompassed by the rules on marine living 
resources of UNCLOS, akin to more conventional uses of marine organisms. 
What implications does this yield for bioprospecting? Firstly, it means that 
such activities must relate to the division in the convention between the 
exclusive rights of coastal states to living resources within national jurisdiction 
on the one hand, and the commons rules provided for living resources beyond 
such areas on the other. Secondly, it implies that bioprospecting must fulfill 
obligations relating to the management and conservation of marine living 
resources. 
 
Development of the rules on marine living resources 
 
Establishing that marine bioprospecting is encompassed by the rules for 
managing marine living resources yields not a singular, but a multifold answer 
as to what rules apply to such activities. This is because the rules applying to 
the use of marine living resources, and the right to harvest living organisms, 
vary depending on what maritime areas they are retrieved from. The rules for 
the management of living resources in the law of the sea are based on the 
fundamental principle that coastal states have exclusive rights to such 
resources in sea areas under their jurisdiction, including the EEZ and 
continental shelf, and conversely that all states have equal access to such 
resources in areas where no state exercises sovereign rights. The differences 
between the general principles of the respective maritime zones of UNCLOS 
have already been discussed in section C.1.2. The implications for the 
management of marine living resources will be further discussed below.  
 
569 See PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 
480-542. It would be more correct to perceive the development of biotechnology and the 
challenges it raises in the application of established rules as evidence for the necessity of 
reforming or updating certain rules in the law of the sea. Advanced suggestions for new rules on 
marine genetic resources are have also been tabled within the BBNJ process. A new 
implementing agreement may result in more precise rules on marine genetic resources. It is 
however unlikely that those negotiations will result in a fundamental revision of the fundamental 







However, despite the differences across maritime zones, the rules on marine 
living resources are based on the same general concepts. Foremost, these 
include how long-term conservation can be ensured in the management of 
these resources. 
 
In order to understand the functioning of these concepts as well as the rationale 
for the differences in balancing the rights of coastal and other states across 
maritime zones, it is necessary to first briefly examine the development of 
regulatory approaches to living resources under the law of the sea. As will be 
further discussed in Part D, throughout the history of the law of the sea, the 
balance between these interests has changed. Foremost, coastal state claims for 
– and recognition of – exclusive rights have increased dramatically. Coastal 
states have, over a long period, gradually increased the geographic extent of 
their claims for exclusive rights to regulate the exploitation of marine 
organisms. The underlying drive behind this gradual enclosure of ocean 
commons has been an ambition among coastal states to expand areas where 
they sovereignly can harvest and manage living resources. While initially 
being contested by other states, these growing claims for sovereign rights to 
living resources have repeatedly gained subsequent recognition and been 
upheld in international law, both in case law and treaties. The Bering Fur Seals 
arbitration570 and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries571 case represent important 
examples of the former; the development of the exclusive economic zone 
regime under UNCLOS III is the most important representation of the latter. 
Economic interests connected to living resources have thus been the pivotal 
driver behind the development of the maritime zone regime of the law of the 
sea. 
 
Since the concept of coastal states’ sovereign rights to living resources within 
the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone gained recognition in 
UNCLOS, most coastal states have declared such zones. This means that in 
most oceans, coastal states have special right to all marine living resources in 
sea areas within 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the coastline. The 
implications of these rights, and their limitations, will be further discussed 
below.  
 
570 Award between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to the rights of jurisdiction 
of United States in the Bering’s sea and the preservation of fur seals (Bering Sea Arbitration). 
571 Fisheries (United Kingdom v Norway), Merits, ICJ Rep 116, ICGJ 196 (International Court 






Beyond the EEZ, the convention provides that the freedom of fisheries remains 
applicable in the high seas. Even if the high seas areas of the world’s oceans 
have decreased relative to the declaration of EEZ areas, the high seas remain 
by far the biggest part of the oceans, both in area and volume (50 per cent of 
the surface area of the planet, 64 per cent of the ocean’s surface and 95 per cent 
of its volume). Important for the purpose of this investigation, these vast high 
seas areas include the overwhelming parts of the deep seas and their 
biodiversity hotspots. 
 
For living resources on the seafloor and underlying sediments, coastal state 
declaration is not necessary. Instead, the sovereign rights of the coastal states 
to living resources in the continental shelf are regarded as inherent. As regards 
living resources in the Area, it remains disputed whether these are 
encompassed by the common heritage of mankind principle, as discussed in 
section C.1.4.  
 
Managing living resources under the law of the sea 
 
The sovereign right of coastal states to regulate the management of living 
resources within their jurisdiction, as well as the freedom of fisheries in the 
high seas, is not unlimited. It builds on management concepts which are 
commonly applicable within as well as beyond national jurisdiction. As 
articulated in Articles 61 and 62 of the convention (relating to the conservation 
and utilization of living resources, respectively), it is a sovereign right of the 
coastal states to make decisions on allowable catch – commonly referred to as 
total allowable catch (TAC) – within marine areas under its jurisdiction. If 
coastal states are unable to harvest the entire TAC, there is an obligation to 
allow access for other states. In reality, this does not happen, since states lack 
an incentive to set the TAC higher than their own ambition to harvest. 
 
Coastal states are, however, not entirely free to exercise this right to establish 
TAC as they please. Instead, UNCLOS provides an explicit obligation to base 
the management on scientific evidence and ensure that the maintenance of the 
living resources is not endangered by over-exploitation. Moreover, it 









This premise, commonly referred to as the maximum sustainable yield (MSY), 
seeks to maintain the productivity by taking the number of fish from a stock 
which is replaced by the annual rate of new recruits entering the stock.572 It is 
built on the notion that fish stocks regenerate most effectively if a certain share 
is caught annually. The concept of MSY is strongly connected to the principle 
of optimum utilization. This calls for all living resource management under 
UNCLOS to strive for the maximum output. Indeed, if the coastal state itself 
is not able or willing to harvest all surplus of resources according to the MSY 
formula, it should allow other states access to the surplus. According to Article 
119, these concepts apply also to the management of living resources of the 
high seas in relevant parts, with the difference that no state has sovereign rights 
to set allowable catch in high seas areas. Instead, states whose nationals exploit 
identical living resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall 
enter into negotiations with a view to taking the measures necessary for the 
conservation of the living resources concerned.  
 
The basis for the regime on marine living resources in UNCLOS reflects a 
productivity focus among its negotiators.573 The realization that overfishing 
risked the long-term viability of marine life did not become generally accepted 
before the 1970s, when the law of the sea negotiations was already well under-
way. Moreover, a widely shared criticism of the regime for living resources in 
the convention is that it reflects a largely outdated scientific understanding of 
the behavior of living organisms. It disregards the complexities of interactions 
in marine ecosystems, ecological relationships of species as well as migration 
patterns and stock fluctuations, which makes it much more difficult to make 
stock assessments than anticipated by the negotiators of UNCLOS.574 Even in 
areas where states can afford such costly assessments, the collection and anal-
ysis of reliable scientific data, which is a prerequisite for determining the total 
allowable catch, is notoriously difficult and has often been proven to be impre-
cise and of insufficient quality.575 As observed by Harrison and Morgera, the 
provision has also been criticized for not being precise in terms of what unit is 
 
572 BIRNIE. 2009, at 591; Gl Kesteven, MSY Revisited. A Realistic Approach to Fisheries 
Management and Administration, 21 MARINE POLICY (1997). 
573 See GUILLOUX. 2018, at 60. 
574 BIRNIE. 2009, at 591. 






subject to the obligation (stock, species, biomass).576 Similarly, it is unclear at 
what level it is to be maintained.577 
 
As a consequence, the concept of maximum sustainable yield is particularly 
challenging to implement practically.578 This, in turn, results in an often 
unsatisfactory scientific basis for the determination of the total allowable catch. 
The duty to base decisions on allowable catch on scientific evidence can also 
be questioned for its lack of requirement for the scientific review to be 
independent. The regulation also lacks the possibility for third states to review 
or challenge decisions on allowable catch, since the sovereign rights of coastal 
states to manage living resources is exempted from the compulsory dispute 
settlement procedure in Part XV of UNCLOS. 
 
Another point of criticism against the rules for the management of living 
resources under UNCLOS is that populations of marine organisms commonly 
occur and are harvested both in the waters of the coastal state and in other areas. 
As a result, the assessment of the coastal state of the allowable catch within its 
zone must take due account of catches, not only within its own maritime zones, 
but also harvesting in waters within the jurisdiction of other states, as well as 
in the high seas. Yet UNCLOS contains no mechanism for how to relate to 
harvesting beyond domestic maritime zones when deciding on allowable 
catch.579 Instead, Article 63 merely calls for cooperation between states in such 
cases. 
 
Moreover, even in cases where scientific evidence indicates that catches should 
be limited, the coastal state has broad discretion in maintaining fisheries 
opportunities at unsustainable levels.580 With the exception of the duty not to 
endanger living resources by over-exploitation, the coastal state is free to 
establish allowable catch according to its preferences, which may be guided by 
concerns other than the long-term health of stocks. Another consequence of the 
coastal autonomy in setting allowable catch is, as already indicated above, that 
the level is never set beyond what the coastal state is able or willing to harvest. 
 
576 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 484. 
577 MARION MARKOWSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF EEZ FISHERIES (2010). 
578 RICHARD BARNES, THE CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: AN EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK 
FOR DOMESTIC FISHERIES CONSERVATION? (2006). 
579 TANAKA, The International Law of the Sea. 2012, at 223. 







The obligation to allow other states access to surplus has thus been largely 
irrelevant for practical purposes.581  
 
One challenge in applying these concepts to bioprospecting, as well as other 
types of extraction of living resources not confined to traditional fisheries, is 
that Article 61 seems to impose conservation measures only regarding 
“populations of harvested species” directly commercialized and not species 
likely to be exploited (paragraph 3). This provision raises questions in relation 
to bioprospecting, since it appears to imply that the central management 
concept of MSY does not necessarily have to be set in relation to species which 
are not considered as “harvested.” It is not clear what the term “harvested” 
implies in this context. It would, however, be reasonable to assume that small-
scale sampling of organisms, as is commonly the method employed in 
bioprospecting, would not qualify. Hence, for bioprospecting activities which 
only amounts to small-scale sampling of organisms rarely used by humans, it 
would not be necessary to establish management measures in line with the 
MSY formula. Importantly, this would not mean that such organisms fall 
outside the scope of marine living resources, as discussed above, but merely 
that a procedure to assess MSY in line with procedures indicated in the 
convention need not be initiated, in lack of harvesting in a broader sense. This 
is also the case in state practice. Similarly, the obligation in paragraph 4 to take 
effects on species associated with or dependent on targeted species appears to 
be limited to stocks which are considered harvested, within the meaning of the 
convention. 
 
Unlike the obligation to establish MSY and consider the impact on other 
species, the obligation to set TAC in paragraph 1 is not confined to harvested 
species. Accordingly, under Article 61, the coastal state is under obligation to 
set TAC also for genetic resources used on a small scale. In state practice, this 
obligation is not respected. The European Union, for instance, only makes 
assessments of MSY for commercially fished stocks. 
 
Moreover, there are other obligations relating to the conservation of living 
resources, unrelated to the concepts of allowable catch and maximum 
sustainable yield, which are also highly relevant for bioprospecting. Paragraph 
2 provides an obligation to ensure through proper conservation and 
management measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the 
 






exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation, taking into 
account the best scientific evidence available. This entails, in line with Article 
62, measures such as licensing of operators, vessels, and equipment, size and 
age of individual organisms that may be caught, as well as season and aerial 
regulations. There is nothing indicating that this provision does not apply in 
relation to bioprospecting. Hence, states are under obligation to take different 
measures to ensure that such activities do not result in over-exploitation of 
genetic resources. Moreover, this obligation is connected to an obligation to 
cooperate with relevant international organizations in this regard. This calls for 
coordinating measures with fisheries organizations: the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the UN at the central level, but in particular the Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) in an operational context. 
These will be further discussed below. As similarly observed by Harrison and 
Morgera, there is nothing indicating that the obligation to cooperate is limited 
to fisheries organizations. It may also apply in relation to recommendations 
provided by environmental organizations. Thereby, the provision builds a 
bridge to conservation measures enacted beyond the regime of the law of the 
sea. There is thus reason to argue that, for instance, decisions by the CBD 
conference of parties relating to conservation measures of marine biodiversity 




The entry into force of UNCLOS did not manage to prevent growing pressure 
being exerted on fish stocks. The intensification of fishing efforts caused 
catches to increase nearly five-fold between 1950 and the turn of the 
millennium.583 Eventually, the realization that the pressure on stocks had led to 
over-exploitation brought about initiatives to promote more sustainable 
management.  
 
This development, with increased awareness of the functioning of marine 
ecosystems, coincided with the advent of a new form of fisheries. Whereas 
until the Second World War, fisheries were almost exclusively aimed at 
providing fisheries products for consumers, industrial fishing enterprises to an 
 
582 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 487. 
583 Global catches of fishing resources went from around 19,000,000 to 90,000,000 during the 
period 1950-2000, see FAO, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 2018 - 







increasing degree during the second half of the 20th century began harvesting 
marine living resources to produce fishmeal and oil for fertilization, animal 
feed, and as an input commodity for aquaculture.584 Like bioprospecting, the 
development of fish as an input commodity, and the magnitude of the resulting 
expansion of industrial trawling, was not foreseen during the negotiation of the 
convention.  
 
Although the emphasis on exploitative aspects historically has been 
predominant, rudimentary ideas of sustainability had been expressed already 
in agreements relating to fisheries during the first half of the 20th century.585 
The focus on economic utilization did not begin to become balanced with 
ecological sustainability until the negotiation of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement, which was adopted in 1995.586 UNFSA brought about important 
improvements in management. The general ambition of the agreement has 
been described as seeking to ensure a harmonious development of coherent 
conservation and management measures for the high seas and the exclusive 
economic zone, based upon cooperation.587 
 
Particularly noteworthy among the improvements is the ecosystem approach, 
which calls for more holistic management, as well as the focus on regional 
management under the auspice of regional fisheries management organizations 
(RFMOs) and the precautionary principle. In this regard, the terminology of 
the UNFSA expresses a deeper awareness than UNCLOS as regards genetic 
diversity. States must thus take into account the biological unity and other 
biological characteristics of the stocks and the relationship between the 
distribution of the stocks, the fisheries, and the geographical particularities of 
the region concerned. In particular, the reference to the notion of “biological 
unity” emphasizes that the Agreement is more clearly based upon the 




584 Matz-Lück & Fuchs. 2015, at 492. 
585 Id. at 491. 
586 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. 1997. 
587 See Articles 7 and 8, Wolfrum & Matz, MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 







The importance of the reforms of the UNFSA should not be dismissed. 
However, it did not modify the fundamental management concepts for living 
resources in UNCLOS, which remain unaltered. Although the role of 
sustainability in the rules for the management of marine living resources has 
since expanded, the original emphasis on exploitive economic aspects has 
persisted to a surprisingly high degree.589 
 
The growing recognition of the deterioration of fish stocks, which was the basis 
for the negotiation of the UNFSA, was paralleled by increasing awareness of 
the general loss of biological diversity, resulting in the adoption of the 1992 
Convention on Biological Diversity, as discussed in Part C.2. At the same time, 
the concept of sustainability began to feature not only in treaties, but also in 
environmental law and policy generally. These developments outside the law 
of the sea helped shift the focus of fisheries management from a purely 
exploitation-oriented approach to one that included considerations of long-
term sustainability of stocks. Moreover, broader concerns of ecologically 
sustainable development, not only with regards to commercially exploited fish 
stocks but also broader ecosystem implications started to be reflected in policy 
and regulation. For the first time, the complexities and interconnections of 
marine ecosystems were being incorporated into the management of marine 
living resources. Still, management measures were focused on a number of 
commercially lucrative fisheries. 
 
Marine living resources management across maritime zones 
 
Whereas the general rules in UNCLOS for utilization and conservation of liv-
ing resources thus have been discussed in the context of the genetic resources 
used in bioprospecting, it will now be examined how these general concepts 
unfold in the different maritime zones. Much like other concepts in the con-
vention, the differentiated approach to the balance between jurisdiction and 
exclusive rights of coastal and other states results in different sets of rules, 
across maritime zones. 
 
 
589 The perhaps most evident example of the persisting emphasis on economic exploitation 
aspects is the objective of “proper conservation of whale stocks” to “make possible the orderly 
development of the whaling industry” in the Preamble to the 1946 International Convention for 
the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) which still to this day functions as the central instrument for 







The exclusive coastal state rights of internal waters, territorial sea and the 
exclusive economic zone 
 
The internal waters as well the territorial sea, as discussed under section C.1.3, 
are under the territorial sovereignty of states. The exclusive jurisdiction of 
coastal states in these areas comprises all marine resources, including the 
management and conservation of living organisms even if UNCLOS lacks 
explicit obligation to conserve marine living resources in these areas. In the 
EEZ and the continental shelf, it is equally clear under Articles 56 and 77 that 
the coastal state has sovereign rights for exploring and exploiting living 
resources. This implies that no one may undertake activities such as 
bioprospecting, which involves explorations and exploitation of organisms, 
without the explicit consent of the coastal state. As discussed above, the 
convention establishes clear formulas and obligations for how such resources 
should be managed and conserved.590 
 
Continental shelf rights and legal challenges relating to sedentary species 
 
In line with the general approach to marine spaces as divided between the water 
column and the seabed in the maritime zone regimes, UNCLOS provides a 
special set of rules for sedentary species of the continental shelf. According to 
Article 77(4) the term sedentary species relate to “organisms which, at the 
harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable 
to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.” 
These include many of the organisms targeted in deep-sea bioprospecting, as 
discussed in Part B. According to Article 68, such species does not fall within 
the EEZ regime. Instead, they are considered as falling within the rights of the 
coastal state to resources in the continental shelf.  
 
590 In addition to the obligations relating to utilization and conservation, the convention sets up 
additional regulation based on type of species in articles 63-68. For marine mammals, so-called 
shared, straddling, highly migratory, anadromous, catadromous and sedentary species the 
convention provides special rules on cooperation, management as well rights and responsibility 
for certain states based on the migration patterns of the species. Although bioprospecting 
potentially could be exercised in relation to all of these categories of species, the regulation on 
sedentary species appears particularly relevant for bioprospecting. This is because such 
organisms, which according to Maggio includes chanks, clams, oysters, mussels, scallops, 
sponges, corals, and crustaceans such as shrimps, prawns lobsters and crabs legally are not 
regarded as part of the exclusive economic zone, but instead belong to the continental shelf. See 






In bioprospecting, as with any use of living organisms, the result is that 
different maritime zones and conditions apply depending on whether an 
organism is in direct physical contact with the seafloor or found in the water 
column. In areas where a coastal state has extended continental shelf, and the 
overlying water column thus has status as high seas, which may result in an 
uncertain legal status for some organisms, depending on their life cycle and 
“harvestable stage.”591  
 
From the perspective of management of marine genetic resources, this can lead 
to substantial challenges.592 The requirement for states exploiting such 
resources as part of the freedoms of the high seas to pay due regard in their 
exercise to the interest of other states calls for cooperation with coastal states.593 
If, however, the relevant ecosystem is located within the EEZ of coastal states, 
the practical implication of whether an organism falls within or outside the 
scope of the sedentary species definition is less important.594 
 
591 An obvious example of this is jellyfish, where the largest part of the life cycle (the larva, 
ephyra and medusa phases) are spent in the pelagic water column, hence under the high seas 
regime. After the larva phase, however, the organism settles onto a firm surface and develops 
into a polyp. In this phase, it is thus legally considered a sedentary species, hence within the 
sovereign right of coastal states.  
592 Observers have described the differences between legal regimes for deep-sea ecosystem 
depending on location as an illustration of a fractured regulatory approach regarding 
management and conservation of such ecosystem and their associated biological resources. 
These shortcomings of the convention is to a large extent the result of the inflexible division of 
organisms into different rigid categories of species, which is ill-adapted to the real functioning 
of deep-sea ecosystems. The negative consequences of the division into different categories of 
species are then multiplied by the rigid maritime zone regime. See HORST KORN, et al., DEEP 
SEA GENETIC RESOURCES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (Bundesamt für Naturschutz (BfN). 
2003). 
593 An obvious example of this is jellyfish, where the largest part of the life cycle (the larva, 
ephyra and medusa phases) are spent in the pelagic water column, hence under the high seas 
regime. After the larva phase, however, the organism settles onto a firm surface and develops 
into a polyp. In this phase, it is thus legally considered a sedentary species, hence within the 
sovereign right of coastal states.  
594 In these areas, the coastal state has sovereign right to explore and exploit marine genetic 
resources, irrespective if they are found on the seafloor, sediments or in the water column. In 
line with previous discussions, this right follows from the sovereign rights under Article 77 to 
sedentary species in the continental shelf and the corresponding sovereign right to living 








High seas freedoms and conservation of living resources  
 
On the high seas, all states enjoy the freedom of fishing under Article 87. 
Compared to the freedom to conduct marine scientific research, however, as 
discussed above, this freedom is more regulated and by no means absolute.595 
States are thus under obligation to set up cooperation mechanisms in cases 
where their nationals exploit identical living resources or different living 
resources in the same area. UNCLOS provides little as to how this cooperation 
is to be carried out, but more detailed rules are provided by the UNFSA. 
 
The obligation to cooperate in the harvesting of high seas living resources is 
important in a bioprospecting context. The obligation entails that where several 
states are interested in conducting bioprospecting in a specific hotspot for 
marine genetic resource, they are legally bound to enter into negotiations in 
order to ensure sustainable management. This also involves a duty to set up 
formal arrangements to prevent unviable exploitation of living resources. 
States shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish sub-regional or regional 
fisheries organizations to this end.  
 
In the context of fisheries, this obligation has led to the formation of regional 
fisheries organizations (RFMOs). Across the world oceans, such organizations 
now have a central role in fisheries management cooperation and have enacted 
management rules for fisheries not merely on the high seas but also under na-
tional jurisdiction. The mandate of these organizations is commonly limited to 
either a specified geographic area or a specific stock in a geographic area. So 
far, no RFMO has adopted specific management or conservation rules for ma-
rine genetic resources of for species primarily used in such activities.596 Rather, 
across regions the focus of RFMOs lies exclusively with fisheries manage-
ment. Some observers as well as NGOs have voiced criticisms against RFMOs 
for the perceived inability to adopt sufficient measures for the protection of 
particularly sensitive ecosystems of interest for bioprospecting purposes.  
 
595 According to Article 116 and 119, the obligations relating to the management and 
conservation of living resources in the EEZ applies mutatis mutandis also in the high seas. 
Moreover, states are under a far-reaching obligation to cooperate in the conservation and 
management, in line with Article 117-118. 






Partly as a result of this criticism, the legal obligation to protect deep-sea 
ecosystems was developed by the United Nations General Assembly via the 
adoption of two resolutions597 in the 2000s, with the purpose of increasing 
support for vulnerable marine ecosystems from bottom trawling.  
 
Accordingly, although not amounting to direct regulation of bioprospecting of 
marine genetic resources, fisheries management measures have lately adopted 
some measures which protect prolific deep-sea marine ecosystems with high 
abundance of species relevant for bioprospecting.598 The importance of such 
measures should not be underestimated, since the most substantial threat to the 
hotspots for marine genetic resource do not necessarily stem from 
bioprospecting or any other form of direct harvesting. Rather, in the 
evaluations that have been undertaken, the most substantial pressure on such 
ecosystems seems to be comprised of collateral effects of high seas fisheries. 
Bottom trawling has in many areas damaged benthic habitats with high degree 
of endemic biodiversity.599 Despite the measures taken by RFMOs in recent 
years, the collateral effects of fisheries on marine genetic resources remain 
difficult to address legally under UNCLOS.600 Generally, the disconnection 
 
597 United Nations General Assembly resolution 61/105, Sustainable fisheries, including through 
the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, 
A/RES/61/105 (8 December 2006), available from undocs.org/A/RES/61/105 § 24 (United 
Nations General Assembly ed. 2007); United Nations General Assembly resolution 64/72, 
Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, and related instruments, A/RES/64/72 (4 December 2009), available from 
undocs.org/A/RES/64/72 § 24 (United Nations General Assembly ed. 2007). 
598 Some (but not all) RFMOs have prescribed measures relating to the protection of vulnerable 
marine ecosystems. The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission has for instance listed five 
areas as closed areas for fisheries, with the explicit aim of protecting deep-sea ecosystems. 
599 Joanna Mossop, Protecting Marine Biodiversity on the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 
Nautical Miles, 38 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
600 These difficulties are to a high degree the result of a disregard of the broader effects of 
fisheries on the marine environment during the negotiations of UNCLOS. In working document 
proposals for the Second Committee at the UNCLOS III negotiations there was actually a 
proposal for a provision 149: “All states shall be obliged to comply with international 
regulations designed to prevent, reduce or eliminate any damage or risks arising from pollution 
or other effects detrimental or dangerous to the ecological system of the international seas, 







between Part VII on the high seas freedoms and Part XII on the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment has been criticized.601 
 
Moreover, an important difference between Article 87 and Article 116 and 
subsequent provisions conditioning the use of high seas living organisms is 
that whereas the freedom of fisheries uses the term fish, the subsequent 
paragraphs make reference to the broader term living resources. This seems to 
underline an ambition to include extraction of all organisms in the conditions 
set out in Section 2. Why, then, do Articles 87 and 116 not similarly relate to 
living resources? 
 
The explanation appears to be that fisheries were the only living resource 
extraction considered relevant during the drafting of the convention, but that 
the negotiators wanted to underline broader ecosystem concerns as regards 
conservation.602 It can thus be concluded that irrespective of whether 
bioprospecting is encompassed by the freedom of fisheries (or represents a 
freedom of its own, as discussed above), conservation and cooperation 
obligations provided by the convention for high seas living resources also 
apply in respect of bioprospecting of genetic resources.603 
 
The disputed status of living resources of the Area 
 
The concept or term living resources is not used in the rules of UNCLOS for 
the Area. As discussed in section C.1.4, the status of living organisms including 
 
dismissed by the Second Committee, because it was considered that the regulation for the 
preservation of the marine environment of the high seas should be left to Third Committee. 
Similar proposals, or references to undertakings relating to the protection of the marine 
environment outside the scope of UNCLOS was also suggested. In the final text of Part VII, 
however, no specific obligation relating to the protection of the marine environment was 
included. Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, UN 
Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/WP.1, Draft Provisions, Part VII (15 October 1974). Provision 149. 
601 WARNER. 2009, at 34. 
602 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 791-
849. 
603 Or to be more exact, it should be underlined that the provisions relating to the conservation 
of high seas living resources oblige states to take measures, individually or jointly, not with 
regard to living resources per se, but towards their nationals (that is, entities that are under their 
jurisdiction; for example, individuals that are on fishing boats that fly the flag of a given State). 
Hence, it has been claimed, these provisions establish a standard for regulating the conduct of 
nationals, not one that would be directly applicable to the legal status of living resources of the 






genetic resources, and the compatibility with UNCLOS of bioprospecting in 
the Area is highly debated.604 As established in that section, the arguments 
favoring an interpretation of the regime of the Area and the common heritage 
of mankind principle that includes genetic resources of living organisms appear 
more persuasive than the contrary position. Even if the language of the 
convention can be interpreted either way, depending on what provision is 
emphasized, there are other arguments supporting an inclusive scope. Not 
least, it would be difficult to accept that organisms of the Area would be left 
entirely unregulated, in light of the far-reaching rules on marine living 
resources of other maritime zones. If this interpretation is accepted, what 
management and conservation rules would then apply to the living resources 
of the Area and how should organisms of the Area be distinguished from those 
of the high seas?  
 
In addition to the general rules of the Area, discussed in section C.1.4, it has 
been suggested by Armas Pfirter that the rules on sedentary species of the 
continental shelf mutatis mutandis could be applied by analogy to the living 
resources of the deep seabed of the Area.605 In line with Article 77, this would 
include living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, 
organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the 
seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the 
seabed or the subsoil, in the scope of the rules of the Area. Deep-sea organisms 
which fall beyond these criteria would conversely be considered as falling 
within the rules for the high seas. It appears reasonable to assume a dichotomy 
between the rules of the water column (the EEZ and the high seas) and the 
seabed (the continental shelf and the Area), so that the same distinction applies 
between seabed and water column species. There are not merely practical 
arguments for applying this distinction also in relation to the living resources 
of the Area. As already established in section C.1.4, the lack of references to 
living resources in the Area appears to rather be the result of a lack of 
knowledge of their economic potential than reflecting an intention among 
negotiators to exclude such resources from the rules on the Area. 
 
604 Broggiato, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW (2011). 
605 Frida Armas Pfirter, The Management of Seabed Living Resources in “The Area” under 
UNCLOS (Report presented at the Tenth Session of the ISA, 27 May 2004), at 26 as cited in 
Oude Elferink, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2007), at 151. 
This suggestion has however been disputed by other observers, such as Scovazzi (Scovazzi, THE 







It has thus been established that the genetic resources used in bioprospecting 
fall within the scope of the rules on marine living resources of UNCLOS, and 
that any bioprospecting activity would have to respect the relevant obligations, 
even if these in certain regards may be ill-suited to manage other activities than 
commercial fisheries. The rules on marine living resources thus imply that 
extensive conservation measures, also those developed in international 
cooperation beyond the law of the sea, in principle have to be applied in 
relation to bioprospecting. This foremost implies an obligation for states to 
ensure proper conservation and implement management measures such as 
decisions on total allowable catch based on best scientific evidence also for 
species targeted for their genetic resources.606 These elements of the rules on 
living resources apply to bioprospecting, even if the species would be of 
limited interest to fisheries and irrespective of where the operation is carried 
out. Similarly, bioprospecting activities would have to be included in the 
calculation of maximum sustainable yield. 
 
Whereas any use of living resources within coastal state jurisdiction requires 
consent, it is comprised by the open-access principle of the high seas freedoms 
in the water column beyond national jurisdiction. The legal status for living 
resources in the Area is more contested, but there are arguments for 
considering that these can be distinguished from the living resources of the 
high seas by the criteria provided for sedentary species in the continental shelf. 
 
C.1.6. Conclusions on the law of the sea 
 
The rules of the law of the sea relevant for deep-sea genetic resources thus 
provide a multitude of obligations relevant for bioprospecting. Irrespectively 
how bioprospecting is considered as an activity under the UNCLOS 
framework, it is clear that coastal state consent is necessary for such operations 
in areas within national jurisdiction. Beyond such areas, the high seas rules 
provide far-reaching freedoms, for fisheries, scientific research as well as 
activities not explicitly mentioned in UNCLOS. It is thus clear that the 
convention does not prevent the extraction of genetic resources in the water 
 
606 If a species or stock is only subject to small-scale sampling, it is not certain if the maximum 
sustainable yield procedure would be necessary. However, in some cases, as is the case with 
endemic deep-sea species, the sensitive character of ecosystems may call for application of such 






column beyond national jurisdiction, or the use of high seas resources in 
bioprospecting processes aiming to develop patents.  
 
The rules for marine scientific research in UNCLOS do not per se preclude the 
use of samples collected in scientific operations as the basis for private claims, 
such as the patenting of genetic resources. General rules for the protection of 
the marine environment would however have to be respected, as well as 
obligations relating to the use of living resources, irrespective where 
bioprospecting is carried out. 
 
It has further been considered that genetic resources in the seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction ought to be regarded as encompassed by the rules for the 
Area, and that the common heritage of mankind-principle applies to deep-
seabed bioprospecting. This in principle prevents private appropriation of 
genetic resources of the Area and deep-seabed bioprospecting, with the 
possible exception of cases where samples collected in research operations 
without commercial intentions are stored (e.g. in collections or biobanks) and 
subsequently used in bioprospecting. The deep-seabed genetic resources of the 
Area may be distinguished from the high seas based on the behavior and life 
cycle of the organisms, along the criteria developed for sedentary species. 
 
C.2. International Environmental Law 
 
Whereas the law of the sea, compared to other areas of international law, stands 
out by its high degree of codification in a unitary convention, there is no treaty 
in international environmental law with the same central and comprehensive 
role. To a higher degree, discussions on international environmental law relate 
to principles and other elements of customary law. In many cases these norms 
are codified, but with varying formulations across treaties. Accordingly, the 
investigation on rules applying to deep-sea bioprospecting in international 
environmental law will concern customary principles, in addition to treaty 
rules of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
 
C.2.1. General principles of international environmental law 
 
Considering the multitude and proliferation of international treaties and 
cooperation within the field of international environmental law, it is in its 
modern form, a surprisingly novel field. The 1972 Stockholm Conference on 







that ignited modern international environmental law.607 Even if the declaration 
did not use the term sustainable development, it has been widely regarded as 
laying the foundations for its subsequent acceptance as a core principle of 
international environmental law and policy.608 The most widely accepted 
definition of sustainable development was expressed in the Brundtland Report 
of 1987: 
 
Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.609 
 
By articulating the concept of sustainable development, the Brundtland Report 
introduced an innovative concept into international law, with implications that 
hardly could have been foreseen at the time.  
 
Not only did it introduce the concept of intra-generational responsibility; it also 
defined a number of challenges for civilization: population, food security, 
species extinction, genetic resources, energy production, industrial pollution 
and human settlement. Of course, all these challenges had been recognized 
before. The major contribution of the report was rather that it did not approach 





607 The conference was attended by 114 states, as well as the important international institutions 
and non-governmental organizations. The conference resulted in the Stockholm Declaration, 
containing 26 principles, an Action Plan containing 109 recommendations as well as three non-
binding instruments, including a resolution on institutional and financial arrangements. This 
must strike any observer with experience of the relatively slow speed of contemporary 
multilateral cooperation in the environmental field as a remarkable achievement. Of the 
outcomes, the Stockholm Declaration was by far the most significant. 
608 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 53-54. 
609 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. 
United Nations General Assembly document A/42/427 (1987). Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. United Nations General Assembly 
document A/42/427 (1987). 
610 Even more radical in its ambition, the institutional and legal analysis of the report challenged 
the fundaments of the global economy, the managing of global commons, as well as established 
truths on the interplay between peace, security and development. Among the key challenges for 







Importantly, the Brundtland Report did not merely provide a broadly accepted 
definition of sustainable development. It also drew a map suggesting how to 
achieve it. To a surprisingly high degree, subsequent development of 
international law in the field followed this map. 
 
Sustainable development has been at the center of this development.611 As a 
consequence, the central rules in international environmental law applying to 
genetic resources reflects the sustainable development principle. Closely 
related to the notion of sustainable development is the principle of 
intergenerational equality, which can also be traced back to the Stockholm 
conference. Essentially intergenerational equality implies an idea of fairness, 
which requires “that present generations not leave future generations worse off 
by the choices we make today regarding the environment.”612 Current 
generations must thus, under this principle, ensure that they use natural 
resources sustainably and avoids irresponsible environmental damage. 
 
How, then, do the key outcomes of the Stockholm conference – the principles 
of sustainable development and intergenerational equality – apply to deep-sea 
bioprospecting? Firstly, and most evidently, they entail that short-sighted 
exploitation in disregard of long-term preservation should be prevented. This 
implies regarding open-access rules based on commons principles as unviable, 
unless conservation is ensured. Secondly, the integration of social and 
economic objectives, as will be further discussed in Part D.2, calls for an 
instrumental perspective of genetic resources, emphasizing their potential as a 
means to promote economic development. As will be discussed below, these 
perspectives of conservation and the instrumental value in fostering economic 
development are central elements in the rules on genetic resources of the 
Convention of Biological Diversity, which thus reflect the outcome and agenda 
set by the Stockholm conference and the Brundtland declaration. Indeed, 
described in the Brundtland Report, the principles are not only philosophical 
but instrumental in their ambitions.613  
 
611 It was at heart of the outcomes of the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro, as well as the development of treaties such as the Convention 
on Biological Diversity. WARNER. 2009, at 275. 
612 David Hunter, et al., International Environmental Law and Policy (Foundation Press 5 ed. 
2015);Leary. 2010, at 31. 
613 Moreover, developing international law relating to areas beyond national jurisdiction is 







Another central reference point when discussing the relationship between 
human activities and the environment is the precautionary principle. The most 
generally accepted definition of the Precautionary Principle is that contained 
in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration:  
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall 
be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.614 
 
The principle has been reflected in extensive state practice, numerous 
international treaties and other sources of international, as well as domestic 
law. However, there has not been general agreement as to whether it should 
become part of customary international law.615 Moreover, the material content 
of the precautionary principle also remains debated. It appears to be at least 
relatively widely agreed that the precautionary principle alters the burden of 
proof from those who, based on environmental concerns, oppose a proposed 
activity, to those who want to conduct such activity.616 The principle has 
attained a particularly important role in cases where there are scientific 
uncertainties and legal gaps, as in the case of activities relating to deep-sea 
biodiversity. In essence, the call for precaution increases with the level of 
uncertainty and is accordingly higher in the parts of the biosphere that are less 
known, such as the deep seas. 
 
These three legal concepts are described as principles. This indicates some 
level of legal standing.  
 
614 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. 
United Nations General Assembly document A/42/427 (1987). 
615 It does at least not seem to be universally accepted. International courts and tribunals have 
refrained from explicitly conferring it such status. See the Southern Bluefin Tuna, New Zealand 
v Japan, Provisional Measures, ITLOS Case No 3, (1999) 38 ILM 1624, ICGJ 337 (International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 27 August). 
616 However, far from everyone agrees with the view that the principle has the power to turn the 
burden of proof on its head. Some observers contend that it is more appropriate to describe the 
legal effect of the principle as merely raising the requirement of proof. See Daniel Bodansky, 
Precaution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Jutta 






A fourth concept, which is an equally relevant point of reference, albeit one 
with a considerably vaguer legal status, is the ecosystem approach. Perhaps it 
is not even appropriate to describe it as a legal principle, but rather as a way of 
reasoning legally. At the heart of the concept lies a holistic ambition, to look 
beyond the needs of individual species or locations, and consider the broader 
systems. This has been formulated in various ways across different 
instruments.617 Compared to general international environmental law, the law 
of the sea was early in incorporating the ecosystem approach in treaties. When 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) was negotiated in the 1990s, the 
ecosystem approach, which is lacking in UNCLOS, was not merely transposed; 
indeed, it appears to have been one of the motivations for the treaty.618 
Similarly, the ecosystem approach can be retrieved in both regional seas 
convention instruments as well as agreements forming regional fisheries 
management organizations.619 The law of the sea, in both multilateral and 
regional agreements, thus calls for an application of the ecosystem approach. 
This implies an emphasis on integrated ecological dimensions.  
 
617 Under the auspice of the CBD, the concept of the ecosystem approach was specified in the 
1998 Malawi principles. Workshop on the Ecosystem Approach (Lilongwe, Malawi, 26-28 
January 1998), whose report was presented at the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Bratislava, Slovakia, 4-15 May 1998, 
UNEP/CBD/ COP/4/Inf.9). 
618 Consider, in particular its preamble: “Conscious of the need to avoid adverse impacts on the 
marine environment, preserve biodiversity, maintain the integrity of marine ecosystems and 
minimize the risk of long-term or irreversible effects of fishing operations.” Moreover, the 
ecosystem approach found its way into the treaty’s general principles, as formulated in Article 
5: “(d) assess the impacts of fishing, other human activities and environmental factors on target 
stocks and species belonging to the same ecosystem or associated with or dependent upon the 
target stocks (…) (g) protect biodiversity in the marine environment;” The UNFSA thus places 
an obligation upon coastal states and states fishing on the high seas to protect biodiversity in the 
marine environment. TANAKA, The International Law of the Sea. 2012, at 237. 
619 The Biodiversity Committee of the 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) defined the approach as: “the comprehensive 
integrated management of human activities based on the best available scientific knowledge 
about the ecosystem and its dynamics, in order to identify and take action on influences which 
are critical to the health of marine ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use of ecosystem 
goods and services and maintenance of ecosystem integrity.” Meeting of the Biodiversity 
Committee (BDC), Dublin, 20-24 January 2003, Summary Record BDC 2003, BDC 03/10/1-E, 
Annex 13, p. 1, para. 6.; Article 4(a) of the 2006 Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement 
provides that “measures shall be adopted on the basis of the best scientific evidence available 
to ensure the long-term conservation of fishery resources, taking into account the sustainable 








However, whereas application is concerned, at least four major points of 
objection have been raised.620 Firstly, there appears to be ambiguities in the 
material content of the approach. Since there is a lack of principles for deciding 
specific measures to conserve species, the ecosystem approach may be 
interpreted differently based on context. Likewise, it appears dubious whether 
the approach effectively legally constrains the behavior of states, in other 
words, to what extent states actually consider the ecosystem approach in 
decision making. Secondly, it appears questionable whether the ecosystem 
approach can be regarded as an independent rule for adjudication. It is a 
presumption under the ecosystem approach that decisions on appropriate 
measures should be based on considerations relating to scientific, political, 
economic, and social factors which essentially are matters for national policy. 
Any international examination of individual states’ application of the 
ecosystem approach is thus rendered difficult. Thirdly, and especially relevant 
for the purposes of this investigation, questions arise with regard to the 
compatibility of conservation measures on the basis of the ecosystem approach 
between marine spaces within and beyond national jurisdiction. Fourthly, as 
far as the instruments under the law of the sea are concerned, the ecosystem 
approach appears to lack precision in some important respects, for instance in 
terms of how to delimit ecosystems. 
 
Some guidance and perhaps even clarity on these important questions can be 
provided by retreating to the instruments of general international 
environmental law. The conference of parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity has established a definition of the ecosystem approach, connecting it 
strongly to sustainable development, scientific aspects and adaptability.621 
 
620 Yoshifumi Tanaka, Zonal and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: 
Reflections on a Dual Approach in International Law of the Sea, 19 THE INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2004), at 483-514. 
621 See decision V/6 of the 2000 conference of parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
“(1). The ecosystem approach is a strategy for the integrated management of land, water and 
living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way. Thus, the 
application of the ecosystem approach will help to reach a balance of the three objectives of the 
Convention: conservation; sustainable use; and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. (2). An ecosystem approach is based on the 
application of appropriate scientific methodologies focused on levels of biological organization, 
which encompass the essential structure, processes, functions and interactions among organisms 
and their environment. It recognizes that humans, with their cultural diversity, are an integral 






Irrespective of the challenges in practical application, the ecosystem approach, 
at least as a concept, must be regarded as an important reference point when 
discussing the legality of bioprospecting marine genetic resources. Regarding 
organisms targeted in bioprospecting not as individual species but as part of 
broader ecosystems calls for adaptive and more holistic management 
approaches. 
 
C.2.2. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
C.2.2.1. Marine Genetic Resources under the CBD 
 
Whereas general principles of international environmental law may provide 
some indication of what norms states should consider in relation to deep-sea 
genetic resources, codified rules provide more precise obligations. Although 
international environmental law lacks a convention with the comprehensive 
scope UNCLOS has for the law of the sea, the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), which entered into force in 1993, has at least a central role 
 
interactions is consistent with the definition of “ecosystem” provided in Article 2 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity: “'Ecosystem' means a dynamic complex of plant, animal 
and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional 
unit.” This definition does not specify any particular spatial unit or scale, in contrast to the 
Convention definition of “habitat” Thus, the term “ecosystem” does not, necessarily, correspond 
to the terms “biome” or “ecological zone”, but can refer to any functioning unit at any scale. 
Indeed, the scale of analysis and action should be determined by the problem being addressed. 
It could, for example, be a grain of soil, a pond, a forest, a biome or the entire biosphere. (4). 
The ecosystem approach requires adaptive management to deal with the complex and dynamic 
nature of ecosystems and the absence of complete knowledge or understanding of their 
functioning. Ecosystem processes are often non-linear, and the outcome of such processes often 
shows time-lags. The result is discontinuities, leading to surprise and uncertainty. Management 
must be adaptive in order to be able to respond to such uncertainties and contain elements of 
“learning-by-doing” or research feedback. Measures may need to be taken even when some 
cause-and-effect relationships are not yet fully established scientifically. (5). The ecosystem 
approach does not preclude other management and conservation approaches, such as biosphere 
reserves, protected areas, and single-species conservation programmes, as well as other 
approaches carried out under existing national policy and legislative frameworks, but could, 
rather, integrate all these approaches and other methodologies to deal with complex situations. 
There is no single way to implement the ecosystem approach, as it depends on local, provincial, 
national, regional or global conditions. Indeed, there are many ways in which ecosystem 








as regards genetic resources.622 The position of the CBD in relation to the 
broader regime of international law is more comparable to the role of the 
TRIPS agreement in relation to WTO law, as will be discussed in the next 
section.623 The CBD contains extensive provisions on different aspects of 
biodiversity conservation, which in part develops customary principles. Of 
central important for the purpose of bioprospecting, it addresses the issue of 
sovereign rights and legal claims to genetic resources. Already among the 
objectives formulated in Article 1 it is made clear that the CBD sets out not 
only to provide rules for genetic resources, but to do so with the explicit aims 
of ensuring sustainable use, equitable sharing of benefits and technology 
transfer. The purpose of the convention is thus not limited to the protection of 
biodiversity. In addition to the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources are set out as primary 
objectives. 
 
By obliging state parties to adopt and implement the principle of sustainability 
in the use of biological resources, the CBD reflects an integrated approach for 
the protection of biological diversity, which encompasses both the 
conservation of biological resources and the protection of ecosystems, in the 
terrestrial as well as the marine environment.624 Moreover, the definition of 
central concepts in the CBD reflects a focus on the ecosystem approach. 
According to Article 2, biological diversity means the variability among living 




622 The intention with the CBD was never to systematically codify all international 
environmental law in one treaty. International environmental law is thus more disintegrated than 
the law of the sea and codified rules are found in many different treaties. 
623 In relation to the regime of international trade law, TRIPS is only one of a number of treaties. 
However, since the central treaties were negotiated in concert during the same Marrakech round, 
the regime remains more coherent than international environmental law. Another obvious deficit 
in comparison with the law of the sea and international trade law is that international 
environmental law lacks a dedicated dispute settlement body and process, with the ability to 
provide coherence., see Alan Boyle, Relationship Between International Environmental Law 
and Other Branches of International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Daniel Bodansky, et al. eds., 2008). 






In the context of the marine environment, it refers to the variability of 
organisms as indicated and to the diversity of the marine ecosystems in a state, 
a region or the world.625 However, based on negotiation documents, it appears 
that the drafting phase almost exclusively focused on terrestrial biological 
diversity. Only late in the negotiating process were marine and coastal 
biodiversity introduced and even then they were not intensively discussed.626 
 
In the same provision, the Convention also provides a precise definition of 
genetic resources, a considerable strength in comparison with UNCLOS. 
According to Article 2 of the CBD, “genetic resources” means “genetic 
material of actual or potential value.” It further defines “genetic material” as 
“any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional 
units of heredity.” 
 
The definitions of genetic resources and genetic material are thus unconcerned 
with the use of the resource or material and make no exception for organisms 
traditionally used for purposes other than their genetic composition. This 
means that commercially targeted fish stocks are also encompassed by the 
definition of marine genetic resources. All marine species, regardless of 
taxonomic origin (animal plant, microbial or other) and size (whether 
microscopic or not), are considered a genetic resource under the convention.627 
 
The convention also makes clear in Article 3 that it regards the legal status of 
genetic resources in line with the traditional understanding according to which 
natural resources are subject to the sovereignty of the state in whose territory 
they are located. The preamble of the convention proclaims that “[s]tates have 
sovereign rights over their biological resources.” The same concept, in slightly 
different language, is expressed in Article 15(2). If it is considered that the 
convention has been ratified by the vast majority of the states628, that its text 
does not allow reservations (Article 37) capable of diminishing its normative 
character, the reasonable conclusion is that the CBD provides that states have 
the sovereign right to exploit natural resources within their territorial 
 
625 Christopher C. Joyner, Biodiversity in the marine environment: resource implications for the 
law of the sea, 28 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1995), at 635-638. 
626 Verhoosel, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1998), at 91. 
627 GUILLOUX. 2018, at 62. 








jurisdiction, including genetic resources.629 Moreover, Article 15 affirms, as a 
part of this sovereign right, the authority to regulate foreign access to these 
resources, by public as well as private institutions. 
 
Two mandatory principles govern access to genetic resources. Firstly, the 
access to genetic resources is subject to the prior and informed consent of the 
national authority of the state under whose territory or jurisdiction the resource 
is located (Article 15(3)). Secondly, the terms that authorize access are agreed 
upon between the provider state and the user (Article 15(4)). The content of 
the terms comprising the second principle is left to the discretion of the parties. 
Nonetheless, the terms should ensure that benefits arising from the economic 
exploitation of the resources are fairly and equitably shared between the user 
and the provider state (Article 15(7)). States are instructed to “endeavour to 
create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources” by other states. The 
Convention also encourages the establishment of mutually agreed terms for 
access, transfer of technology under favorable terms, and the exchange of 
information (Article 15–18). 
 
The convention thus calls upon states to facilitate access to genetic resources. 
Importantly, however, this should not be interpreted as an obligation for states 
to open up the genetic resources to outside actors. State sovereignty is 
maintained and there is no need for states to indicate reason for rejecting 
access. Still the request in Article 15 of the CBD marks a difference in relation 
to the rules in UNCLOS. Under the law of the sea, coastal state sovereignty 
over living resources in territorial waters or the exclusive economic zone is 
equally unconditional. However, under Article 62 of UNCLOS, states are 
under the obligation to give other states access to surplus in case the coastal 
state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch.630 
 
Due to the vagueness of the notion of “fair and equitable sharing of benefits,” 
which the CBD does not define precisely, and considering that neither a model 
contract nor standard clauses are provided by the convention, the objectives of 
this part of the Convention were notoriously difficult to implement.  
 
629 Francioni, International Law for Biotechnology: Basic Principles. 2006, at 9-10. 
630 As discussed under section C.1.5, it is however very unlikely and appears not to have 
happened historically that coastal states in stock assessments have set maximum sustainable 
yield levels at higher levels than can be caught by domestic resources, and then allowed the 






Indeed, practice demonstrates that the corresponding obligation was seldom 
fulfilled in the first decade after the entry into force of the convention.631 In the 
central provisions in the benefit-sharing part of the CBD, the Clearing House 
mechanism, it was even explicitly stated that the parties should decide at a later 
date how it should be established.632 
 
As a result, the CBD framework was subsequently expanded with the adoption 
of the Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization (“Nagoya Protocol”), which 
aimed to ensure the implementation of the benefit-sharing elements of the 
CBD. 
 
In addition to the benefit-sharing elements relating to genetic resources, Article 
8 of the CBD imposes obligations on states to take steps to protect biological 
diversity in situ where possible. Amongst other things, the convention requires 
its parties to, as far as possible and as appropriate, maintain viable populations 
in natural surroundings. A “viable” population can be defined as one which 
maintains its genetic diversity, its potential for evolutionary adaptation and 
faces minimal risk of extinction from demographic fluctuations, environmental 
variation and potential catastrophe, including over-use.633 
 
Preservation of the natural state is referred to in the Biodiversity Convention 
as “in situ conditions” or “in situ conservation.”634 The conception that there is 
an inherent value in conservation in situ is central to CBD. The convention is 
based on the premise that biodiversity is best preserved in its natural state. Such 
steps might include establishing a system of protected areas, rehabilitating 
degraded ecosystems, and managing biological resources to ensure 
conservation and sustainable use. In the marine context, the CBD places 
responsibility for protection of biological variability in offshore areas squarely 
upon the shoulders of the coastal states.  
 
631 Bonfanti & Trevisanut, BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011), at 206-207. 
632 See Article 18.3 of the CBD (“The Conference of the Parties, at its first meeting, shall 
determine how to establish a clearing-house mechanism to promote and facilitate technical and 
scientific cooperation.”) 
633 Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/2/12 para. 39. 







In essence, the convention does not make any distinction between terrestrial 
and marine organisms in this regard, nor between marine and land areas under 
state jurisdiction.635  
 
Moreover, the CBD establishes in Article 8 how this in situ conservation is to 
be ensured: states should establish a system of protection areas or areas where 
special measures need to be taken to conserve biological diversity and promote 
the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable 
populations of species in natural surroundings. Contracting parties are also 
required to rehabilitate and restore degraded ecosystems and to promote the 
recovery of threatened species. These obligations have been referred to as an 
area where the CBD overlaps with the regime for management of living 
resources under UNCLOS. Both require states to enact management measures 
for living organisms. Under the CBD this obligation refers to the marine life in 
general under the principle of viable populations. Under UNCLOS it refers to 
harvested stocks only, which are to be managed according to the principles of 
optimum utilization and maximum sustainable yield.636 
 
As a central element of the CBD, these obligations for the protection of 
biodiversity are balanced with a system aimed at ensuring that states which 
grants access to its genetic resources gain benefits derived from their use.637 
This bargaining element represents a trade off in the convention: states with 
genetic resources have accepted obligations to conserve them and ensure 
sustainable use in return for financial incentives. This intrinsic link between 
the conservation of genetic resources and the sharing of benefits from their use 
can be regarded as the engine of the CBD. It is built on the premise that 
biotechnological use of genetic resources will yield substantial incomes. 
Implicitly, biotechnology thus lies at the heart of the convention. 
 
635 Joyner, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (1995), at 649. 
636 Wolfrum & Matz, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2000), at 465. 
637 See Arts 15, 16 and 19. Such benefits is not limited to monetary benefits but may also include 
participation in scientific research (article 15 para. 6); the fair and equitable sharing of research 
results (article 15 para. 7); participation in commercial and other benefits derived from genetic 
resources (article 15 para. 7); access to, and transfer of, technology making use of the genetic 
resources provided (article 16 para. 3) and access to the results and benefits arising from 
biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided (article 19 para. 2). The providing of 
access for and transfer for technology that is relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity (article 16 para. 1) has been described as “not as a matter of benefit sharing 
but rather as an undertaking under the common responsibility of all States parties to promote 






C.2.2.2. Scope of application 
There is thus no shortage of obligations under the CBD with material 
implications for bioprospecting of marine genetic resources. However, there is 
a limitation in the scope of the convention which seemingly prevents its 
provisions from being directly applicable to bioprospecting of genetic 
resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction. This is because the territorial 
scope of the CBD, as articulated in Article 4(a), is limited to the national 
jurisdiction of its parties, insofar as components of biological diversity are 
concerned. As regards processes and activities carried out under the control or 
jurisdiction of its parties, on the other hand, the scope is, according to Article 
4(b), universal and the convention applies irrespective of where the effects 
occur. The “processes and activities” referred to are, however, only those 
undertaken under the jurisdiction (not necessarily territorial) of the given state. 
The decisive element of Article 4(b) of the CBD is that it distinguishes between 
where the process or activity took place and the place of its impact.638 
Article 4 
Jurisdictional scope 
Subject to the rights of other States, and except as otherwise expressly provided 
in this Convention, the provisions of this Convention apply, in relation to each 
Contracting Party: 
 
(a) In the case of components of biological diversity, in areas within the limits 
of its national jurisdiction; and 
 
(b) In the case of processes and activities, regardless of where their effects 
occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control, within the area of its national 
jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
 
This dual approach based on a distinction between components of biological 
diversity on the one hand and processes and activities on the other has been 
considered arbitrary by some observers.639 There is, however, a rationale for 
this division, in that it reflects the twofold material scope of the convention. 
The CBD contains both provisions relating to benefits of genetic resources and 
provisions relating to sustainable use.  
 
638 Id. at 462. 
639 Lyle Glowka, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity (IUCN Gland and 







The jurisdictional scope in Article 4 is divided along the same lines. Moreover, 
the limitations of the scope of provisions on components of biological diversity 
to areas under national jurisdiction reflect the territorial sovereignty under the 
law of the sea, which enables coastal states to determine rules concerning 
management and use of resources within the maritime areas under their 
jurisdiction. As regards the global scope of effect of processes and activities, 
parallels can also be drawn to the law of the sea, which provides an obligation 
for states to protect and preserve the marine environment, including marine 
biological diversity and not to transfer damages or hazards from one 
jurisdictional area to another.640 
 
This intricate regulation of the scope of application of the CBD has been 
subject to considerable debate. As regards the effect of processes and activities, 
it is undisputed that the CBD applies in areas beyond as well as within national 
jurisdiction, and that states ought to apply jurisdictional nexuses at their 
disposal to implement the obligations of the convention. With regards to 
components of biological diversity as regulated in paragraph (a), the situation 
appears less clear.  
 
The reference to areas within national jurisdiction makes clear that the CBD 
applies to components of biological diversity in all areas within the limits of 
states’ national jurisdiction – on land as well as at sea – and thus applies to the 
outer limits of the continental shelf and EEZ. It is, however, debated whether 
the reference implies that application to genetic resources beyond national 
jurisdiction is excluded. In this regard, some observers support a restrictive 
interpretation, claiming that the limitation of the jurisdictional scope regarding 
components of biological diversity in Article 4(a) precludes direct application 
to marine genetic resources in the water column of the high seas or on the deep 
seabed. Taken to its extreme, this would imply that there is no obligation under 
the CBD for states to provide for the protection of marine genetic resources in 
the high seas and the Area.641 Other observers dispute this reasoning and argue 
in favor of an extensive interpretation, suggesting that it rather implies that 
state parties (only) may regulate the activities of their own nationals to achieve 
the objectives of the CBD.642  
 
640 WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 463. 
641 Proponents of this view includes Matz and Wolfrum, see id. at 471. 






As a result of the limitation of the scope of the CBD under the restrictive view, 
the regulation of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction 
would be left to other treaties – notably the UNCLOS regulations on the high 
seas and the Area, as discussed under section C.1.4. Supporters of the extensive 
view, on the other hand, do not dispute the validity of the UNCLOS regime, 
including the high seas freedoms. But in contrast to the restrictive view, they 
claim that states are able to exercise jurisdiction as regards marine bioprospect-
ing also in these areas based on the customarily accepted application of extra-
territoriality. Although the exercise of the freedom of the high seas is not lim-
ited to parties of UNCLOS, the basic presumption of flag state jurisdiction has 
attained customary status.643 The implication of this requirement is that the ves-
sel is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state, which in turn is 
obliged to exercise “its jurisdiction and control” over it.644  
 
Based on this concept of flag state jurisdiction, the argument goes, states could 
– and are ultimately obliged to – ensure that their vessels do not undermine 
their CBD obligations in any marine area.645 The discussions within the CBD 
subsequent to the convention’s entry into force also appear to support the view 
that the obligations of the state of nationality of private actors or even the state 
sponsoring the private activity apply in relation to activities in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction. Not only have issues relating to biodiversity conservation 
and management continuously been part of the working program; the scientific 
advisory body of the CBD646 has even urged the parties to take measures to 
manage activities in deep-sea ecosystems to ensure conservation and sustaina-
ble use of resources, including reporting of measures taken.647  
 
643 On the requirement for vessels to fly flag, see UNCLOS Articles 90-91. 
644 See UNCLOS Article 92, CHURCHILL & LOWE. 1999, at 203. 
645 This discussion is complicated by the fact that many activities affecting marine genetic 
resources – and indeed bioprospecting itself – can be carried out by private as well as public 
actors. As already has been discussed, Article 15 of the CBD makes no distinction in this regard 
and international law also have clear criteria for the nationality of private actors. As far as the 
nationality of legal persons is concerned, the main international law criteria were stated by the 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (BeIgium v. Spain), ICJ Rep, ICJ GL 
50 (International Court of Justice 5 February) 
646 Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of the CBD 
(“SBSTTA”). 
647 ‘Concerned about the threats to genetic resources in the deep seabed beyond national 
jurisdiction, requests Parties and urges other States, having identified activities and processes 
under their jurisdiction and control which may have significant adverse impacts on deep seabed 







Moreover, as will be discussed in the next section, the Nagoya Protocol 
recognizes the need to find an “innovative solution,” addressing “the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources 
… for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent.” This 
expression seems to target marine genetic resources beyond national 
jurisdiction, supporters of the extensive have claimed, arguing that it presumes 
that the CBD applies indirectly to marine genetic resources in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction.648 
 
In sum, it appears undisputed that the CBD applies to marine bioprospecting 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction as regards the effects of processes and 
activities. It appears less certain if the jurisdictional scope of the provisions on 
components of biological diversity applies in such areas.649 
 
As such, as long as bioprospecting does not risk endangering the conservation 
of deep-sea organisms, or go against other environmental requirements set by 
the CBD, the convention appears to raise no hindrance to the sampling of 
genetic resources outside national jurisdiction.650 Yet, it should be cautioned 
that even limited human involvement in deep-sea ecosystems could have a 
significant detrimental impact, as discussed in section B.4. 
 
Some observers claim that this circumstance effectively means that the logic 
which otherwise underpins the CBD, the access to genetic resources as an 
incentive for their protection, is undermined, in at least two ways. Firstly, under 
the logic of the CBD, the interest in preserving biological resources beyond 
national jurisdiction decreases if there is no requirement for benefit sharing 
connected to access. Secondly, it indirectly distorts the system set up under the 
CBD and the Nagoya Protocol within national jurisdiction.  
 
measures to urgently manage such practices in vulnerable deep seabed ecosystems with a view 
to the conservation and sustainable use of resources, and report on measures taken as part of the 
national reporting process.’ (Eleventh Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, 
Technological & Technological Advice [SBSTTA], Montreal, Canada, Nov. 28-Dec. 2, 2005, 
Recommendation XI/8: Marine and coastal biological diversity: conservation and sustainable 
use of deep seabed genetic resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 4(c) (2005), 
available at http://www.cbd.int/recommendation/sbstta/?id=10967.) 
648 Bonfanti & Trevisanut, BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011), at 213. 
649 In any event it appears clear that the rules on access to genetic resources has little relevance 
beyond national jurisdiction since they regulate situations of national sovereignty.  






If bioprospecting can be carried out on the high seas without requirements for 
benefit sharing and technology transfer, as would have been required for 
resources under national jurisdiction, the functioning of the CBD system can 
be circumvented by consistently targeting resources beyond national 
jurisdiction. As a result, opportunities for making profits by preserving genetic 
resources within national jurisdiction would decrease, as would the incentives 
for states to protect genetic resources under their sovereignty.651 
 
C.2.2.3. The Nagoya Protocol 
 
By virtue of representing a treaty with the purpose of implementing certain 
parts of the Convention on Biological Diversity, it is logical that the Nagoya 
Protocol as a starting point reiterates the CBD declaration that states have 
sovereign rights over their natural resources, and the authority to determine 
access to their genetic resources in accordance with the applicable national 
legislation, on mutually agreed terms, and subject to the prior informed consent 
of the state providing access.652 
 
The primary purpose of the Nagoya Protocol, as set out in Article 1, is to define 
the modalities according to which the parties shall enforce the principles of 
prior and informed consent and the fair and equitable benefit-sharing 
obligations, as set out in the CBD. It thus applies to genetic resources within 
the scope of Article 15 of the CBD, and also includes within its scope 
derivatives, which are defined as naturally occurring biochemical compounds 
resulting from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic 
resources, even if they do not contain functional units of heredity.653 With 
regards to application, the protocol in Article 3 makes reference to the 
corresponding provision in the convention, as discussed in section C.2.2. 
 
The benefits from genetic resources which are to be shared under the protocol 
are broadly formulated. According to Article 5, benefits may include monetary 
and non-monetary benefits. For resources originating within national 
jurisdiction, it is provided that these shall be shared in a fair and equitable way 
with the party providing such resources upon mutually agreed terms.654 
 
651 Verhoosel, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1998), at 102. 
652 See, in particular, the preamble of the CBD, as well as Articles 3 and Art. 19. 
653 CBD Article 2. 
654 The country of origin of such resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in 








C.2.2.4. The bilateral benefit-sharing clearing house 
 
The benefit-sharing mechanism for genetic resources under the Nagoya 
Protocol is built on the issuance of internationally recognized certificates by 
competent national authorities.655 It provides for their notification to the Access 
and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House, a mechanism established by the Protocol, 
as an implementation of the Clearing House mechanism set out in Article 18.3 
of the CBD.  
 
Such certificates shall show that the genetic resource has been obtained, 
accessed, and used in accordance with prior informed consent, and that 
mutually agreed-upon terms have been entered into.656 There is thus a 
formalized system under the protocol in cases where a country uses genetic 
resources retrieved within the national jurisdiction of another state. 
 
C.2.2.5. The multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism 
 
Article 10 of the Nagoya Protocol addresses issues that could not be resolved 
during the negotiation of the Protocol and for which further discussion was 
required. The provision calls on states to consider the need for and modalities 





655 CBD Article 6.3(e). 
656 CBD Article 6(3)(e) and 14(2)(c) The certificates shall contain basic information, such as the 
identities of the issuing national authority, the provider, and the user. Moreover, they shall 
specify the subject matter covered and the geographic location of the access activity, the uses 
permitted and the correspondent restrictions, as well as the conditions of transfer to third parties. 
Finally, the certificates shall contain a link to the mutually agreed terms regulating the benefit 
sharing. See CBD Article 17.4. 
657 Article 10 of the Protocol states that “Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a 
global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits derived from the utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources that occur in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to 
grant or obtain prior informed consent. The benefits shared by users of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources through this mechanism shall be used 







The mechanism is supposed to support the conservation of biological diversity 
and the sustainable use of its components globally, based on the sharing of 
benefits that arise from the utilization of genetic resources in transboundary 
situations or from uses for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior 
informed consent.658  
 
In substance, Article 10, which is yet to become practically operational, may 
come to involve obligations relevant for deep-sea bioprospecting: The 
mechanism implied would be of a “multilateral” character and thus distinct 
from the bilateral approach to access and benefit-sharing established by the 
CBD and the operational provisions of the Nagoya Protocol. The focus is on 
“transboundary situations” and also on situations “for which it is not possible 
to grant or obtain prior informed consent.” This latter aspect has been 
interpreted broadly by some observers and more narrowly by others. In a 
broader interpretation, this provides a basis for arguing in favor of an unlimited 
temporal or geographical scope of the Nagoya Protocol. Under a narrower 
reading, it could help in resolving situations where genetic resources in user 
jurisdictions are of unclear origin or legal status, or perhaps it might also help 
in addressing benefit-sharing for material in ex situ collections.659 
 
Depending on how and if this global arrangement under the Nagoya Protocol 
is implemented, it could be considered applicable to deep-sea bioprospecting. 
It can hardly be disputed that such activities represent clear cases of situations 
for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent. However, 
it appears unclear if the geographic scope of a future operationalization of the 





658 Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that many parties opposed the inclusion of marine genetic 
resources in the application of the Protocol, it eventually applies also to their exploitation. 
Bonfanti & Trevisanut, BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011), at 217. 
659 Matthias Buck & Clare Hamilton, The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and 
the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.(Report), 20 REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY & INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2011), at 60. 
660 Studies and submitted views in CBD discussions on Article 10 provide limited guidance in 








C.2.3. Conclusions on international environmental law 
 
In conclusion, it appears that international environmental law, as foremost 
expressed in CBD, does not preclude deep-sea bioprospecting. Indeed, the 
generally liberal approach to the use of genetic resources in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction stands in stark contrast to the detailed regulation for 
genetic resources within national jurisdiction. General environmental 
obligations, as also expressed in the CBD, foremost the obligation to ensure in 
situ conservation of species, as well as arguably obligations relating to benefit-
sharing, are, however, also relevant to bioprospecting in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. Compared to the law of the sea, international environmental law 
thus appears to take a considerably more liberal approach, not only by being 
generally permissive towards deep-sea bioprospecting. Depending on how the 
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism of the Nagoya Protocol becomes 
operationalized, it could involve obligations relevant for deep-sea 
bioprospecting, but there are no signs of a conclusion to these discussions in 
the near future. Under existing rules, the obligation on states to conserve 
biological diversity in situ, which also applies to processes and activities in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, appears to be the most relevant for deep-sea 
bioprospecting. Parties to the CBD are thus required to ensure the protection, 
conservation and maintaining of viable populations in natural surroundings of 
organisms targeted and affected by bioprospecting operations in the deep seas.  
 
C.3. International Trade Law 
 
C.3.1. International Law and the Patenting of Biotechnology 
 
Irrespective of how the term “marine genetic resources” should be defined 
legally, no observer would contest that it ipso facto refers to living resources. 
As has been established, the main value of, and indeed the reason for, 
exploiting such resources relates to the exploration of their genetic functions. 
Marine bioprospecting, in turn, involves an ambition to use the findings in the 
exploration for purposes of biotech innovation. In a commercial context, this 







Although biotechnology may appear as a relatively novel phenomenon, 
international law has at least attempted to settle the difficult questions on the 
patenting of inventions based on natural compounds for decades. In the area of 
intellectual property rights law, several different treaty co-operations have 
approached the issue. Of these, the World Trade Organization regulation in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
has exercised the greatest degree of influence on domestic legislation. As will 
be established, relevant rules in that treaty do not just relate to inventions based 
on biological material, including deep-sea genetic resources; they also provide 
obligations for the use of information and data applying to bioprospecting. 
 
Depending on the type of marine bioprospecting related innovation, the genetic 
resource component in intellectual property can vary broadly. As discussed in 
Part B, in some cases, an innovation can have only part of its origin based in 
findings in a marine organism, which at a later stage has been sequenced or 
even modified in a laboratory environment, and then combined with other 
components to attain certain properties. In other cases, the innovation may lie 
much closer to the marine genetic source, essentially consisting of its functions 
or utilities. Where the actual bioprospecting development is done, and the 
extent to which the original marine genetic resource sample is an ingredient, 
are of great importance for the application of the law of the sea and biodiversity 
law frameworks. For intellectual property law application, however, this seems 
to be less important. As will be discussed, the conditions for intellectual 
protection rights law seem to be little concerned with the origin of biological 
components. 
 
C.3.2. The WTO TRIPS 
 
In international trade law, the central agreement for regulation of intellectual 
property rights is the TRIPS.661 The agreement was negotiated and concluded 
as part of the Uruguay-round of trade agreements which founded the World 
Trade Organization. As of 2011, 153 states are members of the WTO and 
parties to TRIPS. Of these, approximately 130 are also parties to UNCLOS.662  
 
661 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
662 Peter Van Den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization : Text, Cases 







TRIPS is thus broadly accepted among states, but it is not a comprehensive 
treaty which should be viewed in isolation. Rather, it ought to be regarded as 
the intellectual property rights component of a family of trade agreements, 
negotiated in parallel during the Uruguay round and entering into force by the 
finalization of the round and the resulting transformation of the GATT into the 
WTO. This also explains the widespread ratification by developing countries, 
in spite of their reluctance during the negotiation of intellectual property rights 
during the trade round: To become a member of the WTO, acceptance of all of 
the Uruguay Round agreements, including the TRIPS agreement was 
required.663 Compared to international environmental law discussed in the 
previous section, WTO treaties collectively appears to function more 
coherently, with a formalized structure, which facilitate interpretation, 
including an elaborate dispute settlement system. Moreover, a major 
institutional advantage compared to both the law of the sea and international 
environmental law is that international trade law is anchored by a central 
organization with a clear mandate: the WTO secretariat.664  
 
Although also other areas of intellectual property rights law are relevant for 
bioprospecting, private claims connected to genetic resources foremost 
connect to claims for exclusive rights based on patent law. In most 
biotechnology ventures, the prospects for lucrative patents is the driving force 
for bioprospecting, as discussed in Part B. 
 
Patents confer on their holders more or less extensive and exclusive rights to 
offer their invention for sale, in exchange for publication of or information on 
their invention, including the right to exclude others from "making, using, or 
selling or importing the protected invention into a jurisdiction where the patent 
protection is in force, or to charge others for any uses or purposes involving 
the protected invention within such jurisdiction" (i.e. through licensing).665 
 
 
663 By accepting the Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round and the WTO Agreement, states 
become parties to virtually all of the legal instruments negotiated during the round. See 
McLaughlin. 2010, at 376. The dynamic of the TRIPS negotiation and the reasons for acceptance 
by developing states in spite of their reluctance will be further discussed in section D.3.4. 
664 Boyle. 2008. 
665 Salpin & Germani, Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 






Like many other treaties of international law, TRIPS establishes minimum 
levels of protection, and a significant degree of legal autonomy is left to the 
individual states. Similarly, the aim of TRIPS is not to create a unitary global 
regulation of patents. Rather, TRIPS provides a standardization of rules for 
intellectual property protection to help trade, i.e., to establish conditions in 
which intellectual property standards are harmonized to facilitate trade in 
(intellectual property rights) goods. In this way WTO Members will know what 
standards to expect when they trade their goods with other WTO Members. 
 
TRIPS thus functions as a lowest common denominator for WTO Members in 
their implementation of patent laws. Still, patent law remains primarily a 
matter of national jurisdiction: national law must be in accordance with 
international obligations, such as TRIPS, but it is the patent law of the state 
where the patent was registered and granted that applies. The patent holder, 
therefore, can only enforce its rights to exclusive use in the jurisdiction where 
the patent has been registered.666 
 
Article 8 of TRIPS lays down two principles that allow WTO Members to 
adjust intellectual property protection to particular concerns and to take 
appropriate measures within their jurisdiction. Firstly, members may, in 
formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary 
to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions 
of TRIPS. Secondly, states can take appropriate measures, provided that they 
are consistent with the provisions of TRIPS, to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or prevent the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology. 
 
The agreement’s pivotal Article 27 states that unless one of the specified 
exceptions apply, patents should “be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, 
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”  
 
666 Petra Drankier, et al., Marine Genetic Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: 
Access and Benefit-Sharing, 27 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 







Some authors have questioned whether inventions derived from marine genetic 
resources fulfil patenting criteria, in particular whether they can be considered 
as novel under the wording of TRIPS.667 This is connected to the position that 
in particular many developing states maintained during the negotiation of 
TRIPS, that the patenting of genetic functions should be rejected, not only 
because it would be inappropriate to allow for the patenting of nature but also 
because such functions have been developed by evolution rather than humans, 
as will be further discussed in section D.3.668 The mainstream of observers 
however consider the highly technical and knowledge intensive processes 
discussed in Part B used to screen, identify and reproduce genetic materials 
capable of commercial use fulfil the requisites in Article 27.669 In addition, 
there are procedural requirements for patent applications in Article 29: “an 
applicant for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear 
and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.” 
 
Once a patent has been granted, it endows its owner with a series of exclusive 
rights. According to Articles 28 and 33, this protection enables the owner of 
the patent for at least twenty years from the filing date, to prevent third parties, 
not expressly authorized to the contrary, from making, using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing the product or the process covered by patent. Patent 
protections were thereby significantly strengthened by TRIPS.670 Regarding 
benefit-sharing, TRIPS does not appear to limit or condition the rights 
conferred on the patent owner with requirements to share benefits. Conversely, 
the owner is bestowed exclusivity. It is up to the owner to which extent the 
exclusive rights conferred on the patent holder are to be shared with others. In 
the wording of Article 28(2), patent owners have the right to assign, or transfer 




667 Kirsten E. Zewers, Bright Future for Marine Genetic Resources, Bleak Future for Settlement 
of Ownership Rights: Reflections on the United Nations Law of the Sea Consultative Process 
on Marine Genetic Resources, 5 LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 
(2008). 
668 Carrie P. Smith, Patenting life: the potential and the pitfalls of using the WTO to globalize 
intellectual property rights, 26 NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
COMMERCIAL REGULATION (2000), at 146. 
669 McLaughlin. 2010. 






At first glance it appears that the parties to TRIPS are obliged to uphold 
intellectual property rights for inventions based on marine genetic resources in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction. There seems to be no hindrance to base 
patents on such resources. Moreover, there appears to be no compulsory 
requirement to share benefits under the agreement. 
 
C.3.3. Patentability of Biotechnology 
 
However, the interpretation of the obligation to patent “any inventions” raises 
many important policy issues, such as the extent to which parties are bound to 
confer patent rights over discoveries, particularly over substances found in 
nature such as genes.  
 
Article 27 
Patentable Subject Matter 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application(…) 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect 
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such 
exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their law. 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
(a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or 
animals; 
(b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection 
of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by 
any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed 
four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
 
Although it is regularly argued that Article 27.1 is intended to permit the 
patentability of any subject matter that meets the patentability criteria, the text 







If a broader scope was intended, some observers contend, another less 
ambiguous formulation could have been used, such as “any subject matter that 
is new, involves an inventive step and is capable of industrial application.” In 
any event, parties to TRIPS are not obliged to grant patents to what is not 
ordinarily considered an “invention.” But since the agreement only establishes 
minimum standards, parties to TRIPS can adopt a more generous approach 
domestically.671 
 
Moreover, by virtue of paragraphs 2–3 of Article 27, it is clear that there are 
three permissible exceptions to the rule on patentability: (1) for inventions 
contrary to ordre public or morality (including inventions dangerous to human, 
animal or plant life or health or seriously prejudicial to the environment); (2) 
for diagnostic, therapeutic, surgical methods for the treatment of human beings 
and animals; and (3) for plants and animals other than micro-organisms and 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-
biological and microbiological processes. It is important to note that although 
states may exclude plants and animals from patentability, micro-organisms 
cannot be excluded. This is of particular relevance to deep-sea bioprospecting 
since a large part of the genetic resources identified in Part B as relevant in 
such projects are considered as micro-organisms. 
 
It follows that marine genetic resources considered as micro-organisms not 
only are patentable under TRIPS but in fact cannot be excluded from 
patentability. It should also be underlined that in order for the other categories 
of organisms referred in paragraph 3 to be exempted from patentability, states 
would have to make a formal exception. In lack of such a declaration, the 
general rule of patentability applies. 
 
The WTO’s dispute settlement system has so far not rendered a conclusive 
interpretative explanation of the criteria in Article 27. Domestic 
implementation also varies. Still, some general observations can be made on 
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Firstly, paragraph 2 of Article 27 enables member states to exclude certain 
inventions from patentability, namely those relating to “the commercial 
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality including 
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious 
prejudice to the environment.”672 This implies mandatory rules, where 
application cannot be neglected. Ordre public, in this context, refers to basic 
values prevailing in society, including interests such as public safety, the 
physical integrity of individuals, and the protection of the environment. 
Morality, on the other hand, is based on ethical norms accepted and deeply 
rooted in a specific culture.673 Article 27(2) does not enable parties to TRIPS to 
obstruct certain technological developments or prohibit the exploitation of 
research results within the context of patent law, by prohibiting exploitation. It 
is only the patenting of such inventions that can be hindered under this 
provision, provided that the party in question also refrains from exploitation of 
such inventions. This is the result of two mechanisms built in Article 27.2: 
Firstly, the explicit requirement for a ban on commercial exploitation in the 
relevant member country; and, secondly, that such prohibition is necessary in 
order to protect the interests described in detail in Article 27.2.674 Secondly, 
parties are enabled to prevent patentability of “diagnostics, therapeutic, and 
surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals”.675 Thirdly, and of 
central importance in the context of deep-sea bioprospecting, Article 27 
provides in paragraph 3(b) a particularly detailed possibility for excluding 
patentability relating to biotechnology. Members may exclude from 
patentability “plants and animals other than micro-organisms” as well as 
“essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals other 
than non-biological and microbiological processes.” 
 
This exception significantly affects certain types of biotechnology, such as hy-
bridisation or biogenetically-engineered crops and livestock. It does however 
not exempt the molecular screening and manufacturing processes involved in 
screening and designing pharmaceuticals and other biotechnological products, 
as discussed in Part B.  
 
672 …provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by 
their law. 
673 Bonfanti, European journal of risk regulation (2012). 
674 Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis (Thomson Reuters 
4 ed. 2012), at 434-435. 







Many observers have considered the multi-sequenced processes involved in 
screening and designing pharmaceuticals and other commercial products from 
marine genetic resources as clearly patentable under Article 27.676  
 
It is important to point out that TRIPS does not require its parties to preclude 
the patenting of biological material or biotechnological inventions relating to 
the categories for which exceptions are provided. Rather, states are free, if they 
desire, to prevent patentability for the species and processes for which 
paragraph 3(b) enables exception. However, the last part of Article 27(3) sets 
outer limits in this regard, effectively functioning as an exception to the 
exception, implying that inventions relating to ‘micro-organisms’ as well as a 
“microbiological process or other technical process or the product of such a 
process” may not be excluded from patentability.677 Since there is no generally 
agreed definition of the different types of species and biological processes 
referred in TRIPS Article 27, states appear to have considerable discretion in 
interpreting what organisms fall within the scope of these categories, for which 
the parties to TRIPS must allow patenting.678 The exceptions in Article 27(3) 
have been collectively described as more “focused” exceptions that do not need 
to be justified in the same way as exceptions under Article 27(2). The only 
condition here is to qualify for the category mentioned. Interestingly for the 
purposes of this study, exceptions which have been made on the basis of this 
paragraph relate primarily to concerns in relation to biotechnological 
inventions. Largely, justifications for applying such exceptions can be divided 
into two groups: firstly, the reason for such exclusions may be ethical or moral, 
as is the case in certain European countries; secondly, and notably claimed by 
developing countries, are arguments relating to biodiversity and the 
appropriation of genetic resources.679 
 
Thus, TRIPS generally grants its parties discretion to determine within its 
sovereignty which inventions, including biotechnology, to prevent from 
patentability based on ordre public or moral concerns.  
 
676 See McLaughlin. 2010;Smith, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation (2000). 
677 LIONEL BENTLY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Brad Sherman ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 4. ed. ed. 2014), at 499. 
678 CORREA & YUSUF. 2016, chapter 8. 






In particular, states may prevent the patentability of the active functions of 
organisms relevant in bioprospecting, with the exception of micro-organisms, 
as well as non-biological and microbiological processes. Most but far from all 
of the genetic resources identified in contemporary marine bioprospecting in 
the review in Part B would fall within the “micro-organism” or 
“microbiological process or the products thereof” categories. At least 
organisms involved would be considered as such under a conventional 
biological understanding.680 Accordingly, states are by virtue of TRIPS under 
obligation to enable patentability of inventions relating to such genetic 
resources.681 Conversely, there is nothing preventing parties to TRIPS 
excluding from patentability inventions relating to higher species and 
processes not considered as non-biological or microbiological.682 
 
From a functional perspective, this approach to biotechnological patents in 
TRIPS has been criticized. Foremost, exclusions from patentability in one state 
may be bypassed by filing patents for biotechnology in less restrictive 
jurisdictions. From the perspective of commercial bioprospecting interests, this 
possibility would appear especially attractive given that advanced industrial 
economies, which also represent the most important patent jurisdictions, do not 
raise objections to biotechnological patents based on subject matter relevant 
for deep-sea bioprospecting, as will be discussed in section C.3.5. Furthermore, 
the semantic uncertainty connected to the categories of species and processes 
may make it difficult to challenge how patentable subject matter is regarded in 
domestic law.683 
 
C.3.4. Disclosure of marine genetic origin 
 
When applying for patent protection, the applicant must under Article 29 of 
TRIPS disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for 
the invention to be reproduced by a person skilled in the art.  
 
680 Zewers, Loyola University Chicago International Law Review (2008). 
681 There is however little reason to suspect that states stretching these terms to exclude a broader 
scope of biotechnology from patentability would be challenged. 
682 Zewers, Loyola University Chicago International Law Review (2008), at 164. 
683 Giuseppe Cataldi, Biotechnology and Marine Biogenetic Resources: The Interplay between 
UNCLOS and the CBD, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tullio Scovazzi & 
Francesco Francioni eds., 2006); Francioni, International Law for Biotechnology: Basic 







The applicant may also be required to indicate the best mode for carrying out 
the invention known to the inventor at the filing date, or, where priority is 
claimed, at the priority date of the application. 
 
This requirement may raise difficulties for bioprospecting generally, since it is 
often easier to identify the effect or application of a bioactive function than its 
basic mechanism. Moreover, this may raise challenges where basic taxonomy 
is difficult to distinguish, which is not uncommon in the context of little-
explored deep-sea organisms. To meet patentability requirements, the inventor 
must disclose the invention fully, so that others reading the patent document 
will have enough information to reproduce the invention. This may entail, for 
instance, giving the full botanical name of plants used in the claimed invention, 
or references to deposits of micro-organisms in recognized international 
collections.684 Since some recently discovered marine genetic resources have 
unique properties and their taxonomy has not been settled, establishing a 
sufficiently precise reference in a patent document can be problematic.685 As 
things currently stand, there is no explicit requirement for disclosure of origin 
of genetic material. Under TRIPS, there is thus no obligation for states to set 
requirements in patent applications for disclosure of geographic origin of 
marine genetic resources. Discussions about introducing such a requirement 
have been ongoing within the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) for more than a decade without any concrete measures 
materializing.686 
 
Effectively, this enables states to have permissive patent rules relating to 
bioprospecting of deep-sea genetic resources. For some types of genetic 
resources, in particular micro-organisms, as discussed above, parties to TRIPS 
are even bound to allow patenting. Similarly, TRIPS sets no requirement to 
disclose geographic origin in patent data.  
 
684 Procedures for this is provided in the Budapest Treaty, Budapest Treaty on the International 
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure. 
685 Zewers, Loyola University Chicago International Law Review (2008). 
686 The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore has compiled a table over regulations in different member 
states, WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore - Genetic Resource Disclosure Requirements Table. 






As will be further evaluated in Part E, this may be interpreted as inconsistent 
with the perspective of deep-sea genetic resources provided by UNCLOS and 
the CBD. It also raises practical challenges. For instance, in the myriad of cases 
where a species may occur in many jurisdictions, it is difficult to ascertain if a 
patent applicant has violated the rights of other states by using genetic 
resources within their sovereignty. Similarly, in lack of a requirement for 
disclosure of genetic origin, it is difficult to establish to what degree 
bioresources from areas beyond national jurisdiction are used in applications, 
as was shown in section B.6.687 
 
C.3.5. State practice 
 
Under traditional concepts of intellectual property rights law, bioprospecting 
is difficult to characterize, in particular in relation to the traditional division 
between scientific discoveries and inventions. States have taken different 
approaches in this regard.688 States have regarded the patenting of genetic 
resources differently under discovery and invention-criteria.689 The patent law 
of most countries comprises three basic requirements for determining whether 
a claimed innovation is possible to patent. These are that the invention, whether 
it is in relation to a product or a process, must be: new (or novel); involve an 
inventive step (or not be obvious); and be capable of industrial application (or 
have utility).690  
 
687 As discussed in section B.6, several studies of geographic origin for marine genetic resources 
in bioprospecting based on patent application data have been conducted, but the results are 
inconclusive as the result of the lack of requirement for geotagging in important jurisdictions. 
This does not only make it difficult to ascertain whether the result are conclusive, it is also 
difficult to ascertain statistically representativity. See, as discussed in section B.6 for instance 
Oldham. 2014.; RACHEL WYNBERG, MARINE GENETIC RESOURCES AND BIOPROSPECTING IN THE 
WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN: WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN (2016). 
688 Smith, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (2000), at 
146-147. 
689 The Nuffield Council, a UK-based independent charitable body, which examines and reports 
on bioethical issues raised by new advances in biological and medical research, has stated that: 
“genes are naturally occurring entities that are there to be discovered, like new species or new 
planets. They are not invented. In our common usage of the term, a “discovery” is the acquisition 
of knowledge of a new nut already existing fact about the world. An “invention”, on the other 
hand, is something that someone creates or develops which did not previously exist. Thus, on 
the usual interpretation of the words, it seems apparent that the identification of a gene is a 
discovery, since genes exist in the world, in our bodies.” THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics. 2002), at 23.  







However, even if these requisites are similarly formulated across jurisdictions, 
they have been differently applied in relation to biotechnology. As discussed 
in Parts A and B, the general trend across different jurisdictions is that patent 
protection for biotechnological innovations has been increasing over the past 
few decades.691 
 
As regards patentable subject matter, states have generally pursued different 
courses based on the possibility of making exceptions to patentable subject 
matter under TRIPS Article 27. With regards to the possibility of precluding 
patentability applied for ethical or moral considerations, the European Union 
has made reference to this ground in rejecting imports and patenting of 
genetically modified organisms.692 Developing countries have used this 
provision to prevent patentability on biological resources, justified by 
biodiversity interests and the prevention of appropriation of genetic 
resources.693 Some have explicitly claimed incompatibility of Article 27 of 
TRIPS with the CBD as the reason for their derogation.694 As regards the 
different categories of organisms in paragraph 3, approaches appear to be 
largely divided across north-south lines.  
 
In EU patent law, it is made clear that an invention shall not be considered 
unpatentable solely on the ground that it concerns a product consisting of or 
containing biological material or a process by which biological material is 
produced. More specifically, the European Patent Convention states that it is 
possible to patent inventions for plant and animals, so long as they comply with 
the general requirements of patentability.695  
 
691 OECD, Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence 
and Policies. 2002. 
692 GERVAIS. 2012, at 224. 
693 The status of such general exceptions to biotechnology patents in apparent inconsistency with 
paragraph 3 has not yet been judicially decided. Rohini Acharya, Patenting of Biotechnology: 
GATT and the Erosion of the World's Biodiversity, 25 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (1991); 
Andrew T. Mushita & Carol B. Thompson, Patenting Biodiversity? Rejecting WTO/TRIPS in 
Southern Africa, 2 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2002); Arvind Subramanian, Genetic 
Resources, Biodiversity and Environmental Protection - An Analysis, and Proposals Towards a 
Solution, 26 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (1992). 
694 GERVAIS. 2012, at 420-458. The compatibility of these treaties will not be examined here but 
under Part E. 
695 See Article 3, Directive 98/44/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (Biotech Directive) ; BENTLY. 






In 1998 the EU Biotech Directive696 was approved, banning patenting of the 
human genome, including modifications thereof.697 In relation to non-human 
genetic resources, as will be further discussed in section D.3.3, the Biotech 
Directive establishes a comparatively permissive, open-ended approach to 
patentability, explicitly stating that a previous occurrence in nature of a 
biological material does not prevent it from being the subject of an invention.698 
As regard scope of protection, the Directive provides that “the protection 
conferred by a patent containing or consisting of genetic information shall 
extend to all material(…) in which the product is incorporated and in which 
the genetic information is contained and performs its function.”699 
 
In common law generally (and not only in the United States), the 1980 decision 
of the US Supreme Court in Diamond vs. Chakrabarty700 is commonly referred 
to as a landmark case. In its ruling, the supreme court essentially held that 
inventions involving biological materials and some life forms were patentable 
under US law. This decision spurred a rapid increase in the number of patents 
granted in relation to biotechnology. As a result, a new field of patents covering 
“genetic inventions” emerged, comprising nucleotide DNA or RNA sequences 
that may encode genes or fragments of genes and their application).701 This 
development extended well beyond the US, and inspired the Biotech Directive, 




696 Directive 98/44/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (Biotech Directive). 
697 In Article 5, the Biotech Directive bans the patenting of ‘the entire human body in all its 
development phases’ as well as processes for cloning and modifying the DNA of humans. 
698 For genetic subject matter not related to the human body the Biotech Directive expressly 
declares in Article 3(2) that “biological material which is isolated from its natural environment 
or produced by means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it 
previously occurred in nature.” As regard scope of protection, Article 9 provides that “the 
protection conferred by a patent containing or consisting of genetic information shall extend to 
all material(…) in which the product is incorporated and in which the genetic information is 
contained and performs its function.” 
699 Article 9. 
700 Sidney A. Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, v. Ananda M. Chakrabarty, 
et al., 447 U.S. 303 (United States Supreme Court 16 June). 
701 OECD, Genetic Inventions, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing Practices: Evidence 







Broadly speaking, the patenting of biotechnology is now an accepted and 
integrated part of the intellectual property rights law of most jurisdictions, but 
the extent to which genetic resources found in nature can be patented varies 
considerably. 
 
Certain jurisdictions have ascertained relatively unequivocally that isolated 
genes are patentable. However, lately the pendulum has swung back slightly, 
at least with regards to the possibilities of patenting whole or partial strands of 
DNA and RNA. The US for long generally permitted patentability of genetic 
sequences, provided a specific utility was disclosed (merely identifying the 
existence of a sequence was not considered sufficient). But lately a trend has 
developed in US case law702 and legislative action703 towards more restrictive 
patentability standards.704  
 
In particular, the case the Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics705 together with the ruling in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories706 clarified US patent law in important regards, as 
will be further discussed in section D.3.3. As a consequence of these rulings, 
all patent claims directed to isolated genomic DNA were invalidated.707 
 
Under current jurisprudence in the US, it appears clear that substances 
occurring freely in nature cannot be claimed as patent. However, an isolated or 
purified form thereof is patentable.708 Hence only a very thin line separates 
invention from discovery, and many patents have been granted on purified or 
crystallized products obtained from a natural source of impure material.709 
 
702 See for instance, In re Dane K. Fisher et al., No. 04-1465. In Federal Circuit, 7 September 
2005, which held that genetic markers, known as “expressed sequence tags”, lack substantial 
and specific utility unless the underlying gene function is identified, as discussed by Zewers. 
Zewers, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2008). 
703 Such as the bill presented in the US Congress in February 2007 to prohibit the patenting of 
human genetic material. 
704 Zewers, Loyola University Chicago International Law Review (2008). 
705 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (United States 
Supreme Court). 
706 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (United States 
Supreme Court). 
707 As a consequence of Myriad procedures, primers, or probes of particular genes, also became 
ineligible. 
708 Drankier, et al., The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2012). 






Similarly, the regulation in the European Union provides that ‘biological 
material which is isolated from its natural environment or processed by means 
of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it already 
occurred in nature.’710 However, even if genes are patentable under these 
jurisdictions, they do not become an “invention” by the mere process of 
isolation.711 An inventive step is also required, under US and EU law. There 
are also significant differences between US and EU jurisprudence. In Europe 
patent protection allows for experimentation with patented material, including 
for commercial purposes. US patent law, on the other hand, restricts the use of 
protected material for further research and variation, and hence offers the 
exclusive rights attached to the use and exploitation of the patented material in 
its entirety for a limited period. The possibilities for exceptions to patentability 
have also been used differently across jurisdictions in other regards. The 
European Patent Convention permits exclusion of plant varieties from 
patentability and European states have accordingly excluded these, in contrast 
to the US, Australia and Japan where plant varieties can be patented.712  
 
Other states have explicitly excluded genes from patentability even if isolated. 
A large number of Latin American states exclude in different terms the 
patentability of substances that exist in nature.713 Some states seeking to deny 
patent protection to gene sequences or compounds isolated from genetic 
material found in their jurisdiction have used the ambiguous division between 
micro- and macro organisms under Article 27(3)(b) to argue that genes are not 
micro-organisms within the meaning of TRIPS, but rather components of 
animals or plants. Commonly, this third exception has been invoked in parallel 
with the first exception, relating to ordre public, as discussed above.714 The 
developing country rejection of patentability of innovations based on living 
resources has been largely principal. Patents for forms of life have consistently 
been granted in other states, and, indeed they are granted in countries such as 




710 Article 3.2, The Biotech Directive Directive 98/44/EC. 
711 CORREA. 2007, at 272. 
712 Drankier, et al., The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (2012), at 389. 
713 CORREA. 2007, at 273.  
714 Acharya, Journal of World Trade (1991); Mushita & Thompson, Global Environmental 







On the issue of disclosure of geographic origin, there are similarly significant 
differences across states. 715 The largest group of states set no such 
requirements in patent applications. Many states provide requirements to 
disclose if a genetic resource originates within the state’s own jurisdiction. 
Others provide a more general requirement to indicate in what country genetic 
material has originated. Only a small group of states sets generic requirement 
for place of origin, which would also implicitly involve cases where the genetic 
resource originates in deep-sea areas beyond national jurisdiction.716  
 
It is thus clear that the right to make claims for exclusive rights to inventions 
or discoveries based on deep-sea genetic resources cannot be considered 
universally accepted. Nor does it follow automatically from TRIPS. WTO 
members have in some cases exercised their legitimate right under Article 27 
to exclude the patentability of genes as found in nature, even if isolated or 
purified from higher organisms and processes.717 However, the commercially 
most relevant patent jurisdictions of the EU and the US have not made such 
exceptions. Moreover, categorical exceptions from patentability for genetic 
resources, as appears to apply in some countries, are arguably incompatible 
with TRIPS, insofar as the most central types of deep-sea genetic resources are 
concerned.718 However, this notion could be disputed by these states by 
reference to ethical or moral considerations based on paragraph 2 as the ground 
for exception instead of paragraph 3. Moreover, state practice indicates that 
geographic indication of genetic material is only required by a small number 
of states. 
 
TRIPS thus provides complex and partly ambiguous rules for the patentability 
of genetic resources. In particular, there appears to be uncertainty as to how to 
consider the different types of organisms and processes for which states are 
obliged to enable patentability or able to exempt from patentability.  
 
715 Francioni, International Law for Biotechnology: Basic Principles. 2006 TULLIO SCOVAZZI & 
FRANCESCO FRANCIONI, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Bloomsbury Publishing. 
2006), at 22. 
716 The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore has compiled a table over regulations in different member 
states, WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore - Genetic Resource Disclosure Requirements Table. 2017. 
717 CORREA. 2007, at 273.  
718 Genetic resources encompassed by the terms micro-organisms and non-biological and 






It is however clear that for microorganism genetic resources, which are highly 
relevant in deep-sea bioprospecting, states parties are under obligation to 
enable patentability. In domestic law, rules on patentable subject matter differ 
considerably.  
 
The different positions on these issues are far from new. The patent section of 
the TRIPS Agreement was notoriously difficult to negotiate.719 It appears 
unlikely that a WTO Panel or the Appellate Body would clarify the scope of 
central terms, not only because of the general difficulties WTO dispute 
settlement is currently facing. The competence of such bodies to clarify WTO 
rules is also formally limited.720 
 
C.3.6. Conclusions on international trade law 
 
TRIPS generally requires states to ensure the protection of intellectual property 
rights, including patents to bioactive functions of organisms. States may 
however preclude the patenting of inventions or discoveries based on genetic 
resources. In line with the limitations to the possibility of making exceptions 
from patentability, such exceptions cannot extend to micro-organisms, or non-
biological and microbiological processes.  
 
 
719 The difficulty can be explained by the large number of key North-North as well as North-
South issues involved. See GERVAIS. 2012, at 428-445. 
720 They are not permitted to resolve ambiguities deliberately left in the text by the drafters of 
the agreements and transform the balances in agreed rules. There appears to be widespread 
agreement that the existence of gaps and ambiguities in the TRIPS Agreement indicates that 
members retained a certain amount of room for maneuver at the national level, which should not 
be limited by interpretations by panels or the Appellate Body Correa has considered that in spite 
of the ambiguities, the result is impressive in that the scope and coverage of the section are 
comprehensive. TRIPS overcame the main weakness of its predecessor the Paris Convention by 
not merely relying on domestic law, but actually defining the scope of a patent. CORREA. 2007, 
at 273; Article 3.2 of the WTO DSU expressly prevents panels and the Appellate Body from 
adding rights and obligations when adjudicating disputes. In Canada-Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS114/13, Panel Report (World Trade Organization Panel 18 
August), the Panel alerted against interpretations that ‘would be equivalent of a renegotiation of 
the basic balance of the Agreement.’ ( para. 7-26); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
GATT AND THE WTO : INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS (Cambridge : 







In domestic law, states have related to these possibilities for exceptions 
differently, and can largely be divided across global north/south-lines, with 
developed countries setting no limits to the patentability of genetic resources 
while developing countries have claimed both moral and ethical considerations 
as well as the plants and animals-exception as the basis for rejecting patents on 
genetic resources. 
 
Essentially, the rules in TRIPS imply patentability as a general rule. For 
bioprospecting involving genetic resources of microorganisms, states are even 
unable to make exception from patentability. As discussed in Part B., many of 
the existing deep-sea projects appear to fall within this category. Moreover, the 
rules on patentability do not make any distinction based on geographic origin 
of genetic resources. Nor do the rules require information on genetic 
provenience to be provided in patent data. In lack of such information, it is 
difficult to distinguish both where genetic resources have been sampled in 
individual cases and how common deep-sea origin is compared to other marine 
areas.  
 
Of particular importance to this study, as a result of the lack of such 
requirements in TRIPS it is difficult to establish if biotechnological inventions 
and discoveries have complied with requirements in the law of the sea and 
international environmental law, since these largely are based and depend on 
territorial origin, with significant differences between the rules for areas within 












D. Underlying perspectives on the legal status 
of deep-sea genetic resources 
 
In the previous part, it was discussed how the law of the sea, international 
environmental law and WTO law relate differently to bioprospecting and deep-
sea genetic resources. In Part E, it will be further discussed how the apparent 
inconsistencies across the three regimes in relation to this activity should be 
considered under treaty law. But before investigating the consequences of 
these differences, the reasons will be examined: How can it be explained that 
three sub-regimes of the same system of public international law formulate 
rules with dissimilar or potentially irreconcilable implications for the same 
activity? After all, the lists of parties to the three investigated treaties 
overwhelmingly overlap and these treaties have been negotiated in the same 
legal system of public international law, roughly during the same period.721 
 
This investigation is based on the assumption that rules on central concepts in 
treaties of international law reflect underlying norms in the relevant regimes. 
In this regard, this part of the study is based on the observation made by the 
International Law Commission on the effect of the “speciality” of a regime. As 
expressed by the ILC, “the significance of a special regime lies in the way its 
norms express a unified object and purpose. Thus, their interpretation and 
application should, to the extent possible, reflect that object and purpose.”722  
 
It is hypothesized that the differences in rules applying to deep-sea 
bioprospecting can be explained by fundamentally dissimilar perspectives on 
legal claims to deep-sea genetic resources across the three regimes. Moreover, 
it is assumed, these different conceptions can be exposed by examining the 
development of the relevant treaties, as well as the historical context and 
political dynamics of negotiations. Unravelling the reasons for these dissimilar 
perspectives may provide an explanation for potential inconsistencies between 
the rules of the three treaties in this specific case.  
 
721 The subjective element as well as temporal aspects of the treaties and their negotiation is 
further discussed in section E.3.2 and E.3.3. 
722 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Draft conclusions of the work of the Study 







It may also illustrate differences in the underlying ideological basis of the three 
regimes. Accordingly, this part of the study will attempt to unearth the 
underlying purpose, ideology or ethos of the three regimes, which explain the 
different perspectives of appropriating deep-sea genetic resources. 
 
D.1. The law of the sea 
 
D.1.1. From res omnium communis to common heritage of 
mankind 
 
The status of legal claims to the seas and their resources has been at the heart 
of debate in international law ever since the origin of the law of the sea. Over 
the years, the legal arguments and basis for states and private actors to claim 
exclusive rights to marine spaces and resources have developed. 
Indeed, the history of the law of the seas has been described as a story of 
creeping jurisdiction, where coastal states have gradually expanded their 
sovereign and exclusive rights, step by step enclosing and consuming global 
commons.723 As will be discussed below, this depiction is partly accurate. But 
this development has not gone uncontested. There have always been theorists 
as well as states defending the contention that the seas and their resources are 
– and ought to remain – global commons, with either equal rights for 
appropriation for all actors or global management under common(s) 
institutions. 
 
It is difficult to present an account of the conception of appropriation under the 
law of the sea without seeking its origins. As with many concepts in the law of 
the sea, the theories of Hugo Grotius reverberate in the modern iterations of 
this concept and provide a good starting point for addressing it. When Grotius 
formulated his treaty on the Freedom of the Seas in 1609, the oceans had 
already been a de facto synonym for freedom for centuries.  
 
723 Ross D. Eckert, The Enclosure of Ocean Resources: Economics and the Law of the Sea 
(1979); Churchill & Lowe. 1999; Lewis M. Alexander, The ocean enclosure movement: 
inventory and prospect. (Law of the Sea XV), 20 San Diego Law Review (1983); Philip E. 






Since the oceans could be neither bounded nor exhausted by use, they should 
in Grotius’ view be freely accessible to all and shared amongst nations.724 
Under his doctrine of mare liberum, which since has shaped the legal regime 
of the high seas, the oceans should be regarded as common property in 
perpetuity, for navigation as well as fisheries.725 
 
His treaty and ideas should not be read in isolation, but as a reply amid a lively 
academic debate of the early 17th century. Foremost, it was written as a rebuttal 
to the maritime policy of Portugal, which had claimed exclusivity of traffic to 
the East Indies for trade purposes. The position that oceans could be enclosed 
by states has often been considered as part of the Spanish and Portuguese 
imperialist projects. The opposition to the freedom of the seas was however 
more widespread. John Selden’s Mare Clausum, largely considered to reflect 
the British position at the time, claimed a monopoly over fishing rights in the 
North Sea. Selden maintained that the resources of the sea were just as 
abundant – and just as exhaustible – as land resources. The treaty was written 
as a vigorous defense for the British seizure of some Dutch ships that were 
returning from Greenland waters with a catch of walrus in 1617. However, 
Selden did acknowledge the freedom of navigation and was thus more liberal 
than the Iberic position: He proposed the concept of inoffensive passage (not 
dissimilar to the innocent passage concept included in UNCLOS726 some 350 
years later).727 
 
Nevertheless, Grotius’ Mare liberum understanding of the seas as free 
commons largely prevailed in this debate, albeit in a form modified by his 
compatriot Bynkershoek, who forged a compromise with the Mare Clausum 
camp by suggesting that parts – but only parts – of the sea can be possessed by 
occupation.728  
 
724 Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the seas or The right which belongs to the Dutch to take part 
in the East Indian trade (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin & James Brown Scott trans., The Lawbook 
Exchange. 2001). 
725 Richard Barnes, Entitlement to Marine Living Resources in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF AREAS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: 
CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS (Alex G. Oude Elferink & Erik Jaap Molenaar eds., 2010), 
at 87. 
726 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 1997. 
727 Mónica Brito Vieira, Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden's Debate 
on Dominion over the Seas, 64 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (2003), at 361. 







In realpolitik terms, the success of the concept of the seas as essentially free 
areas can be explained by the British Empire’s increased dependence on free 
navigation for its increasing intercontinental trade.729 
 
The struggle of early modern Europe between different positions on the 
possibility for appropriating seas thus ended with the freedom of the high seas 
prevailing. The high seas parts of oceans thus became – and have remained – 
common resources, “free and open for all” in the words of Grotius.730  
 
Yet, even if the legal regime of the high seas has largely remained intact since 
Grotius’ days, the geographic scope of those areas has decreased. Without 
challenging the legal content of the high seas, coastal states have continuously 
cut away high seas areas by gradually expanding their jurisdiction. This 
development, which was particularly strong during the 20th century, has been 
referred to as creeping jurisdiction and encompasses not only the high seas, but 
increasingly the seafloor of the continental shelf.731 But despite this gradual 
expansion of coastal state jurisdiction, the common areas of the high seas and 
the Area, beyond national jurisdiction, still represent about 64 per cent of the 
surface of the oceans, and around 95 per cent of the ocean’s volume.732  
 
The roots of the legal regime of these areas, as spelled out in UNCLOS, can 
thus be traced back to Grotius’ treaty. Interestingly, Grotius’ thinking was not 
confined to the legal status of the high seas in the broad sense. Rather than 
merely theorizing on the freedom of the seas, Grotius and other contemporary 
lawyers also discussed the legality of property rights to marine resources.  
 
 
729 Hans-Jürgen Wagener, Free Seas, Free Trade, Free People: Early Dutch Institutionalism, 
26 HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (2007). 
730 GROTIUS, The Freedom of the seas or, The right which belongs to the Dutch to take part in 
the East Indian trade. 2000. 
731 Erik Franckx, The 200-mile limit: between creeping jurisdiction and creeping common 
heritage? Some law of the sea considerations from Professor Louis Sohn's former LL.M. student, 
39 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2007), at 469. 
732 As part of the Earth’s total surface, these areas make up around 40 per cent. Measured as 
share of habitable space, areas beyond national jurisdiction make up around 95 per cent of the 
habitat occupied by life on Earth in all its forms. the biodiversity of these areas includes more 
of the major divisions of the forms of life than land ecosystems. THE FIRST GLOBAL INTEGRATED 






In the contemporary debate, different views on the extent of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction were expressed, based on the presumption that jurisdiction should 
be in the form of trusteeship.733 Largely, coastal states’ claims to a territorial 
sea (Grotius called it “the small sea”) were accepted, but only on the condition 
that coastal states managed these seas as trustees, and not owners. Concepts of 
exclusive fisheries zones were also proposed and discussed in that context. 
This can be interpreted as a forerunner of modern ideas of sustainable 
management.  
 
Interestingly, Grotius recognized that discovery did not automatically confer 
property rights: “discovery per se gives no legal rights over things unless 
before the alleged discovery they were res nullius.” 734 The second principle 
from Grotius is closely related, expressing that anything that can be used 
without loss to anyone else is res omnium communis. If constituted by nature 
in a way that, in serving one person, it still suffices for the common use by all, 
it is common property. As an example, Grotius offered, “seas were forever 
exempt from such private ownership on account of their susceptibility to 
universal use.”735 This theory of appropriation of common goods can be 
regarded as the basis for the regulation of resources in marine areas beyond 
national jurisdiction under the modern law of the sea. 
 
In treaty law, the high seas were first recognized as res omnium communis in 
the first International Convention on the Law of the Sea, held in Paris in 1856. 
Subsequent diplomatic conferences at the turn of the 20th century confirmed 
this notion.736 Commonly, this confirmation of Grotian principles of an open 
high seas regime in early treaty law is explained by navigational and 





733 Ingo Klaus Heidbrink, The Oceans as the Common Property of Mankind from Early Modern 
Period to Today, 6 HISTORY COMPASS (2008). 
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The material content of these early attempts at regulating the highs seas should 
not be exaggerated. The regime in this early treaty can by no means be 
considered a developed management concept. Rather, freedom of the seas 
meant essentially non-regulation and laissez-faire which was in the interest of 
the big maritime powers. Historians have shown how this lack of law under the 
freedom of the seas doctrine was often used in the 19th century by European 
powers to threaten small states and obtain concessions from them or simply to 
subjugate them.737 
 
Still, it is not fair to refer to the high seas regime of these early days of treaty 
codification as conceptually not reasoning on issues of resource management. 
The open-access principle applied not only to the high seas as a navigational 
resource, but also to the natural resources therein. It was based on the 
understanding that ocean resources were inexhaustible. Essentially, the regime 
was one of regarding the high seas and its resources as public goods, rather 
than common goods: The risk of overexploiting high seas resources was not 
yet recognized. 
 
In essence, the understanding and legal status of the deep-sea areas beyond 
national jurisdiction for a long time changed little from Grotius’ principles. 
Indeed, the paradigm of the deep seas as being governed by the high seas 
freedoms under the res omnium communis was not challenged before the 
emergence of real interests in appropriating and enclosing deep-sea resources 
in the latter half of the 20th century. 
 
What were the reasons for this sudden rupture from the established 
understanding of high seas resources as res omnium communis? It will now be 
discussed, firstly, how these gradual attempts at appropriating and enclosing 
the deep seas by coastal states evolved. Thereafter, it will be investigated how 
the negotiation of UNCLOS can be regarded in part as a reaction to this process 
of enclosure and appropriation of deep-sea resources. In particular, it will be 
discussed how a counter-movement against enclosure during the UNCLOS 
negotiation process emerged and ignited radical new legal concepts for 
managing common marine resources, which made its way into the negotiation 
outcome. 
 
737 R.P. Anand, Changing Concepts of Freedom of the Seas: A Historical Perspective, in 







D.1.2. UNCLOS I and II - Resource depletion and enclosure 
of the deep seas 
 
Not until the end of the First World War was there evidence that contradicted 
the view that high seas resources were unlimited in supply.738 In certain regions 
with high fisheries pressure, it became evident that stocks were becoming 
depleted. As a result, the League of Nations initiated international regulation 
of high seas fisheries, with the aim of preventing extinction of commercially 
important fisheries. The issue was handled at the Hague Conference for the 
Codification of International Law held in 1930. Among other issues, the 
conference dealt with the territorial waters. Even if it was unable to reach 
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, it presented 13 draft articles in 
its report, setting out foundations for material rights in the territorial sea.739 At 
the time, fish was the only resource considered commercially relevant in the 
deep sea. But the discourse was more general. These early attempts to manage 
deep-sea fisheries mark an important shift from the perception of high seas 
resources as a public good to a common-pool resource.740 Still, these early 
foundations of fisheries management linked access to preservation of the 
resource base. Rather than setting up a regime privatizing the fisheries, the 
regulation continued to be based on the res omnium communis principle. 
Instead of privatizing the resource, the aim was to ensure a sufficient supply 
for all.741  
 
Even if the management principles for the high seas remained intact, the 
geographic scope of the high seas was transformed in subsequent decades. The 
apparent first act for enclosing the seas was made by US President Harry 
Truman, who in 1945 declared that the United States had the exclusive right to 
 
738 That is to say the resources of what was considered high seas at the time. As discussed below 
this included areas now considered part of exclusive economic zones as well as parts of the 
territorial sea. 
739 Tommy Koh, The origins of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 29 MALAYA LAW 
REVIEW (1987). 
740 In economic theory, public goods and common pool resources are both non-excludable. The 
main difference is their rivalry property: public goods can be consumed without reducing 
availability for others, while consuming common pool resources will decrease the available 
resources for others. See, for instance Jose Apesteguia & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, The Role of 
Rivalry: Public Goods Versus Common-Pool Resources, 50 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
(2006). 







exploit all resources in its territorial waters, defined as on or under the 
continental shelf. From 1945 to 1957, 41 other enclosure declarations or laws 
were enacted by various countries.742 The freedom of the high seas also slowly 
became more of a “relative” freedom as the international community 
increasingly cooperated to regulate activities.  
 
The decades after the Truman declaration were thus marked by increased 
enclosures. Whereas the Truman declaration and the ensuing discussion of the 
1940s and 50s had focused on the continental shelf, political events in the high 
seas and resulting enclosures soon set the breadth of exclusive coastal state 
rights to the water column in focus. In the North Sea, the coastal states Norway 
and Iceland started to challenge foreign fisheries in the vicinity of their coasts. 
In December 1951, the International Court of Justice recognized Norwegian 
claims for exclusive fisheries rights in an area which by domestic decree had 
been declared as their territorial sea.743  
 
Bolstered by this coastal state success, Iceland soon started to pursue legal 
activism against foreign trawlers operating off their coast. In 1952, Iceland 
unilaterally extended the limits of their exclusive fishery zone from 3 to 4 
nautical miles. This was disputed and resulted in trade sanctions by the United 
Kingdom, until they finally accepted the Icelandic claim in 1956 as the result 
of pressure by the United States, which was in turn motivated by Iceland’s 
strategic position in the Cold War.744 
 
Against this backdrop, where sovereign declarations for enclosures as well as 
the acceptance of such declarations increased, the First United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was convened in 1958. Lasting 
for only two months but standing on the shoulders of extensive preparatory 
work of the International Law Commission, the conference adopted the four 
conventions, which are commonly known as the 1958 Geneva Conventions: 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone; The Convention 
on the High Seas; The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas; and The Convention on the Continental Shelf.  
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While in many regards laying the foundations for the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, the 1958 conventions failed to bring about agreement on central 
issues. Foremost, like the Hague Conference of 1930, it did not manage to 
establish a maximum breadth of the territorial sea. The 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas addressed what can and cannot be controlled in 
international waters, e.g. piracy, pollution, and the activity of warships.745  
 
However, the material obligations were limited and the convention did little to 
prevent coastal state appropriation of high seas territory. The legality of the 
enclosure of common marine areas was regarded as an issue of prime interest, 
with conflicting views arising in response to it. During the conference, several 
coastal states, including Iceland, insisted, albeit with limited success, on 
extending the right for territorial waters.746 Still, the conference outcome in 
important regards was a victory for coastal states at the expense of the high 
seas. More than 60 jurisdictional extensions were confirmed. The 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention essentially confirmed the Truman Proclamation. 
However, instead of full territorial sovereignty over the continental shelf, 
coastal states were granted “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and 
exploiting its natural resources.”747 These rules were subsequently upheld in 
UNCLOS.  
 
In the years after UNCLOS I, increased pressure on high seas resources created 
new efforts for coastal states enclosure. The Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967 
off the coast of England called into question whether the freedom of navigation 
should not be curtailed for environmental purposes.748 Similarly, the freedom 
of fishing was increasingly called into question. Technological progress 
enabled a rapidly increasing fishing effort at a cheaper price.  
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Factory freezing ships for the first time enabled large-scale distant-water 
fishing. The annual worldwide fish catch doubled between 1955 and 1967. As 
a reaction, only four months after UNCLOS I, Iceland decided to unilaterally 
expand their fishery zone from 4 to 12 nautical miles. This marked the start of 
the first Cod War, where UK trawlers protected by war ships, under the pretext 
of the high seas freedoms, would dispute the Icelandic claim.749 
 
These increased political tensions caused by the enclosures, as well as the 
reactions to such declarations, prompted the United Nations General Assembly 
to once again consider the key unresolved question of the extent of territorial 
seas, together with that of fishing limits, worthy of a further effort to reach 
agreement. These were tabled as the main items on the agenda of the Second 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which was summoned for 
one month in Geneva in 1960. However, this Conference also failed to fulfill 
the objective of bringing about agreement on these issues.750  
 
But at least tacitly, the conference did accept the Icelandic claims during the 
Cod Wars, thereby legitimizing extensive enclosures. Following the UNCLOS 
II, a settlement was reached, albeit combined with interim measures.751 In spite 
of this apparent victory for coastal state ambitions, as we will see below, this 
was not the end of these states’ ambitions to enclose high seas based on 
fisheries interest. 
 
The period up to the second conference on the law of the sea was thus marked 
by enclosures of vast marine areas and appropriation by states of the resources 
therein. This did not pass unnoticed, but sparked reaction and in some cases 
outright conflict between states. Meanwhile, the international law system 
failed to reach agreement on central issues, such as the extent of relevant 
maritime zones. Importantly, the negotiations of UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II, 
however implicitly, accepted and legitimized enclosures.  
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Even if different opinions were voiced on how far-reaching coastal state 
maritime zones should be in codification, existing claims were not questioned 
during the negotiations but rather treated as a fait accompli. The most evident 
example of this is that by the time UNCLOS II started, the UK had already 
been forced to accept Icelandic appropriation of high seas and the claim was 
never disputed during the negotiations. Acceptance of such claims was thereby 
already implicit in the basis for the negotiations, which in itself was an 
important victory for coastal states keen on increasing their maritime zones. 
The fact that concrete codified agreements in this regard did not materialize 
was less important for coastal states, since the status quo was working in their 
favor.752 This tacit acceptance of enclosure amounted to a rather radical 
transformation of the law of the sea. Material rules for the high seas, including 
its freedoms and the conception of res omnium communis, were left unaltered. 
But the geographical scope for those rules was effectively shrunken by coastal 
states. 
 
D.1.3. The development of the common heritage of mankind 
principle 
 
The period between UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II did not just see renewed 
efforts for enclosure by coastal states. Many states opposed this movement. Up 
until the late 1960s, such objections against enclosure had always been 
formulated based on the interest of protecting the freedom of the seas. 
However, after UNCLOS II a new strain of argument against the enclosure of 
oceans commons unfolded. In 1967, arguments were for the first time raised 
based on the contention that oceans commons should not be free in the notion 
of free from restrictions, but rather free from appropriation by coastal (or any 
other) state. Under this new approach, common marine resources should be 
regarded as belonging to all of humanity and be managed for mankind 
collectively, in particular to promote development and equality in resource 
allocation among states.  
 
The first time this concept was articulated in a law of the sea context was at the 
UN General Assembly at the 22nd session, in 1967. The proposal was tabled by 
Malta.  
 







It was titled: “Declaration and treaty concerning the reservation exclusively 
for peaceful purposes of the seabed and of the ocean floor, underlying the seas 
beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources 
in the interest of mankind.”753 The central principle embodied in the proposal 
came to be referred to as the principle of the common heritage of mankind.754 
 
The proposal was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in which 
Malta raised the fear of national appropriation of the ocean floor beyond the 
continental shelf because of rapid technological development, and as a result a 
militarization of the ocean floor and the exploitation of its immense resources 
by a few technologically advanced countries.755 States supporting the Maltese 
proposal contended that there existed a legal vacuum in the deep seabed. The 
concept of the common heritage of mankind, they claimed, transcended res 
nullius, res communis and other concepts, and sought to fill that vacuum. As 
presented by Malta, the common heritage of mankind proposal did not include 
any effort to provide a definition of the concept.756 This resulted in considerable 
confusion as to the content of the principle among states (a confusion which, 
to a substantial degree, persists to this day). 
 
Some explanation was, however, provided. The major implications of the 
concept, as presented by the Maltese ambassador Arvid Pardo, were firstly that 
the common heritage can be used but not owned. In this sense there are 
communalities between common heritage and res communis. The reason for 
using heritage rather than property was because, in the opinion of Pardo, 
property was a form of power and since the time of Roman Law it had implied 
jus utendi et abutendi (right to use and misuse). Heritage implied a distinction 
in that regard, namely that the resource should be carefully managed. Secondly, 
the use of common heritage requires a balanced system of management. This 
is different from the management of a res communis, which can be fulfilled by 
each individual state or person.  
 
753 United Nations, 22nd Session, First Committee, 1515th Meeting, 1 November 1967, Doc 
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Thirdly, common heritage implies an active sharing of benefits, which again is 
different from the case of a res communis. Fourthly, the concept implies 
reservation for peaceful purposes, and finally it promises preservation for 
future generations.757 This original vision of Pardo has been interpreted as 
implying that common heritage entailing a notion of common use of or access 
to a certain property but not common ownership.758  
 
Malta’s proposal indeed marked a rupture from conventional legal perspectives 
of marine resources. Not only was it radical in a contemporary context. It also 
marked a shift from the res omnium communis principle, that ever since 
Grotius’ days had been the basis for managing common marine resources. 
Foremost, the proposal can be regarded as a reaction to the enclosure which 
had increased in the years leading up to the Maltese proposal. Yet, there are 
two other factors that explain the timing and rationale of the common heritage 
of mankind principle, as well as the widespread support it attracted by 
developing states during the negotiations of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Foremost, the principle 
forms part of a broader movement criticizing established models of resource 
distribution among states in international law. Moreover, the principle was a 
reaction not just to enclosure, but also to resource depletion in the oceans 
commons. It will be examined below how both these aspects played out during 
UNCLOS III. First, however, the reaction to the Maltese proposal will be 
discussed, in order to illustrate the different perceptions that states had on the 
appropriation of common resources in the period leading up to UNCLOS III, 
as well as during its negotiation. 
 
D.1.4. Initial objections to the common heritage of mankind 
principle 
 
Even proponents of the concept of common heritage of mankind agreed that it 
was alien to international law as developed over centuries. Indeed, some 
delegations even stressed this as an advantage; the proposal would mark a 
rupture in relation to established unjust resource distribution principles.759  
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It therefore came as little surprise that the proposal did not go uncontested. The 
opponents can largely be divided into two groups. The first group consisted of 
capitalist industrialized countries with deep-sea mining technology. The 
second group consisted of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. 
 
The argument of the first group was essentially that the freedoms of the high 
seas should also apply to deep-sea resources. Without making aspirations for 
sovereign or exclusive rights to the deep-sea resources, these countries insisted 
on affirming the freedom to access and use the resources without any 
discrimination in the new treaty. Referring to similar positions in negotiations 
in space law760 around the same time, this group of states argued that there 
should “be a clear distinction between non-appropriation of the sea-bed” on 
the one hand and “the exploitation or use of it on the other.”761  
 
760 Space law generally is characterized with a high degree of parallelism in relation to the law 
of the sea. In the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, Article 2 declares “Outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by 
means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”, Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (1967). Similarly, the 1979 Moon 
agreement declares that “the exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all 
mankind and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective 
of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due regard shall be paid to the interests 
of present and future generations as well as to the need to promote higher standards of living 
and conditions of economic and social progress and development in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations” (Article 4). The Moon Agreement also provides more direct 
application of the common heritage of mankind principle. “The moon and its natural resources 
are the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this 
Agreement, in particular in paragraph 5 of this article. 2. The moon is not subject to national 
appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means. 3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural 
resources in place, shall become property of any State, international intergovernmental or non- 
governmental organization, national organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural 
person. The placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and 
installations on or below the surface of the moon, including structures connected with its surface 
or subsurface, shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the 
moon or any areas thereof.” (Article 11), Agreement governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 5 December 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979).; See also RICKY 
LEE, LAW AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL MINING OF MINERALS IN OUTER SPACE (Springer 
Netherlands. 2012), at 203-271 for an investigation of the relationship between common heritage 
of mankind in law of the sea and space law. 






Whereas many states in the group consistently rejected the equation of the term 
heritage with property and the notion that the resources of the deep seabed 
belong to the world community, some members of the group appear to have 
been open to at least part of the common heritage vision. However, that came 
with a different interpretation compared to developing countries. Apart from 
the principal objections, this group of states also objected to the common 
heritage of mankind concept as proposed by Malta on the ground that it would 
be difficult to formulate legal norms based on the lofty language.762 
 
The second group, dominated by socialist states, reacted surprisingly similarly 
to the capitalist states. They rejected a priori the common heritage concept as 
a notion lacking clarity and precision from the standpoint of international law. 
Perhaps counterintuitive in light of this group of states being socialist, they 
contended that interpreting common heritage as common property or collective 
ownership would be utopian in light of the realities of the world. Contrary to 
the supporters of the common heritage principle, they claimed that a regulation 
implying collective ownership would not prevent but stimulate appropriation 
of deep-sea resources.  
 
In fact, the socialist group went further in opposing the common heritage 
proposal than capitalist industrialized countries by disputing the suggestion 
that there was a legal lacuna for the deep seas, a notion that capitalist 
industrialized countries at least implicitly appeared to accept. Rather, the 
socialist states contended that the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the 
high seas freedoms, provided sufficient regulation for deep-sea resources, 
which should not be regulated differently compared to the high seas.763 Once 
the principle had gained acceptance by the General Assembly in the Seabed 
Declaration despite facing some opposition764, as discussed in section C.1.4, 
the socialist states made clear that they interpreted the principle to mean that 
“the seabed is at the general disposal of all states and not subject to any 
appropriation.”765  
 
762 U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.28, p. 118; A/AC.138/SR.72; U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SR.58, p. 201.; 
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763 U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.1/SR.12-29, pp. 26.27 (The Soviet Union), as cited in id. at 125. 
764 United Nations General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV), Declaration of Principles 
Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of 
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As observed by Mahmoudi, this equates the concept of the common heritage 
of mankind with the res communis omnium and the principle of the freedom of 
the high seas.766 For all but formal purposes, this group of states reserved 
themselves against respecting the principle. 
 
D.1.5. UNCLOS III - the reaction to enclosure 
 
How then, did the proposal of building deep-sea management on the basis of 
the common heritage of mankind-principle and the approval of the Seabed 
Declaration alter the dynamics of the negotiation of UNCLOS? 
 
Once the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III) was formally started in 1973, the debate over the legal status of deep-sea 
resources, including the common heritage of mankind became part of the 
agenda. But the conflict between states promoting and objecting to enclosure 
in UNCLOS III was not confined to the issue of ownership or appropriation of 
deep-sea resources or the principle of common heritage of mankind. The 
conflict on the issue of enclosure, largely between coastal and other states, 
went deeper and encompassed more areas. Nor was it, as we have seen, a new 
disagreement; rather, it reflected one of the fundamental disputes of law of the 
sea being brought to a new arena. The opening of the conference marked the 
start of a negotiation – a more open and formal competition between two 
distinct evolutionary processes of international law aiming to forge new 
property arrangements in the oceans. In the process, historical dynamics also 
influenced the negotiations. The enclosure movement of the oceans was the 
older and more decentralized process of the two. For coastal states, high seas 
freedoms were partly regarded as ambiguous or even obsolete parts of 
international law. From their perspective, coastal states could legitimately 
make claims for new enclosures of high seas for a number of reasons, one being 
that scientific evidence indicated that resources were becoming depleted in 
areas of common and free access. This, they effectively claimed, disproved the 
notion of a functioning res omnium communis.767 
 
States geographically disabled from benefiting from enclosures, on the other 
hand, entered UNCLOS III with the objective of drafting the new treaty as a 
reaction to the development which had been ongoing at least since the Truman 
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declaration: Landlocked countries desired to prevent further territorial claims, 
which (they perceived) effectively marked a rapid enclosure of the high seas. 
For these states, the treaty making process in the form of UNCLOS III should 
thus aim to safeguard the freedoms of the high seas, as well as the geographic 
integrity of common marine areas. Indeed, for geographically disadvanta-
geously located states the coming treaty was seen as a last chance to halt 
sovereign claims for enclosure, which regularly, albeit unpredictably, occurred 
(as was the case with Iceland’s unilateral expansions of its territorial sea).  
 
Compared to this movement of gradually transforming international law to 
facilitate enclosure, the negotiation of UNCLOS was more comprehensive, in 
at least three ways. Firstly, the treaty negotiation was not limited to coastal 
states, but encompassed all interested states. Landlocked states came to play 
an important role. This affected the dynamics of the negotiation: Right from 
the start it was clear that a large group of states would object to increased rights 
for coastal states. Secondly, the negotiations of UNCLOS aimed to encompass 
all activities and uses of the seas. This marked a substantial change in relation 
to the enclosure movement as well as previous treaties, which in principle had 
been limited to addressing issues of navigation, offshore hydrocarbons and 
fisheries. UNCLOS negotiations aimed to regulate also other issues. Some 
were explicitly mentioned in the mandate, such as marine scientific research 
and marine mining. Indeed, the scope of the treaty negotiation was open ended: 
As discussed under Part A, even new, i.e. as yet unknown, activities were 
supposed to be covered by the treaty. Thirdly, soon after the launch of the 
conference it became evident that other options than state ownership of 
resources would be considered as possible options for management regimes, 
such as administration of resources by the United Nations.768  
 
Once the first negotiation conference started, however, it became clear that 
coastal states would strive for a broad range of exclusive rights under the new 
treaty. In many regards the convention also came to extend the jurisdiction of 
coastal states. By 1978 it appeared that the conference would yield a treaty 
which reinforced the enclosure movement rather than reversed it.769  
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The principle of the freedoms of the high seas was certainly recognized in the 
convention, but it was cut short by a number of derogations, as explained in 
Part A. Landlocked countries and in particular developing countries expressed 
objections to this development during the conference.770 Against this backdrop, 
it was not surprising that Pardo’s proposal for a deep-sea regime for the benefit 
of the common heritage of mankind was greeted with so much enthusiasm by 
these states. It can be regarded as a reaction to the disappointment from 
developed and landlocked states in light of the enclosures that coastal states 
had managed to reach during the previous stages of negotiations.771 
 
This provides an important explanatory factor for the proposal to declare the 
deep seabed as the common heritage of mankind. Developing countries wanted 
to ensure that the resources of the deep sea were not appropriated by the more 
powerful and technologically advanced states. Also, the common heritage of 
mankind principle can be regarded as an operationalization of Grotius’ 
heritage. The pillar of his argument for freedom relied on the idea of sharing a 
common domain: the sea. The desire to regulate these traditionally unregulated 
areas as common heritage of mankind was not occurring in a Mare Clausum 
type of policy, but rather following a growing recognition that there was a 
further need to share the resources provided by the planet. This realization 
contributed to calls for international cooperation and regulation in order to put 
the adequate frameworks in place within which such sharing can happen in a 
peaceful and harmonized way.772 
 
D.1.6. The New International Economic Order 
 
The proposal to manage resources of areas beyond national jurisdiction under 
the common heritage of mankind principle can thus at least partly be 
interpreted as a reaction to the perceived enclosure of marine resources by 
coastal states. Non-coastal and developing states had hoped that the creeping 
advancement of coastal state jurisdiction would be halted by the negotiation of 
UNCLOS.  
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But in important regards the first part of the negotiations instead ended up 
confirming coastal state aspirations. This only increased developing countries’ 
calls for a more balanced outcome. 
 
The reaction to the enclosure movement development did not simply comprise 
a desire to halt enclosure. To a larger degree, it formed part of a more profound 
critique of the equity of the global economic system and in particular the 
allocation of resources. The discussion on how to manage the resources of the 
deep sea started at the time of increased and dynamic cooperation among 
developing states, with shared aspirations to challenge established principles 
in the global economic system.773 This movement is commonly referred to as 
the New International Economic Order, and associated with a General 
Assembly resolution with the same name as well as the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States’of 1974.774. This movement was strongly supported 
by developing countries sharing both the experience of colonization and the 
consideration that their challenges to catch up with industrialized, 
technologically advanced countries was the result of the policy of exploiting 
developing countries’ resources.775 There was a widespread commitment 
among these states to strive for a remodeling of the international system, to 
reverse the perceived mechanisms of exploitation.776 More than just a strain of 
thought or political conviction, the ideology of the New International 
Economic Order offered developing countries an interpretation of the existing 
“old” international order, largely predicated on the principles of the Western 
ideology of economic liberalism, and it rallied them in their struggle for a more 
equitable new international order. 
 
In international relations, the New International Economic Order had its 
strongest support around the time of the Third International Conference on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).777  
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Its culmination thereby coincided with the negotiations of the deep-sea regime. 
From the perspective of developing countries, it was only natural to attempt to 
implement the New International Economic Order ideology in the negotiations 
of UNCLOS III, which encompassed management principles for previously 
unregulated resources. Several delegations openly declared that a key objective 
was to prevent the colonial injustices incurred in the management of terrestrial 
resources from being repeated in the management of deep-sea resources.778 
Indeed, two reasons made the negotiations of UNCLOS III a particularly fertile 
ground for the New International Economic Order discourse. Firstly, there was 
a widespread belief that the oceans contained enormous quantities of 
exploitable resources, as will be discussed in section D.1.7. The discussion 
focused on but was not limited to minerals. Secondly, from a management 
perspective the deep seas were regarded as pristine land. This made it 
particularly suitable for testing new concepts. Here, the lack of regulation made 
it possible to counter colonial and historical injustices and ensure a more 
equitable distribution of wealth. In particular, New International Economic 
Order advocates considered that deep-sea resources should be prevented from 
being appropriated by private or individual state actors, and instead used to 
enable development in poorer states. The law of the sea thus became an arena 
in which the traditional Western international order was challenged by the 
ideology of the New International Economic Order. 
 
In the common heritage of mankind principle, developing countries thus not 
only saw an opportunity to prevent colonial domination from being repeated 
in the deep sea; based on optimistic predictions about the riches of deep-sea 
resources, they also hoped that the benefits of deep-sea resources could be used 
to reduce the inequalities between rich and poor states.779 
 
Moreover, the negotiating objectives of the supporters of the New International 
Economic Order were not limited to the management of the deep sea. The 
purpose was rather to let all parts of the convention reflect the ambition to 
change the fundaments of the world economy.  
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Accordingly, the impact can be seen across the convention.780 Already in the 
preamble of UNCLOS, the influence of the New International Economic Order 
can be distinguished.781 
 
Bearing in mind that the achievement of these goals will contribute to 
the realization of a just and equitable international economic order 
which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole 
and, in particular, the special interests and needs of developing 
countries, whether coastal or land-locked. 
 
Similarly, operational provisions aiming to use UNCLOS as a vehicle for 
promoting New International Economic Order values can be found in Part XIII 
dealing with marine scientific research, as well as Part XIV dealing with the 
transfer of marine technology. 
 
Apart from the obvious influence of the New International Economic Order in 
the management regime of deep-sea resources, Part XI of the Convention also 
contains obligations to critically evaluate how successful the convention has 
been in bringing about equity.782 
 
As shown by Mahmoudi, the introduction of the Maltese proposal in 1967 also 
coincided with concrete challenges to economic development of developing 
countries. 783 Moreover, around the same time developing countries had, with 
increasing success, started to act in concert in the UN, as the Group of 77. The 
formation of the G77 is intimately bound up with the development of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development during the 1960s (UNCTAD).784  
 
780 For a more elaborated investigation of how the new international economic order is reflected 
in different parts of UNCLOS see John Gamble & Maria Frankowska, International law's 
response to the New International Economic Order: an overview, 9 BOSTON COLLEGE 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW (1986). 
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782 See, for instance, Article 155 para. 2: “The Review Conference shall ensure the maintenance 
of the principle of the common heritage of mankind, the international regime designed to ensure 
equitable exploitation of the resources of the Area for the benefit of all countries, especially the 
developing States.” 
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The formation of UNCTAD provided a developing country driven 
counterweight to the Bretton Woods institutions, including attempts to set up 
an international trade organization. But more importantly, it propelled the New 
International Economic Order concept and restored confidence among 
developing states. Previously divided along Cold War lines, the formation of 
the G77 for the first time made developing states act in concert with force in 
UN negotiations.785 This spirit of collectivism and sentiment of joint interest 
among developing countries was particularly strong during UNCLOS III and 
can be regarded as the main reason why proponents of the common heritage of 
mankind principle were successful in gaining acceptance for the proposal.786 
Or rather, the relationship between these concepts was circular: The push for 
the common heritage of mankind principle was in line with and closely 
connected to the values reflected in UNCTAD, which in turn had enabled the 
formation of the G77, which also provided the necessary platform for 
developing states during the negotiations of UNCLOS III. 
 
Often heralded as one of the greatest triumphs for developing countries in 
international law, a closer investigation of the negotiation history carried out 
by Mahmoudi, however, reveals that support for the common heritage of 
mankind concept was actually more widespread. Several developed states, 
notably the Nordic countries, Switzerland and Australia supported the 
principle.787  
 
With regards to interpretation of the principle, these states contended that 
common heritage implied a notion of ownership, a property owned by mankind 
in the sense that unlike res communis, none might take any part of it without 
the consent of all. Initially this assertion was combined with several different 
proposals for implementation. There was, however, widespread agreement that 
there should be equitable participation of all states in the administration of the 
common heritage. Common ownership and common administration would 
logically lead to the sharing of benefits on an equitable basis.  
 
785 An examination of the negotiation documents, in particular from the proceedings of the first 
committee of UNCLOS III dealing with seabed resources, shows that in many regards the 
consistency of developing country unity in many regards was considerably higher compared to 
non-socialist industrialized states, NORDQUIST, et al. 2002., at 103-111. 
786 Edward L. Miles, Global Ocean Politics: Decision Process at the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1973-1982 (Kluwer Law. 1997). 






In addition, claims for preferential rights for developing states were raised. On 
the institutional side, developing states also contended that common 
management made common representation necessary, and that a specific 
management organization had to be set up, to act on behalf of mankind for the 
management of its property. This would later become the International Seabed 
Authority.788 In sum, these states called for common ownership, common 
management and equitable distribution of benefits, in order to ensure a de facto 
and genuine equality of states instead of the prevailing de jure equality.789 
 
After extensive debates, the principle of common heritage of mankind 
eventually gained acceptance. After having tabled the issue for three sessions, 
the United Nations General Assembly established that the use of the seas was 
for the benefit of humanity, equitably shared. The seabed, ocean floor, and 
subsoil were declared “the common heritage of mankind … [The] exploitation 
of its resources shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 
irrespective of the geographical location of states, whether landlocked or 
coastal, and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of the 
developing countries … [It ensured] the equitable sharing [of its] benefits.”790 
This declaration is the regulative origin for the common heritage of mankind 
principle later included in UNCLOS. The dominance of developing countries 
within the general assembly explains why proponents of the principle pursued 
the strategy to adopt a resolution, rather than addressing the issue at the 
UNCLOS negotiations. The subsequent treaty negotiation of the deep-sea 
regime was effectively bound by the resolution and spelled out operative 
provisions in line with its ambition.  
 
D.1.7. Increased human involvement in the deep seas 
 
It has now been discussed how both enclosure and the discourse of the New 
International Economic Order affected the discussion and negotiation relating 
to the appropriation of deep-sea resources.  
 
788 A. V. Lowe, The international seabed: a legacy of mistrust, 5 MARINE POLICY (1981). 
789 As expressed by Yugoslavia in U.N. Doc A/c.1/PV.1784, para.62, as cited in MAHMOUDI. 
1987, at 128. 
790 The resolution passed by 108 to 0 with 14 abstentions. United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 2749 (XXV), Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, 
and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, A/RES/25/2749 (12 







A similarly important explanatory factor for the central role that the concept of 
the common heritage of mankind attained in the negotiations was the resource 
depletion in the oceans commons, which accelerated during the time of 
UNCLOS III, as well as the increase in knowledge of deep-sea resources 
generally. In both cases, technological improvements played a major role.  
 
Fisheries management is not the focus of the present study, but the 
enhancement of fisheries technology and the ensuing competition for and 
depletion of fisheries resources around the years of the negotiation of 
UNCLOS are still relevant in this context. Firstly, the depletion of fish stocks 
and increased competition for remaining resources provide important 
explanations for high seas enclosure, which in turn sparked the reaction to 
which the common heritage of mankind principle forms part. Secondly, 
fisheries’ depletion transformed the perception of marine resources generally, 
making it obvious that they were exhaustible. This sentiment would provide a 
solid argument for not letting the freedom of the seas extend to deep-sea 
resources, once UNCLOS started to negotiate the subject. 
 
The depletion of living resources thus sparked discussions over how regulation 
in the high seas would be pursued, a discussion that would transform 
fundamental conceptions of appropriation in the law of the sea. The common 
heritage of mankind principle can be regarded as part of this discussion, and at 
least in part as a reaction to the resource depletion. 
 
Long-distance fisheries in the high seas had commenced prior to the start of 
the negotiations of UNCLOS. It has already been discussed how that 
development found the basis for the expansion of Iceland’s territorial sea in the 
1950s. But it was during the years leading up to the negotiation of UNCLOS 
III that technology for the first time enabled a rapid growth in extraction of a 
substantial part of these resources: The total world catch trebled in 20 years, 
from 20 million tons in 1950 to 70 million in 1970. The improvement in 
techniques for finding and capturing fish, and processing the catch at sea, with 
trawlers and factory-freezer ships, rang alarm bells in some coastal states, as 
stocks in nearby waters soon shrank.791  
 
 






In addition to empirical evidence of decreasing fish stocks, commons regimes 
in general came under increased scrutiny in economic theory around the end 
of the 1960s, when Hardin published Tragedy of the commons.792 The paper 
and the ensuing debate casted light on the inherent problems of open-access 
management of common resources. As observed by Hardin, ‘the inherent logic 
of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy’, as free access and 
availability to resources leads to over-exploitation and minimizes the interest 
of any individual state in conservation and restraint.793 Gradually, the adverse 
consequences of open access for the sustainability and effective exploitation 
of marine living resources became recognized.794 As a result, it became 
increasingly evident that to prevent the resources of the deep seas from 
becoming depleted, it was no longer viable to effectively manage them as res 
nullius under the mare liberum principle. This widespread realization of the 
unviability of unrestrained access to common resources worked to the 
advantage of coastal states, which used the argument to promote further 
enclosures, based on their desire to increase their maritime claims, as discussed 
in section D.1.2. In the Icelandic Fisheries Cases in 1974795, the ICJ also 
expressed observations on the character of high-seas fishing resources as 
common property. As observed by Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell: 
 
While the decision confirmed that established fishing states continued to 
have high-seas rights beyond the twelve-mile limit of coastal state 
fisheries jurisdiction, the court also found that all the states concerned 
had an obligation of reasonable use which required them to take account 
of the needs of conservation and to allow coastal states preferential 
rights in the allocation of high-seas stocks. In the court’s view, there 
was an obligation on all parties to negotiate in good faith with a view to 
reaching an equitable solution.796  
 
Moreover, during UNCLOS III, a rudimentary management model for deep-
sea fisheries was therefore included in the part governing the high seas.  
 
792 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE (1968). 
793 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 195. 
794 Barnes, Entitlement to Marine Living Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction. 
2010, at 87. 
795 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland), Merits, Judgment ICJ Rep 3, ICGJ 142 
(International Court of Justice 18 December). 







Essentially, the regulation of high seas fisheries was based on the same 
maximum sustainable yield and total allowable catch concepts as in marine 
areas within national jurisdiction (see section C.1.5.2). But as compared to 
fisheries management within national jurisdiction, an obvious weakness of the 
high seas fisheries management, as provided by UNCLOS III, was that it did 
not bring about any mechanism enforcing the rules. Whereas coastal states 
were given the exclusive mandate to implement and enforce the modalities for 
fisheries management within enclosed marine areas, the same modalities were 
combined with an unaltered open-access concept in the high seas.797 For 
practical purposes, the implications of the high seas rules on fisheries were thus 
limited. The status quo effectively persisted, and frustration with the continued 
depletion of stocks eventually resulted in renewed negotiations, leading up to 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995.798 As previously discussed, the 
UNFSA did not privatize or enclose high seas fish stocks. Instead, this 
implementing agreement to UNCLOS provided for interested states to set up 
cooperation institutions to set maximum sustainable yields and allocate quotas. 
Such regional fisheries management organizations have been set up for many 
high seas areas. Despite the development of high seas management of fisheries, 
it should be borne in mind that it still resides on the mare liberum concept. 
Even under the regional approach of the UNFSA, there are possibilities for 
new states to enter regulated fisheries. Moreover, many fisheries remain 
unregulated.799 
 
Although the common heritage of mankind principle was not formulated as 
extending to high seas fisheries, whether in the 1970 declaration or in 
UNCLOS, this can partly be explained by the realization that deep-sea 
resources were becoming depleted by unviable extraction on the part of states. 
During the years leading up to UNCLOS III, it became evident that the deep 
sea was not an infinite resource; rather, human technology could empty its 
resources. As a reaction, ideas of setting up management institutions for deep-
sea resources under commons principles gained ground.800 
 
 
797 Up until the 200 nautical mile limit of the exclusive economic zone, see Part A.1. 
798 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. 1997. 
799 Sarika Cullis-Suzuki & Daniel Pauly, Failing the high seas: A global evaluation of regional 
fisheries management organizations, 34 MARINE POLICY (2010). 






The increased knowledge of and human involvement in the deep sea was not 
limited to fisheries. Development of technology enabling deep-sea research 
increased knowledge of other deep-sea resources than fish during the latter half 
of the 20th century. States started to become aware of the potential for 
extraction of valuable deep-sea minerals. There was scientific excitement set 
off by discoveries starting in the late 1950s which widely increased the 
knowledge of the deep seafloor and found extensive deposits of manganese 
nodules.801 Predictions in 1965 foresaw that by 1985 operations would be 
processing 50 million tons of nodules annually.802 In hindsight it is clear that 
these predictions were widely exaggerated, not in respect of the mineral wealth 
or the ability of technology to mine the resources, but rather in terms of the 
economic feasibility of deep-sea mining.803 But it illustrates that the discussion 
on how deep-sea resources should be managed and divided was not theoretical, 
but based on genuine interests. Indeed, the insight in the potential value of 
resources beyond national jurisdiction transformed the perception of the deep 
seas as containing little besides fish of commercial value, into an area of 
potential and uncharted treasures. Essentially, the assumption of the deep sea 
as res nullius was disproved also in this regard. 
 
The course from the realization of the extent of value of deep-sea resources to 
the establishment of the common heritage of mankind regime was by no means 
straight. As discussed previously, a number of states, led by the United States, 
consistently objected to the concept that the deep seas should be governed as 
commons under specific global institutions. These states contended that the 
realization that there were more resources than previously assumed essentially 
boosted their argument: Why would a restrictive regime have to be put in place 
for a resource which was not scarce? 804 The Reagan administration, in office 
during the final years of the negotiation of UNCLOS, contended that the 
freedom of the high seas, recognized by all for navigation, could be extended 
to the exploitation of minerals, and that seabed minerals should open to all on 
a “first come” basis.805  
 
801 SANGER. 1986. 
802 Richard J. Payne, Mining the Deep Seabed: The Political, Economic and Legal Struggle, 40 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS (1978). 
803 Carol B. Thompson, International Law of the Sea/Seed: Public Domain versus Private 
Commodity, 44 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL (2004), at 846. 
804 To this day, the common heritage of mankind principle is often cited as the primary reason 
against ratifying UNCLOS in the United States, see McLaughlin. 2010, at 379-380. 







This argument was disputed by developing countries, which argued 
conversely: The increased prospects for accruing large profits from deep-sea 
resources made a regime ensuring equitable distribution of this wealth even 
more necessary. Otherwise, developing states claimed, these resources would 
become appropriated and privatized by the industrialized states with the 
relevant technologies.806 
 
D.1.8. The trade-off between freedom of the seas and the 
common heritage of mankind 
 
The realization that living resources could be – and were being – depleted, as 
well as the recognition that there were non-living resources in the deep seas 
amounting to vast potential values, prompted states to call for transforming the 
deep-sea regime. With regards to high seas living resources, the combination 
of empirical evidence of decreased stocks and recognition of the tragedy of the 
commons-problem illustrated in economic theory, as discussed in the previous 
section, made it apparent that unrestrained application of the freedom of the 
seas would result in mismanagement, and greater depletion of living 
organisms. This bolstered both the argument for increased high seas enclosure, 
and for regulating the freedom of seas in the remaining high seas.807 The 
renewed calls for enclosure of high seas areas built on the decision in the 
Icelandic Fisheries Cases808, as discussed in the previous section. The case 
opened the way for a much more radical transfer of marine areas with high seas 
status to the coastal states state. This had far-reaching implications: much of 
the world’s fishing resource were no longer common property but fell under 
the exclusive rights of coastal states.809 Whereas high seas enclosure was 
eventually halted at 200 nautical miles, the decision in the Icelandic Fisheries 
Cases also circumscribed the freedoms in remaining high seas-areas. The 
decision stated that had a customary law obligation not only to allocate 
common resources equitably, but also to promote sustainable utilization and 
 
806 Heidbrink, HISTORY COMPASS (2008). 
807 Vaughan Lowe, Was it Worth the Effort?, 27 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND 
COASTAL LAW (2012). 
808 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland). 
809 For highly migratory species and straddling stocks, which migrate across the maritime zones 
of several states and/or the high seas, coastal states were not granted full autonomy but an 






conservation for future benefit.810 As a development of these principles, 
UNCLOS developed conservationist obligations for high seas fisheries, which 
later would be further elaborated in the UNFSA. The operational provisions on 
high seas fisheries in UNCLOS effectively implied that a range of obligations 
had to be observed when exercising the freedom of fisheries. The central 
elements of the mare liberum-approach to high seas fisheries were however 
left intact. In the high seas, a regime contributing to both over-exploitation and 
inefficient use was thus solidified.811 
 
With regard to other deep-sea resources than fisheries, the same trade-off 
yielded a very different result. In the negotiation of a deep-sea regime, the 
common heritage of mankind principle advocated by developing states 
prevailed. This can be interpreted, as has been discussed, firstly a reaction to 
the enclosure movement. Secondly, it can be explained by the influential 
standing of the new international economic order at the time of negotiation. 
Thirdly, and intimately connected to the previous point, a previously unseen 
cooperation of developing states gave force to these arguments.  
 
Essentially, the rules relating to areas beyond national jurisdiction in UNCLOS 
can be interpreted as being built on different strains of thought; Firstly, the 
claims for expanded coastal state rights which were reflected in recognition of 
increased maritime zone entitlements. Secondly, the new international 
economic order which resulted in the common heritage of mankind-principle. 
Thirdly, the freedoms of the high seas, which came to persist largely intact in 
remaining high seas areas. The conclusion of the negotiations of UNCLOS III 
can be regarded as a trade-off between the first two of these movements. With 
regards to fisheries in what used to be high seas, coastal state appropriation of 
vast areas and exclusive claims for the resources in those areas gained 
acceptance, in return for a new radical regime for other deep-sea resources, in 
line with the New International Economic Order. The advancement of both 
these conceptions, enclosure and common heritage of mankind, was made at 
the expense of the high seas-freedoms, where the old res omnium communis 
regime was substantially cut short by exceptions, and geographically curtailed 
by enclosures. 
 
810 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 196. 
811 Barnes, Entitlement to Marine Living Resources in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction. 








D.2. International environmental law 
 
Whereas the underlying perceptions of appropriation of resources in the law of 
the sea can be traced back to Medieval Europe, tracing the corresponding 
values of international biodiversity law predominantly relate to relatively 
recent events. Like the investigation of the law of the sea, the examination here 
will primarily concern one central treaty: The Convention on Biological 
Diversity.812 As discussed in section C.2, in relation to the regime of 
international environmental law, CBD has a status comparable to the role of 
UNCLOS in the law of the sea. But unlike UNCLOS, CBD does not aspire to 
the same status as a framework convention – or implicit constitution – of a 
regime. If it is the ambition of UNCLOS to encompass all uses of the sea, the 
CBD can be regarded as the first international law treaty explicitly aiming to 
address all aspects of biodiversity, ranging from the conservation of biological 
diversity and sustainable use of biological resources to access of biotechnology 
and the safety of activities related to modified living organisms. The scope of 
the CBD is thus broad as regards rules on biodiversity, but it does not purport 
to codify the full spectrum of international environmental law. Whereas 
UNCLOS effectively incorporated pre-existing law of the sea treaties by means 
of references and also provided for negotiation of new special treaties, the CBD 
lacks such a comprehensive ambition. Compared to UNCLOS it is more 
streamlined, and important environmental obligations are provided by other 
treaties. As will be further discussed, the negotiation processes of the treaties 
were also, as will be discussed, very dissimilar. Yet there are important 
similarities between the two conventions.  
 
A considerable difference from law of the sea is that biodiversity law is 
notoriously difficult to delimit. Especially when historically examining 
international rules relating to biological diversity, it is more fruitful to regard 
the field as part of a broader regime of international environmental law. Indeed, 
most modern environmental treaties share a common legal history. There may 
be considerably different orientation in specific purposes, aiming to protect 
widely different interests, such as climate, biodiversity or the integrity of the 
ozone layer. Still, the treaties of international environmental law are rooted in 
a common legal history and relate to the same overriding purpose of preventing 
 






the depletion of the natural environment and its resources.813 Not only can the 
different treaties be regarded as offspring with common ancestry, but they are 
also strongly connected to principles which encompass all of them, as 
discussed in section C.2.1.  
 
Before getting into how international biodiversity law relates to the 
appropriation of common bioresources, a central term for this area of 
international law needs to be briefly examined: How should the defining term 
biological diversity be approached? What is the rationale behind a terminology 
addressing different species collectively, emphasizing their differences? 
 
D.2.1. Biological diversity as a legal interest 
 
The perception of the variety of life forms is as old as the self-consciousness 
of the human species. Since pre-historic times, humans have been aware of the 
interest in maintaining biodiversity, in order to ensure sufficient food supplies. 
The first Neolithic revolution, around 10,000 years ago, was itself dependent 
on breeding, which conceptually overlaps with the knowledge of intra- and 
extra-species diversity. The reason for diversity among – and the origin of – 
species was one of the most captivating riddles of science for a long time. A 
gradual – and rather linear – setting out of a puzzle can be traced back to the 
Age of Enlightenment, following the discoveries of Linné, Mendel, Darwin all 
the way to Watson and Crick’s discovery of the map for the structure of DNA 
in 1953. Yet the concept of evolutionary differences was not conceptually 
referred to as biodiversity before 1985, when an American scientist was 
planning a forum on biological diversity. The timing was not coincidental. In 
the mid-1980s, interest in the knowledge of the diversity of life and concerns 
about its conservation, both among scientists and among a considerable portion 
of society, was gaining momentum. A consensus emerged among scientists – 
as well as a more general popular awareness – that species were becoming 
depleted or extinct at an increasing speed.814 Biodiversity – or biological 
diversity – (the terms are used interchangeably) has since been described in a 
number of ways.  
 
813 Kyu Sung Woong, How did they become law? A jurisprudential inquiry about the outcome 
principles of historic United Nations environmental conferences, 45 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (2016). 
814 Anna Deplazes-Zemp, ‘Genetic resources’, an analysis of a multifaceted concept, 222 







Broadly, biodiversity has been referred to as “an umbrella term for the degree 
of nature’s variety.”815 More specifically, CBD came to codify a definition 
entailing a three-fold concept, encompassing: 1) the diversity of ecosystems; 
2) the diversity of species; and 3) genetic diversity within species.816 
 
Out of these elements, Bowman argues that the concept of diversity of 
ecosystems appears to be most important, since individual species depend on 
the function of ecosystems and preservation of entire ecosystems is the most 
effective way to conserve biodiversity.817 Species diversity has been regarded 
as the basis for taxonomic classification of living organisms, and has been the 
traditional focus for conservation efforts.818 Genetic diversity can be regarded 
as the most fundamental element. It is closely connected to resilience of 
biodiversity, and its adaptability to changing conditions such as climate 
change.819 The genetic variety within and between species also represents the 
instrumental value for bioprospecting. 
 
D.2.2. The roots of biodiversity regulation in international 
law 
 
How, then, did the concept of biological diversity find its way into international 
law? And based on what fundamental conceptions did regulation of 
biodiversity unfold? 
 
In international law, the term biological diversity was first referred to in the 
CBD, signed at the Rio Summit of 1992. The CBD was not the only instrument 
produced by the Rio Conference. The conference resulted in a number of 
instruments but only the CBD and the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change were adopted as treaty texts open for signature at the 
meeting.  
 
815 MCNEELY. 1990. 
816 See Article 2, CBD. 
817 As observed by Bowman, “all living organisms exist and function not in isolation but as part 
of a wider environment, occupying a particular niche within their appropriate ecosystem, and it 
is through the preservation of entire ecosystems that diversity can most effectively be secured.”, 
Bowman. 1996, at 5. 
818 EDWARD OSBORNE WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (Harvard University Press. 1992), at 35-
45. 
819 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), World 
Conservation Strategy: living resource conservation for sustainable development 






The CBD was thus part of a broader shift of momentum in international 
environmental law in the final years of the 20th century. Accordingly, the ethos 
underpinning CBD form part of a broader paradigm of international 
environmental law, which was at its peak in the golden years of international 
relations in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
 
But the idea of international law rules on biodiversity was not conceptually 
invented in 1992. Proposals for negotiating such a treaty predates the Rio 
Summit by at least three decades. Many of the principles reflected in the CBD 
originate in international wildlife treaties drafted already a century or more 
ago. Already in early treaties relating to wildlife conservation, it was 
effectively accepted that biodiversity protection is best effected in situ, i.e. 
through the conservation of natural habitats in a way which preserve entire 
ecosystems and the species they contain.820  
 
Such instruments concerned with habitat protection and the control of or 
reduction in activities that adversely affect species and habitat date back to at 
least 1900, when the Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds 
and Fish in Africa821 was signed by the European colonial powers.822 This 
convention and similar wildlife treaties, such as the International Convention 
for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture823, which were negotiated 
during the beginning of the 20th century can be regarded as the first generation 
of environmental treaties.824 These instruments are however predated by 
Bearing Fur Seals arbitration, which in 1892 provided the first international 
judicial determination of an international conservation dispute.825  
 
820 See also Jeffrey A. McNeely, Conserving the world's biological diversity (IUCN Publications 
Services. World Bank. 1990); Bowman. 1996, at 6. 
821 The Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals Birds and Fish in Africa, 19 May 1900, 
94 BFSP 75. 
822 The objective of the Convention was ‘to prevent the uncontrolled massacre and to ensure the 
conservation of diverse wild animal species in their African possessions which are useful to man 
or inoffensive’, MICHAEL BOWMAN, et al., LYSTER'S INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (Cambridge 
University Press 2 ed. 2011), at 262. 
823 The International Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, 19 March 
1902. 
824 Michael J. Bowman, The 1902 Convention for the Protection of Birds in Historical and 
Juridical Perspectiveal, 61 ARDEOLA (2014). 
825 See Bering Sea Arbitration. The decision was however not fully successful in resolving the 
matter, and in 1911 a convention for preserving the fur seals was concluded. See BOWMAN, et 







It can thus be claimed that regulation of biological diversity, at least elements 
of it, has a long history in international law.826 But this older generation of 
environmental agreements were limited in both scope and ambition, generally 
focusing on conservation of one specific species, or one geographic location. 
They generally lacked consideration of species as part of ecosystems and the 
dependency on habitats. 
 
The conception that countering depletion of biodiversity generally, without 
limitations to specific species, is a task which ought to be regulated in treaty 
law is a considerably younger idea, connected to the modern generation of 
international environmental law.827 Explicit attention to biodiversity as a legal 
interest is a modern concept. The reason for its relatively short history is that 
it was only recently that the scale of the threat posed to the natural environment 
by human activities became recognized. Awareness of biodiversity loss as well 
as the magnitude of the environmental degradation in general did not become 
widespread until the 1960s, when Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring was 
published and sparked extensive debate, first in the US and then in other parts 
of the world.828 The publication and the ensuing discussion contributed to the 
development of the first legislation on pesticides in the US, as well as the 
formation of civil society organisations pressuring governments for protection 
of nature.829 
 
Agreement within the international community that global action was 
necessary in order to halt the high rate of extinction was also made difficult by 
the traditional understanding that exploitation of natural resources forms part 
 
law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Shawkat Alam, et al. 
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826 A. Gillespie, The long road to sustainability: The past, present, and future of international 
environmental law and policy (2018). 
827 Michael Bowman & Catherine Redgwell, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Michael Bowman & Catherine Redgwell eds., 
1996). 
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of national sovereignty, to be managed by the individual states as part of their 
sovereign jurisdiction.830  
 
This also remains the central problem of management of biodiversity and a 
central explanatory factor for its depletion; even if wild organisms migrate 
across borders, the basic presumption of international law is that each state is 
free to exploit wildlife within its territorial jurisdiction, on land as well as in 
the sea.831 
 
An early landmark in international cooperation relating to biological diversity 
was the 1968 Intergovernmental Conference in of Experts on the Scientific 
Basis for Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere. 
The program document adopted at the conference underlined humanity’s place 
in the natural order and the importance of a holistic, ecosystem approach to 
nature conservation.832 
 
The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (The 
Stockholm Conference on Environment) is usually described as the spark that 
ignited international environmental law. The conference was attended by 114 
states, as well as important international institutions and non-governmental or-
ganizations. The conference resulted in the Stockholm Declaration, containing 
26 principles, an Action Plan containing 109 recommendations as well as three 
non-binding instruments, including a resolution on institutional and financial 
arrangements. 833 The declaration has been considered a remarkable achieve-
ment, in particular in comparison with the relatively slow speed development 
of contemporary multilateral cooperation in the environmental field. In more 
concrete terms, there was no direct reference to the biodiversity concept as 
such in the Declaration.834 There were however references to the need for con-
servation among the outcomes.  
 
830 Bowman. 1996, at 6-7. 
831 As already has been discussed in the context of the law of the sea, states have enjoyed free 
and equal access to exploiting living resources in the high seas. 
832 Maureen Reed, The contributions of UNESCO Man and Biosphere Programme and biosphere 
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In particular, Principle 4 of the Stockholm Declaration declared that ‘Man has 
a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife 
and its habitat, which are now gravely imperilled by a combination of adverse 
factors. Nature conservation, including wildlife, must therefore receive 
importance in planning for economic development.’835 There is no doubt this 
ambition strongly connects to what would later become the objective of the 
CBD. Equally importantly, sustainable development, a concept that would later 
deeply influence biodiversity regulation, dates back to the Stockholm 
conference. Even if the Stockholm Declaration similarly did not use the term 
sustainable development, it has been widely regarded as laying the foundations 
for its subsequent acceptance as a core principle of international environmental 
law and policy.836 
 
It was not until 1980, with the adoption of the World Conservation Strategy 
(WCS)837, formulated by the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) in collaboration with UNEP, WWF, FAO and UNESCO, with 
its explicit references to diversity of life forms, that the basis for the 
biodiversity concept was established.838 The WCS articulates one of the three 
fundamental objectives of living resource conservation as the preservation of 
genetic diversity.839  
 
In the Strategy, genetic diversity was defined as the ‘range of genetic material 
found in the world's organisms), on which depend the functioning of many of 
the above processes and life-support systems, the breeding programmes 
necessary for the protection and improvement of cultivated plants, 
 
835 Also connected to biodiversity, Principle 2 emphasized that ‘The natural resources of the 
earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially representative samples of 
natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations 
through careful planning or management, as appropriate.’ Principle 3 declared that “The capacity 
of the earth to produce vital renewable resources must be maintained and, wherever practicable, 
restored or improved.” 
836 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 106-127. 
837 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, United Nations 
Environment Programme, World Wildlife Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and Unesco, World Conservation Strategy: Living resource conservation for 
sustainable development. (1980). 
838 Bowman. 1996, at 8. 
839 The others being (a) to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems and 
(c) to ensure the sustainable utilisation of species and ecosystems. World Conservation Strategy. 






domesticated animals and microorganisms, as well as much scientific and 
medical advance, technical innovation, and the security of the many industries 
that use living resources.’ 
 
The concept of biodiversity as a vital interest was further developed in the 1982 
World Charter for Nature840, and the Second World Conservation Strategy, 
Caring for the Earth (1990)841. In the latter document, the emphasis is on the 
need to conserve the “vitality and diversity of the Earth.” In relation to the 
WCS, this terminology marks a substantial modification: For the first time 
there was a call for the conservation of biodiversity, including the range of 
genetic stocks within each species, and the variety of ecosystems.842  
 
D.2.3. Biodiversity law as part of sustainable development 
 
In parallel to these first soft law appeals to protect biodiversity, a broader 
concept of sustainable development unfolded. As we will see, the sustainable 
development concept would eventually come to have a vast impact on the 
development of environmental regulation in international law, encompassing 
and qualifying environmental conservation, including biological diversity. In 
order to examine the interplay between sustainable development and biological 
diversity, it is necessary to complement the account of the origin of 
biodiversity regulation in international law with a description of where 
sustainable development originated. 
 
As a legal interest, sustainable development was partly developed in the same 
World Conservation Strategy documents which identified biological diversity 
as a concept. Sustainable development not only included environmental policy, 
but also implied a new normative perspective. Sustainable development entails 
a holistic understanding of economic, social and environmental policy. It 
implies interconnectivity and maintains that having regard to all three aspects 
of sustainability is necessary for development.  
 
 
840 United Nations General Assembly, Draft World Charter for Nature, A/RES/35/7 (30 October 
1980). 
841 Caring for the Earth - A Strategy for Sustainable Living - Second World Conservation 
Strategy (IUCN. 1991). 







The implications of environmental – including biodiversity – conservation 
becoming part of this broader concept were far-reaching and would 
subsequently affect the rules of the CBD, as well as its perspective of 
appropriation of genetic resources.843 
 
Like biological diversity, sustainable development as a legal interest is 
regularly traced back to the 1972 Stockholm conference. However, with 
sustainable development the reference is not entirely accurate. Rather, 
sustainable development would come about later, mainly as the result of the 
disappointment with the limited success of the conference’s objectives. As a 
result, ten years after the conference, the UN General Assembly at the request 
of the General Secretary decided to set up an ad hoc commission, to focus on 
environmental and developmental problems and solutions. Chaired by Gro-
Harlem Brundtland, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, which started its work in 1984, had a relatively open mandate.844  
 
The Brundtland Commission came to base its analysis primarily on the needs 
and interests of humans. Foremost, it was concerned with securing a global 
equity for future generations by redistributing resources towards poorer nations 
to encourage their economic growth in order to enable all human beings to 
meet their basic needs. In its report, the commission declared that social equity, 
economic growth and environmental maintenance are simultaneously possible. 
The report thereby highlighted the three fundamental components of 
sustainable development: the environment, the economy, and society. The 
concluding sections focused on the need to apply integrated, sustainable 
solutions to a broad range of problems related to population, agriculture and 
food security, biodiversity, energy choices, industry, and more. Although it 
was largely optimistic about the prospects of bringing about such a holistic 
perspective, the Brundtland Report did acknowledge the potential for tension 
between economic growth and environmental protection. However, reasoning 
about detrimental impacts of integrating environmental with economic and 
social development was largely lacking.845 
 
 
843 Alan Boyle, The Rio Convention on Biological Diversity, see ibid. 
844 Anne E. Egelston, Sustainable Development: A History (Springer Netherlands. 2013). 
845 Jacobus A. Du Pisani, Sustainable development – historical roots of the concept, 3 






When the report of the Brundtland Commission was eventually released in 
1987, species and ecosystems were explicitly declared resources for 
(sustainable) development.846 Even more interestingly, the Brundtland 
Commission called for a new approach to species and ecosystem conservation 
based upon the notion of “anticipate and prevent” and for the negotiation of a 
properly funded “Species Convention” along the lines of UNCLOS. The 
original call for negotiation of the CBD was thus made with direct reference to 
UNCLOS as a source of inspiration. Moreover, this call was part of a broader 
new paradigm of sustainable development, which in a novel way integrated 
environmental conservation and protection with other aspects of development. 
 
Indeed, by articulating the concept of sustainable development, the Brundtland 
Report introduced a revolutionary new concept into international law, with 
implications that could hardly have been foreseen at the time. Not only did it 
introduce the concept of intra-generational responsibility, it poignantly defined 
the challenges for civilization: Population, food security, species extinction, 
genetic resources, energy production, industrial pollution and human 
settlement. Of course, these challenges had been recognized before. The 
revolutionary impact of the report was rather that it did not treat these topics in 
isolation but as part of a common agenda. Even more radical in its ambition, 
the institutional and legal analysis of the report challenged the fundaments of 
the global economy, the managing of global commons, as well as established 
truths on the interplay between peace, security and development. Among the 
key challenges for the development of international law identified in the report, 
areas beyond national jurisdiction were described.847 
 
Moreover, the Brundtland Report did not merely provide a broadly accepted 
definition of sustainable development; it also drew a map indicating how this 
might be achieved.  
 
846 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. 
United Nations General Assembly document A/42/427 (1987).; Michael Bowman, The Nature, 
Development and Philosophical Foundations of the Biodiversity Concept in International Law, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Michael; Redgwell 
Bowman, Catherine ed. 1996). 
847 Philippe Sands, Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of 
International Law (Oxford University Press. 1999); Nico Schrijver, The evolution of sustainable 
development in international law: inception, meaning and status (Leiden : Martinus Nijhoff. 
2008); Alan Boyle & David Freestone, International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 







To a surprisingly high degree, the subsequent development of international law 
in the field followed this map. Sustainable development has been at the center 
of this development. It was at the heart of the outcomes of the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, as 
well as the development of treaties such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity.848 
 
It is thus clear that biological diversity has recently been recognized as an 
important value and necessary to protect. Its legal development originates in 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and is deeply rooted in the sustainable 
development concept launched in the Brundtland Report of 1987.  
 
D.2.4. Rationales for negotiating a biodiversity treaty 
 
What motivated this proposal, namely to undertake a complex negotiation for 
a global framework for biodiversity? Foremost, it reflected a growing 
recognition of the need for a global convention to remedy the perceived defects 
of the previously fragmented approach to the conservation of global 
diversity.849 In its analysis, the Brundtland Commission highlighted the 
patchwork nature of international environmental law, regulating either 
particular types of ecosystems (e.g. the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance), particular species (e.g. the Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals) or particular threats to 
endangered species (e.g. the regulation of wildlife trade in the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora).850 
 
Based on the conclusions of the Brundtland Commission, the Governing 
Council of UNEP decided to establish an ad hoc working group to examine 
“the desirability and possible form of an umbrella convention to rationalize 
current activities in this field and to address other areas which might fall under 
such a convention.”851  
 
848 WARNER. 2009. 
849 Veit Koester, The Nature of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Application of 
Components of the Concept of Sustainable Development, 16 THE ITALIAN YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE (2006).  
850 Iris Borowy, Defining Sustainable Development for Our Common Future (Routledge. 2016). 






Within this working group, consensus had been achieved by 1990 on launching 
negotiations on what would later become CBD. The primary stated motivation 
for launching the CBD negotiation was thus to fill the perceived lacunae of the 
existing fragmented regime and bring about a comprehensive global approach 
to the protection of the planet’s biodiversity.852 However, in line with the 
sustainable development mandate for the preparation of the CBD, the treaty 
negotiation would go beyond conservationist aspects, and include other issues 
of development, in particular economic equity and distributional aspects. To a 
surprisingly high degree, these other elements of sustainable development, in 
particular economic distribution, came to dominate the negotiation and indeed 
the final treaty, overshadowing the conservationist ambitions which were 
claimed as the reason for initiating negotiations in the first place. 
 
The major motivation for negotiating the CBD can thus be traced to the 
conclusion of the Brundtland Report that a comprehensive global regulation 
was lacking, and in its absence loopholes in the regulation were expected to 
persist. Although it is true that the CBD lacks a predecessor with an equally 
comprehensive scope, it is inaccurate to say that there were no treaties of 
relevance for the regulation of genetic resources prior to the CBD. 
 
Among the pre-existing treaties, some addressed the issue of ownership of 
genetic resources. Of particular interest in this context was the FAO 
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources853 of 1983, which 
declares as a universal principle that all plant genetic resources are a heritage 
of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction.854 
Although the undertaking was without applicability to marine organisms, the 
approach illustrates that prior to the adoption of the CBD, at least developing 
states were inclined to consider genetic resources, including such resources 
within national jurisdiction, not to be part of the sovereignty of states, but 
encompassed by the common heritage of mankind.855  
 
852 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 612-620. 
853 The International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 31 
I.L.M. 822 (1992)  
854 Verhoosel, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1998), at 96. 
855 Gregory Rose, The International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food And 
Agriculture: Will the Paper be Worth the Trees?, in ACCESSING BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES: 







The approach of the FAO undertaking, which essentially applies the same 
principle as for seabed resources of the area under the law of the sea to all plant 
resources, irrespective of jurisdiction, was already controversial at the time.856 
The main criticism was that some considered it incompatible with Principle 21 
of the Stockholm Declaration, which recognizes that states have the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their environmental policies.857 
 
The rules in the FAO undertaking illustrates that not only were issue of 
ownership to genetic resources contemplated and indeed to a certain extent 
regulated in international environmental law prior to the CBD. This disproves 
the notion that the new convention was negotiated in a legal lacuna as regards 
biotechnology. Moreover, it is particularly noteworthy that the pre-existing 
rules in the FAO undertaking were based on a conception contrary to what 
would become the basis for the approach of the CBD. Because once 
negotiations for the CBD started, the proposition that biodiversity should be 
considered as the “common heritage” of humankind was rejected at an early 
stage, in spite of a suggestion in the Brundtland report that a new global 
convention on wild species should be drafted based on the concept of ‘common 
concern of all countries’.858 
 
Instead, the negotiators of the CBD unconditionally put biological resources 
under the sovereign rights of the states where they occur.859 This was decided 
already at the second session of the Working Group in 1990, where the 
Executive Director of UNEP had stressed that the agreement should not 
infringe the sovereignty of states over their resources.860 Whereas the 
negotiators thus actively rejected the common heritage approach, the CBD 
would come to include the linguistically similar principle of common concern 
for humankind.  
 
856 Verhoosel, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law (1998), at 96. 
857 GLOWKA, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 1994, at 3. 
858 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 129. 
859 See Article 3 of the CBD, which reproduces verbatim Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration. Moreover, Article 15 recalls the sovereign rights of states over their natural 
resources as a basis for the authority to determine access to genetic resources. 
860 As accounted by Boyle, the Executive Director further stated ‘that it must protect the interest 
of States in which the resources are located and must provide the incentives for the conservation 
of biological diversity without inhibiting growth or sustainable development.’ Alan Boyle, The 
Rio Convention on Biological Diversity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION OF 






The choice of language was the result of political compromise, since initial 
proposals for using the common heritage of mankind had met considerable 
opposition.861 
 
The material content is however different. Common concern was not employed 
in international law prior to the Rio conference, but came to be reflected in 
both the CBD and UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.862 In many 
regards its legal implications appear vague, but according to Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, it appears to indicate “a legal status for climate change and 
biological resources which is distinctively different from the concepts of 
permanent sovereignty, common property, shared resources, or common 
heritage which generally determine the international legal status of the natural 
resources.”863 
 
As expressed in the preamble of the CBD, the common concern approach does 
not relate to the ownership of genetic resources but is only concerned with 
conservationist aspects: It implies a common responsibility on the part of the 
entire international community to preserve biological diversity.864 As observed 
by de Lucia, “The concept of ‘common concern’ has a more delimited 
normative and operational scope than ‘common heritage’ because it does not 
involve the ‘internationalisation’ of areas or resources.”865 When the FAO 
undertaking in 2001 became developed into the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture866, the common concern approach 




861 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 129-130. 
862 The common concern for humankind-concept is also used in the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (UNFCC), preamble para 1. 
863 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 129. 
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865 Vito De Lucia, The Concept of Commons and Marine Genetic Resources in Areas beyond 
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Equating territorial jurisdiction with sovereign rights for genetic resources in 
this manner may appear self-evident today, but the approach marked a notable 
shift in comparison to previous undertakings. 
 
Once negotiations for the CBD started, the work progressed with a remarkable 
speed. Compared to the decades of negotiations of UNCLOS, the period 
leading up to the final negotiations of CBD was incredibly short: Already in 
February 1991 a first draft of a convention was presented, to serve as a basis 
for launching formal negotiations. The formal negotiation would then ensue 
for only 15 months before the adoption in Nairobi in May 1992. One month 
later, it was opened for signature and already in December 1993 it entered into 
force after its thirtieth ratification.  
 
D.2.5. The ethos of the CBD: Conserving biodiversity for 
human purposes? 
 
It has already been discussed how CBD defines biodiversity, encompassing 
diversity of ecosystems, species, as well as diversity within species. Of similar 
importance, the convention defines genetic resources as genetic material of 
actual or potential value.867 The purpose of ensuring long-term conservation of 
the biodiversity of living organisms runs like a thread through the convention. 
The way the regulation is drafted, it is considered axiomatic that biodiversity 
protection can be most efficiently carried out in situ, that is, through the 
conservation of natural habitats in such a way as to preserve entire ecosystems 
and the species they contain. It is, however, also recognized that ex situ 
conservation, such as captive breeding and gene banks, can be used for 
conservation purposes.868 
 
What, then, is the underlying purpose of the aim to conserve genetic diversity 
under the CBD? Values of nature are often divided into different categories, 
distinguished as instrumental, inherent or intrinsic. These different strands of 
valuing nature are reflected as the purpose or ethos of environmental 
conservation have shifted over time. They will now be briefly described, in 
order to enable us to define the CBD in this context and categorize its ethos. 
 
867 See Article 2, CBD. 
868 Bowman, The Nature, Development and Philosophical Foundations of the Biodiversity 






The instrumental value of a particular entity lies in the use to which it may be 
put, as in any case of a natural resource being extracted for an economic 
purpose, such as food or input goods in production. Inherent value, by contrast, 
is the value that an entity possesses on account of being prized for itself, rather 
than for its utility. Perhaps most commonly, natural resources can be 
appreciated for esthetical values, but cultural or religious considerations may 
be equally relevant. Both instrumental and inherent value depend upon the 
existence of an element of external assessment of value. Intrinsic value, on the 
other hand, is interpreted as the value that objects have of and for themselves. 
Consequently, intrinsic value does not presuppose the existence of any external 
assessment of value.869 
 
All three different notions of value can be distinguished as primary motivators 
in different bodies of international law relating to environmental protection. 
Early attempts at nature conservation were primarily motivated by utilitarian 
and material considerations. This essentially instrumental motivation is 
reflected in the first generation of treaties to protect species that we today aim 
to safeguard for biodiversity purposes. Commonly, even the names of these 
treaties of the early 20th century contain utilitarian references, such as the 1902 
Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture. References were 
made to preserving species that were “useful to man or inoffensive.” 
Conversely, species considered harmful to human interests were excluded from 
protection. In some cases, treaties even provided for their destruction. Early 
environmental treaties can thus be regarded as genuinely anthropocentric. 
Human interests were also the basis for early management regimes for species 
such as whales, seals and fish.870 
 
An assessment of the success of the early environmental treaties and 
management regimes for living resources yield disappointing results, even in 
light of the limited objectives of the treaties concerned. For instance, the 
regulation of whaling catch levels and quotas under the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling appears to have been mainly 
concerned with commercial and market regulation aspects of whaling.  
 
869 Donald S. Maier, What's So Good About Biodiversity?: A Call for Better Reasoning About 
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The ecological state of whale stocks seems to have been largely disregarded, 
and the treaty cooperation failed to prevent the continued depletion of large 
marine mammals.871 
 
A second consideration, which appears to have been a major motivation of 
early international environmental treaties, was the esthetic value of the natural 
world. From this perspective, which focuses on the inherent value of the 
environment, nature was to be regarded in a manner similar to a work of art. 
Whereas instrumental motivations are most apparent in conservation treaties 
in then colonized parts of the world, the inherent motivations appear to have 
been more prevalent in early treaties protecting certain regions of North 
America. Inherent value arguments were repeated in the preambles of many 
later conventions, frequently in combination with other justifications such as 
economic and scientific aspects.872 
 
Motivating international regulation on the inherent value of nature can in many 
regards be just as anthropocentric as the instrumental perspective, for in both 
settings the environment should be protected for qualities appealing to humans. 
But there are also some key differences. The inherent motivation does not 
relate to consumption, but is based on preserving its subject in an 
untransformed state in perpetuity, simply for enabling humans to continue to 
enjoy it. Moreover, the inherent motivation commonly had a geographically 
defined conservationist ambition that the materially motivated treaties lacked. 
In certain regards, this has similarities with – and can be regarded as the basis 
for – modern area-based management measures. In some of these treaties, 
knowledge and recognition of the interdependence between species within the 
geographic site can be distinguished. However, this should not be exaggerated. 
There was certainly no ecosystem analysis behind this reasoning. Nevertheless, 
it does have some similarities with such modern approaches: Important areas 
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Thirdly, there are international environmental treaties based on a different form 
of environmental ethics – promoting conservation or sustainable management 
for the intrinsic value of nature itself. This motivation is surprisingly new and 
was lacking in the first generation of environmental treaties.874 The Berne 
Convention875, signed in 1979, appears to be one of the first instruments where 
such motivations are dominating. In its preamble, the convention states that 
European wildlife constitutes a natural heritage possessing intrinsic value. The 
World Charter for Nature, signed in 1982, is another instrument where such 
motivations stand in the foreground.  
 
In its preamble, the Charter states that “Every form of life is unique, warranting 
respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such 
recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action.”876 Compared to 
the first generation of environmental treaties, regarding nature’s intrinsic value 
as a major motivation for conservation marked an important step: For the first 
time, at least seemingly non-anthropocentric values were added to the 
anthropocentric values which had hitherto been the reason for international 
commitments. 
 
One could perhaps have assumed that this development would progress in a 
linear manner, with increased emphasis on non-anthropocentric values in 
subsequent treaties. But a critical examination of the references to underlying 
motivations of the 1992 Rio Declaration yields a different conclusion. Its 
Principle 1 declares that human beings are at the center of concerns for 
sustainable development. Moreover, there is no recognition of the intrinsic 
value of natural ecosystems and wild species anywhere in the document.877 
Accordingly, rather than marking a continuation of a development with greater 
emphasis on the intrinsic values of environment, the 1992 Rio Declaration 
marked a backlash against these non-anthropocentric values. 
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In part, this return to the instrumental value of nature as a motivation can be 
explained by the introduction of the sustainable development concept, into 
which environmental conservation objectives were integrated, starting with the 
Rio Declaration. This resulted in an increased tendency to merge 
environmental management and conservationist motivations with the purpose 
of promoting development. This approach was set out relatively early in the 
process leading up to the CBD. As noted in the previous section, the Executive 
Director of UNEP already at the second session of the Working Group in 1990 
set the stage by stressing that the agreement should not infringe the sovereignty 
of states over their resources and ‘that it must protect the interest of States in 
which the resources are located and must provide the incentives for the 
conservation of biological diversity without inhibiting growth or sustainable 
development.’878 
 
This should not come as a surprise: Promoting economic development for 
humans is inherently anthropocentric and merging environmental 
considerations with developmental ones naturally results in a move towards 
instrumental perspectives. This idea to see environmental conservation as a 
vehicle for economic development was at the heart of the Brundtland Report. 
While the sustainable development concept meant a more holistic approach to 
development, including economic as well as social and environmental values, 
it also changed the way in which nature conservation was perceived in treaty 
law. Prior to the Brundtland Report, the intrinsic values of nature had been 
guiding. After the Brundtland report, nature primarily was referred to as an 
instrumental value, to be used for human development.879 
 
This is perhaps most striking in Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration, which 
states: “In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection 
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it.” This formulation has been criticized for 
subordinating environmental protection entirely to the needs of the 
development process.880  
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Nevertheless, in the CBD, which was drafted at the same conference, and 
forms part of the Rio paradigm as previously discussed, intrinsic motivations 
are not only mentioned, but seem to be of prime importance, at least in the non-
operative parts of the convention. The first paragraph of the preamble of the 
CBD clearly reflects the regard to non-instrumental values: 
 
Conscious of the intrinsic value of biological diversity and of the eco-
logical, genetic, social, economic, educational, cultural, recreational 
and aesthetic values of biological diversity and its components. 
 
Intrinsic values are thus not just mentioned, but actually referred to in the first 
line of the CBD. Thereafter, a number of instrumental values are noted, 
including finally a reference to inherent (esthetic) values. When approaching 
the values underpinning the CBD, this is important to bear in mind. The CBD 
is thus different from earlier environmental law treaties, as well as the 
contemporary Rio Declaration, in that it at least sets out to reflect instrumental 
and inherent and intrinsic values.881 
 
How, then, were these values reflected in the operative parts of the convention, 
including how the convention would regard appropriation of genetic 
resources?  
 
Already during the preparatory stage, at the second session of the Working 
Group in 1990, before formal negotiations were launched, the Executive 
Director of UNEP stressed that the agreement should not infringe the 
sovereignty of states over their resources, that it must protect the interest of 
states in which the resources are located, and that it must provide incentives 
for conservation of biological diversity without inhibiting growth or 
sustainable development.882 It was thus clear at an early stage that the CBD 
would not only leave the sovereign rights of states to their resources intact; the 
new convention would also protect their interests. Moreover, incentives for 
conservation would be provided but only to the extent that doing so would not 
inhibit economic growth. 
 
 
881 Michael Bowman, Biodiversity, Intrinsic Value, and the Definition and Valuation of 
Environmental Harm (Oxford University Press. 2002). 
882 Bowman, The Nature, Development and Philosophical Foundations of the Biodiversity 







This deviates considerably from the spirit of the preamble, as discussed above, 
and marks a step closer to Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration, i.e. the concept 
of not only merging environmental purposes with developmental ones, but also 
giving economic development interests preference. Accordingly, it can be 
concluded that already at the working group stage, it was established that 
instrumental, economic development purposes would take precedence in the 
new convention. 
 
Relatively early on in the negotiations, there was also a consensus among 
participants, not only that those who benefited most from the economic 
benefits of biological diversity (developed states) would have to transfer 
economic means for the preservation and conservation of biodiversity (in 
developing states). There was also rather widespread support for the notion that 
genetic resources should in some form be accessible to all and that technology 
and information on their use should be transferable to all.883  
 
The subsequent negotiation appears to have been relatively straightforward 
compared to other framework conventions. Essentially, the central area of 
contention related to how cooperation could be built on an agreement which 
both gene-rich developing countries and technology-rich developed countries 
could be built. In 1991, the basic negotiation objectives were formulated as 
ensuring both the conservation of biological resources and the rational use of 
biological resources as integral and inseparable elements of the convention.884 
However, bridging the gap between developed and developing states was far 
from easy. In the negotiations, there was a considerable element of suspicion 
among developing states that the convention as well as the 1992 Rio Summit 
generally would be used to facilitate developed countries’ access to developing 
countries’ resources and curtail the latter’s ability to pursue an independent 
development agenda by means of environmental requirements.885 It became a 
key objective among developing states to prevent this from happening.  
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Therefore, they required that the new convention would bring about a special 
system of intellectual property rights and appropriate mechanisms for 
compensating the south for the biological resources provided by it. Moreover, 
developing states wanted to establish mechanisms giving the south access to 
the biotechniques developed through the use of the genetic resources that it 
provides, as well as funding to facilitate the implementation of the convention 
and access to technology. Any observer examining the final convention would 
find that these objectives largely appear to have been met. In some respects, 
the convention expresses recognition of the intrinsic value of biodiversity and 
of the conservation of biodiversity as a “common concern of humankind.”886 
These references and the fact that all components of biological diversity (not 
only those considered valuable) are encompassed by the measures calling for 
protection under the convention have been cited by some observers as evidence 
of a dual ethos of the CBD, including not only instrumental perspectives of 
living organisms, but also intrinsic values, manifested by broad undertakings 
relating to long-term species and habitat preservation.887 
 
But in its central elements, the CBD can be regarded as the result of a trade-
off, whereby developing states have undertaken to preserve their natural 
genetic resources on the condition of economic incentives.888 This conditioning 
of conservation based on economic benefits runs like a red thread through the 
convention. The reference to “sustainable use” as “the use of components of 
biological diversity” in Article 2 of the CBD is further evidence that the 
convention is not primarily concerned with the preservation of biodiversity, 
but instead “assumes human use and benefit as the fundamental purpose for 
conserving biodiversity, limited only by the requirement of sustainability and 
the need to benefit future generations.”889  
 
886 See in particular the preamble of the CBD where intrinsic values are referred in a long list of 
interests relating to biological diversity and its components, including also ecological, genetic, 
social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational and esthetic values., Catherine 
Redgwell, Biotechnology, Biodiversity and Sustainable Development: Conflict or Congruence?, 
in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tullio Scovazzi & Francesco Francioni eds., 
2006), at 66. 
887 See for instance Wolfrum & Matz, MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 
(2000), at 464. 
888 Id. at 469. 
889 ‘Sustainable use’ is defined in Art 2 as “the use of components of biological diversity in a 
way and at a rate that does not lead to the long- term decline of biological diversity, thereby 







As regards underlying values, the convention is thus closer to agreements 
regulating human use, such as fisheries agreements, than conservationist 
treaties.890 Essentially, the CBD thus marked a step away from the perspective 
of preserving the inherent value of nature as an aim of the convention, as 
formulated in its objective, in favor of a rather radical instrumentalist approach. 
The references to intrinsic values are limited to the preamble and in the 
operative parts no attempts are made to balance the instrumental perspective 
of biological resources.891 This way of conditioning conservation on economic 
benefits may appear natural since such models are now frequent in 
environmental agreements.892 It is worth noting that the validity of this “dual 
rationale” for promoting bioprospecting, creating incentives to conserve 
endangered environments by demonstrating the economic benefits that could 
accrue from their exploitation, which forms the logical basis for the CBD 
regime, appears to have never been tested.893 
 
What, then, is the origin of this approach? How is it that environmental protec-
tion has been conditioned on economic incentives? As shown in the previous 
discussion, this development can be traced back to the birth of the concept of 
sustainable development. The concept, as formulated in the Brundtland Report, 
essentially entails merging economic development with environmental protec-
tion.894 This discourse was based on the premise that economic development 
policies had to be intrinsically connected to environmental protection, for a 
range of reasons. Foremost, it was based on the presumption that without such 
a connection, detrimental environmental impacts risked becoming disregarded 
in economic development. Moreover, there was a sentiment among developing 
states that they, who harbored the majority of wilderness and biological 
diversity, ought to be compensated for undertaking the lion’s share of 
conservationist action. Effectively, the impact in international law, as 
manifested in the CBD, of the sustainable development concept was that 
 
COP V (2002, Decision V/24), sustainable use was adopted as a cross-cutting issue under the 
Convention, and at COP 7 (2004) the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable 
Use of Biodiversity were adopted, Boyle, The Convention on Biological Diversity. 1994, at 115. 
890 Redgwell. 2006, at 65. 
891 Wolfrum & Matz, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2000), at 461. 
892 For instance, the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change has a large number of provisions reflecting an instrumentalist approach. 
893 PARRY. 2004, at 122. 
894 SANDS, Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of 






environmental protection would be regarded not as an end-goal, but rather as 
a transactional value for developing states to attain a transfer of economic 
resources. This has been described as a reductionist, utilitarian and commercial 
mark on the environmental approach of the living world, at the expense of 
biodiversity conservation and the sustainable use of its resources.895  
 
The final round of negotiations took place during the actual Rio Summit. In 
order to reach an agreement before the end of the summit, some suggested 
commitments were removed.896 Among these, one proposal which was 
scrapped at the final stages of negotiation is particularly worth mentioning: 
The responsibility for damage to biodiversity. The last draft before the final 
negotiation contained a provision providing that those responsible for activities 
which damaged or threatened biodiversity would be responsible for the costs 
of avoiding or remedying the damage.897  
 
That this proposed commitment was scrapped is telling in that it substantially 
decreases the opportunities for holding states accountable for biodiversity 
degrading activities. Not only did it mark a missed opportunity for developing 
the rudimentary principles of state responsibility for environmental harm. It 
would also have been one of the more important commitments for state 
activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction.898 
 
The final outcome of the negotiation – the treaty text of the CBD – was far 
from globally welcomed.899 Among developing states, the clear declarations of 
 
895 GUILLOUX. 2018, at xxix. 
896 MCCONNELL. 1996; Adede. 1994. 
897 Boyle, The Convention on Biological Diversity. 1994; Boyle. 1996, at 37.  
898 MCCONNELL. 1996. 
899 In particular the United States the outcome received a more lukewarm reception. The US 
initially criticized the convention, mainly for its perceived adverse impact on biotechnology 
development as well as the perceived general attitude of the Convention towards intellectual 
property rights. In many regards this position was in line with the US critique of the common 
heritage of mankind principle under UNCLOS. But with regards to the CBD, the US criticism 
went beyond economic and resource distribution aspects, encompassing also the conservationist 
component; provisions on environmental impact assessments and the scope of obligations 
affecting the marine environment were raised as areas of concern. Moreover, the US believed 
that the convention failed to recognize the positive role that intellectual property rights could 
play in the conservation of biodiversity. Accordingly, the US did not sign the convention until 
the Clinton administration, and it remains to be ratified. The European Union expressed little 







exclusive rights for the state of origin of genetic resources were heralded as an 
important principal victory. Dissatisfaction with the lack of operational preci-
sion was, however, also expressed. Similarly, with regards to capacity building 
and transfer of technology, many states had wished for more.900 Eventually, 
this would form the basis for the negotiation of the Nagoya Protocol901.902 
 
It can thus be established that although the negotiation was set out on a differ-
ent, conservationist approach, reflecting at least in part intrinsic environmental 
values, the negotiation as well as the resulting treaty would focus on transac-
tional aspects of economic distribution in relation to biological resources.903 In 
its central respects, the convention reflects an instrumentalist approach to the 
environment and its resources, which can largely be explained by the merging 
of environmental and development interests during the years leading up to the 
Rio Summit and the negotiation of the convention. Since the entry into force 
of the CBD, this instrumental perspective of biodiversity has evolved into even 
more integrated sustainable development concepts.904 By being based on a 
profoundly anthropocentric view of the marine environment and its resources, 
the underlying values of the CBD thus bear similarities with those behind 
UNCLOS. There are, however, also some key differences between the instru-
mental perspectives of the two treaties, primarily in terms of their temporal and 
holistic perspectives on resources. As a result, as will be discussed in Part C, 
the CBD emphasizes the needs of future generations, seeking to provide 
comprehensive long-term efforts that protect all components of biological 
diversity and not just those that are momentarily considered valuable. 
UNCLOS, on the other hand, aims at short-term efforts to secure stocks 
valuable for human consumption. Accordingly, UNCLOS has been described 
as more myopically resource-oriented, whereas the CBD – generally speaking 
– focuses more on long-term species and habitat preservation.905  
 
they had hoped for higher ambitions generally. See Ian Walden, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Biodiversity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 
(Michael; Redgwell Bowman, Catherine ed. 1996), at 172. 
900 Boyle, The Rio Convention on Biological Diversity. 1996. 
901 Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 October 
2010, 3009 U.N.T.S. (Nagoya Protocol). 
902 MCCONNELL. 1996. 
903 GUILLOUX. 2018, at xxviii. 
904 Redgwell. 2006, at 66. 






It will now be examined more closely how this instrumentalist approach is 
reflected in the operational parts of the CBD, whether there are exceptions to 
it, and how the relationship between biological diversity and economic 
development plays out. 
 
D.2.6. Rules on genetic resources under the instrumentalist 
approach 
 
With regards to objectives of the CBD, its Article 1 reflects a twofold ambition: 
Both the interest of conserving biodiversity and the interest of developing 
states to use the convention as a vehicle for development are reflected: 
 
The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its 
relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including 
by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer 
of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those 
resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding. 
 
Already the first operative provision of the convention thus sets the course 
away from the intrinsic values referred in the preamble, in favor of 
predominantly instrumental values. It assumes human use and benefit as the 
fundamental purpose for conserving biodiversity, limited only by the 
requirement of sustainability and the need to benefit future generations.906 It is 
thus clear that despite the preambular references to the intrinsic values of 
nature as previously discussed, in operative parts the CBD is not primarily a 
preservationist convention. This can be interpreted as the result of the 
insistence by developing states that references to conservation should be 
combined with sustainable use of its components.  
 
However, the objective can also be read the other way around. The emphasis 
on sharing benefits and technology as well as promoting access entails that 
permanent sovereignty over biological resources is no longer a basis for the 
exclusion of others.  
 







Rather, it entails a “commitment to cooperate for the good of the international 
community at large.”907 An examination of the treaty reveals that the operative 
obligations of cooperation are limited. In any event, these parts of the 
convention do not alter the principal base of the regulation: biological and 
genetic resources are regarded as a national resource with relatively 
indiscriminate state sovereignty, save for certain cooperative obligations. This 
concept of state sovereignty, which is central to the CBD, will now be 
examined more closely.  
 
D.2.7. State sovereignty over biological resources 
 
Already when discussions started on a broad global framework convention on 
biodiversity, they were based on the assertion that biodiversity is a national 
resource, with exclusive rights for states to regulate and manage, based on 
territorial jurisdiction. The notion of basing the new convention on alternative 
conceptions of property, such as commons regimes as partly employed in 
UNCLOS, was rejected early on.908 This decision was based partly on 
conventional notions of state sovereignty over economic resources, but also on 
the contention that principles such as the principle of common heritage of 
mankind left natural resources open for the taking.909 Consequently, unlike 
minerals on the international deep seabed, living marine resources within a 
state’s national jurisdiction are sovereign biological resources belonging to that 
state. In line with this notion, the CBD clearly declares that states have 
sovereign rights over their own biological resources. 
 
The convention provides that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right 
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies” 
(provided that those activities do not harm the environments of, e.g., other 
states). As discussed in section C.2, this stipulation essentially reiterates 
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, and thus reflects the modern 
conceptual foundation for international environmental law.910  
 
907 Günther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International 
Law, 1 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991). 
908 MCCONNELL. 1996; Adede. 1994. 
909 Joyner, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (1995), at 648-649. 






Thus, for the purposes of this investigation, the CBD clearly brings 
biodiversity and genetic resources – whether terrestrial or marine – within a 
state’s jurisdiction and under national control, insofar as the resource is 
retrieved within its territorial scope.  
 
Moreover, to the extent that the convention entails conservationist obligations, 
there is no doubt that the responsibility for protection of biological variability 
in offshore areas under national jurisdiction accordingly is put on the coastal 
states. On the marine side, the convention thus builds on the division of marine 
spaces into sovereign and exclusive rights under the maritime zone regime of 
UNCLOS and obliges its parties to implement a number of obligations for the 
protection of biodiversity in the areas where they exercise those rights.911 
Essentially, the convention thus makes no distinction between the obligations 
of states in terrestrial and in marine spaces: Sovereign jurisdiction over 
biodiversity applies equally for marine coastal resources as it does for land-
based natural resources, both as regards rights and duties under the 
convention.912 
 
Furthermore, the concept of conserving biodiversity for the purpose of human 
benefit is connected to another basic assumption of the CBD: That the 
sovereign right of states over their biological resources, includes the right to 
exploit these resources pursuant to their own environmental policies. No other 
state has the right to influence how a state pursues the conservation of its 
biological resources. The obligation in relation to other states extends only to 
endeavor to create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources by other 
parties. But this entitlement does not amount to a right of free access for other 
states. Rather, prior informed consent by the relevant state controlling the 
genetic resource is required, and the relevant state by virtue of jurisdiction has 
authority to determine access to genetic resource by means of national 
legislation.913 This approach has striking similarities with the law of the sea 
rules on marine scientific research in the exclusive economic zone, where the 
coastal state can exercise similar discretion with regard to foreign activities, 
and cooperation is called for but not mandatory.914  
 
 
911 In Part A.2. it was discussed what these obligations entail for states. 
912 Joyner, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (1995), at 649. 
913 See the preamble, as previously discussed, as well as Articles 3 and 15. 







The clearly established rights of states to control their biological resources 
encompass marine genetic resources. This answers the question regarding the 
possibilities of states to appropriate such resources unequivocally. It is 
apparent that the CBD regards such resources as belonging to states, based on 
their territorial jurisdiction, and that the ability of other states to access the 
resources in principle is left to the discretion of the state in possession of the 
resource. In this regard, states can opt for a more open or restrictive regime. 
Essentially, the convention thus divides up the genetic resources of the world 
between states in a similar manner to any other regulation of resources under 
international law. The CBD thereby introduced a legal basis for – or rather, it 
confirmed that the old doctrine of sovereign rights extends to – the 
appropriation of all genetic resources within the geographic borders of states, 
by those states. 
 
Again, a natural point of reference is the provisions entailing exclusive 
economic rights of coastal states within their respective maritime areas under 
UNCLOS, which essentially provide the same answer. Are there, then, no 
references to common interests or common management under the CBD? 
Compared to UNCLOS, these are considerably weaker, but by no means non-
existent. The preamble describes the conservation of biological resources as a 
“common concern of humankind.” But while there are apparent linguistic 
similarities with the principle of common heritage of mankind under 
UNCLOS, the reference in the CBD preamble should not be interpreted 
analogously. Rather, the option of using the exact same term as under 
UNCLOS was rejected during the negotiation in order to avoid 
misrepresentations that a commons regime was being set up. 
 
From the operative provisions it is evident that the CBD does not seek to 
internationalize or create a commons regime for biological resources similar to 
deep-sea resources under UNCLOS. The conditions for access to the resource 
are also fundamentally different between the two regimes. In the CBD, there 
is a lack of references to institutions to regulate common resources, as is the 
case with the International Seabed Authority under UNCLOS. In the case of 
the CBD, the right to grant or refuse access clearly lies with the relevant state 
exercising geographic jurisdiction. Yet, there are similarities in that both 
conventions are based on the premise that benefits of access to the resource 






However, in the CBD, this obligation is much more limited than under 
UNCLOS, and in no case does it affect the legal status of the resource itself. 
 
Rather than serving as a basis for a common management regime, the reference 
to “common concern” in the CBD is significant in legitimizing international 
interest in the conservation and use of biological resources otherwise within 
the territorial sovereignty of other states. In that sense, the CBD reference to 
common concern has more in common with human rights regulations; 
domestic state jurisdiction is not questioned, but an aim to strive for a common 
goal is added on.915  
 
But are these sovereign rights of the states possessing the genetic resource 
unconditional and open-ended? And how does the CBD relate to appropriation 
of genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction? Foremost, as has 
been discussed, the CBD is a convention which provides rights and duties for 
states over biological resources within their territorial jurisdiction. With 
regards to components of biological diversity, Article 4 establishes the 
jurisdictional scope as areas within the limits of its national jurisdiction.  
 
Within national jurisdiction, state sovereignty is far-reaching. Rules relating to 
the access of biological resources by other states, and the contracts to address 
such transactions, are further provided in the Nagoya Protocol.916 There are, 
however, a number of conditions that states must comply with in the exercise 
of their sovereignty, including foremost the obligations to ensure conservation 
and sustainable use.917 Whereas states are granted unlimited rights to genetic 
resources within their territorial jurisdiction, states are not without restraints 
on how to manage such resources. How, then, does the CBD relate to genetic 
resources located beyond national jurisdiction? 
  
 
915 Alan Boyle, International law and the protection of the global atmosphere: Concepts, 
categories and principles, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (1994). 
916 As discussed in section C.2., Nagoya Protocol; ibid. 








D.2.8. Obligations beyond state borders - The Janus face of 
the CBD rules on biological resources  
 
At first sight, it appears that the scope of the CBD is limited to areas under 
national jurisdiction. The convention clearly establishes that in the case of 
direct management of components of biological diversity, the direct 
application of the CBD is limited to areas within the limits of its national 
jurisdiction.918 While the CBD foremost entails operative obligations relating 
to biological resources within the territorial jurisdiction of its parties, there are 
also obligations relating to areas beyond national jurisdiction. In the case of 
processes and activities affecting biological diversity, the convention applies 
regardless of where their effects occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or 
control, within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.919 The convention thus makes a distinction between 
jurisdictional entitlements of biological resources and connected economic 
rights, where the application is limited to national jurisdiction. With regards to 
“processes and activities,” essentially human interference of biological 
diversity, the regulatory scope extends beyond state borders. 
 
Among the obligations applying to states irrespective of jurisdictional area, 
there is an explicit obligation not to cause damage to other states or to areas 
beyond national jurisdiction.920 Moreover, there is a duty to cooperate, directly 
or through competent international organizations, in relation to conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.921 The 
reference to competent international organizations in this context can be 
interpreted as indicating that the drafters of the CBD wished to avoid norm 
conflict or overlap with institutions or agreements with a clearly expressed 
mandate in areas beyond national jurisdiction. According to this interpretation, 
the CBD reference to these organizations essentially makes clear that the CBD 
calls for its parties to participate in such cooperation, and that it should be 
carried out within those organizations, according to their rules, and not under 
the auspice or regulation of the CBD.  
 
918 See Article 4(a) of the CBD. 
919 See Article 4(b) of the CBD. 
920 See the preamble, Articles 3 and 15 of the CBD. 






However, such an interpretation is far from certain. The reference could also 
be interpreted as merely a recognition that there may be other organizations 
and treaties with a mandate to regulate the management of biodiversity beyond 
national jurisdiction, but that the cooperative parts of the CBD apply equally 
in these areas, as they do in areas within national jurisdiction.  
 
There are also other explicit references to areas beyond national jurisdiction in 
the convention, which clearly establishes that in at least certain regards, the 
drafters intended its obligations to apply equally beyond state borders. States 
are expected to promote arrangements for the consultation, notification, and 
exchange of information relating to activities that might adversely affect the 
biological diversity of other states or areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.922  
 
Moreover, other conservationist provisions in the convention equally apply 
irrespective of location. These include taking biological resources beyond state 
borders into account in the development of national conservation plans and 
strategies, as provided in the general measures for conservation and sustainable 
use.923 The same goes for the obligation relating to identification and 
monitoring. Similarly, there is nothing indicating that the central provisions on 
in situ and ex situ conservation or the obligation to sustainable use do not apply 
equally to areas beyond national jurisdiction.924 
 
Looking at the work program carried out under the auspice of the CBD, it has 
also related to both areas within and beyond national jurisdiction. This is 
particularly apparent in the work with protected areas of the convention, which 
accelerated with the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, decided at the 
second Earth Summit in 2002.925  
 
922 Article 14(1) of the CBD. 
923 See Article 6 of the CBD. 
924 Articles 8, 9 and 10 CBD respectively. 
925 The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPOI), confirmed the need to “maintain the 
productivity and biodiversity of important and vulnerable marine and coastal areas, including in 
areas within and beyond national Jurisdiction” and provided explicit targets for the “application 
by 2010 of the ecosystem approach” and the “establishment of marine protected areas consistent 
with international law and based on scientific information, including representative networks by 
2012”, see UN Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South 







The Programme of Work on Protected Areas926 clearly aims to extend beyond 
state borders.927 When the program was decided, questions were actually raised 
on what mandate the CBD had for carrying out work in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. However, the focus on scientific criteria and inclusive approach 
in relation to other organizations made states consider that there was no 
hindrance to the agenda under CBD.928 
 
It thus appears clear that not only does the convention apply and provide a 
mandate for engagement in areas beyond national jurisdiction, but in addition, 
in practice, that mandate has been used for a rather ambitious work program. 
 
But how do the work and the legal obligations relevant in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction under the CBD compare to the provisions applying within state 
borders? Interestingly, the obligations relating to areas beyond national 
jurisdiction accordingly have a markedly different character compared to other 




926 The Convention on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) Programme of Work on Protected Areas 
(PoWPA) was agreed in 2004 and reaffirmed with additional elements in 2010 in Nagoya, Japan. 
PoWPA aims to encourage parties to the CBD to develop and manage ecologically 
representative networks of protected areas on land and sea. Unusually for the CBD, it contains 
many (over 90) specific actions for countries or others to take, with deadlines. It includes many 
social safeguards and promotes a range of management approaches and governance types within 
protected areas, see UNEP/CBD/WGRI/1/2 Implementation of the Convention and the Strategic 
Plan and progress towards the 2010 Target and UNEP/CBD/WGRI/1/9 Framework for 
monitoring implementation of the Convention and achievement of the 2010 target, and the 
connected review of the thematic programmes of work. 
927 “In addition, the establishment and management of protected area systems in the context of 
the ecosystem approach should not simply be considered in national terms, but where the 
relevant ecosystem extends beyond national boundaries, in ecosystem or bioregional terms as 
well. This presents a strong argument for and adds complexity to the establishment of 
transboundary protected areas and protected areas in marine areas beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction”, SECRETARIAT OF THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (2004) PROGRAMME 
OF WORK ON PROTECTED AREAS (CBD PROGRAMMES OF WORK) (Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity. 2004). 
928 Daniel C. Dunn, et al., The Convention on Biological Diversity's Ecologically or Biologically 
Significant Areas: Origins, development, and current status, 49 MARINE POLICY (2014);Daniel 
C. Dunn, et al., The Convention on Biological Diversity's Ecologically or Biologically 






Firstly, the cooperative nature of the parts of the CBD applying to areas beyond 
national jurisdiction seemingly makes it less likely that it will have a 
substantial legal impact. Indeed, there is no shortage of unheard calls for 
cooperation in international environmental law. Yet, in reality, despite less 
solid ground in terms of mandate, a considerable portion of the work program 
under the CBD has related to areas beyond national jurisdiction. This is 
especially true with the work relating to protected areas already discussed. 
Indeed, there is nothing indicating that the cooperative nature of provisions 
relating to areas beyond national jurisdiction has made them any less efficient.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, the obligations in the CBD relating to areas 
beyond national jurisdiction reflect a different ethos as compared to the 
provisions applying within state borders. As we have found, the CBD can be 
seen as being founded on the conception that biodiversity ought to be 
conserved for human purposes, reflecting a predominantly instrumental 
perspective on natural resources. At its heart lies the contention that states have 
exclusive sovereignty over biological resources within their territorial realm, 
and that they should be adequately compensated for supplying and conserving 
those resources. These conclusions are certainly valid for the regulation 
applying within state borders, where economic perspectives of resources take 
precedence. 
 
However, in provisions as well as work programs relating to areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, the convention is based on a different perspective. 
Beyond state borders, the CBD is, as we have seen, little concerned with 
appropriation of resources or distribution of benefits. Instead, the emphasis is 
predominantly on conservation. In these areas, the instrumental perspective of 
biological resources is replaced by provisions reflecting a conception of 
conserving biological diversity as an end in itself, an essentially intrinsic value 
approach, as discussed under D.2.5. 
 
Moreover, the difference between CBD regulation within state borders and 
beyond national jurisdiction extends beyond reflecting different perceptions 
and perspectives of biological resources. For practical purposes, the regulation 
in areas beyond national jurisdiction is actually converse to the general 








As discussed under D.2.7, the regulation within state borders can be 
summarized as granting the state unlimited rights to appropriate genetic 
resources within its territorial jurisdiction, so long as certain conservationist 
obligations are fulfilled. Beyond national jurisdiction, the legal effect of the 
convention is the opposite: States are obliged to fulfill conservationist 
obligations relating to biological resources without any provisions entailing 
possibilities for appropriation.  
 
In this way, international biodiversity law regulation of biological resources, 
including marine genetic resources, displays a Janus face, with converse 
regimes depending on where resources are located. Within their borders, states 
are rather unconstrained in appropriating such resources. Beyond areas of 
national jurisdiction, conservationist obligations limit states, not only from 
appropriating such resources, but even from carrying out activities affecting 
their conservation status. 
 
D.3. International trade law 
 
It has now been discussed firstly how the UNCLOS rules relating to areas 
beyond national jurisdiction can be regarded as the result of a trade-off between 
the res omnium communis principle of the high seas freedoms and the common 
heritage of mankind principle of the Area. Or to be more exact, under 
UNCLOS, living resources can be freely appropriated by states within national 
jurisdiction. Beyond those areas, they are considered global commons, but 
depending on their location they are managed under two different regimes. In 
the high seas water column, individual organisms are free for anyone to 
appropriate under the res omnium communis principle of the freedom of the 
seas. However, no state can claim territorial jurisdiction over these areas. In 
the seafloor and underlying sediments of the Area, both individual 
appropriation and claims for territorial jurisdiction are unlawful. Instead, the 
deep-sea resources in these areas are managed collectively, by multilateral 
institutions, for the benefit of all of mankind. 
 
Secondly, it was illustrated how the CBD seemingly rejects many of the 
fundamental concepts of UNCLOS. Instead, much of CBD is devoted to 
putting biodiversity under national jurisdiction, facilitating for the states to 






Mechanisms are provided by the CBD for enabling access to other states 
against compensation, thereby providing economic incentives for conservation 
of biological diversity, which can be regarded as the central logic of the CBD 
in areas within national jurisdiction.  
 
Beyond national jurisdiction, the logic of the CBD was considered distinct in 
some key respects. In these areas, CBD emphasizes preservation instead of 
appropriation, requiring states to ensure in situ conservation of genetic 
resources, seemingly based on a broader interest of preventing depleting 
biodiversity. As regards the purposes for preserving the biodiversity beyond 
national jurisdiction under the CBD, it was not formulated in terms of human 
use, but rather built on theories of inherent and intrinsic values of nature. These 
parts of the CBD were thus considered to be built on a different logic, not only 
compared to the common heritage of mankind principle of UNCLOS, but also 
compared to the operative provisions of the CBD relating to areas within 
national jurisdiction. Rather, for CBD purposes, conservation of living 
resources was considered an end in itself in areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
including in the deep seas. 
 
How, then, do the rules of the third regime of international law investigated in 
this study, international trade law, relate to the appropriation of deep-sea 
genetic resources? What underlying logics can explain its rules on how legal 
claims can be made in relation to such resources? As will be discussed in this 
section, WTO law, as manifested in TRIPS929, like the CBD, rejects the concept 
of the common heritage of mankind, but for entirely different reasons. It 
effectively disregards the notion of state sovereignty over living resources, 
perhaps the most fundamental concepts of both UNCLOS and the CBD. 
Instead, TRIPS establishes a unitary regime enabling the appropriation of 
living resources by means of patenting, applicable irrespective of where the 
living resource was retrieved. This disregard of state sovereignty is particularly 
noteworthy, since TRIPS was negotiated in parallel and immediately after the 
CBD. Still, it completely disregards the CBD notion of exclusive rights of 
states to regulate living organisms within their realm. Instead, TRIPS has a 
permissive view of what inventions or discoveries relating to genetic resources 
should be granted exclusive rights by means of patenting.  
 







The agreement sets no restrictions on the patentability of genetic resources, 
irrespective of origin. It generally opens the door for legal claims to genetic 
resources by means of patenting, seemingly in disregard of both UNCLOS and 
the CBD. The patentability of genetic resources is, however, formulated in an 
ambiguous manner, distinguishing between different forms of organisms and 
processes, opening the way for derogations by individual states for some but 
not all of these categories.  
 
It will now be examined what underlying understandings and considerations 
can explain how a treaty negotiated only a decade after UNCLOS and in 
parallel with the CBD could come up with such a different concept of genetic 
resources and the possibility of making legal claims to such resources. 
 
D.3.1. The patentability of genetic resources under TRIPS 
revisited 
 
Although there are other agreements providing rules for intellectual property 
rights, this investigation on the underlying perspectives is like other elements 
of international trade law in principle delimited to the World Trade Organiza-
tion agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).930 
 
The material implications of these rules for deep-sea bioprospecting have 
already been discussed in section C.3. In order to contextualize the 
examination of underlying values, central features will nevertheless be briefly 
recapitulated in this section. In the operative treaty provisions, the material 
rules on biotechnology patents are relatively straight-forward. Inventions 
obtained from genetic resources, including deep-sea genetic resources, can be 
patented, which provides minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection, provided that standard criteria for patenting are met.931  
 
930 As already discussed in Part A, this delimitation is legitimate for two reasons. Firstly, TRIPS 
has in many regards engulfed preceding treaties on intellectual property rights, increasingly 
regarded as having attained the status of a framework convention for international intellectual 
property rights law, with similarities to the status of UNCLOS in the international law of the sea 
and the CBD in international environmental law respectively. See also Ian Walden, Intellectual 
Property Rights and Biodiversity, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION OF 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Michael Bowman & Catherine Redgwell eds., 1996). 
931 According to Part II, Section V of TRIPS. Article 27 of TRIPS moreover establishes that 






Patents should thus be granted to any inventions if the three essential 
conditions of novelty, inventive step and usefulness are simultaneously 
fulfilled. Moreover, as a necessary condition, applications shall contain 
invention descriptions sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be 
carried out by a person skilled in the art.932 If all of these requirements are 
fulfilled, a patent confers on its owner a series of exclusive rights for at least 
twenty years, including the right to prevent third parties, not expressly 
authorized to the contrary, from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing the product or the process covered by patent.933 
 
There are however exceptions to the obligations for states to grant patents. 
Firstly, pursuant to Article 27, there are possibilities for states to preclude 
patentability based on ordre public concerns and morality.934 Secondly, parties 
may consider diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment 
of humans and animals as nonpatentable subject matter.935 Thirdly, it is 
possible for states to exclude plants and animals from patentability, as well as 
essential biological processes for the production of plants or animals. However, 
patentability may not be precluded for micro-organisms as well as non-
biological and microbiological processes.936  
 
Whereas the second possibility for exception from patentability is generally 
considered to have little relevance for biotechnology inventions, the third 
exception has condensed all the tensions and sensitivity relating to the issue of 
patentability of life.937 Based on a peculiar distinction between macro- and 
microbiology, the third exception endows states with the possibility to enact 
domestic legislation which prevents the patenting of macro-organisms. For 
micro-organisms, on the other hand, there is not even a possibility for states to 
preclude patentability, according to the main rule, as discussed in section C.3.3. 
 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application’. 
932 Article 29 of TRIPS. 
933 In line with Article 28 of TRIPS. 
934 Ordre public and morality are composed of mandatory rules, the application of which cannot 
be neglected. Ordre public refers to those basic values prevailing in society and is meant to 
include public. 
935 See paragraph 3(a) of TRIPS Article 27. 
936 See paragraph 3(b) of TRIPS Article 27. 







State parties to TRIPS are obliged to grant patent protection to applications 
relating to micro-organisms fulfilling the standard patent criteria. 
 
How deep-sea genetic resources should be interpreted in this context is, as 
previously discussed, far from certain. But as was established in that part, it 
appears that most commercial interest to deep-sea genetic resources relates to 
what is generally considered micro-organisms, resources that TRIPS 
essentially obliges states to accept patent claims, provided that standard patent 
criteria are fulfilled. 
 
The formulation of the exceptions in Article 27 was the result of one of the 
most difficult compromises of the TRIPS negotiations. Essentially, the 
presumption of Article 27 that living resources should be open for patenting 
unless states decides otherwise builds on the position which was upheld in US 
practice and had gained support in many other developed countries at the time 
of negotiation, that innovations built on living resources generally, and micro-
organisms in particular should be patentable. The third exception, as provided 
in Article 27(3)(b) which enables states to derogate from that obligation, as 
regards plants, animals and certain biological species and processes, was a 
requirement by developing countries in the negotiation. However, that the US 
and EU position became the main rule and the developing country position an 
exception that requires express legislation is itself evidence of the dynamics of 
the negotiation.938 
 
D.3.2. Underlying perceptions of patentability of genetic 
resources 
 
Patent law generally relies on the social contract whereby an inventor or 
applicant publicly reveals the technical learning or invention, in return for 
recognition of a temporary exclusive right of exploitation. As the result of 
developments of knowledge economies, some consider that the balance of this 
relationship has shifted and that patents are now increasingly designed as a 
strategic defense weapon for the protection of industrial investments and 
profitability in relation to research and development.939  
 
938 Daniel Barben, The Political Economy of Genetic Engineering: The Neoliberal Formation of 
the Biotechnology Industry, 11 ORGANIZATION & ENVIRONMENT (1998). 






Regardless of commercialization of the patented product or process, the patent 
holder can earn an income from their invention by transferring it or by granting 
licenses. The scope of the exclusive rights claimed for the patent is specified 
by the applicant and may involve several independent claims. In 
biotechnology, two main types of inventions are relevant: On the one hand, 
process inventions, where the protection concerns the invention that has been 
developed based on studies of a genetic resource; on the other, composition of 
matter inventions, where the protection concerns a produced substance or its 
application.940 Deep-sea bioprospecting can involve both these types. 
 
By commonly involving claims for exclusive rights to bioactive functions 
discovered in living organisms, biotechnology is sometimes referred to as the 
patenting of life. This suggests a gradual reservation of the living and genetic 
material through biotechnological invention. A more accurate description of 
the relationship between patent law and living organisms is that it does not 
involve claims for the full organisms. Rather, it is only concerned with certain 
manifestations of the living and genetic material.941 In biotechnology, genetic 
resources or functions thereof become incorporated by and into the immaterial 
property represented by patents. As such, patents have become accepted, the 
functions and genetic material of organisms have thus gradually become 
appropriated by patent owners, whereas the legal status of the physical 
representation of the organism of origin remains unaltered. The genetic 
functions of the living world in all its forms have thus become open for 
appropriation by the private sector and part of the market. This represents an 
instrumental view of nature which is not dissimilar to how international 
environmental law has developed with the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol. The 
possibilities for making patent claims based on genetic resources, however, 
differ across jurisdictions, as discussed in section C.3.5.942 This reflects 
different positions among states concerning the patentability of genetic 
resources, and implicitly different degrees of an instrumental view of nature.  
 
 
940 Hanns Ullrich, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, Benefit-Sharing and the Patent System: 
Romantics v. Economics?, in BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Francesco Francioni 
ed. 2006). 
941 GUILLOUX. 2018, at 79. 
942 As discussed in section C.3, TRIPS Article 27 enables states to make exceptions to the general 







The premise of TRIPS is that states can and – provided that certain conditions 
are fulfilled – should protect and grant exclusive rights for intellectual property 
in their jurisdiction, and that such protection can be extended across borders.943 
TRIPS thus sets requirements for what states must regard as patents as well as 
patentable matter, but implementation is left to the parties, by means of 
national legislation. TRIPS is thus similar to the approach of the UNCLOS and 
the CBD in that it accepts the notion of exclusive rights of states to regulate 
the use of genetic resources within the sovereignty afforded to them by 
international law. Yet, there is a major difference insofar as TRIPS does not 
make a distinction based on territorial jurisdiction, which is a central theme of 
UNCLOS and the CBD. Whereas TRIPS thus respects the integrity of the 
legislative and enforcement sovereignty of states, it undermines their 
sovereignty in another respect: the exclusive right of states to manage and 
utilize living organisms within their territorial sovereignty is not left intact. As 
discussed under Part C, one of the fundamental components of UNCLOS and 
the CBD is that living resources within the territory of states, including 
maritime zones, are enclosed by the states. By disregarding geographic origin 
of organisms involved in patent claims, TRIPS disregards this allocation of 
sovereign rights. Moreover, the lack of geographic considerations in the 
agreement opens the way for conflicts in areas beyond national jurisdiction. As 
discussed under section C.1, the common heritage of mankind principle rules 
out any form of appropriation of deep-seabed resources. Yet, TRIPS allows for 
and even obliges states to allow for the patenting of certain types of such 
resources. Indeed, the discretion for states to decide on patentability in the 
context of genetic resources is not unlimited under TRIPS. Patentability must 
be provided for micro-organisms as well as non-biological and microbiological 
processes, which involve most important deep-sea genetic resources. 
 
Part of the aim of TRIPS was to streamline national patent laws, but it did not 
intend to put patent procedures at a supranational level. Rather, this streamlin-
ing is pursued by means of obligations, which effectively function as manda-
tory requirements for the domestic patent laws of states. In addition to the lack 
of concern for geographic origin of organisms in patent applications, no re-
quirements for prior or informed consent to access to the relevant organism by 
the state which has exclusive competence to grant such consent according to 
 
943 G. Kristin Rosendal, Impacts of Overlapping International Regimes: The Case of 






UNCLOS and the CBD are set. Similarly, there is no reference in TRIPS to the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits, as provided by the CBD.944 The ability 
to make legal claims for exclusivity by means of patenting to genetic resources 
as called for by TRIPS is thus seemingly inconsistent with how such resources 
are perceived by other regimes, as will be discussed in Part E.  
 
This can be explained by the rather limited perspective of TRIPS, under which 
the granting of patents is solely conditioned on technical requirements. CBD 
and even more so UNCLOS have a broader scope, considering different 
aspects of human use of the environment and genetic resources. TRIPS, by 
contrast, does not seek to regulate a broad scope of activities affecting the 
physical environment. It rather has a singular scope, focused on defining the 
issue of invention, and establishing under what conditions inventions ought to 
be granted protection. 
 
TRIPS thus provides obligations for states to enable patentability of 
bioresources, including deep-sea genetic resources, irrespective of where such 
resources are retrieved, with an obligation to permit such patents as the main 
rule, albeit combined with possibilities for certain exceptions. Save for micro-
organisms as well as non-biological and microbiological processes, for which 
patentability is mandatory, TRIPS implicitly refers the central question to the 
states, allowing them to decide if legal claims by means of patents can be made 
in relation to living organisms. However, it should be underlined that it not 
only permits such patenting, but even calls for it, as a main rule. How did this 
conception gain acceptance in international law, despite apparent discontent 
among a large group of developing countries? 
 
It is logical to start the examination of how these values gained acceptance in 
the unexpected developments of US domestic legal practice in the 1980s, 
which was briefly described in section C.3.5, and look closer into the 
circumstances whereby the US patent system in a short period of time went 
from regarding living organisms as ineligible for patents to granting patents, 
not only for cells or micro-organisms, but for animals including mammals. 
This legal development came to influence other states too.  
 
 







Once negotiations for TRIPS got underway, it became a key interest for the US 
and allied states to make the new treaty reflect this newly adopted conception 
of living organisms and genetic resources as patentable. Developed states 
opposing this view did not manage to hinder this notion from being included 
in the final agreement, but reluctantly accepted the patentability of life as the 
main rule on the condition of a future review, which so far has not 
materialized.945 It will now be examined how these events unfolded. 
 
D.3.3. Reflection of transformed practice under domestic 
law 
 
The widespread use of biotechnology in various sectors, which has increased 
in recent years builds on a long history, as discussed in Part B. Yet the question 
of the patentability of living resources, or the components thereof, has arisen 
relatively recently.946 But at least since the early 1980s patent offices in the 
Western world have been granting patents on genes, cell lines, proteins, 
antibodies, hormones, micro-organisms and in some states even animals and 
plants, in line with well-established national laws. The extension of patents to 
life is based on the common law’s recognition of biological and organic matter 
as patentable subject matter.947 In particular, it connects to development of US 
case law starting in the 1980s which would influence the approach to 
biotechnology patents in many countries, and subsequently form the basis for 
the rules in TRIPS on patentability of genetic resources.  
 
The case which established the foundations for the area of patenting of genetic 
material in the United States was Diamond v. Chakrabarty948 in 1980, relating 
to the first ever patent application on a man-made living thing. The background 
of the case was an application of a patent on a strain of bacterium that a chemist 
had transformed with plasmids to promote hydrocarbon digestion.  
 
945 James Watson, The WTO and the Environment - Development of competence beyond trade 
(Routledge. 2013), at 116. 
946 Smith, North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation (2000), at 
146-147. 
947 DANIEL J. KEVLES, A HISTORY OF PATENTING LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES WITH COMPARATIVE 
ATTENTION TO EUROPE AND CANADA (Science European Group on Ethics in & Technologies 
New eds., Luxembourg : Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 2002). 






In 1973, the patent application had been rejected because living organisms 
were not patentable subject matter. After a long series of lawsuits, the Supreme 
Court eventually revoked the decision, and awarded Chakrabarty his patent. In 
the case, which gave rise to the dictum that “anything under the sun that is 
made by man” is patentable, the Supreme Court held that a claim to a 
genetically engineered bacterium was a “manufacture” and/or a “composition 
of matter.”949 In its opinion, the Court based much of its argumentation on the 
perceived intention of congress to give the patent laws a wide scope.950 
Importantly, the Court held that the distinction between living and inanimate 
things was not relevant for subject matter eligibility. Thus, the Court decided 
that living subject matter with markedly different characteristics from any 
found in nature, such as the claimed bacterium produced by genetic 
engineering, is not excluded from patent protection.951 This was the first 
occasion in which a patent had been granted for a living organism. It should be 
added that the case concerned bacteria which were capable of breaking down 
crude oil in cleaning processes, and thus certainly useful for legal purposes. In 
the decision, the Court furthermore stated that:  
 
… the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics than any found in nature… His discovery is not nature’s 
handiwork, but his own; accordingly, it is patentable subject matter 
under patent law.952 
 
The Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision thereby overturned the “product of 
nature” principle, which previously had precluded patents of living resources. 
Under this principle, laws of nature, natural phenomena, abstract ideas, and 
products of nature have long been deemed ineligible for patent protection.953 
 
949 Jacob S. Sherkow & Henry T. Greely, The History of Patenting Genetic Material, 49 ANNUAL 
REVIEW OF GENETICS (2015). 
950 In particular, the court made reference to the use by the Congress of “such expansive terms 
as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive’ and ‘any’”. See 
also Dan L. Burk, Patents and Related Rights: A Global Kaleidoscope, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Justine Pila eds., 2017), at 
471. 
951 United States Patent and Trademark Office Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (83 FR 
4473) (United States Patent and Trademark Office 9 ed. 2018).  
952 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. 
953 Although courts sometimes have struggled to give those terms concrete meaning, see Jacob 







Accordingly, the US Patent and Trademark Office had prior to 1980 in 
principle interpreted the US Patent Law as excluding living things such as 
laboratory-created micro-organisms from patenting, since they were 
considered to fall outside the definition of patentability. Section 101 of the law 
provides that utility patents are available for ’Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, (…), subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”954 The product of nature principle had held that 
living subject matter was not eligible for patenting, either because such subject 
matter did not fall within one of these statutory categories, or because it was a 
judicial exception to patent eligibility.955 
 
However, even if the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case thus opened the door to 
patentability of living resources, the Court’s statement still made clear that 
there was a need for human action upon the genetic material as a key element 
for obtaining the patent. Gradually, however, this requirement for human 
action was de-emphasized.956  
 
Patentability was first admitted for process inventions using micro-organisms 
and then for product inventions obtained through microbiological processes. 
In subsequent cases, patentability was extended to microorganic organisms of 
plant and animal origin, as well as to non-essential biological processes.957 In 
the years following the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office consistently granted patents on micro-organisms, including 
unicellular organisms, bacteria, yeast, fungi and other living organisms, and on 
non-biological and microbiological processes.958 This transformation of US 
patent practice was thus not the result of a legal reform by lawmakers. Rather, 
it was the consequence of new interpretations by courts, administrative officers 
and patent law practitioners.  
 
954 Verma. 2010. 
955 John M. Conley & Roberte Makowski, Back to the future: rethinking the product of nature 
doctrine as a barrier to biotechnology patents, 85 JOURNAL OF THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE SOCIETY (2003); United States Patent and Trademark Office Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (83 FR 4473). 2018, at 2105 Patent Eligible Subject Matter — Living 
Subject Matter [R-08.2017]. 
956 Walden, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity. 1996. 
957 GUILLOUX. 2018, at 81-99. 
958 Daniel S. Hodgins, Life forms protectable as subjects of US patents--microbes to animals 






Largely, observers regard this change in the interpretation of the US patent law 
as extremely unexpected.959 The issue of human involvement was subsequently 
extensively discussed in the Onco mouse case of 1988, where the successful 
implantation of cancer-causing genes in mice was granted a US patent.960 The 
same patent spurred more controversy elsewhere. In Canada, the Onco mouse 
patent was rejected on the grounds that higher life forms could not be 
considered inventions.961 In Europe on the other hand, patent was granted, on 
the ground that European law forbade the patenting of animal varieties but not 
animals, in spite of arguments against the patent based on the ‘ordre public’ 
and ‘moral’ provisions of the European Patent Convention962.963 Gradually, the 
common law approach to the patentability of genetic resources became 
mainstream among developed countries. Largely, this was motivated based on 
the highly technical and knowledge intensive processes used to screen, identify 
and reproduce genetic materials capable of commercial use, as discussed in 
Part B. 
 
Starting in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the development in common law which 
enabled biotechnology patents thus gradually became more permissive. During 
the 1990s, there was considerable discussion concerning human patents, which 
eventually made the US Congress prohibit patents containing ‘a claim directed 
to or encompassing a human organism.’ In the EU, similar laws were put in 
place. In parallel, discussion became lively over the patenting of genetically 
modified crops.964 In 1998 the EU Biotech Directive965 was approved, banning 
patenting of ‘the entire human body in all its development phases’ as well as 
processes for cloning and modifying the DNA of humans.  
 
959 Verma. 2010. 
960 Scovazzi & Francioni. 2006, at 17. 
961 Eventually, the patent was issued in Canada but excluding the mouse itself. Burk. 2017, at 
470-471; Sherkow & Greely, ANNUAL REVIEW OF GENETICS (2015). 
962 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 5 October 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (European 
Patent Convention). 
963 Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention states that no protection is available for 
‘plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological processes or the products thereof.’ See 
also MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: BIOLOGICAL 
INVENTIONS (Edward Elgar. 2008). 
964 Sherkow & Greely, ANNUAL REVIEW OF GENETICS (2015). 
965 Directive 98/44/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the 







For genetic subject matter not related to the human body the Biotech Directive 
took a considerably more permissive approach, expressly declaring in Article 
3(2) that ‘biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or 
produced by means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention 
even if it previously occurred in nature’.966 As regard scope of protection, 
Article 9 provides that ‘the protection conferred by a patent containing or 
consisting of genetic information shall extend to all material(…) in which the 
product is incorporated and in which the genetic information is contained and 
performs its function’. 
 
In the US, the issue of gene patents remained controversial in the wake of the 
Onco Mouse decision until 2013, when the issue again would become 
scrutinized in the Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.967 
The case concerned certain patent claims covering isolated DNA sequences, 
methods to diagnose cancer by looking for mutated DNA sequences and 
identify drugs using isolated DNA sequences. In its ruling, the Supreme Court 
held that merely isolating genes that are found in nature does not make them 
patentable. ‘separating [a] gene from its surrounding genetic material is not 
an act of invention(…) ‘A naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of 
nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that 
cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.’ The Myriad 
decision thus invalidated the patents relating to the identification of genes, but 
upheld the patents relating to DNA created through artificial process.968 When 
the Myriad patents eventually were tried in the EU, only limited protection was 
granted, although gene patents were not altogether ruled out.969 In Australia, 




966 This builds on the traditional understanding in European patent law that all biological 
inventions in principle are patentable. In principle, under European patent law there no 
distinction is made between the patentability of naturally occurring as opposed to artificial 
genetic material. See Walden, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity. 1996, at 174. 
967 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 569 U.S. 576. 
968 Sherkow & Greely, ANNUAL REVIEW OF GENETICS (2015). 
969 Anja von der Ropp & Tony Taubman, Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of Myriad, WIPO 
MAGAZINE (2006). 






Taken together with the ruling in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories971, decided in parallel, the Supreme Court decision the Myriad 
case marks a turn in a considerably more restrictive approach to gene patents 
compared to previous practice. As a broader consequence of the Myriad 
procedures, all patent claims directed to isolated genomic DNA were 
invalidated.972 Instead, DNA sequences generally became regarded as products 
of nature, ineligible for patenting, under US practice.973 Moreover, as the result 
of the partly connected ruling in Mayo, patent claims directed to methods of 
conducting genetic risk-assessments became ineligible.974 The US rejection of 
Myriad’s patents was followed in Australia, with a majority in the High Court 
considering that such molecules constituted “information” which was not of 
human manufacture, and were otherwise unsuited to protection having regard 
to the purpose and coherence of patent law.975 The turn taken in US patent law 
by the Myriad and Mayo decisions have however so far not been followed by 
a corresponding more restrictive approach in the EU, where the more liberal 
approach of the Biotech Directive still applies.976 Effectively, EU law on 
patentability of genetic resources has thus effectively become less restrictive 
than US law under current practice.  
 
It is important to note that the US Supreme Court decisions in the Myriad and 
Mayo cases, which made the US approach to gene patents more restrictive, 
came a decade after the conclusion of TRIPS. The starting point for the US in 
the Uruguay round negotiations on intellectual property rights was thus not the 
approach to patentability which is now accepted, but the unadjusted and much 
more liberal approach to biotechnology patents which was prevalent in the 
years after the Diamond v. Chakrabarty ruling. 
 
 
971 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66. 
972 As a consequence of Myriad procedures, primers, or probes of particular genes, also became 
ineligible. 
973 Burk. 2017, at 471-472. 
974 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66,  
975 See Burk. 2017, at 471-472. 
976 Includes isolated and purified genetic molecules within patentable subject matter, while it 
also limits the scope of protection for genetic products to the product when performing the 
specific function for which it is patented. Directive 98/44/EC of The European Parliament and 
of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (Biotech 







Indeed, the US, as well as the European Community, who together formed the 
driving force behind TRIPS entered into its negotiation against the backdrop 
of a domestic regulation which gradually had embraced the idea that inventions 
could be built on biological resources and granted patent rights. It should 
therefore not come as a surprise that they pursued an international regulation 
in line with this conception. As will be further discussed below, this agenda 
came largely to prevail in the negotiations of TRIPS, which thus came to reflect 
the approach to patenting of life at its permissive high-point, a perspective even 
the US since has abandoned. 
 
It must also be noted that the approach taken to patentability in relation to 
genetic resources under the Diamond v. Chakrabarty ruling never was 
universally recognized but largely confined to OECD-countries. Developing 
countries rejected these liberal approaches to biotechnology patenting, and 
regarded the development with great skepticism, not least in relation to the 
patenting of plants and seeds.977 Accordingly, developing states in general 
more reluctantly entered the negotiation of TRIPS. This is connected to 
dissimilar perspectives on the more fundamental issue of the privatization 
represented by the patenting of genetic resources.978 Many developing states 
have considered that the patenting of genetic functions is unacceptable, not 
only based on principal objections against the patenting of nature but also 
because such functions have been developed by evolution rather than humans. 
Since the value under this understanding has been provided by nature, 
accepting intellectual property rights claims to genetic resources has also been 





977 Ali M. Nizamuddin, The Patenting of Life, Limiting Liberty, and the Corporate Pursuit of 
Seeds (Lexington Books. 2017); Thompson, Natural Resources Journal (2004), at 850. 








D.3.4. Globalization of patentability of living organisms and 
reaction to the CBD 
 
When negotiations for an agreement on protection on intellectual property 
rights started within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
both the United States and the European Community demanded that 
discoveries involving recombinant DNA (rDNA) should be declared 
intellectual property, admissible for patenting, in line with their domestic 
regulation. Based on this approach, micro-organisms (such as bacteria) as well 
as biological processes eventually would become patentable under the 
agreement.979 It will now be discussed how these and likeminded states 
managed to find acceptance in the new global regime for their relatively new 
conception of living organisms as patentable. 
 
This notion was based on two presumptions, which were also the basis for the 
patentability of living organisms in their domestic laws. Firstly, that the 
possibility of appropriation and exclusive rights is a precondition for 
innovation. Secondly, that such rights can extend also to cases of discovery of 
naturally occurring functions, i.e. where the inventive step is the result of 
evolutionary processes and the human contribution is limited to the discovery 
of that function and its potential use. Based on this rationale, these states argued 
that innovation is driven by economic incentives, and that discoveries 
involving recombinant DNA should be considered intellectual property, 
admissible for patenting.980 The concept of regarding DNA as intellectual 
property as proposed by these states was wide, encompassing micro-organisms 
(such as bacteria) as well as biological processes. 
 
The Uruguay round of trade agreement negotiations, which would lead to the 
formation of the WTO, started already in 1987. The inclusion of intellectual 
property rights in the negotiation round was not the result of a request by all 
states, but rather that of a limited group, led by the US and supported by the 
EC and Japan. In addition to the US interest in bringing about a global treaty 
in line with its national regulation of intellectual property rights, as discussed 
in the previous section, concerns had also started to emerge on the perceived 
 
979 GERVAIS. 2012, at 420-458. 







cost of intellectual property right violations for the US economy.981 This 
prompted a broad coalition of corporations involved in knowledge-based 
industries, as well as the US Chamber of Commerce, to put considerable 
lobbying efforts into making the US and other developed states prioritize the 
prevention of such violations in the Uruguay round. As part of this movement, 
the Intellectual Property Committee, consisting of enterprise federations in the 
US, Japan and the EC, was formed.982 
 
This committee amplified and spread the efforts for the inclusion of an 
ambitious platform for the protection and globalization of intellectual property 
rights in the round. It also came to play an important role as a lobbyist 
throughout the negotiations. What corporate stakeholders sought in the 
suggested agreement was thus more than merely deterrents to international 
trade in goods which violated intellectual property rights.983 They also called 
for the global adoption and implementation of adequate and effective, but not 
necessarily harmonized, rules protecting patents in all fields, including 
biotechnology inventions, irrespective of organism.984  
 
As already mentioned, the developing countries’ Group of 77 were critical of 
the suggestion to include intellectual property rights issues. As shown by 
Smith, this connects to fundamentally different views on intellectual property 
rights in developing countries. Whereas most developed states for long had 
subscribed to the logic of intellectual property right protection, this had not 
been generally accepted in developing states.985  
 
981 In a widely discussed report by the US International Trade Commission issued in 1986, 
intellectual property rights violations had been estimated to cost the US $61 billion dollars. 
982 Derrick Purdue, Hegemonic trips: World trade, intellectual property and biodiversity, 4 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (1995), at 96; Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in Information: 
The story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13 PROMETHEUS (1995), at 6-19; Cary Fowler, Unnatural 
selection: technology, politics, law and the rationalization of plant evolution (1993) Diss. 
Uppsala University), at 176. 
983 Susan K. Sell & Aseem Prakash, Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Between Business 
and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights, 48 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY 
(2004). 
984 Drahos, PROMETHEUS (1995), at 12-13. 
985 The logic of intellectual property rights is commonly described as creating private property 
rights for developers of new knowledge to compensate for the labor and resources expended 
during the creative process. By rewarding research and development, intellectual property rights 
aim to promote the creation of new knowledge, as well as its dissemination, since patents require 






Rather than accepting this individualistic approach, knowledge is commonly 
considered communal and not private property in developing country societies, 
where there is a widespread recognition of invention as an intergenerational, 
rather than individual achievement which extend existing ideas and 
discoveries.986 As discussed in the previous section, the concept that exclusive 
rights could be claimed to species or the components of life was particularly 
alien to G77 members. 
 
Still the developing states did not manage to prevent the issues which would 
become codified in TRIPS from becoming a central element in the negotiation 
round. This has been explained in different ways. Sutherland has attributed it 
to the lack of expertise and resources among developing states.987 McLaughlin 
has explained the inclusion of intellectual property rights as a trade-off: 
Despite their reluctance, developing countries had to accept the negotiation of 
these issues in the Uruguay round, in order to enable the negotiation of trade 
liberalizations.988 Venbrux has described it as the result of external pressures 
from the United States and the European Union to force intellectual property 
legislation in other member states, which involved threats of trade sanctions 
unless the protection was strengthened.989 
 
The negotiation group on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights, 
including in counterfeit goods thus became part of the Uruguay round 
negotiations from the start. In the initial years, work progressed slowly. The 
first period of negotiations focused on identifying lacunae in existing 
intellectual property rights conventions and national law.990  
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However, already by the end of 1987, a range of participants, notably the US 
and the European Community had expressed their desire for a far-reaching 
agreement on intellectual property rights.991 These calls did not go uncontested. 
Developing countries expressed serious concern about possible over-
protection of intellectual property rights.992 This resulted in a stalemate, and at 
the mid-term meeting of the Uruguay round in Montreal in 1988, the ministers 
limited themselves to a short statement concerning TRIPS. It was not until 
1990 that proposals for a treaty text started to materialize, again led by the US 
and the European Community supported by allies like Japan, Australia and 
Switzerland.993  
 
Already at the outset of the negotiations it had been clear that the US, EU and 
likeminded states wanted a narrow and ambitious agreement, which did not 
allow for a multitude of exceptions. By the end of 1991, it appeared clear that 
a future agreement would require patentability of inventions in all fields. The 
G77, however, still insisted on the exclusion of plants and animals.  
 
In 1992, the dynamics of the TRIPS negotiation changed by the adoption of 
the CBD at the Rio Summit. The CBD, which had been negotiated and adopted 
in parallel to the first years of the TRIPS negotiation, gave rise to considerable 
controversy in the area of intellectual property rights. Across the US 
intellectual property business sector there was considerable disappointment 
with the negotiation outcome. In particular Article 16 of the CBD on the Access 
to and Transfer of Technology (as discussed in section C.2.2) was cited by the 
US government as one of the reasons behind their decision to initially not sign 
the CBD.994 Generally, the US considered that the CBD focused on intellectual 
property rights as a constraint to the global economy.995 The CBD provisions 
on technology transfer were regarded as potentially permitting countries to 
restrict the intellectual property rights of companies that develop products 
based on resources obtained from the country.  
 
991 See proposals tabled by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), document 
MTN.GNG./NG11/W/14 (October 20, 1987) and the European Community, document 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/16 (November 20, 1987).  
992 Gervais. 2012, at 3-32; Terence P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay round: A Negotiating 
History (1986-1992) § 2 (Kluwer. 1993). 
993 GERVAIS. 2012, at 19. 
994 In the end the US signed the CBD, but not until 1993, one year after the Rio summit, where 
other participating states had signed the treaty. 






Moreover, the US objected to the calls to set up compulsory licensing regimes 
as well as the provision in Article 22(1) that opened for the possibility to affect 
preceding intellectual property rights agreements in case of serious damage or 
threat to biological diversity.996 
 
The upshot was that the US position in the TRIPS negotiation became fiercer. 
It no longer merely sought to gain international acceptance for the US 
regulation, but also to a considerable degree came to reflect the disappointment 
with the outcome of the CBD negotiations. The debate among intellectual 
property rights stakeholders in the US in the wake of the disappointment with 
the outcome of the CBD negotiations increased the interest for, and 
consequently the mobilization of lobbyists in relation to the negotiation of 
TRIPS. In particular major pharmaceutical companies realized that there were 
considerable interests at stake.997 
 
In the wake of the adoption of the CBD, negotiations of the most contentious 
issues of TRIPS would continue through 1993 and eventually the TRIPS 
agreement was adopted in 1994.998 Judging by the negotiation documents, only 
developing states appear to have expressed concerns that the proposals for 
including patentability of living organisms would go against what had been 
agreed as fundaments of the CBD at the Rio Summit. These calls for exploring 
connections to other treaties were however voiced rather late in the 
negotiations. The developing countries’ opposition to regarding living 
organisms as patentable was founded on the same concerns that had guided 
their positions in the negotiations of the CBD: namely a fear that the gene-poor 
North would be robbing the gene-rich South of germplasm as a resource for 
biotechnology and then commercialize products without adequate 
compensation for the state of origin for the gene.999 For developing countries, 
it was central to maintain the sovereign rights to their genetic resources which 
had been affirmed by the adoption of the CBD at the Rio Summit in 1992. 
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The US, EC and likeminded states rejected these proposals for exploring the 
connections to other treaties and limiting the patentability of living organisms 
by referring to the limited mandate of the negotiations, which did not include 
possibilities for including non-trade aspects. In any event, these states 
contended, issues of connections to other treaties should not be allowed to halt 
the adoption of the agreement. After all the TRIPS negotiation was part of the 
broad multilateral round of WTO agreements of the Uruguay round, they 
considered, and was thus bound by tight deadlines. Moreover, as previously 
stated, an all-inclusive definition of patentable matter was central to the US 
and EC positions.1000  
 
With regard to the patentability of living organisms, as would finally be 
provided in Article 27 of TRIPS, the US had initially been categorically 
opposed to possibilities for excluding of plants and animals. It finally agreed 
to allow states to derogate from that obligation for two reasons. Firstly, the 
exceptions provided in Article 27, for methods for the treatment of humans and 
animals as well as for plants and animals other than micro-organisms and 
essentially biological processes were only optional and not mandatory. This 
permitted the US, the most important patent jurisdiction, to maintain its legal 
practice of regarding living resources as patentable. Secondly, the US in the 
final rounds of negotiations declared, as a requirement for their acceptance of 
possibilities for exceptions for plants and animals, that micro-organisms would 
not be part of that exception.1001 The US, supported by the EC and other OECD-
states, thereby managed to bring about a mandatory acceptance of the 
patentability of micro-organisms as an “exception to the exception.” Some 
observers have disagreed with the description of Article 27 as a reflection of 
US interests. For instance, Walden has based on the possibilities for exceptions 
claimed that Article 27 should be interpreted as a balance between the broad 
protection under US law of the time and the public interest concerns of 
developing countries, which had been more reflected in the CBD.1002 In any 
event, the agreed compromise of Article 27 was not formulated as a definitive 
solution to the matter.  
 
1000 For a vivid account of these parts of the negotiations, see GERVAIS. 2012, at 420-458. 
1001 Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker, From GATT to TRIPs : the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights § 18 (Max Planck Institute for Foreign and 
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Instead, the parties agreed to postpone the decision on critical issues by 
including a review mechanism in Article 27(3)(b). According to the mandate 
for this review, a process starting five years after the agreement should handle 
the issue of whether plants and animal inventions should be covered by patents, 
and how to protect new plant varieties. This review procedure, together with 
the possibilities for exception made developing countries accept patentability 
as the main rule. However, the review procedure would not solve the conflict; 
indeed, it has still not solved the conflict. Developing country proposals for 
adjusting the regulation of patentability of living organisms have consistently 
been rejected. The scope for the review was eventually expanded in the 2001 
Doha Declaration, by also including the relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the CBD.1003 The review discussion has since continued in the 
TRIPS council. In 2008 a group of parties called for a procedural decision to 
negotiate a provision including geographic disclosure requirements. Members 
however remain divided over this idea.1004 As a consequence of the inability to 
make progress on the issue, the original conception of macro-organisms as 
patentable according to the main rule, and micro-organisms as patentable under 
any event, remain intact.  
 
In conclusion, the US, EC and allied states succeeded in bringing about an 
ambitious treaty, with a broad regulation of patentability, encompassing living 
organisms as a main rule and micro-organisms as a mandatory requirement. 
This was in line with, and can partly be explained by, legal development, 
foremost in US domestic law. Powerful interests within the business sector 
lobbied effectively for a corresponding multilateral regulation. Moreover, 
these actors were disappointed with substantial parts of the newly adopted 
CBD and wanted to ensure that their interests were better upheld in TRIPS. 
The approach to patentability of TRIPS can thus also be regarded as a reaction 
to the CBD. As for developing states, they did not manage to bring about 
leverage in favor of their objection to include living organisms as patentable 
subject matter.  
 
1003 See Paragraph 19 of the 2001 Doha Declaration, World Trade Organization, Ministerial 
Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) (Doha 
Declaration); Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
(2002). 
1004 World Trade Organization, Draft modalities for TRIPS related issues, WTO Doc. 







Instead, they reluctantly accepted patentability of living organisms as the main 
rule, in return for possibilities for exceptions on a national basis, as well as a 
review mechanism. Yet, the review procedure ßfailed to advance the question. 
Developing country calls for a modified definition of patentability, as well as 
for geographic declaration of origin for genetic material, have so far failed to 
gain acceptance. 
 
The new treaty thus came and continues to reflect and continues to manifest 
the conception of patentability of living organisms under US practice, as it had 
evolved during the years leading up to the finalization of the negotiations, 
which coincided with the period highly permissive in relation to biotechnology 
patents, in the wake of Diamond v. Chakrabarty.1005 This explains why TRIPS 
generally accepts the appropriation of living organisms by means of claims for 
exclusivity based on patenting, irrespective of the origin of genetic compo-
nents, and only provides limited possibilities for exceptions. Whereas US case 
law since has become more restrictive in relation to gene patents, TRIPS 
remains a reflection of the period before the Myriad1006 and Mayo1007 cases. 
 
D.4. Conclusions on underlying perspectives 
 
The study has now examined how the international law of the sea, international 
environmental law and international trade law, as manifested in UNCLOS, the 
CBD and TRIPS, relate to the appropriation of deep-sea organisms, and what 
underlying values explain these different conceptions. A multitude of 
explanatory factors have been established, relating to such diverse aspects as 
contemporary political movements, particular dynamics of negotiations, 
involvement of private interests and regulative origin. 
 
In the examination of the rules applicable to the appropriation of genetic 
resources under the law of the sea it was established that these can be 
interpreted as built on differentiated conceptions of appropriation across 
maritime zones. Firstly, the claims for expanded coastal state rights gradually 
increased maritime zone claims, including exclusive rights for living resources 
within those areas. This amounted to a substantial enclosure of marine areas 
which used to be global commons.  
 
1005 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. 
1006 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics Inc., 569 U.S. 576. 






Secondly, in remaining areas beyond national jurisdiction the regulation in 
UNCLOS was built on a dichotomy between two widely different conceptions 
of appropriation of common resources. In the high seas, the medieval freedoms 
of the high seas-principles remained relatively intact. This implies a res 
communis-conception of the living organisms, open for individual 
appropriation by anyone, provided that certain conditions are met, albeit 
without possibilities for collective enclosure by assertions of sovereignty. 
 
As regards resources in the seafloor and underlying sediments of the Area, their 
regulative regime was based on the revolutionary new concept of the common 
heritage of mankind, providing common management under global 
institutions, prohibiting appropriation. This concept was considered strongly 
connected to the New International Economic Order movement, which was 
particularly influential in the international system around the time of the 
negotiation of this part of UNCLOS. It was also established that the dichotomy 
of the regime for areas beyond national jurisdiction, based on partly opposing 
concepts of appropriation in the high seas and the Area, was the result of a 
trade-off between the movements of enclosure and the New International 
Economic Order movement. With regards to the management of living 
resources in what used to be the high seas, coastal state appropriation of vast 
areas and exclusive claims for the resources in those areas gained acceptance, 
in return for the new deep-seabed regime of the common heritage of mankind. 
The advancement of both these conceptions – enclosure and common heritage 
of mankind – was made at the expense of the high seas freedoms, where the 
old res omnium communis regime was substantially cut short by exceptions 
and geographically curtailed by enclosures. 
 
In investigating international environmental law, a partly overlapping and 
equally interesting duality was found in the CBD. The convention essentially 
establishes two different regimes, one applying in areas within and another one 
beyond national jurisdiction, based on fundamentally different perspectives of 
appropriation of living resources. It was established that the CBD generally 
can be regarded as being based on the conception that biodiversity ought to be 
exploited and conserved for human purposes, reflecting a predominantly 









At its heart lay the contention that states have sovereignty over biological 
resources within their territorial realm, including exclusive rights to regulate 
their appropriation, and that they should be adequately compensated for 
supplying and conserving those resources, in particular when granting access 
to others.  
 
However, in the investigation of the provisions relating to areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, it was found that the convention appeared to shift 
perspective: Beyond state borders, the CBD is less concerned with 
appropriation of resources or distribution of benefits. Instead, emphasis is put 
on conservation. In these areas, the instrumental perspective of biological 
resources is replaced with provisions reflecting a view that conserving 
biological diversity is an end in itself, an essentially intrinsic value approach. 
Like the case of the law of the sea, this dichotomy reflects different perceptions 
and perspectives of appropriation of biological resources within the same 
convention. The regulation within state borders can be summarized as granting 
unlimited rights to the states to appropriate genetic resources within their 
territorial jurisdiction, so long as certain conservationist obligations are 
fulfilled. By qualifying the access of other states on benefit-sharing, incentives 
are created for conservation. Beyond national jurisdiction, the effect of the 
convention is the opposite: States are obliged to fulfill conservationist 
obligations relating to biological resources without any provisions entailing 
possibilities for compensation.  
 
The exploration of international trade law rules on patentability, as manifested 
by TRIPS, established that the regime disregarded the UNCLOS and CBD 
notion of exclusive rights for states to appropriate genetic resources within 
their territorial scope. Instead, TRIPS was found to be built on an all-inclusive 
conception of patentability, including living organisms and genetic resources 
according to the standard rule. This conception, has its roots in an increasingly 
permissive practice in domestic US application of patentability criteria. The 
success and resulting reflection of this conception in the negotiations was 
explained by a chain of events. A powerful industrial lobby had been 
assembled already before the negotiations, calling for an intellectual property 
rights treaty to be part of the Uruguay round of trade agreements. Initially, this 







However, as negotiations for TRIPS were launched, the same interests started 
to pursue a globalization of US conceptions of patentability. After the adoption 
of the CBD at the Rio Summit in 1992, disappointment with the summit 
outcome within the industry, which considered that the CBD would put US 
intellectual property rights interests at risk, bolstered the engagement in 
TRIPS, aiming to make it a counterweight to CBD. Developing countries, 
which wanted to protect gains made at Rio, disputed US claims for an 
unlimited definition of patentability, including living organisms. 
 
This opposition was eventually bought off in return for trade liberalizations 
and by the inclusion of a review mechanism. In the review discussion, 
developing states have called for an exploration of connections to the CBD and 
have proposed requirements for declaration of origin for living organisms used 
in patent applications. However, these proposals have received a lukewarm 
reception by the US and likeminded states, and the originally adopted text of 
the TRIPS thus remains intact. It is noteworthy that the rules applicable to the 
patenting of genetic resources under TRIPS reflect an approach in US law 
which has since in part has been revoked. Taken together, these dynamics 
explain how TRIPS ended up adopting rules entailing unlimited patentability, 
enabling the appropriation of living organisms and genetic resources by legal 









E. The interaction of rules in different regimes 
of international law – integration, 
coherence or fragmentation 
 
Under Part C it was examined how norms in three international law treaties, 
representing three distinct regimes, regulate the appropriation of deep-sea 
living resources in different ways. Under Part D the concerns, motivations and 
ideologies behind these rules were investigated. It was discussed how 
substantive differences can be explained by fundamentally dissimilar 
underlying ideologies and perceived assumptions of purpose across the three 
regimes. The differences encompass the most basic elements of the rules, 
including how the regimes conceptually interpret appropriation of genetic 
resources. 
 
These fundamental underlying disparities between the regimes, it was argued, 
explain why they relate differently to the legal status of claims to deep-sea 
genetic resources. To the law of the sea, organisms within national jurisdiction 
are resources which are to be managed and allocated between states according 
to their sovereign rights and interests. Beyond such areas, the resources of the 
oceans are global commons, either open for appropriation by anyone under the 
freedoms of the high seas or unlawful to appropriate under the common 
heritage of mankind principle of the Area. Under international environmental 
law, the same organisms are regarded as biodiversity which states have the 
sovereign rights to appropriate within their jurisdiction. Beyond state 
jurisdiction, they are safeguarded by conservation measures and other tools for 
environmental protection. For international trade law, the same organisms are 
generally considered as matter which can be appropriated by means of patents, 
which, according to the main rule, should be granted protection, irrespective 
of where the organism is retrieved. 
 
So far, the rules applicable to deep-sea bioprospecting provided by each 
respective regime have been approached in isolation, without fully considering 
areas of overlap and impact across regime boundaries. In this part, these rules 
will be compared and combined to see what rules should be given priority or 
if an aggregated set of norms can be distinguished, representing not one treaty 






Although the conclusions would be relevant also in other contexts, such as in 
settlements of judicial disputes involving deep-sea bioprospecting, this will 
foremost be viewed from the perspective of the primary subject of international 
law: the state. It will thus be investigated if it would be possible for a state to 
implement in good faith its obligations in all three regimes when faced with 
practical cases of deep-sea bioprospecting or when attempting to draft 
domestic legislation for the use of deep-sea genetic resources. This implies an 
assessment of whether the rules can be practically applied in concert, despite 
their origins in different branches of international law. Or, if there appears to 
be a material overlap, which would prevent states from being able to 
simultaneously implement relevant norms from all three regimes. This will 
enable a more precise identification of inconsistencies between the rules of the 
different regimes. 
 
Thereafter, it will be developed how international law addresses 
inconsistencies between treaties. Possible means to prevent and resolve norm 
conflicts, primarily based on treaty law rules on application and interpretation, 
will be examined. This will serve two purposes. 
 
Firstly, these rules will be tested in the context of potential conflicts identified 
relating to deep-sea bioprospecting and biogenetic resources. Thereby, it will 
be established if this case represents a genuine, irreconcilable norm conflict, or 
merely a prima facie problem, which the rules in international law would be 
able to prevent or resolve. From the perspective of the state, this would clarify 
if it would be possible to interpret or apply relevant obligations in a manner 
that would enable it to implement the undertakings of all three regimes 
 
Secondly, this will serve as the starting point for a discussion on systemic 
implications on international law. If the rules that aim to maintain international 
law as an integrated, coherent system of law fail to fulfill this objective in 
practical cases such as that of deep-sea bioprospecting, can international law 
still be regarded a unitary system of law? Or could the ability of treaty law 
rules to address such difficult cases serve as an indication of fragmentation into 









E.1. Areas of contention between UNCLOS, CBD and 
TRIPS 
 
To start with the law of the sea, marine genetic resources in the high seas and 
the Area are regarded as global commons. As regards genetic resources of the 
high seas, it appears that states are free to use these in bioprospecting by virtue 
of the high seas freedoms and the principle of res omnium communis. 
Generally, the open-access regime of the high seas gives all states access, and 
the limitations to appropriation principally relate to territorial claims. General 
obligations of the high seas regime must, however, be respected in 
bioprospecting. Similarly, the rules on marine living resources remain 
applicable, calling for their different approaches to management to be 
considered. For genetic resources in the high seas, it is less relevant whether 
sampling operations are considered to represent marine scientific research, 
since the legal material implication is the same, irrespective of how the activity 
is considered. 
 
In the Area, the legal status of genetic resources is less clear. Whereas there is 
no consensus regarding the legal status of bioprospecting in the seafloor and 
underlying sediments, it was considered that there are powerful arguments for 
considering the genetic resources of the seabed as encompassed by the scope 
of the Area regime, and as falling within the scope of the principle of common 
heritage of mankind, although the issue remains contested.1008 As a 
consequence of the consideration that the common heritage of mankind 
principle is applicable to seabed genetic resources, it was found that legal 
claims to these resources are precluded under UNCLOS.1009  
 
1008 As was found under section C.1., this question essentially boils down to interpretation of the 
resource definition under UNCLOS. Either, resources should be interpreted extensively, thus 
bringing marine genetic resources within the scope of the common heritage of mankind 
principle. Or, the scope of that principle is limited to mineral resources, thus leaving marine 
genetic resources outside the remits of the principle. Ultimately, this determination is decisive 
with regards to the legality of bioprospecting in the seafloor and underlying sediments. As was 
established in section C.1.4., the arguments favoring an extensive position are considered more 
powerful in this study. This understanding implies that genetic resources geographically located 
in the seabed are part of the Area-regime and falls within the scope of the common heritage of 
mankind-principle. 
1009 See Article 137 of UNCLOS. “No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign 






This is connected to an integral part of this principle: if the resource is owned 
by all of mankind collectively, individual or sovereign appropriation would 
represent a violation. Effectively, this implies that all forms of appropriation – 
including by means of bioprospecting – of genetic resources in the seabed are 
unlawful.  
 
From the perspective of international environmental law, as articulated by the 
CBD, the investigation in Part C established that the regime provides far-
reaching rights for states to appropriate genetic resources within national 
jurisdiction. In contrast, beyond national jurisdiction, the convention is not 
concerned with the legal status of such resources. States are, however, bound 
to respect a number of obligations relating foremost to the preservation and in 
situ conservation of bioresources as well as the sharing of benefits from 
bioprospecting activities relating to organisms beyond national jurisdiction. It 
could be argued that these obligations, in particular relating to conservation, 
go further than the corresponding conditions imposed by UNCLOS. Hence, it 
could be alleged that CBD could potentially limit the possibilities for freely 
exercising the high seas freedoms and the use of the Area provided by 
UNCLOS. 
 
Based on the ordinary meaning of treaty terms, it appears that WTO law, as 
provided by TRIPS is inconsistent in relation to both the rules of UNCLOS and 
the CBD by declaring as a main rule that marine genetic resources are 
patentable subject matter, and thus can be appropriated, irrespective of where 
such living resources are retrieved, as discussed in section C.3. States are 
however able to exempt plants and animals from patentability. For some 
bioresources on the other hand, in particular micro-organisms, which includes 
most relevant deep-sea genetic resources identified in section B.6, state parties 
to TRIPS are even under obligation to enable patentability. 
 
If patents are based on genetic resources retrieved within the national 
jurisdiction of other states, such claims would represent a violation of the 
sovereign rights of these states to control and manage bioresources within their 
territorial jurisdiction under both UNCLOS and the CBD, unless consent has 
been granted.  
 
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor 







Where patent claims are accepted involving genetic resources sampled beyond 
national jurisdiction, as is the focus of this study, the bioprospecting involved 
could be considered as not being fully in line with the CBD, to the extent that 
obligations relating to conservation are violated or benefits-sharing obligations 
not fulfilled. If this area of contention may appear hypothetical, it appears less 
remote to consider the allowance of legal claims by means of patenting to 
seabed genetic resources as violating the common heritage of mankind 
principle of UNCLOS, as well as other law of the sea rules for the Area. At 
least an inconsistency appears to be at hand where genetic resources have been 
sampled for bioprospecting purposes. 
 
Where deep-seabed genetic resources have been sampled as part of scientific 
research operations without commercial purposes, and stored, either by means 
of sequence data in libraries or in biobank collections only to subsequently be 
used as the basis for bioprospecting, the rules in UNCLOS do not appear to 
preclude patenting.1010 In the law of the sea rules on the high seas, on the other 
hand, there is no rule precluding patent claims to genetic resources, as 
discussed above. There thus appears to be full coherence between the 
obligations under UNCLOS and TRIPS relating to bioprospecting in the 
pelagic realm of the deep seas. Where such activities are conducted in relation 
to deep-seabed genetic resources, there appears to be a considerable risk of 
conflict between the obligations of these treaties. In particular, this is the case 
for the types micro-organism resources for which TRIPS prevents states from 
making exceptions from patentability. 
 
In conclusion, a preliminary reading, based on the ordinary meaning of terms 
involved, suggests that the three treaties provide inconsistent rules for some 
but not all types of deep-sea bioprospecting. In some areas, foremost relating 
to bioprospecting of deep-seabed genetic resources, located beyond national 
jurisdiction, these obligations could result in conflict, implying that one 
obligation under international law cannot be fulfilled without violating another.  
 
1010 This model, which may appear to be remote and theoretical has become increasingly 
common in bioprospecting processes, as discussed in Part B. The compatibility of this model 
with the rules in UNCLOS is due to the more generous access to non-commercial marine 
scientific research in the seabed as compared to other activities under the Area regime, and the 
lack of rules in UNCLOS on how samples collected in scientific research missions subsequently 






In particular, this is the case for bioprospecting of deep-seabed micro-
organisms, where contrary obligations put states in a legal dilemma: Rejecting 
patent claims as called for by the rules of the Area under the law of the sea 
would represent a violation of the obligation to enable patentability under 
TRIPS.  
 
Identifying this norm conflict does not imply that the discrepancies between 
these regimes extend to all legal issues involving bioprospecting. As identified, 
in many regards the rules of the three regimes remain compatible, despite the 
fundamental differences discussed in Part D. But in the specific case of deep-
sea bioprospecting, treaty provisions in the three regimes in some regards 
appear difficult to apply in concert. These potential norm conflicts are not 
merely theoretical but relate directly to practical aspects of the growing 
bioprospecting sector. Such conflicts are likely to become more relevant under 
current industry trends, in particular since the conflict is most articulate in 
relation to the deep-seabed micro-organisms which are the focus for much of 
the commercial interest, as discussed in Part B. 
 
Where life in the deep seas is exploited for bioprospecting purposes, conflicts 
can thus arise between obligations in the three regimes. The law of the sea in 
certain regards prohibits the appropriation of naturally occurring genetic 
resources, whereas intellectual property rights elements of WTO law obliges 
states to enable patenting of the same organisms. International environmental 
law in turn sets requirements not only for conservation but also for the sharing 
of benefits. How, then, does international law relate to such situations?  
 
E.2. Approaching cases of conflicting obligations 
 
Considering the different perspective on deep-sea bioresources identified in 
Part D, it is not surprising that rules vary across these legal regimes. In this and 
subsequent sections, the consequences of these differences will be explained. 
Firstly, it will be examined how overlaps and conflicts of norms in 
international law have been interpreted. As will be discussed, scholarly 
positions on the possibility of preventing or resolving such conflicts largely 
correlate with the perspective of central systemic elements. Those who contend 
that international law remains a coherent system, despite its proliferation into 
different regimes, generally hold that treaty law rules are able to prevent and 







Taken to its extreme, this understanding would suggest that even conflicts 
between norms that appear entirely irreconcilable prima facie will function in 
concert once treaty law rules for conflict prevention and solution have been 
applied. Under this argument, genuine norm conflicts would be inconceivable 
in international law since the system is constructed to self-repair, or rather to 
prevent conflicts from even arising.  
 
This position can be contrasted with that of observers who claim that the 
system has fragmented. According to this understanding, the once monolithic 
public international law has not only developed different regimes; these have 
also become largely independent systems of laws, which function according to 
internal logics and regime objectives. As a result, norm conflicts may be 
bridgeable within regimes. But where incompatible obligations originate in 
different regimes, it is less certain that treaty law rules for preventing and 
resolving conflicts will provide a viable course of action. Under this argument, 
the incoherence would in itself be evidence of the fragmentation of the system 
of international law.  
 
Once this discussion has been explored, it will be complemented with a 
practical investigation, which despite the lively theoretical debate appears to 
have been carried out only rarely. The elements of treaty law, which according 
to the systemic position preserves the integrity of international law as a 
coherent system, will be contextualized in the case of deep-sea genetic 
resources. Would applying treaty law rules for preventing and resolving 
conflicts in this specific case provide orientation as to what norm states should 
implement? This investigation will serve two purposes. Firstly, it will be 
examined whether international law establishes priority among the different 
treaty obligations relating to deep-sea bioresources or ways to interpret them 
which prevent conflict. Secondly, the outcome of this examination will serve 
as the basis for reapproaching the question of the systemic elements of 
international law. If the rules claimed to preserve the integrity of the system 
fail to bridge treaty conflict in a practical case such as that of deep-sea 








This implies a practically oriented perspective which is different from most 
investigations of norm conflicts in international law, which seem to be inclined 
to assume the viewpoint of an international tribunal setting out to decide an 
unspecified difficult case involving conflicting norms.1011 Contrary to what one 
might be led to believe when following academic debate, norm conflicts are 
not most acute or relevant as potential disputes between states. In reality, few 
international disputes on norm conflicts have arisen.1012 This investigation is 
based on the contention that these problems are most relevant at the more 
fundamental stage where norms of international law become operationalized 
by means of state implementation.  
 
Rather than that of an international arbitrator, the perspective in this analysis 
is that of the central subject of public international law, namely the state: How 
should a state willing to carry out its obligations under international law in 
good faith act in situations where it is bound to implement conflicting 
obligations, such as bioprospecting of deep-sea genetic resources? 
 
E.3. Norm conflicts under international law 
 
International law, with some exceptions, lacks a clear hierarchy.1013 Often it 
will yield a straightforward answer to questions of what norm is decisive in a 
given situation. But there are many cases where the material content of two or 
more norms in international law overlap.  
 
1011 The same observation has been made by Young, Regime interaction in creating, 
implementing and enforcing international Law. 2012, at 89. Albeit the discussion is more gen-
eral, also the ILC study group on fragmentation appears to have focused on the role of the inter-
national judge, Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group 
of the International Law Commission. 2006.; See also James Crawford & Penelope Neville, 
Relations between International Courts and Tribunals: The ‘Regime Problem’, in REGIME 
INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW - FACING FRAGMENTATION (Margaret A. Young ed. 2012). 
1012 The most famous of these cases is the United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization 
12 October). The case is discussed elsewhere in this investigation. Studies based on state 
perspective of norm conflicts have been carried out, see for instance MARGARET A. YOUNG, 
TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Cambridge University Press. 2011). 
1013 Exceptions have traditionally been considered to include jus cogens, obligations erga omnes 
and Article 103 of the United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS 
XVI (UN Charter), see ERIKA DE WET, HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cary: Oxford 







In some cases, rules appear to be contradictory, at least at first glance. Such 
cases are referred to as prima facie norm conflicts. Rules in international law 
may provide recourses to avoid or solve conflict by means of certain 
interpretative approaches, an issue which will be further investigated in 
subsequent sections. 
 
The fact that regimes of international law are built on different basic 
assumptions and occasionally provide materially inconsistent rules, resulting 
in norm conflict, is not a revolutionary insight. The theoretical side of this 
problem strongly connects to an academic debate on – and represents an 
example of – the fragmentation of international law, as discussed in Part A.1014 
The term refers to the dynamic growth of new and specialized sub-fields of 
international law which accelerated after the Cold War. In particular, in the 
context of the proliferation of international courts and tribunals, a fear soon 
developed that greater variations in the determination of general international 
law would damage the international system. But as stated in Part A, the 
argument is equally valid for the development of new sub-fields of 
international law, referred to here as regimes. That international law has 
developed in this way is not contested. However, there are different 
interpretations as to what implications this development has for public 
international law as a system.  
 
Taken to its extreme, a fragmented view would suggest that international law 
is developing into several different systems, all of which are based on different 
logics and unable to cooperate across regime boundaries. The fragmented view 
is often contrasted with the systemic view, which maintains that international 
law, despite recent developments, remains a unitary legal system, composed of 
interconnected rules and principles. 
 
Prima facie norm conflicts produce a blurred picture of what norm applies in 
a given situation. The motive looks different, depending on the perspective 
taken. In lack of useful tools to apply in such cases, international law can be 
different things.  
 
1014 For a discussion of the positions and overview of literature on the fragmentation of 
international law, Martti Koskenniemi & Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? 






Depending on what treaty or regime of international law is prioritized in 
national implementation or policy, markedly different rules can be developed 
across states, despite the latter being parties to the same obligations. Similarly, 
any observer’s perspective of applicable norms would vary depending on what 
regime of international law is in focus for the investigation.  
 
As formulated by Michaels and Pauwelyn, this is not surprising:  
 
the fiction of the unitary lawmaker (…) becomes increasingly implausi-
ble in the modern context of highly specialized, functional regimes. In-
ternational trade, investment, environment, and human rights law, with 
each of their own international institution and/or club of negotiators, 
enforcement mechanisms, epistemic communities, related national min-
istries, NGOs, and even academics, make it increasingly difficult to as-
sume a unitary lawmaker with a sufficient sense of institutional coher-
ence, continuity, and memory across these different branches.1015 
There are different views as to how big a problem fragmentation constitutes. 
Gilbert Guillaume, then president of the ICJ, expressed concern about the 
substance of proliferation at speeches given on successive days to the plenary 
and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 2000. To the plenary, 
Judge Guillaume spoke about the emerging prospect of forum-shopping that 
may “generate unwanted confusion” and “distort the operation of justice.” All 
this, he felt, “exacerbates the risk of conflicting judgments” and gives rise to a 
serious risk of conflicting jurisprudence as the same rule of law might be given 
different interpretations in different cases.1016 Others have expressed the 
concern that if individual regimes do not consider general international law, in 
addition to its own rules, this opens the door for powerful actors to use 
fragmentation to their advantage. Pauwelyn has considered this risk as 
particularly acute in relation to international trade, where powerful export 
interests could circumvent domestic legal constraints such as environmental 
rules by “insulating their goals and concerns in a trade-only WTO cocoon.”1017 
 
1015 Michaels & Pauwelyn, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012), at 
367. 
1016 Address by H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of Justice to 
the United Nations General Assembly, 26 October 2000, cited in Koskenniemi & Leino, LEIDEN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 







Koskenniemi and Leino, in contrast, consider the fear of a dissolution of an 
integrated system of international law as a predominantly theoretical 
discussion, referring to it as a postmodern anxiety.1018 
E.3.1. Causes of fragmentation 
The causes of fragmentation are multifold, and observers have not agreed on 
what factors are most important in contributing to this development.1019 The 
discussion is closely connected to the debate on the concept of regimes in 
international law, as discussed in section A.6.5. As discussed by Peters, two 
relevant facets seem to be institutional fragmentation (different treaties, 
organizations, bodies, courts) and ideational fragmentation (different 
objectives and values). At the functional side, two patterns of explanation are 
often referred to.  
Firstly, such a development is essentially built into the decentralized structure 
that is international law. The increasing decentralization, in turn, is a response 
to globalization. Global challenges have increased the demand for more 
international and more specific rules.1020 The occurrence of norm conflicts can 
thus be explained by the organic growth of international law. Sub-fields of 
public international law, referred to here as regimes, have been bestowed with 
the mandate of regulating certain activities, such as the protection of laborers, 
international aviation or intra-state trade. Despite frequent overlaps with rules 
beyond regime boundaries applying to aspects of such concepts, legal regimes 
develop in relative isolation, often disregarding the potential of conflict with 
norms in other regimes.1021  
 
1018 Koskenniemi & Leino, LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 
1019 As regards the causes of fragmentation, see Joel P. Trachtman, Fragmentation, Coherence 
and Synergy in International Law, 2 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY (2011). 
1020 Peters, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2017), at 674. 
1021 Although the challenge of fragmentation certainly was discussed before that date, the issue 
was highlighted and became en vogue after the “proliferation”-speech given by the then 
President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Gilbert Guillaume, before the UN General 
Assembly in 2001. (See H.E. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the International Court of 
Justice, Speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations (Oct. 30, 2001), http://www.icj-
cij.org/ les/press-releases/5/2995.pdf. A broader orientation of the development of regimes of 
international law, and connected problems, was presented by Koskenniemi (before he took on 






This may be connected to simplistic understandings of mandate, lacking 
consideration of overlaps in relation to equally valid norms provided by other 
regimes.  
Secondly, fragmentation can be explained by sociological elements of 
fragmentation, as suggested by Young.1022 This own-regime bias often appears 
to correlate with professional identity.1023 Legal professionals within regimes 
of international law commonly identify themselves as lawyers of the regime at 
hand.1024 Different regulative objectives in combination with the project of 
building a new sub-body of international law in line with the objective have 
resulted in the development of specific languages, unique to individual 
regimes, with a vocabulary reflecting the common project.1025 Koskenniemi has 
described this as “managerialism”:  
Differentiation does not take place under any single political society. 
Instead it works though a struggle in which every interest is hegemonic, 
seeking to describe the social world through its own vocabulary so that 
its own expertise and its own structural bias will become the rule.1026 
 
Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 
MODERN LAW REVIEW (2007). 
1022 Young, The Productive Friction Between Regimes. 2012. 
1023 In the particular relationship between trade and environment, Perez has demonstrated how 
the different discursive and institutional structures of these domains have influenced the contours 
of conflict. OREN PEREZ, ECOLOGICAL SENSITIVITY AND GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM—
RETHINKING THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT CONFLICT (Hart Publishing. 2004). 
1024 Fischer-Lescano and Teubner have discussed own-regime bias and the reproduction of 
structural conflicts between regimes. Andreas Fischer-Lescano, et al., Regime-collisions: the 
vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation of global law (Diversity or Cacophony? New 
Sources of Norms in International Law Symposium), 25 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2004). 
1025 The development of such intra-regime features has been further discussed by Uruena, with 
particular focus on the use of technical indicators. See Rene Uruena, Indicators as the working 
language for interaction among regimes, 106 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING-
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). Similarly, Messenger has discussed the role 
of causal language in the same context. Gregory Messenger, The Development of International 
Law and the Role of Causal Language, 36 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES (2016). 
1026 Martti Koskenniemi, International Law: Between Fragmentation and Constitutionalism, The 
Australian National University 12–14 (Nov. 27, 2006), as cited in Peters, INTERNATIONAL 







This is also reflected in arrangements on the domestic side: Different issue 
areas are divided between ministries and branches of government, which often 
lack coordination or a holistic perspective of the comprehensive system of pub-
lic international law. As a result, the same states are likely to take positions in 
international cooperation, in treaty negotiations as well as in the work of inter-
national institutions, which result in conflicting ambitions and norms. Even in 
efficient administrations, joint preparation rarely manages to countervail this 
problem.1027 This is thus connected to the differences in perspectives of funda-
mental concepts referred to as ethos in Part B. These different languages have 
shaped the way in which observers of different regimes of international law 
view concepts as only relevant to the project of their particular regime.1028 In 
many cases, this tunnel vision blinds the observer of any specific regime from 
conflicting rules beyond the regime boundary, preventing them from even 
investigating relevant instruments in other regimes.1029  
This does not just result in overlapping rules, viewed through the multifaceted 
prism of public international law; it also misleads any observer who limits their 
investigations to one regime of international law. Any such regime-specific 
investigation will of course provide a reply in line with that regime and its 
logic, but so long as applicable obligations in other regimes are disregarded, 
established conclusions have no validity as regards the totality of international 
law. However, the fragmented position, with its emphasis on inconsistencies 
between different treaties and regimes, is not generally accepted. 
 
1027 Young, The Productive Friction Between Regimes. 2012, at 1.  
1028 Koskenniemi has discussed the influence experts in international law, as has Kennedy more 
broadly in global governance. Similarly, Young has called for considering the central role of 
other actors than states in the formation of regimes and the influence of ‘professional mindsets’ 
on regime interaction. See Koskenniemi, MODERN LAW REVIEW (2007);Young, The Productive 
Friction Between Regimes. 2012;David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO 
NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (2008). 
1029 See Gunther Teubner & Peter Korth, The Productive Friction Between Regimes, in REGIME 
INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW - FACING FRAGMENTATION (Margaret Young ed. 2012) 
The question of difficulties as the result of differences across regimes of international law has 
been addressed by many authors, perhaps most succinctly by Bruno Simma, see for instance 
Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
International Law, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). The issue of 
different ethos across regimes of international law has been profoundly investigated by 
Pulkowski, using the example of trade in cultural products DIRK PULKOWSKI, THE LAW AND 






The contention that international law remains a coherent system of law despite 
its development into different sub-branches is far from a marginal view. The 
systemic view is prominently supported by the International Law Commission, 
which in its first conclusions of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law declared that “International Law is a legal system.”1030 As 
will be discussed later, this conclusion was based on the Koskenniemi report 
which argued in favor of the ability of the system to remain intact and 
functioning.  
At least insofar as conflict of norms in treaties is concerned, which is the focus 
of this investigation, there are reasons for considering this formulation as 
unfortunate. Foremost, the description of international law as a legal system 
risks reinvigorating the widespread misunderstanding that international law is 
comparable to domestic systems of public law, where the same coherent rules 
apply to all subjects insofar as jurisdiction can be asserted, with norms for 
establishing a hierarchy between different rules, based on the status of certain 
laws as lex specialis, superior or other principles expressing hierarchy.  
Already in 1953 Jenks observed:  
in the absence of a world legislature with a general mandate, “law-
making” treaties are tending to develop in a number of historical, 
functional and regional groups which are separate from each other and 
whose mutual relationships are in some respects analogous to those of 
separate systems of “municipal law.”1031 
By virtue of lacking any central authority, it may appear particularly helpful to 
compare treaty law to contract law. Like states in treaty law, parties may in 
contract sign up to a broad variety of obligations; identical obligations seldom 
apply to several persons and (in some cases) parties seek to carry out 
undertakings that are incompatible with other undertakings. But such 
comparisons to domestic legal systems have considerable weaknesses. 
  
 
1030 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission. 2006. 
1031 C. Wilfred Jenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 







As Young has observed, contrary to domestic law,  
there has never been a single global legislature or appellate court to 
mold a unified body of international law. Nor has there ever been a 
uniform will for such a system by sovereign states. Instead, states have 
implicitly or explicitly conceived of particular issues and problems – 
often at key historical moments of transition and often strategically – 
and responded by agreeing to new laws and supporting international 
organizations.1032 
Moreover, basing an investigation of treaty law on the conception that it 
functions in the same way as domestic legal systems results in an inclination 
of observers to strive for coherence. As implied by Michaels and Pauwelyn, 
there exists a widespread normative preference for coherence over 
fragmentation. As a result, “scholars often want to see international law as a 
system (rather than a pluralist or fragmented agglomeration).”1033 Under this 
understanding, any comparison to domestic legal systems risks misleading the 
observer into assuming that international law is more systemic than it really is. 
Not only does international law contain a vast quantity of treaties which states 
in many cases appear to have developed in disregard of pre-existing rules. 
There are also norms that have been developed by other subjects. As is 
particularly apparent in a study involving the role of regimes in international 
law, states are not the only relevant actors in international law. In most 
problems involving regimes, international organizations are actors of central 
importance.1034 International governmental organizations are often explicitly 
mandated in constitutive instruments to make institutional arrangements with 
other regimes. In other cases, as observed by Young, international 
governmental organizations have implicit powers to act without express orders 
of state parties.1035  
 
1032 Young, The Productive Friction Between Regimes. 2012, at 2. 
1033 Michaels & Pauwelyn, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012), at 
249. 
1034 In international relations there is an extensive scholarship involving studies of the role of 
expanded sets of actors, referred to as ‘epistemic communities’, strongly associated with Haas. 
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination, 46 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1992). 







This role of international governmental organizations as actors in the 
international system has developed based on the UN Reparations case1036, in 
which the ICJ established that international governmental organizations may 
have legal personality. International law may thus, in addition to states, be 
developed by the vast number of international governmental organizations, 
which in many cases have been bestowed with far-reaching mandates to act 
without express consent of its parties. 
The lack of central authority, as well as broad range of actors, involving not 
only states but international organizations, means that international law falls 
short of any comparison to domestic legal systems. Rather, it is tempting to 
subscribe to the position that international law should be regarded as an 
accumulation of legal norms which, as further articulated by Michaels and 
Pauwelyn, with the “increased maturity and complexity of international law 
and its unique, hybrid features,” has developed into a “sui generis type of legal 
order.”  
International law may, therefore, be a system at some level (in the sense, for 
example, that all of its rules and branches interact and are governed by certain 
general rules without there being so-called self-contained regimes), but a 
universe of different systems, sub-systems or branches at another level (…) 
The outcome is not chaos and anarchy but a more sophisticated legal 
landscape.1037 
The cases of overlap and conflict appear to be particularly frequent in relation 
between certain regimes. As pointed out by Sands, the intense proliferation 
among environmental treaties has already led to an increasing number of 
factual cases of overlap or conflict between two or more treaties.1038 
More generally, such cases do not appear randomly but can be divided into 
four forms, all commonly represented in connection to international 
environmental law:  
 
1036 Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 
174, ICGJ 232 (ICJ 1949) (International Court of Justice 11 April). 
1037 Michaels & Pauwelyn, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012), at 
374-376. 







Firstly, the risk of norm overlap is high in the interface of international trade 
and environmental law, such as the relationship between the growing number 
of environmental treaties which seek to ensure environmental protection 
measures by restricting trade in certain goods, and the WTO and regional trade 
treaties which aim to prevent trade barriers. The example of the regulation of 
trade in living modified organisms represents such a case: It should be allowed 
under WTO rules, but states are still mandated to restrict such products based 
on the Cartagena protocol1039.1040  
 
A second area with high potential for overlap is where global and regional 
agreements relate to the same subject matter. This is common in relation to the 
marine environment, where regional seas conventions regularly duplicate 
norms in global treaties. The global and regional regulation of marine dumping 
represents one such case.  
 
Thirdly, norm overlap is common in areas regulated by both general 
framework conventions and more specific treaties. Many such cases are 
provided by international fisheries law, where general rules are established in 
UNCLOS, developed in the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement and further 
adapted in regional fisheries treaties.  
 
Fourthly, and particularly relevant in the context of deep-sea bioprospecting, 
new issues are likely to become subject to overlapping rules by treaties in 
different areas of international environmental law. Treaty cooperation in 
different fields of international environmental law has a tendency to interpret 
mandates extensively, expanding the field of cooperation by amending treaties 
to include new issues in line with the theory of organic growth of international 
law, as discussed in Part A. Such issues include novel technological challenges, 
as well as areas which have been set in focus due to policy priorities or external 
events. This is also much in line with the functionalist theory of international 
organizations and has been explained by Klabbers as the result of the inherent 
will of international organizations to be relevant for new challenges.1041  
 
1039 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 29 January 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208. 
1040 See, for an extensive discussion on the relationship between WTO law and the Cartagena 
Protocol, DAVID LANGLET, PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT AND HAZARDOUS TRADE: REGULATING 
TRADE IN HAZARDOUS GOODS AT THE INTERSECTION OF SOVEREIGNTY, FREE TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Kluwer Law International. 2009). 
1041 Functionalism and international organizations has been extensively discussed by Jan 






One area in which an increasing number of such norm overlaps between 
different areas of international environmental law can be expected is regulation 
of climate change mitigation. Notable in this regard is ocean fertilization, 
which has been regulated in treaties relating to climate change, biodiversity 
and ocean dumping.1042  
 
With the growing number of environmental agreements relating to the same 
subject matter, the question has also arisen as to the conditions under which a 
party is entitled to invoke the dispute settlement provision under one treaty as 
opposed to another, as similarly observed by Sands.1043 For example, the issue 
has been addressed judicially under the law of the sea in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna cases, as will be discussed in the following sections.1044 In the case, 
Australia and New Zealand litigated on the basis of UNCLOS rather than under 
the 1993 Convention on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.1045 Norm 
conflicts between treaties of international law are thus not merely a theoretical 
concern but have also become subject to judicial decision. 
 
E.3.2. The material element of norm conflict 
 
In order to establish that a prima facie norm conflict is at hand, a number of 
elements must be fulfilled. These relate to material, subjective and temporal 
aspects. The most apparent of these is the material element, which relates to 
the contradiction itself. The material element can be defined narrowly or 
widely. 
 
For a case to qualify for this material element according to the standard, narrow 
definition, it must be established that a state cannot fulfill one obligation 
without violating another. According to an often-used definition by Jenks, “A 
conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party 
to the two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under 
both treaties.”1046  
 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015); JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (Cambridge University Press 3 ed. 2015). 
1042 David Freestone & Rosemary Rayfuse, Ocean iron fertilization and international law, 364 
MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES (2008). 
1043 SANDS, Principles of international environmental law. 2018, at 113. 
1044 ICJ, Southern Bluefin Tuna. 
1045 SANDS, Principles of international environmental law. 2018, at 113. 







This classic narrow definition later became confirmed in dispute settlement 
decisions.1047 It has also been supported by more contemporary observers.1048 
Alternative and wider definitions of the material element of norm conflicts 
have been suggested. Rather than regarding the subject matter as the central 
element, Bartels proposes focusing on the object and purpose, arguing that two 
treaties should be regarded as conflicting if the latter defeats the object and 
purpose of the former.1049 Even if this interpretation still ought to be regarded 
as unconventional, a wider understanding of conflict has gained support from 
other observers. Vranes points to situations where permissive norms conflict 
with prescriptive or prohibitive norms, which would be excluded under the 
narrow definition.  
 
He argues that such cases should also be regarded as material conflicts, since 
the prescriptive or prohibitive norm limits the application of the permissive 
norm, or conversely (even if the norms in principle may be mutually 
applicable, with the permissive norm in confined form). Moreover, Vranes 
argues that a wider understanding of material conflict in international law 
would be more in line with the established understanding of norm conflict in 
legal theory, as formulated by Kelsen and Engisch.  
 
1047 Guatemala—Anti-Dumping Investigation regarding Portland Cement from Mexico 
(WT/DS60/AB/R), Appellate Body Report (The Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization 25 November), at para. 65. The same narrow definition was also used in 
Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry (WT/DS54, 55, 59 and 64/R), 
Appellate Body Report (The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization 23 July), at paras 
14.29-14.36 and 14.97-14.99. 
1048 Danilenko and Czapliński considers that “[o]ne can speak of the conflict of treaties when 
one of the treaties obliges party A to take action X, while another stipulates that A should take 
action Y, and X is incompatible with Y”. see Wladyslaw Czapliński & Gennady M. Danilenko, 
Conflicts of Norms in International Law, 21 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(1990), at 12-13. See also WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 
2003, at 4. 
1049 See Roland Bartels, The Relationship between Treaties, Paper for CIEL, 2001 as cited in 
Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions The Relationship between 
the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties, 35 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2001), at 
1085. As described by Marceau, “for Bartels, this interpretation of treaty conflict is confirmed 
by Article 41 of the Vienna Convention, which would prohibit parties to a multilateral treaty 
from concluding any treaty inter se that is incompatible with the effective execution of the object 
and purpose of the main treaty as a whole. For him, this broad definition of a conflict is also 
confirmed by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention, which obliges a State that has signed but not 






In particular, he claims that a wider interpretation would be in line with 
Kelsen’s “test of violation,” which provides that a “conflict between two norms 
occurs if in obeying or applying one norm, the other one is necessarily or 
possibly violated.”1050 Similarly, Pauwelyn appears to call for a wider 
definition, encompassing incompatibilities between permissive norms and 
obligations.1051 
 
As was the case with the narrow interpretation, there are dispute settlement 
cases which can be interpreted as supporting the wider definition. In the EC—
Bananas III case, the Panel saw treaty conflict not only in cases where the 
narrow definition is fulfilled but also in situations where a rule in one 
agreement prohibits what a rule in another agreement explicitly permits.1052 
In some cases, the materially conflicting element appears evidently when 
studying two norms. Potential for norm conflict may be established in 
abstracto by means of logical reasoning; standard treaty interpretation rules 
would provide that the material element of two norms relating to the same 
subject matter yield incompatible obligations for states.  
 
 
1050 Vranes discusses Kelsen and Engisch positions on the matter. Vranes interprets Kelsen’s 
perspective in the following: “If one has to recognize that ‘prescribing’ and ‘permitting’ 
constitute two different normative functions, one cannot deny that a permission and a 
prescription mutually exclude each other.” According to Engisch’s definition, there is a conflict 
“if a given behaviour appears in abstracto or in concreto as prescribed and not prescribed, or as 
prohibited and not prohibited, or even as prescribed and prohibited.” See HANS KELSEN, 
GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS (Oxford University Press. 1991) and Karl Engisch, Die einheit der 
rechtsordnung (1935), at 46 and Karl Engisch, Einführung in das juristische Denken (1977), at 
162 as cited in Erich Vranes, The Definition of 'Norm Conflict' in International Law and Legal 
Theory, 17 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), at 402, 406, 409, 414. 
1051 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW 
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press. 2003), at 176-
199. 
1052 See European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
WT/ DS27/R(US) (EC—Bananas III), Panel Report (World Trade Organization Panel 22 May). 
“As a preliminary issue, it is necessary to define the notion of “conflict” laid down in the 
General Interpretative Note. In light of the wording, the context, the object and the purpose of 
this Note, we consider that it is designed to deal with (i) clashes between obligations contained 
in GATT 1994 and obligations contained in agreements listed in Annex 1A, where those 
obligations are mutually exclusive in the sense that a Member cannot comply with both 
obligations at the same time, and (ii) the situation where a rule in one agreement prohibits what 







In other cases, the conflicting material element may become evident only in 
the context of certain practical concepts or situations. Norms may co-exist in 
all but certain circumstances when they give rise to conflict. Even where there 
appears to be a considerable potential for norm conflict, where several treaties 
provide different obligations relating to the same case, states may be able to 
pursue a course of action which fulfills all relevant obligations, thereby 
avoiding conflict. 
 
It should be underlined that even prima facie cases of material norm conflict 
are exceptions in international law. It is not uncommon that many norms apply 
in a certain situation, but in most cases norms do not overlap but merely 
consider different aspects or implications of state action. Moreover, there are 
plenty of cases where several norms indeed overlap without necessarily 
resulting in conflict.1053  
 
Such cases include overlaps between so-called multi-sourced equivalent norms 
(MSEN), a term denoting rules which are binding upon the same international 
legal subjects, similar or identical in their material content and have been 
established through different international instruments, legislative procedures 
or are applicable in different substantive areas of law.1054 These types of norm 
overlap are common within regimes of international law, such as in 
international trade law, where rules on national treatment may be found in 
central WTO treaties and regional trade agreements. Similarly, in the law of 
the sea, there are many cases of MSEN overlaps between UNCLOS, regional 
and/or special agreements.1055  
 
1053 Commitments by states may indeed be parallel without being contradictory. As formulated 
by Marceau, “Ultimately, only when there is a conflict between two treaty provisions must one 
of them be set aside (either as suspended or abrogated). In all other situations, because good 
faith is to be presumed and States are obliged to implement their international obligations 
accordingly, it can be concluded that all States’ obligations are cumulative and must be complied 
with simultaneously.”, Marceau, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2001), at 1084; LO CHANG-FA, 
TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2018), at 
94. 
1054 Tomer Broude & Shany Yuval, Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law (Hart 
Publishing. 2011), at 5. 
1055 One example is rules on marine dumping, where general rules follows from Article 210 in 
UNCLOS and the London Convention Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 29 December 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120 (London 
Convention) as well as the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 






Even if norms in MSEN cases may be differently formulated, they point in the 
same direction. Thereby, this type of norm overlap lacks the material element 
and does not represent norm conflict, irrespective of whether the narrow or 
wider definition is applied. 
 
In the case of deep-sea bioprospecting, it has already been shown how rules in 
treaties applying to genetic resources point in different, partly conflicting 
directions as the result of the underlying differences discussed in Part D. As 
such, the material element of norm conflict appears to be fulfilled, at least 
based on a preliminary reading of relevant treaty provisions. 
 
E.3.3. The subjective element of norm conflict 
 
The evolution of public international law into different regimes has thus 
increased the number of material norm conflicts. Yet, there is a second element 
to norm conflicts which is as necessary as the material aspect. Differences in 
what treaties states are parties to creates another dimension to the problem. 
Two materially conflicting treaties do not result in a norm conflict unless the 
same state is party to both instruments.1056 This aspect, which can be regarded 
as the subjective element of norm conflict, follows from one of the basic 
presumptions of treaty law: a state is not bound by an obligation in a treaty 
unless it has expressed its consent to be bound by it. Accordingly, a material 
conflict between two treaties is practically irrelevant unless there is an overlap 
of state parties. 
 
For a treaty conflict to practically occur, both the material and the subjective 
elements must be fulfilled. Accordingly, the International Law Commission 
study group on fragmentation has contended that the question of what 
constitutes a conflict in public international law may be approached from two 
perspectives: the subject matter of the relevant rules or the legal subjects bound 
by them.1057 
 
1056 The implications of the subjective element has for instance been discussed in LANGLET. 
2009, at 263-274. 
1057 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 







In the context of the overlap of norms relating to deep-sea genetic resources, 
the subjective element is not unproblematic. Some states have not become 
parties to all three investigated treaties. In particular, the United States – which 
globally is the most active state in bioprospecting, both measured in capability 
and registered patents – has signed but not yet ratified UNCLOS.1058 The same 
is the case for Colombia, among other countries. There is also a group of large 
countries, including Turkey, Peru and Venezuela, which have not even signed 
the convention. Taken together, 168 states are parties to UNCLOS. All 164 
WTO members are parties to TRIPS. This leaves a group of developing states 
outside, of which most are negotiating accession. The CBD is the only of the 
three investigated treaties that has near universal ratification with 193 
parties.1059  
As a result of the subjective element, the norm conflict discussed in this 
investigation plays out differently for states that are not parties to all three 
treaties. For the US, Colombia, Turkey, Peru and Venezuela, the only area of 
contention would be that between TRIPS and the CBD, qualified for the 
obligation for the former two as UNCLOS signatory states to refrain, in good 
faith, from acts that would defeat the object and the purpose of the treaty under 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention. For Ethiopia and Iran, which are party to 
neither UNCLOS nor TRIPS, but only to the CBD, the subjective element is 
not fulfilled. Consequently, these two states are not concerned by the norm 
conflict in a subjective sense. The overwhelming number of states, however, 
are parties to all three of the treaties investigated here. The emphasis in this 
investigation will accordingly be put on the material element of norm conflicts. 
It should, however, be borne in mind that the requirement for the subjective 
element means that the conflict applies differently, or not at all, in relation to 
some states. 
Another reason for focusing more on the material element is that it is in these 
aspects of norm conflicts that central systemic functions of public international 
law are tested. That said, as a consequence of the subjective element, the norm 
conflict on deep-sea bioresources may appear differently across states, depend-
ing on what treaties states are bound by.  
 
1058 Oldham. 2014. 
1059 Information retrieved from the United Nation Treaty Collection (treaties.un.org), The WTO 
(wto.org), CBD (cbd.int) and UN Division for Oceans and the Law of the Sea (un.org/Depts/los) 






Accordingly, if there is a material norm conflict between two treaties, that 
conflict lacks practical relevance for states only party to one or neither of the 
treaties. This effect increases exponentially with the number of treaties 
involved in the norm conflict. Although this may appear complex, it is a logical 
consequence of the systemic nature of international law: Insofar as treaty 
obligations are concerned, international law can be many different things, 
depending on obligations for individual states.  
E.3.4. The temporal element of norm conflict 
 
Closely connected to the subjective element, which essentially concerns to 
whom obligations apply, is the question of when obligations arise, generally, 
as well as in relation to particular states. The temporal element is central first 
for establishing that the materially conflicting treaties apply not only to the 
same party, but also at the same time. Secondly, it is particularly relevant in 
cases of treaty conflict, since many of the rules establishing priority among 
treaties appears to be based on which treaty came first, as will be discussed in 
section E.5. 
 
How, then, should this central element of time be measured? What criterion 
should be decisive in establishing what treaty is prior and what is subsequent? 
This connects to the broader question of when an obligation of an international 
treaty comes into existence. Wolfrum and Matz conclude that four potentially 
different dates could be relevant in this regard: the date of adoption as well as 
the dates for signature of relevant states, ratification or entry into force.1060 In 
the context of establishing priority under the Vienna Convention, Borgen has 
concluded that “although originally a cause of some disagreement, states now 
generally agree that determining the time of the earlier treaty is based on date 
of adoption, not entry into force.”1061 
 
Since all elements of norm conflicts are cumulative and must be fulfilled for a 
factual norm conflict to be at hand, it appears difficult to establish what date 
should be decisive without considering the subjective element.  
 
1060 WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 126. 
1061 Christopher Borgen, Resolving treaty conflicts, 37 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2005), 601. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND 







After all, no factual norm conflict exists before the conflicting legal obligations 
apply in relation to the relevant state. Neither the date of adoption of a treaty, 
nor its entry into force per se confer any obligation on individual states.1062 It 
would therefore appear more rational to base the selection on the date when 
the conflicting obligation arises for individual states. This requires not only for 
the treaty to have entered into force, but also that the relevant state has become 
bound by it.  
 
To include the subjective element when establishing the temporal order in this 
manner, however, raises additional problems, as will be examined in section 
E.5. A logical consequence of establishing the temporal element based on the 
date of entry into force for states involved is that the temporal order also 
becomes subjective. The order may differ between individual states depending 
on when different treaties became binding for them. Furthermore, individual 
states would not always be able to foresee how this order would turn out. This 
is most evident in the case of ratification of treaties before entry into force. 
  
These implications are particularly problematic in cases such as deep-sea 
bioprospecting where treaties involved were ratified by large groups of states 
and entered into force within a short period. UNCLOS became binding for the 
around 60 states which had ratified it when it entered into force on November 
16, 1994. Around 100 states have, however, ratified the treaty at different dates 
since its entry into force. Similarly, TRIPS only became legally binding for a 
minority of its current parties when it became effective on January 1, 1995.1063  
The CBD, on the other hand, became effective already on 29 December 1993 
but only for under 50 states. A large group of states became parties to the 
convention in a short period after its entry into force.1064 
 
 
1062 The signature of treaties does however have legal implications. According to Article 18 of 
the Vienna Convention, states may no longer engage in activities which go against the object 
and purpose of the treaty. It is however not until states are completely bound by the treaty that 
specific rights and obligations apply. 
1063 It is a requirement for WTO members to become party to TRIPS. Out of the current 164 
WTO parties, 76 states and the European Community were founding members of the 
organization. 
1064 Information retrieved from the United Nation Treaty Collection (treaties.un.org), The WTO 
(wto.org), CBD (cbd.int) and UN Division for Oceans and the Law of the Sea (un.org/Depts/los) 






Treaty conflicts could thus not only appear different in relation to individual 
states based on what treaties the state is party to. Differences between states in 
relation to what order and at what time the treaty obligations became binding 
raise additional complications in the assessment of treaty conflicts, particularly 
as regards applications. This is especially apparent in the case of deep-sea 
bioprospecting where all the three relevant treaties entered into force within a 
three-year period and were ratified by states in different order. 
 
E.4. Preventing and resolving treaty conflicts under the 
systemic position 
 
The material, subjective and temporal elements of treaty conflict have now 
been discussed and it appears that the prima facie conflict relating to deep-sea 
bioresources fulfill these elements in relation to a large number of states. Under 
the fragmented view, this would render it difficult if not impossible to 
implement relevant obligations from all three regimes in parallel.  
 
Supporters of the systemic view would, however, maintain that this may not 
be as bad as it may seem at first glance. Certain elements of treaty law, it has 
been suggested, have been drafted precisely to address these types of 
situations, as means to address issues of material overlap and prima facie 
conflicts between norms in different treaties or regimes.1065 These observers 
have a positive perspective on such overlaps of norms and claim that there is 
an inherently pragmatic element in international law – reflected in concepts 
such as the principle of harmonization and the theory of systemic integration – 
which prevents or bridges conflicts.1066  
 
In this section, these elements of treaty law, which under the systemic 
understanding could be described as a cure or vaccine to fragmentation, 
ensuring the integrity of the system of public international law, will first be 
explored. Secondly, these rules will be contextualized by discussing how they 
would apply to the prima facie norm conflict of deep-sea bioresources. 
 
1065 Michaels & Pauwelyn, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 







In the previous section, the fragmentation of international law into different 
regimes was suggested as an explanation for the increasing number of norm 
conflicts under international law. The reasons for and consequences of this 
development were discussed, as well as the outlook for solving conflicts of 
norms across regimes.  
However, not all observers agree that the proliferation of treaties and sub-
branches of international law represents such a challenge to the integrity of 
international law. An extensive argument in defense of the systemic position 
was put forth in the International Law Commission study group report on 
fragmentation.1067 The conclusions of the report were presented by Martti 
Koskenniemi in 2006.1068 The report had been commissioned on the basis of a 
perceived threat to the integrity of public international law and an increasing 
scholarly debate on fragmentation at the turn of the century. In particular, the 
study group was commissioned to investigate five topics, which all relate to 
the potential of different rules in treaty law and other established hierarchies to 
prevent and resolve treaty conflict.1069 
After having first examined the nature and prevalence of fragmentation, the 
report concluded that public international law indeed has grown into different 
regimes.  
 
1067 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission. 2006. Other observers had previously made some of the same 
observations as the report without the same impact, see for instance Jenks, BRITISH YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1953); Czapliński & Danilenko, NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990). 
1068 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Draft conclusions of the work of the Study 
Group Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. 2006. 
1069 (a) The function and scope of the lex specialis rule and the question of self-contained 
regimes; (b) The interpretation of treaties in the light of “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties” (Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties), in the context of general developments in international law and concerns 
of the international community; (c) (Article 30 (d) (Article 41 The application of successive 
treaties relating to the same subject matter of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); 
(d) The modification of multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties); and (e) Hierarchy in international law: jus cogens, 






However, in its conclusion, the report appears to consider that treaty law rules 
on application and interpretation of treaties have the possibility to prevent this 
development from resulting in the decomposing of public international law as 
a comprehensive system. While recognizing the challenges of fragmentation, 
the report thus essentially supports the systemic view: the tools inherent to 
public international law prevent its fragmentation. This alleged cure to 
fragmentation (or mechanism to prevent it) is thus foremost based on treaty 
application and interpretation principles codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.1070  
The universal application of these principles to treaty conflicts has not been 
uncontroversial. It has been questioned whether these principles can be used in 
relation to agreements where the conclusion predates the Vienna Convention, 
since the latter states in its Article 4 that it does not apply retroactively. This 
may appear problematic in cases involving treaties which predate the Vienna 
Convention. In the present case, however, all treaties involved were both 
adopted and entered into force after the Vienna Convention.1071 This has 
however commonly been overlooked by virtue of the generally considered 
status of the Vienna Convention as in relevant parts reflecting customary 
international law.1072 
 
Essentially, the systemic view as formulated by the ILC Study Group Report 
is based on the contention that central elements in the Vienna Convention can 
be used to apply and interpret conflicting norms in a way that promotes 
coherence and harmonization across treaties.  
 
 
1070 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
1071 It could be claimed that this problem still is relevant in relation to UNCLOS. Although the 
Vienna Convention was adopted in 1969 it did not enter into force before 1980, i.e. during the 
negotiations of UNCLOS. Most states however ratified the Vienna Convention after the 
conclusion of UNCLOS. As discussed in the previous section, Borgen has argued that rather 
than the date of entry into force, the date of adoption of treaties should be decisive. See GU ̈NTHER 
JAENICKE, LIBER AMICORUM GU ̈NTHER JAENICKE (Springer. 1999) as cited in Wolfrum & Matz, 
MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW (2000), at 473; Borgen, THE GEORGE 
WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2005), 601. AUST. 2000, at 183. 
1072 MARK E. VILLIGER, THE RULES ON INTERPRETATION: MISGIVINGS, MISUNDERSTANDINGS, 
MISCARRIAGE? THE ‘CRUCIBLE’ INTENDED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (Oxford 







This is based on four basic presumptions. Firstly, that all treaty provisions set 
up rights and obligations that exist alongside rights and obligations established 
by other treaty provisions and rules of customary international law. Secondly, 
that none of such rights or obligations has any intrinsic priority against the 
others and that there is no general hierarchical structure of international law.1073 
Thirdly, that both treaty and customary law are basically of equal legal 
validity.1074 Fourthly, that all treaties are equally binding, with Article 103 of 
the UN Charter as the only exception.1075  
The report of the ICJ Study Group accordingly claims that in lack of 
hierarchical structure, the question of the relationship between conflicting 
norms can only be approached through a process of reasoning that makes them 
appear as parts of some coherent and meaningful whole.1076 The systemic 
approach would thus call for any interpreter of public international law to strive 
for coherence, thereby supporting the logics of it as a meaningful system.1077  
This has been referred to as the principle of harmonization. As stated in the 
conclusions of the Fragmentation report, “It is a generally accepted principle 
that when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent 
possible, be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible 
obligations.”1078 This implies that there is an obligation for a state which is 
bound by several potentially conflicting norms to pursue an interpretation that 
avoids violation. In order to enable such harmonious interpretations, the ICJ 
Report points to two different approaches based on the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.  
 
1073 WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 120. 
1074 Karol Wolfke, Treaties and custom: aspects of interrelation, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES - A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BERT VIERDAG (Jan Klabbers & René 
Lefeber eds., 1997), at 36. 
1075 UN Charter.; Ignaz Seidle-Hohenveldern, Hierarchy of Treaties, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES - A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BERT VIERDAG (Jan Klabbers & René 
Lefeber eds., 1997). 
1076 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission. 2006. 
1077 GABRIEL ORELLANA ZABALZA, THE PRINCIPLE OF SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION: TOWARDS A 
COHERENT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (LIT Verlag. 2012), at 237. 
1078 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Draft conclusions of the work of the Study 






These two approaches, as reflected in Articles 30 and 31–33 of the Vienna 
Convention, are, as previously stated, widely considered to reflect customary 
international law.1079  
Firstly, the problem can be solved by applying rules on conflict which give 
priority to one agreement over another. This perspective perceives norm 
conflict as a problem of application rather than interpretation. It implies 
solving such problems based on the instructions indicating what treaty should 
be given priority in application of successive treaties relating to the same 
subject matter in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. As a general rule, 
Article 30 provides for application in line with the principle of lex posterior. 
However, it makes exception for cases where a treaty indicates how it should 
relate to another treaty. Such provisions, commonly referred to as conflict 
clauses (but also referred to as savings clauses or compatibility clauses), should 
be respected according to paragraph 2 of Article 30. Under this perspective, 
conflict clauses thus trump lex posterior. 
Secondly, tools can be used that try to uphold as much of the content of the 
legal rules of both treaties, harmonizing them as much as possible without fully 
derogating from either one. This approach builds on treaty interpretation rules 
generally, as provided in Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention. In 
particular, the second approach bases its argumentation on Article 31(3)(c), 
which provides that in treaty interpretation, any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties shall be taken into account, 
together with the context. Unlike the first approach, the second approach 
discusses the interpretation of conflicting norms, and uses that as the basis for 
attempting to prevent conflict, rather than how they should be applied. Also in 
contrast to the first approach, which in principle is concerned with the 
hierarchy of conflicting norms rather than their material content, the second 
approach avails itself of the opportunity to materially adjust the reading of a 
rule in consideration of an overlapping provision, provided that other 
obligations in treaty interpretation are met.1080  
 
1079 Mark Eugen Villiger, The Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings, Misunderstandings, 
Miscarriage? The ‘Crucible’ Intended by the International Law Commission, in THE LAW OF 
TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION (Enzo Cannizzaro ed. 2011). 
1080 MARK EUGEN VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 







The second approach thus attempts to shy away from deciding what rule should 
be given priority in norm conflicts by employing an interpretation which 
prevents the prima facie conflict from materializing. This is based on the basic 
conception that treaties should not be read in isolation, but as part of the system 
of public international law, and that the system of public international law 
inherently strives to remain coherent. It also implies that the two perspectives 
have different emphases: While the first approach accepts the notion of conflict 
and attempts to solve it, the second approach aims to prevent the conflict from 
occurring.  
The International Law Commission summarizes the difference between the 
two approaches as the first (the application approach, Article 30) seeking 
resolution by establishing a firm priority between treaties. The second 
(interpretation approach, Articles 31–33), avoids a clear priority and instead 
seeks to coordinate the simultaneous application of the two treaties.1081  
According to Wolfrum and Matz, the general preference under the law of 
treaties in cases of norm conflict is to favor the first approach. Only if certain 
circumstances are fulfilled does the law of treaties provide for maintaining two 
diverging agreements, as may be the consequence of the second approach.1082 
Seemingly, this position is based on the wording of the convention text which 
seems to favor the application approach in deciding priority between treaties. 
This observation, however, appears to overlook that under the interpretative 
approach, the norm conflict never materializes and, as observed by Pauwelyn, 
there is a presumption in international law against conflict.1083 If interpretative 
tools manage to establish a reading which reconciles the overlapping norms, 
there is no conflict and hence no reason for establishing hierarchies. Under this 
argument, it would appear most rational to first attempt to prevent norm 
conflict by means of interpretation before resorting to application tools. As a 
third position, it could be claimed that the application approach at least should 
be preferred in some cases, namely where the parties by means of conflict 
clauses clearly have expressed instructions on priority in relation to other 
treaties.  
 
1081 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission. 2006. at 18, 130 and 138. 
1082 WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 133. 
1083 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 






Favoring conflict prevention by means of interpretation in such cases would 
amount to ignoring the will of the parties. In line with this position, Borgen 
declares that (only) “if there are no such express provisions of priority within 
the four corners of the agreements, or if any such clause is ambiguously 
worded, one would turn to principles of treaty interpretation.”1084  
In light of the fundamentally different ways of regarding the concept of norm 
conflict, where rules of application can be used to resolve the problem and 
interpretation rules aim to prevent it, it appears most pragmatic to regard these 
two approaches as alternative. In fact, there is nothing preventing regarding 
them as equally relevant recourses in cases of prima facie norm conflict. 
E.5. Resolving norm conflicts by means of priority in 
application 
 
The first approach, as provided in the rules on treaty application of the Vienna 
Convention thus attempts to resolve treaty conflict by deciding what treaty 
should be given priority. Unlike the interpretation approach, it accepts the 
existence of the conflict and attempts to resolve rather than prevent conflict. 
Article 30 provides several alternative courses in such situations. It thus deals 
with the priority between prior and subsequent norms, cases of dissimilar 
parties and the relevance of treaty provisions on the relationship to other 
treaties. 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 30 
Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter 
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and 
obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject-
matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.  
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered 
as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty 
prevail.  
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but 
the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, 
the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible 
with those of the latter treaty.  
 







4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier 
one:  
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in 
paragraph 3; 
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the 
treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights 
and obligations.  
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the 
termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any 
question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or 
application of a treaty, the provisions of which are incompatible with its 
obligations towards another State under another treaty. 
 
Before discussing these, however, the significance of the heading of the 
provision must be assessed. A literal reading suggests that the provision 
regulates not all cases of application of successive treaties, but such cases 
where the treaties relate to the same subject matter. It must therefore first be 
established whether it is a precondition for employing Article 30 that the prima 
facie conflicting provisions actually relate to the same subject matter. 
 
E.5.1. The same subject matter criterion and the applicability 
of Article 30 to treaty conflicts 
 
As formulated in the heading of Article 30, the provision was negotiated to 
regulate the application of “successive treaties relating to the same subject-
matter,” which is not necessarily the same thing as different treaties with 
overlapping or conflicting norms.  
 
There are different views on how “same subject-matter” should be 
interpreted.1085 It can be claimed that a norm conflict between two or more 
treaties per se implies that the instruments relate to the same subject matter. 
Under this liberal interpretation, the conflict in itself is evidence of overlap 
between the treaties, hence relation to the same subject matter. This view is 
disputed by other observers who favor a more restrictive interpretation, 
claiming that Article 30 cannot be applied in cases when the material scope of 
treaties diverges.  
 






For instance, Aust argues that “[t]he meaning of the expression ‘relating to the 
same subject-matter’ is not clear but should probably be construed strictly, so 
that the article would not apply when a general treaty impinges indirectly on 
the content of a particular provision of an earlier treaty.”1086 It must thus, 
according to the restrictive perspective, be an overlap of treaties, not merely of 
individual norms for Article 30 to apply. In norm conflicts between treaties 
falling outside of the same subject-matter criterion, resolution should instead 
be sought in general principles, such as lex specialis, according to the 
restrictive position, as represented by Schulz and Borgen.1087 Under this 
understanding, Article 30 is not applicable in cases when treaties have 
overlapping issue areas but different foci. Similarly, Wolfrum and Matz 
dismiss the liberal interpretation of the same subject matter criterion when 
addressing conflicts of environmental treaties and agree that Article 30 must 
be considered inapplicable when dealing with overlapping norms where the 
material scope of the treaties concerned is different, such as different aspects 
of environmental protection. They raise UNCLOS and CBD as examples, 
claiming that the two agreements “cannot be regarded to be successive treaties 
on the same subject matter, even if their focus on the protection of the marine 
environment overlaps to some extent; the scopes and primary aims of both 
agreements are too different.”1088 Accordingly, these supporters of the 
restrictive view would consider it out of the question to apply the principles in 
Article 30 in cases of norm conflicts between treaties originating in different 
regimes of international law.  
 
Despite numerous scholars favoring the restrictive view, the Study Group of 
the International Law Commission, when addressing Article 30 in the context 
of fragmentation, reasoned more in line with the liberal view. In the view of 
the study group, too much emphasis in the discussions of Article 30 has been 
put on the problematic title of the article, which seems to limit its scope to 
conflict between treaties “relating to the same subject-matter.” If the limitation 
implied in the title is to be interpreted strictly, then it seems to leave most of 
the important cases – for instance, conflicts between environmental and trade 
 
1086 AUST. 2000, at 183. 
1087 Borgen, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2005), at 603, 605 and 
ANDREA SCHULZ, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT AND 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, cited in Borgen. 







treaties, or conflicts between human rights and humanitarian law treaties – 
outside of the scope of Article 30.  
 
The ILC Study Group rejects this idea based on several arguments. Most 
importantly, it holds that limiting the application of Article 30 to treaties 
“dealing with the same subject” would allow states to deviate from their 
obligations “simply by qualifying a novel treaty in terms of a novel ‘subject’.” 
Under the restrictive view, the Study Group contends, states “might for 
example derogate from their obligations under refugee instruments simply by 
concluding an instrument in an allegedly novel subject of ‘the law of human 
movement’.” Instead, the Study Group suggests testing if two treaties deal with 
the same subject matter by assessing whether the fulfillment of the obligation 
under one treaty affects the fulfillment of the obligation of another. Moreover, 
in the test, the Study Group considers that “affecting” should be interpreted 
generously; it should not be necessary to establish that one obligation strictly 
prevents the fulfillment of the other obligation. The undermining of the object 
and purpose of the other obligation in one or another way should suffice.1089 
By formulating this test for assessing whether the relationship between two 
treaties qualifies for applying Article 30, the Report of the Study Group of the 
ILC in clear language dismisses the restrictive view and instead opens the door 
for applying the provision in the numerous cases where a treaty obligation 
undermines the object and purpose of another treaty.  
Furthermore, the Report of the ILC Study Group considers that “the question 
of the relationship between two treaties cannot be resolved completely in 
abstraction from any institutional relationship between them.” This could be 
interpreted as indicating that when assessing norm conflicts, it should be a 
relevant consideration whether treaties involved belong to different regimes. 
In line with this argument, it should be less complicated to establish that Article 
30 applies if a conflict concerns two treaties within the same regime. The Study 
Group, however, does not exclude application of Article 30 if the conflicting 
rules lack an institutional relationship. In fact, in line with the general rejection 
in the ILC Study Group Report of the notion that public international law has 
fragmented into different incoherent systems, the Study Group appears to 
consider that any difference between regimes cannot in itself prevent the 
 
1089 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 






application of Article 30. There is nothing in the preparatory works of the 
Vienna Convention supporting that notion, according to the Study Group, 
which refers to it as “pigeon-holing.”1090 Rather, the ILC Study Group Report 
concluded, the negotiators of the convention did not consider the notion of 
regime boundaries but regarded international law as being constituted of 
treaties with formally similar status, which in itself is an argument for not 
reading treaties from different regimes as excluded from the scope of Article 
30. Institutional relation and regime divisions are thus considered of secondary 
interest by the ILC Study Group Report, even if close connections may make 
it easier to apply Article 30. Rather than determining in abstracto when two 
treaties deal with the same subject matter, the interpretation of Article 30 
suggested by the ILC Study Group calls for a practical approach to assessing 
whether the same subject matter criterion is fulfilled. This is in line with an 
observation made by Vierdag prior to the ILC Study Group Report, namely 
that the same subject matter may appear more difficult to approach in theory 
than in practice: 
The requirement that the instruments must relate to the same subject-
matter seems to raise extremely difficult problems in theory, but may 
turn out not to be so very difficult in practice. If an attempted 
simultaneous application of two rules to one set of facts or actions leads 
to incompatible results it can be safely assumed that the test of sameness 
is satisfied.1091 
 
Essentially, the ILC Study Group thus argues in favor of a liberal interpretation 
of the same subject matter criterion and calls for a practical approach in 
applying Article 30 to treaty conflicts. Before contextualizing this practical 
approach to the case of deep-sea bioprospecting, it is necessary to discuss an 
aspect favoring the liberal interpretation of Article 30 which appears to have 
been overlooked by ILC as well as in academic discussions. As has already 
been mentioned, Article 30 calls for applying lex posterior (third paragraph) 
save for cases where the parties have indicated how to relate to another treaty 
(according to the second paragraph).  
 
1090 Id. at 18. 
1091 Bert E. W. Vierdag, The time of the 'conclusion' of a multilateral treaty: Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and related provisions, 59 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988), as cited in PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International 







Where such instructions have been provided by the parties, Article 30 
establishes that they should be followed. This is not surprising. Respecting an 
express request from parties as to how agreements should be applied is in line 
with treaty law rules on interpretation (which will be discussed in section E.6) 
as well as case law. As pointed out in the Namibia case, the ICJ maintains “the 
primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance with the 
intentions of the parties.”1092  
 
The rule providing that instructions in treaties on how to apply its obligations 
in relation to other treaties is thus declared as the primary recourse in Article 
30. Declaring that Article 30 is inapplicable in some cases (as called for by the 
restrictive interpretation) would have the consequence of setting aside this rule 
providing that instructions by the parties should be respected. There are 
functional arguments for instead considering this principle, as well as other 
elements of Article 30 as applicable also in cases where treaties do not fully 
overlap, including where they originate in different regimes. Indeed, the 
general character of the operational provisions of Article 30 appear to be 
drafted for more general purposes, and not only for fully overlapping treaties. 
 
Several arguments thus favor not interpreting the same subject matter criterion 
restrictively. Rather, than as a restrictive criterion which in operative language 
indicates that the provision applies in relation between some but not all treaties 
there appears to be reasons for regarding the term for what it appears to be at 
first sight: the heading of a Vienna Convention provision declaring that it con-
tains the rules for deciding issues of application in cases of conflict between 
treaties.1093 Supporters of the restrictive view use the ambiguous formulation 
of the heading of Article 30 to construct an interpretation that goes against the 
purpose of the operative content of central parts of the provision. From a func-
tional standpoint, what must be guiding in approaching Article 30 is that if 
there are instructions on how to apply a treaty in relation to other treaties, those 
should be respected. In the next section, the characteristics of such instructions, 
commonly known as “conflict clauses,” will be discussed before investigating 
such elements in the three treaties that are the focus of this investigation. 
 
1092 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, ICJ GL No 
53, ICJ Rep 16, ICGJ 220 (International Court of Justice 21 June); Right of Passage over Indian 
Territory (Portugal v. India), ICJ Rep 125, ICGJ 173 (International Court of Justice 26 







Establishing that such conflict clauses should be respected in any event does 
not render the practical approach suggested by the ILC Study Group Report to 
test the applicability of Article 30 any less relevant. This is because there are 
also cases where treaties do not contain such instructions on their application 
in relation to other treaties, for which the other parts of Article 30 establish 
priority under the application approach. Testing whether the fulfillment of the 
obligation under one treaty affects the fulfillment of the obligation of another 
as suggested by the ILC Study Group also provides helpful guidance in 
establishing if a treaty conflict is actually at hand. Conversely, in failing to 
fulfill this criterion, it would be doubtful if Article 30 can be applied since the 
substantive difference across the treaties would merely represent an overlap, 
not an actual conflict. 
Would, then, the norm overlap between UNCLOS, the CBD and TRIPS in the 
case of deep-sea bioprospecting qualify as a treaty conflict in the test set by the 
ILC for assessing the applicability of Article 30? The central criterion in the 
test is whether the fulfillment of the obligation under one treaty affects the 
fulfillment of the obligation of another or undermines the object and purpose 
of the other obligation.1094 It appears difficult to dispute that at least some of 
the inconsistencies between the treaties identified in E.1 qualify for both these 
alternative criteria. Three treaties – which regarded in concert at the same time 
prevent the appropriation of deep-sea genetic resources under the principle of 
common heritage of mankind, call for states to enable private appropriation of 
the same resources by means of patenting, and request their protection based 
on biodiversity concerns – can hardly be regarded as fully compatible. For 
bioprospecting activities based on micro-organisms in sensitive deep-seabed 
ecosystems the three treaties raise particularly conflicting obligations. 
Elements of the treaties involved not only appear to undermine the object and 
purpose of another treaty; from a state perspective it also seems impossible to 
simultaneously fulfill the obligations of all three treaties.  
It thus appears that the contentions between the three treaties represent a treaty 
conflict and qualifies for the criterion suggested by the ILC Study Group for 
assessing the applicability of Article 30.  
 
1094 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 







Hence, it should also, in line with the reasoning of the group, lack relevance 
that UNCLOS, the CBD and TRIPS, as discussed in Part B, not only originate 
in different regimes of international law, but are based on different rationales 
and follow dissimilar logics. Under the approach suggested by the ILC, the 
same subject matter criterion is fulfilled functionally and the principles 
expressed in Article 30 still applies in the case of deep-sea bioresources.  
In sum, there are arguments for considering that the rules in Article 30 on how 
to apply overlapping treaties ought to be applied also to cases of conflict where 
the material overlap of treaties is not complete.  
 
Although this conclusion is in line with the reasoning in the report of the ILC 
Study Group, there are reasons for criticizing the analysis of the Study Group. 
On the principal question as to how to interpret the same subject matter 
criterion, it is claimed that the ILC Study Group (even if it sides with a more 
liberal interpretation) essentially makes the same mistake as the observers of 
the restrictive position, namely by reading the article heading as an operational 
requisite.  
 
Still, the test suggested by the ILC Study Group for establishing the 
applicability of Article 30 may be helpful, since it provides functional criteria 
for establishing when a conflict is actually at hand. Under this test, the practical 
case of deep-sea bioprospecting represents a conflict for which Article 30 
would be applicable. How, then, do the rules on treaty application relate to 
treaty conflicts? And what instructions would they yield in the conflict between 
UNCLOS, CBD and TRIPS relating to deep-sea bioprospecting? 
 
E.5.2. Treaty conflicts under the rules on treaty application  
 
Comprising several different approaches for resolving issues of overlapping 
treaties depending on their relation and content, the different elements of 
Article 30 will now be discussed in order to establish how treaty application 
rules may be used to resolve treaty conflicts in general. This will then serve as 
the basis for a discussion on how this approach to treaty conflict applies to the 
case of deep-sea bioprospecting. In this part the investigation will not follow 








E.5.2.1. Supremacy of the UN Charter 
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 30 first affirms the overriding principle of supremacy 
of the UN Charter, which in its Article 103 states:  
 
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the 
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.  
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 30 thus effectively reaffirms Article 103 of the UN 
Charter as a general exception to the applicability of the Vienna Convention 
rules on treaty application. This should not only be regarded as an exception 
for the cases of norm conflict involving the UN Charter. It also implies that 
there is one exception to the lack of hierarchy between treaties of international 
law: the UN Charter takes precedence in questions of application in relation to 
other treaties. 
 
E.5.2.2. The subjective element and pacta tertiis 
 
There are not merely material aspects of treaty conflicts, although such 
elements are the main focal points for the discussion in this part. Rather, as 
discussed in section E.3.1, a treaty conflict is the result of a combination of two 
factors. Equally necessary as the material element (a conflict between the 
content of the norms) is the subjective element: that the materially conflicting 
treaties are binding in relation to at least one state. If the materially conflicting 
treaties lack common parties, then this subjective element is lacking and no 
conflict is at hand. Paragraph 4 provides the rules on how to approach cases 
where the subjective component in part is lacking: “when the parties to the 
later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one”: 
 
(a) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in 
paragraph 3; (b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State 
party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are 
parties governs their mutual rights and obligations. 
In cases where not all states are parties to the materially conflicting treaties, 
paragraph 4(b) thus makes clear that the otherwise determining lex posterior 







favor of the least common denominator. This is much in line with the general 
principle of pacta tertiis under international law: A state cannot be considered 
bound by obligations it has not subscribed to. Or, in other words, for a factual 
treaty conflict to be at hand, a material conflict between treaties is not 
sufficient; rather, states must also subscribe to the relevant obligations. 
This may appear self-evident. However, based on case law it is far from certain 
that pacta tertiis precludes interpretation with references to agreements with 
dissimilar lists of parties.1095 More liberal interpretations of this criterion, 
disregarding dissimilar lists of parties, were made in the Bluefin Tuna Case1096 
of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea. In the case, Australia and 
New Zealand claimed that Japan had failed to take necessary measures for the 
conservation and management of the southern bluefin tuna in the high seas and 
had thereby breached its obligations under UNCLOS. Japan, on the other hand, 
claimed that a separate 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna1097 prevailed over those of UNCLOS.1098 Japan further argued that 
the 1993 Convention was to be considered not only lex posterior but also as 
lex specialis vis-à-vis UNCLOS and therefore should override it. The tribunal 
considered that the case indeed was a dispute concerning the implementation 
of UNCLOS by making two important findings. Firstly, based on an 
examination of a number of provisions in UNCLOS1099 the tribunal claimed 
that states have a duty to cooperate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations to ensure the conservation and optimum utilization of highly 
migratory species such as southern bluefin tuna.1100 According to ITLOS, the 
conduct of the parties within the 1993 Convention regime, as well as their 
relations with non-parties, was relevant in the evaluation of states’ compliance 
with UNCLOS and that lack of cooperation under the 1993 regime could lead 
to a violation of UNCLOS.1101  
 
1095 DANIEL BETHLEHEM, et al., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 
(Oxford University Press. 2009), at 321-341. 
1096 ICJ, Southern Bluefin Tuna. 
1097 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 10 May 1993, 1819 U.N.T.S. 
359. 
1098 For a more detailed account of the background to the case, see Simon Marr, The Southern 
Bluefin Tuna cases: the precautionary approach and conservation and management of fish 
resources, 11 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000). 
1099 Article 64 of UNCLOS, read together with Articles 116 and 199. 
1100 ICJ, Southern Bluefin Tuna, Provisional Measures Order, para. 48–49. 






Secondly, the tribunal found that the fact that the 1993 Convention applied to 
the parties did not exclude their right to invoke the provisions of UNCLOS. As 
observed by Romano, ITLOS interpreted UNCLOS and the 1993 Convention 
“as Chinese boxes, where the former includes the latter; the exegesis of the 
latter can only be done within the framework of the former.”1102 Importantly, 
the tribunal established this relationship between UNCLOS and the 1993 
Convention despite highly dissimilar lists of parties. It appears that ITLOS 
considered it sufficient that all parties to the dispute were parties to the 1993 
Convention.1103 
In the US-Shrimp case, the Appellate Body used other rules of international 
law to establish if sea turtles could be considered an exhaustible natural re-
source, within the meaning of GATT Article XX, or whether the term only 
related to non-living resources. With reference to the ruling in the Namibia 
case, the Appellate Body considered that certain terms in international law may 
be inherently adaptable to development, and that the objective of sustainable 
development in the Preamble of the WTO agreement indicated that “exhausti-
ble natural resource” was such a term.1104 Based on this argument, the Appel-
late Body went on to define the meaning of “exhaustible natural resource” with 
reference to a number of international environmental law treaties, including 
UNCLOS and the CBD, concluding that “measures to conserve exhaustible 
natural resources, whether living or non-living, may fall within Article 
XX(g).”1105 In making these references, the ruling did not require all WTO 
members to be party to the other treaties. It did, however, note that all parties 
to the dispute had at least expressed consent to be bound by the norms.1106  
 
1102 Cesare Romano, The Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute: Hints of a World to Come... Like It or 
Not, 32 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001). 
1103 In fact, the parties to the dispute were the only parties to the 1993 Convention. 
1104 Compare Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, at para 130 with the decision of the ICJ in ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the 
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia. 
1105 Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
at para 131 (original emphasis). 
1106 The Appellate Body thus implicitly required some degree of consent among all parties to the 
dispute in relation to the norm of other treaties guiding the interpretation of WTO law. This 
consent could according to the ruling however fall short of being party to the relevant treaty. In 
the case, three of the parties to the dispute (Malaysia, India, and Pakistan) were formally 
bound—i.e. had signed and ratified at least one of the instruments cited by the AB. Of the 







In the EC-Biotech Case1107, the decision of the WTO Panel rejected the EC’s 
argument that the Panel should take the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety 
Protocol) into account when interpreting the relevant WTO rules in this 
specific case. The Panel found that, according to the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, it was not required to take these treaties into account when 
interpreting WTO rules since not all parties to the dispute were parties to the 
CBD and the Biosafety Protocol.1108 Based on the finding of the Panel, this 
appears to imply a requirement of full overlap between the lists of parties to 
treaties involved in conflict: 
Indeed, it is not apparent why a sovereign State would agree to a 
mandatory rule of treaty interpretation which could have as a 
consequence that the interpretation of a treaty to which that State is a 
party is affected by other rules of international law which that State has 
decided not to accept.1109 
 
norms in one of the instruments (UNCLOS) as a matter of customary law. In the case of 
Thailand, it had signed but not ratified two of the instruments. The central argument of the 
Appellate Body appears to be that among all parties to the dispute there was broad acceptance 
of the norm in question, overlapping between the various instruments to which there were 
differing degrees of formal state consent among different disputants. As observed by Howse, 
“what was at stake was not determining whether a rule was applicable between the parties in 
the sense of “binding” in positive law, but whether the norm, as among these parties to this 
dispute, could be applied as a legitimate community norm or standard.” The Use and Abuse of 
other “Relevant Rules of International Law” in Treaty Interpretation: Insights from WTO 
Trade/Environment Litigation. (2007). 
1107 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, WT/DS291/R, Panel Report (World Trade Organization Panel 21 November). 
1108 See id. at paras. 7.67-7.71. The panel based this conclusion on three arguments. Firstly, it 
considered that the VCLT the expression ‘parties’ generally is used to refer to parties to a treaty 
not to a dispute and that the definition of ‘party’ in 2.1(g) of the VCLT is “a State which has 
consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force.” The second argument 
claimed that “requiring that a treaty be interpreted in the light of other rules of international 
law which bind the States parties to the treaty ensures or enhances the consistency of the rules 
of international law applicable to these States and thus contributes to avoiding conflicts between 
the relevant rules.” (para. 7.70) Thirdly, the panel observed “it is not apparent why a sovereign 
State would agree to a mandatory rule of treaty interpretation which could have as a 
consequence that the interpretation of a treaty to which that State is a party is affected by other 
rules of international law which that State has decided not to accept.” (para. 7.71). 






As observed by Jackson, under the understanding expressed by the Panel, 
Article 31(3)(c) does not give the interpreter the discretion to decide whether 
to apply other treaties. If the conditions are met, the interpreter has no other 
option than to take account of international law.1110 
In comparing the seemingly contrasting positions between the Appellate Body 
in US-Shrimp and the Panel in EC-Biotech, Howse has considered the finding 
in EC-Biotech to be incoherent in relation to US-Shrimp, suggesting that the 
decision by the Panel in the latter decision to grant treaties of environmental 
law more limited importance reflects the larger influence of the insider 
perspective of the WTO secretariat bureaucracy in panel decisions. This 
explanation is in line with the discussion in Part D.1111 The argument that the 
ruling in EC-Biotech is conflicting with the finding in US-Shrimp may, 
however, be criticized for understanding the Panel decision in the former as 
more restrictive than it actually is. Read closely, the decision of the Panel does 
not exclude the use of other treaties as points of reference, as will be further 
discussed in section E.5.1. Instead of reading the Panel decision as a radical 
shift from the previous dictum of the Appellate Body, it could be regarded as 
foremost underlining the pacta tertiis requirement.1112 
 
1110 JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press. 2006). 
1111 Howse. 2007. 
1112 In spite of the restrictive approach to ‘applicable in relations between the parties’-element 
applied in EC-Biotech, as will be further discussed in section E.6.1, the Panel declared in its 
decision, that even if there is no obligation to take other agreements into account, such 
considerations could nevertheless be made by using other treaties as references when 
interpreting ‘ordinary meaning’ of terms, in light of their object and purpose, under paragraph 
1-2. The other agreement would thus not be referenced as a legally binding rule, but rather for 
being linguistically informative. As declared by the Panel in paragraphs 7.92-93: “We think that, 
in addition to dictionaries, other relevant rules of international law may in some cases aid a 
treaty interpreter in establishing, or confirming, the ordinary meaning of treaty terms in the 
specific context in which they are used. Such rules would not be considered because they are 
legal rules, but rather because they may provide evidence of the ordinary meaning of terms in 
the same way that dictionaries do. They would be considered for their informative character. It 
follows that when a treaty interpreter does not consider another rule of international law to be 
informative, he or she need not rely on it. In the light of the foregoing, we consider that a panel 
may consider other relevant rules of international law when interpreting the terms of WTO 
agreements if it deems such rules to be informative. But a panel need not necessarily rely on 
other rules of international law.” Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting 







In the case of the treaty conflict between UNCLOS, CBD and TRIPS, the pacta 
tertiis requirement would raise challenges if interpreted restrictively. The lists 
of parties are not completely overlapping, as discussed under the subjective 
element in section E.3.2, although the overwhelming number of states are 
parties to all three treaties. As of 2019, the number of parties is 168 for 
UNCLOS, 193 for the CBD and 164 for TRIPS.1113 Still, this leaves out a 
number of states of which some, in particular the United States, which has not 
ratified UNCLOS, are important global players. Of note is the fact that in the 
US political debate on ratification, rules relevant to deep-sea bioprospecting 
have been raised as an important cause of objection; the common heritage of 
mankind principle has been raised as a major hindrance to ratifying 
UNCLOS.1114 In other cases, aspects less directly but still connected to deep-
sea bioprospecting have been raised as reasons for not ratifying. Accordingly, 
Colombia, Peru and Venezuela have not ratified due to disagreement on the 
maritime delimitation regime.1115 The CBD, by contrast, has almost universal 
acceptance. As previously discussed, TRIPS is an integral part of a broader set 
of WTO agreements which states are required to ratify in the process of 
becoming members to the organization. More than political objections to the 
material content of TRIPS, it has been the complexities of this process and the 
required administrative capacities that have hindered some developing states 
from becoming parties. 
 
The lack of global acceptance of treaties does not just raise challenges to the 
global application of relevant norms in the individual treaties. It could also lead 
to different consequences of regime conflicts between states, whereby not all 
states are parties to all relevant obligations. Accordingly, in the case of deep-
sea bioresources, the treaty conflict is not relevant or applies differently in 
relation to certain states, in line with the previous discussion on states that have 
not signed, ratified or acceded relevant conventions. Some states are only 
bound by obligations in one or two of the treaties, and thus either they are not 
 
1113 Information retrieved from the United Nation Treaty Collection (treaties.un.org), The WTO 
(wto.org), CBD (cbd.int) and UN Division for Oceans and the Law of the Sea (un.org/Depts/los) 
October 14, 2020. 
1114 Elizabeth M. Hudzik, A treaty on thin ice: debunking the arguments against U.S. ratification 
of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in a time of global climate crisis, 9 WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW (2010). 
1115 Eduardo Ferrero Costa, Latin America and the Law of the Sea, in REGIONS, INSTITUTIONS, 






directly concerned by the norm overlap, or the norm conflict is different from 
their perspective, depending on commitments. The question of pacta tertiis in 
relation to treaty conflict may be further complicated by the uncertain 
customary status of relevant norms. Some states may not be parties to all 
relevant treaties and yet still be bound by corresponding norms in customary 
international law. Under the decision in the Namibia Case, the ICJ made clear 
that customary principles of international law may serve as a point of reference 
similar to other treaties.1116 
 
It has not been fully explored to what extent norm conflicts involving 
customary norms differ from those involving only treaty obligations.1117 In the 
case of the US, which has not ratified UNCLOS, it has expressed that it 
considers much of the convention, as reflecting corresponding customary 
norms.1118 As regards Part XI on the Area, which includes the common heritage 
of mankind regulation for deep-seabed resources, the US is of the contrary 
position.1119 Indeed, objection to Part XI appears to have been the major reason 
for the refusal of the Reagan administration to sign the treaty.1120 This example 
illustrates that in light of the pacta tertiis principle, it would be premature to 
speculate on the consequence of practical cases of norm conflicts before first 
establishing what obligations apply in relation to specific states. As discussed 
in section E.3.3, applicable rules may differ between states depending on what 
obligations it is bound by. However, in this investigation, the emphasis is 
predominantly on the material aspects of treaty conflict seen from the 
perspective of the overwhelming majority of states bound by the three 
 
1116 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
1971. 
1117 The issue has however been discussed by Isabelle Van Damme, Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law, and Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (Daniel 
Bethlehem, et al. eds., 2009). 
1118 The US has accordingly declared that it considers the rules on navigational as reflecting 
customary law, as well as other areas, such as rules on sovereign immunity, rules on the conti-
nental shelf and the high seas, and at least part of the rules on living resources. See J. Ashley 
Roach, Today's Customary International Law of the Sea, 45 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014). 
1119 Ewa Kurlanda, Exploitation of sea resources and the territorial application of the law of the 
sea, 4 JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND LAW (2011). 
1120 Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Will Not Sign Sea Law Treaty, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 10. 







investigated treaties and the consequences of the subjective criterion will not 
be fully developed.1121 
 
E.5.2.3. Lex posterior 
 
For cases where the pacta tertiis principle does not lead to different application 
for some states in line with paragraph 4(b), paragraph 3 of Article 30 provides 
that the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are 
compatible with those of the latter treaty. For areas where there is conflict, 
there thus appears to be a strong preference in favor of more recent treaties in 
the provision. According to paragraph 4(a), the same rule also applies in 
relation between states parties to both treaties in cases where there is not a 
complete overlap of parties. 
 
This approach, which essentially establishes precedence in line with the 
principle of lex posterior, has also been regarded by many observers as 
generally having preference in treaty conflict cases. In the case of 
incompatibilities relating to deep-sea bioprospecting, lex posterior would 
prima facie establish priority for TRIPS before undertakings in UNCLOS and 
put the CBD third, since the treaties became effective in 1995, 1994 and 1993 
respectively. If priority instead is based on the date of adoption, as suggested 
by Borgen, discussed in section E.3.4, TRIPS would still be given precedence 
since UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, the CBD in 1992 and TRIPS in 1994. 
 
Yet, it should be noted that this group of observers who favor a rather 
categorical application of lex posterior in treaty conflict cases largely appears 
to overlap with those who maintain a restrictive view of the same subject 
matter criterion, as discussed in E.5.1.1122 Moreover, all rules on priority, which 
requires establishing the temporal order of treaties such as lex posterior, may 
be complicated by several factors, as discussed in section E.3.3. In particular, 
as was discussed in the context of the subjective element of norm conflict, 
establishing hierarchy between rules directly based on adoption or entry into 
force disregards the fact that potential treaty conflicts are only relevant in 
relation to states once both the treaty in question has become effective and the 
relevant state has become bound by it.  
 
1121 Ratification of TRIPS overlaps with membership in the World Trade Organization, currently 
164 states are members, UNCLOS has 150 and the CBD 196 parties (2019). 






As similarly established in section E.3.3, it therefore appears more reasonable 
to consider when obligations arose in relation to relevant states. This 
understanding would, however, result in different chronologies across states, 
depending on the order in which relevant treaties have become ratified. 
 
Indeed, resolving conflicts based on chronology generally appears 
problematic. Foremost, and this is a general point of criticism of the categorical 
application of lex posterior, it would be based on the presumption that new 
agreements are negotiated with existing treaties in mind, and/or that the 
negotiators intend to give the new treaty precedence in cases of overlap. This 
may be true of successive treaties with identical material scope. However, in 
most cases of overlap between treaties in different regimes, such as in the case 
of deep-sea bioprospecting, neither of these assumptions appear to be fulfilled. 
Based on the relevant treaties and their preparatory work, there is an indication 
of only limited consideration by negotiators of the potential for overlap in 
relation to these treaties of other regimes, as discussed in Part D. The signing 
of UNCLOS in 1982 predates the launch of the Uruguay round which resulted 
in TRIPS by six years and the start of the CBD negotiation by seven years. It 
is thus not surprising that no reference to the latter two treaties can be found in 
the negotiation documents of UNCLOS. CBD, on the other hand, clearly 
acknowledged the potential for conflict in relation to UNCLOS, but also 
included special instructions that sought to clarify this relationship in Article 
22 and avoid application of lex posterior, as will be discussed in the next 
section. Despite their parallel negotiation, the CBD and TRIPS were little 
concerned with their internal relationship.1123 It was not until the launch of the 
Doha round, after the entry into force of both treaties, that the WTO initiated a 
discussion to address the areas of communalities. A range of proposals 
concerning the connection to CBD have since been proposed, including an 
amendment on disclosure of origin of biological resources, but these have so 
far failed to materialize.1124 
 
Thus, to the extent that the potential for overlap in the relation between these 
treaties was considered during their drafting, the negotiators did not aim for or 
foresee the establishment of treaty hierarchies based on lex posterior. Rather, 
the rules relevant for deep-sea bioresources in the three treaties examined in 
 
1123 BIRNIE, et al. 2009, at 802. 







Part C with few exceptions appear to have been drafted in disregard of 
applicable commitments in other regimes of international law. Largely, the 
rules appear to have been constructed independently, in line with the objectives 
of their own regime (as discussed in Part D).1125  
At the general level, the negotiators of the three respective treaties at least in 
some regards considered their internal relationship. Provisions as well as 
preparatory works of UNCLOS, CBD and TRIPS indicate that such 
considerations were made, albeit as a matter of principle and not in the specific 
context of the rules relevant for deep-sea genetic resources. Accordingly, there 
is no evidence that the negotiators intended to modify the material content of 
pre-existing rules in other regimes when the relevant treaties were drafted. To 
the extent that internal hierarchies were established in relation to other treaties, 
those were not based on lex posterior. In the next section, these provisions in 
the three treaties indicating priority in relation to other treaties, commonly 
referred to as conflict clauses, will be examined, both in general terms and in 
the specific case of the three treaties investigated in the case of deep-sea 
bioprospecting. 
Even if these conflict clauses were set aside, there are strong arguments against 
rigidly relying on lex posterior. Foremost, in light of the unforeseen 
consequences it yields in most cases, there is no indication that either the 
negotiators of these three treaties, or state parties in general would desire the 
application of lex posterior in case conflict arises with other treaties. Rather, 
there is reason to believe that state parties would prefer to solve the conflict via 
more pragmatic means. Chiefly, this is because treaty conflict is seldom 
intended or foreseen. In cases where it nevertheless arises, it can be assumed 
that the parties to treaties concerned would prefer to solve the conflict by 
attempting to propose an application or interpretation that bridges the conflict. 
Supporters of the restrictive view advocating the use of lex posterior thus make 
the mistake of forgetting “the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument 
in accordance with the intentions of the parties,” as pointed out by the ICJ in 
 
1125 As observed by Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, “The TRIPS Agreement and the Biodiversity 
Convention were developed, albeit at the same time, by different delegations, in different forums, 
with different objectives and with almost no consultation or even communication between the 






the Namibia case.1126 The importance of respecting the interest of the parties 
was similarly stressed under E.4.1 in the critique of the restrictive view of the 
same subject matter criterion, since express treaty instructions on how to relate 
to other treaties (conflict clauses, as discussed below) otherwise would have 
been disregarded. In the context of lex posterior the criticism against a strict 
application of the rule provided by the Vienna Convention is not based on 
express provisions, but rather the assumption that treaty parties would favor a 
more flexible approach to the resolution of treaty application problems in cases 
of treaty conflict. 
 
Based on this inflexibility whereby Article 30 bestows lex posterior primacy 
in the model for solving treaty application, other observers have also voiced 
criticism against the position taken by Wolfrum and other supporters of the 
principle.1127 These include the International Law Commission, which appears 
to agree that a rigid application of the lex posterior rule should be avoided in 
cases of overlapping norms across treaty regimes. Despite its criticism of 
“pigeon-holing” international law into different regimes, the ILC Study Group 
agrees in its report that the practical utility of arguments under lex posterior or 
lex specialis are “more powerful” between treaties within the same regime than 
between treaties in different regimes. Indeed, despite stark criticism of more or 
less artificial divisions of international law into different fields, the ILC Study 
Group Report generally considers that using Article 30 is often fruitless in 
relations between treaty regimes such as those in trade and environmental law.  
 
Whereas it may be reasonable to resort to such principles in cases of conflicting 
treaties within the same family of agreements, the ILC Study Group contends, 
it may yield arbitrary results in cases of overlapping treaties from different 
regimes. Based on this essentially practical argumentation, the ILC Study 
Group Report considers that a straightforward priority of one treaty over 
another in conflicts between norms in different regimes (that is, in fact, of one 
regime over another) cannot be reasonably assumed on a merely chronological 
basis. Instead, they call for a more nuanced approach.1128 
 
1126 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
1971. 
1127 Borgen, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2005), at 219-220; 
Vierdag, BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988), at 92-108. 
1128 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 







The conclusions of the ILC Study Group thus support resorting to other tools 
than lex posterior in the case of norm conflicts between treaties of different 
regimes, if there are legal grounds available. It appears reasonable to support 
this position and reject a rigid application of lex posterior in cases where there 
is no evidence that the parties intended or envisaged priority established in this 
principle. Without strong reasons for making such an exception, however, it 
appears difficult to ignore that paragraph 3 unequivocally establishes that the 
lex posterior principle is decisive in cases where obligations in several treaties 
overlap. It will therefore be investigated what options Article 30 provides to 
derogate from lex posterior, as well as how it would apply in the case of deep-
sea genetic resources. 
 
E.5.2.4. Conflict clauses as an exception to lex posterior 
 
It has thus been established that there are strong arguments against orthodoxly 
relying on the lex posterior rule: in particular, the rigid consequences and the 
lack of connection to an expressed intention of the parties to solve 
inconsistencies in line with the principle. Paragraph 2 of Article 30 provides a 
legal recourse by establishing that when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, 
or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, 
the provisions of that other treaty prevail. This indicates a preference for 
express declarations in treaties on how they should relate to other treaties, 
commonly referred to as conflict clauses. According to paragraph 2, it is thus 
undisputed that if there is an explicit treaty provision prescribing the 
relationship to another treaty, that provision should be given priority over lex 
posterior.1129  
 
The Draft Conclusions of the Study Group of the ILC does not just favor the 
application of conflict clauses, as provided in Article 30(2), and considers it 
“advisable that when States enter into treaties that might conflict with other 
 
1129 PULKOWSKI. 2014; Jan Mus, Conflicts between Treaties in International Law, 45 
NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (1998). According to Wolfrum and Matz, the 
preference for conflict clauses is not primarily the consequence of the indication in Article 30(2). 
They consider that only if “conflict clauses do not clarify the relationship between the two 
colliding agreements are the provisions of the Vienna Convention invoked in an attempt to settle 
conflicts between treaties.” Under this understanding, conflict clauses should be applied even 
before resorting to the Vienna Convention for guidance. See WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in 






treaties, they settle the relationship between such treaties by adopting 
appropriate clauses in the treaties themselves.”1130  
 
In its report, the ILC Study Group also contends that treaty indications of a 
more general harmonizing intention ought to be regarded as having preference 
over lex posterior.1131 Only if both are lacking, the ILC Study Group Report 
suggests, should lex posterior be turned to as a presumption of intent to 
derogate from previous treaties.1132 In the absence of a conflict clause, the issue 
of priority should thus, in the opinion of the ILC Study Group, be resolved by 
interpreting the expressed intent of the parties: had they intended that the latter 
treaty should supplement or derogate from the earlier one?1133 This emphasis 
on the expressed intent of the parties seems to be much in line with the 
arguments against a strict application of the same subject matter requisite as 
well as a strict application of lex posterior. It could however be objected that 
the opening term “when a treaty specifies” in Article 30(2) indicates that a 
clearly expressed indication of priority in the treaty is required for a reference 
to qualify as conflict clause. Accepting vague harmonizing intentions as 
conflict clauses could be considered as transcending into addressing treaty 
conflict as a problem of interpretation rather than application.1134  
 
Indeed, there is reason for generally considering the concepts of application 
and interpretation as separate approaches under treaty law, entailing different 
 
1130 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Draft conclusions of the work of the Study 
Group Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. 2006., para. 32, at 12. 
1131 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission. 2006., para 229 at 118-119. 
1132 The ILC considers that his may be the case for example when the treaties deal with wholly 
different topics and were negotiated by officials from different administrations. 
1133 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission. 2006., at 119. 
1134 It could thus be argued that the suggestion by ILC Study Group blurs approaches of 
application to treaty conflict (Article 30) with approaches of interpretation (Article 31, which 
will be discussed below). Whereas the preference for conflict clauses and lex posterior (in lack 
of conflict clauses) is provided in Article 30, the suggestion of preference for harmonizing intent 
is essentially an argument of treaty interpretation, an issue which is regulated in Article 31. More 
specifically, it relates to evolutionary interpretation and the principle of systemic integration, as 
will be discussed in section E.6.1. In essence, the inclusive view of what may represent conflict 
clauses suggested by the ILC Study Group Report could be considered using a tool for resolving 







approaches under the Vienna Convention.1135 Nevertheless, interpretative 
methods may have to be resorted to in order to distinguish indications of 
priority. As noted by Pauwelyn, “conflict clauses may be straightforward in 
that they provide which norm prevails in the event of conflict.”1136 There may 
however also be more discrete expressions of intent on what to do in case of 
conflict, e.g. in preambles and preparatory works. Implicit expressions may be 
used in the interpretation of the norms in order to prevent conflict.1137 Such 
discrete indications may however be influential “also in the event of genuine 
conflict, i.e. where interpretation did not lead to a harmonious reading”.1138 
Respecting the intention of the parties in establishing priority between treaties, 
expressed clearly or in more discrete terms, may indeed require interpretative 
approaches.  
 
In conclusion, the treaty application rules as provided in Article 30 provide lex 
posterior as the default solution for application in cases of treaty conflicts. 
However, in cases where there are preferences in the relevant treaties for how 
they should be applied in relation to other treaties, such conflict clauses have 
preference over lex posterior. The nature and function of such conflict clauses 
will now be investigated. Thereafter, it will be examined to what extent such 
elements can be distinguished in the three treaties in focus for this 
investigation. 
 
E.5.3. Conflict clauses and treaty communication 
 
Since conflict clauses according to Article 30(2) should have preference over 
other principles for establishing how treaties apply in cases of conflict, it is in 
practical cases necessary to examine to what extent such clauses can be 
 
1135 See, on the distinction between approaches of application and interpretation under treaty law 
Anastasios Gourgourinis, The Distinction between Interpretation and Application of Norms in 
International Adjudication, 2 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (2011);Joshua 
Paine, The Judicial Dimension of Regime Interaction beyond Systemic Integration, in REGIME 
INTERACTION IN OCEAN GOVERNANCE: PROBLEMS, THEORIES AND METHODS (Seline Trevisanut, 
et al. eds., 2020). 
1136 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law. 2003, at 329. 
1137 In this study, such strategies will form part of a broader discussion of harmonization by 
means of treaty interpretation and the principle of systemic integration in section E.6. 
1138 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 






distinguished in the relevant treaties. As established in the previous section 
conflict clauses are expressions of party intent. It should therefore lack 
relevance whether treaties belong to the same or different regimes. The 
approach of solving treaty conflicts by means of principles of application, of 
which conflict clauses form part, can be conducted irrespective of institutional 
relationship.  
 
However, there are, as also established in the previous section, different 
opinions as to how explicitly formulated such expressions or instructions on 
the relationship to other treaties must be. In this regard, it appears reasonable 
to interpret such formulations liberally, and to assume that parties in most cases 
want to establish a functioning relationship between treaties rather than 
inconsistencies. As will be discussed in the following, conflict clauses can 




In an often-used definition by the International Law Commission, formulated 
long before the Fragmentation report, a conflict clause is regarded as:  
 
a clause [in a treaty] intended to regulate the relation between the 
provisions of the treaty and those of another treaty or of any other treaty 
relating to the matters with which the treaty deals. Sometimes the clause 
concerns the relation of the treaty to a prior treaty, sometimes its 
relation to a future treaty and sometimes to any treaty past or future. 
Whatever the nature of the provision, the clause has necessarily to be 
taken into account in appreciating the priority of successive treaties 
relating to the same subject-matter.1139 
 
Conflict clauses, sometimes also referred to as savings clauses, can thus be 
defined as treaty provisions expressing how a treaty (or part thereof) should 
relate to other treaties.1140 Conflict clauses thus declare the will of state parties 
on whether the treaty will take priority over another treaty in the event that a 
conflict occurs.1141 
 
1139 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1966, VOL. II (A/CN.4/SER. 
A/1966/ADD. 1) (United Nations. 1966), at 214. 
1140 Borgen, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2005). 
1141 Mus, NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (1998), at 214; Volker, ROEBEN VOLKER 







Such clauses can appear very different, in both nature and effect. Generally, 
conflict clauses may serve different purposes. They may aim to prevent that 
treaties covering similar or at least partially overlapping subject matters 
contradict each other by clarifying their relationship and hierarchies. Conflict 
clauses can thus be regarded as the result of a concern for ensuring the general 
coherence of public international law, or at least contributing to the function of 
the system. They may, however, also serve other purposes. If an agreement is 
considered comprehensive, conflict clauses may be designed to ensure that the 
overriding principles of the comprehensive treaty will prevail or – in other 
words – not be derogated by more specific treaties, thus aiming to ensure the 
primacy of a specific treaty.1142 Also frequent in framework conventions are 
conflict clauses designed to bestow subsequent agreements with certain 
mandates which fill gaps in the rules in the convention, thereby calling for 
further development of regulation in other treaties, which commonly function 
as lex specialis in relation to the former. As noted by Russo, “the impact on the 
treaty of clauses recognizing special rules can be controversial. By virtue of 
the principle of speciality they could partially replace the treaty while leaving 
it applicable as a residual basis, or they could apply in addition to it.”1143 
 
The lex specialis approach is frequently used in UNCLOS. In some contexts, 
it represents an implicit reference to pre-existing treaties, while in others it can 
signal a call to negotiate detailed rules in new treaties. For example, Article 
211 paragraph 1 calls upon states to establish international rules and standards 
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment. Those 
rules, which are contained in the MARPOL convention, are thus from the 
perspective of UNCLOS aimed to implement and function in conformity with 
UNCLOS.  
 
Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. 2005); Deborah Russo, Addressing the relation between treaties by 
means of 'saving clauses.', 85 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015). 
1142 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law. 2003, at 327. 
1143 Russo further contends that “Assuming the relation of speciality, (lex specialis clauses) do 
not address conflict among rules of international law. They merely indicate that certain aspects 
of the subject matter of the treaty could be regulated by way of according priority by other 
agreements concluded by the parties to the treaty but, as a rule, they do not exclude the 
concurrent or residual operation of the treaty.” Russo, BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2015). Also other observers, such as Jan Mus, do not consider provisions indicating 
priority according to lex specialis as conflict clauses in the proper sense, see Mus, NETHERLANDS 






This relationship is clarified not only in UNCLOS but regularly also in the 
relevant implementing agreement.1144 Conflict clauses may thus aim to both 
provide and prevent the application of lex posterior as well as lex specialis. In 
any event, they strive to prevent treaty conflicts. It will be assessed how 
successful they are in this regard once the form of conflict clauses has been 
discussed. 
 
E.5.3.2 Types and function of conflict clauses 
 
The general purpose of conflict clauses is thus clear. However, the form of 
such clauses can differ considerably. Wolfrum and Matz1145 have identified six 
categories: Firstly, no provision in the agreement; secondly, preambular 
language; thirdly, clauses providing for the suppression of the referring 
agreement in the body of the treaty; fourthly, specific savings clauses that 
provide for the prevalence of existing treaties in the body of the agreements; 
fifthly, general savings clauses in the body of the agreement; and sixthly, 
qualified savings clauses. Although this grouping illustrates the broad 
spectrum of potential clauses, it is of limited value since it focuses on form as 
much as material content. 
 
Without exploring the concept in theoretical terms, the ILC Study Group 
anecdotally provides a number of different examples of explicit conflict 
clauses.1146 Firstly, the ILC refers to clauses which prohibit the conclusion of 
incompatible subsequent treaties. This can be regarded as an express exception 
to the lex posterior rule, designed to guarantee the normative power of the 
earlier treaty. As a second example, the ILC Study Group Report mentions 
treaties expressly permitting subsequent “compatible” treaties. Thirdly, clauses 
in the subsequent treaty providing that it “shall not affect” the earlier treaty are 
highlighted.  
 
1144 See, in addition to MARPOL for instance Article 4 of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, 
which reads “Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of 
States under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of 
and in a manner consistent with the Convention.” The status of conflict clauses and the 
relationship between UNCLOS and implementing agreements, see WOLFRUM & MATZ, 
Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 121. 
1145 Id. at 122-124. 
1146 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 







This essentially represents a call for interpreting the treaty in harmony with, 
and thus not to materially deviate from, the other treaty. Fourthly, the ILC 
Study Group cites clauses in subsequent treaties providing that among the 
parties, it overrides the earlier treaty. This is considered as a modification of 
the previous agreement, inter se the parties to the latter. As a fifth type, clauses 
in subsequent treaties which expressly abrogate earlier treaties are mentioned. 
Furthermore, as a sixth category, clauses in subsequent treaties may expressly 
maintain earlier compatible treaties. An example of this type would be 
provisions stating that a convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of 
states parties which arise from other agreements. The ILC Study Group Report 
inventory illustrates the wide difference in function of conflict clauses. Still, 
the value of the account is limited since it is non-exhaustive and the division 
between the categories appears to be unclear. 
 
Russo distinguishes between different clauses based on effect. Under this 
perspective, which differs considerably from that of Wolfrum and Matz, 
“delineation clauses” are distinguished from “subordination clauses” dealing 
with conflict or inconsistency between treaties by arguing that the former, 
rather than addressing conflict, aim to define the scope of application of 
treaties. Delineation clauses, such as supplementation clauses, which merely 
reserve the right of contracting states to enter into agreements in order to 
supplement or develop the treaty regime, or the already mentioned lex specialis 
clauses, differ from actual conflict clauses by lacking impact on the obligations 
stemming from the treaty and not concerning conflicts among treaties. Russo 
considers that delineation clauses “describe the ‘bounds’ of the treaty and 
clarify that the treaty does not prejudge States’ freedom of action in certain 
matters related to, but not necessarily covered by the treaty. They 
characteristically entail States’ ability to adopt provisions applicable to 
particular aspects of the subject matter that would apply in addition to the 
treaty or that integrate the content of the treaty.”1147 
 
As regards “genuine” conflict clauses addressing the risk of overlap and 
inconsistency between different treaties, Russo divides these into 
subordination and harmonization clauses. Subordination clauses address the 
relationship among contracting parties only and give prevalence to other 
treaties in case of overlap, entailing mutually exclusive approaches in relation 
to other treaties.  
 






This may involve priority to other treaties which are in force between some of 
the contracting parties. It also involves clauses providing that states are free to 
choose which treaty to apply in their mutual relations, as well as 
“disconnection clauses” which exclude a priori the application of the treaty in 
the inter se relations between those parties which are also parties to another 
treaty. 
Harmonization clauses, on the other hand, call for their reciprocal co-
ordination. These clauses call for evaluation of the various obligations at stake. 
In most cases, they aim to prevent possible incompatibilities between treaties 
embodying competing goals, in order to ensure a functional relationship.1148 
Conflict clauses appear to be most commonly formulated as preambular 
language specifying the relationship to other treaties. Especially frequently, 
preambles of treaties contain without prejudice clauses, which indicate priority 
for specified prior treaties. The main challenge with applying such clauses, 
giving priority to existing or previous treaties, has to do with the varying scope 
of the treaties involved, as is often the case. Clarifying language on difference 
in mandate between treaties would be one way of solving the problem. 
However, the general language of conflict clauses commonly used rarely 
addresses this matter.1149 
 
A more problematic case is represented by conflict clauses containing 
reference to other treaties, providing that they should be mutually supportive, 
without clearly indicating preference.1150 Such clauses bring little clarity in 
cases of overlap between the two agreements. So-called suppression clauses, 
which establish priority both over existing and future agreements, similarly 
raise complex issues. It is difficult to foresee the consequences of such 
undertakings, where states curtail their sovereign treaty-making capacity in 
future negotiations.  
 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 Vranes, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
1150 As noted by Wolfrum and Matz, this type of reference is included in the preamble of the 
Cartagena Protocol as well as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 
WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 122. See also 
Riccardo Pavoni, Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle of Interpretation and Law-Making: A 
Watershed for the ‘WTO-and-Competing-Regimes’ Debate?, 21 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 







As will be discussed below, UNCLOS provides an example of this type of 
conflict clause in Article 311(6), providing that “there shall be no amendments 
to the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in 
article 136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation 
thereof.” 
 
Conflict clauses may thus have considerably different functions. That said, two 
elements are generally common. Firstly, all conflict clauses make reference to 
other treaties. Such reference may be specific (specifying the relation to a 
certain element or provision of another treaty) or general in nature (specifying 
the relation to other treaties in general) or anywhere in between. Especially 
common are conflict clauses relating to either past or future treaties. 
 
Secondly, it has been made clear that the reference to the other treaty or treaties 
indicates an element of priority or hierarchy. This may be expressed as 
precedence or subordination in different forms. It may also abrogate other 
treaties, or parts thereof. In conflict clauses making reference to previous 
treaties, conflict clauses regularly express preference in line with lex anterior 
or lex posterior. Apart from these two general characteristics, conflict clauses 
may also express other material content. This includes clauses indicating lex 
specialis of the other or in relation to the other treaty. Suppression clauses, 
which establish the priority of the new agreement over both existing and future 
agreements, or restrain the parties’ sovereign rights to enter new treaties in 
certain regards, appear to be less common.1151 
 
Conflict clauses may also differ in scope, relating to other treaties drafted by 
all or some of the parties. According to an assessment of conflict clauses in 
environmental treaties, the most common function of conflict clauses is to 
provide preference for pre-existing treaties.1152 Such clauses are often 
expressed in the preambular paragraph of treaties, providing that existing rights 
and obligations of states under other treaties take priority. Without prejudice is 
a commonly used term to express such precedence of lex anteriori. As 
observed by the ILC Study Group, also more discrete expressions in a treaty 
on how it is intended to relate to other treaties may arguably qualify as a 
 
1151 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law. 2003. 






conflict clause. In order to distinguish such intentions, it may be necessary to 
use different treaty interpretation approaches, as discussed in section E.6. 
 
Whereas the general form and function of conflict clauses have now been 
identified, such elements of the treaties central for the regulation of deep-sea 
bioprospecting will be distinguished. 
 
E.5.3.3 Conflict clauses of TRIPS 
 
Considering the many areas of existing and potential overlap in relation to 
other treaties, TRIPS in general provides little guidance on how it relates to 
other treaties of international law. Among the limited provisions addressing 
the matter, Article 2(2) of the TRIPS agreement provides a conflict clause 
which gives preference to prior treaties, but only in relation to three specific 
intellectual property treaties.1153 Apart from this limited reference, the TRIPS 
agreement itself does not express any other instructions on how to deal with 
issues of application in relation to previous treaties. A conflict clause relating 
to future treaties is similarly lacking. TRIPS is, however, as previously 
discussed, not an isolated treaty but forms part of the broader family of 
agreements of the international trade law regime, where it has a particularly 
close kinship to the other treaties negotiated as part of the Uruguay round. This 
is the result of these WTO treaties having been adopted in concert, as 
components of the same trade round package.1154 
 
Among the treaties that were negotiated as part of this round, the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter referred to 
as the Marrakesh Agreement1155) has the role of a framework convention, 
although it is considerably shorter than the central treaties of many other 
regimes. Formally, the other WTO treaties function as annexes to the 
Marrakesh Agreement. In the agreement, instructions are provided for 
clarifying the relationship to central aspects of general public international law 
as well as other treaties generally. Importantly, these instructions clarify the 
position of all WTO treaties and not only for the Marrakesh Agreement itself. 
 
1153 GERVAIS. 2012. 
1154 On the relationship between the treaties of the WTO round, see, for instance Marceau, 
JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2001). 
1155 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 







According to Articles IX(2) and X, such clarification can be provided by 
declaring authoritative interpretations of WTO rules, either by granting wavers 
or by amending WTO rules. 
 
Similarly, central WTO organs can adopt guidelines in this regard, in line with 
Article V(1) of the Marrakesh Agreement. Accordingly, many WTO 
provisions explicitly allow for WTO organs to define more clearly the 
relationship between the WTO and other international organizations. The 
primary approach to potential treaty conflicts in WTO law, including TRIPS, 
is thus not to prescribe conflict clauses in its treaties. Instead, procedures are 
established for addressing such matters by developing soft law measures, if 
necessary, on an ad hoc basis.1156  
 
However, such procedures to clarify the application of WTO treaties in relation 
to treaties outside the regime have not been fully tested. As regards the relation 
between WTO treaties and multilateral environmental treaties (which would 
be considered to encompass both UNCLOS and the CBD in this context), a 
specific Declaration on Trade and Environment1157 was drafted in 1994 as part 
of the final act in the Uruguay round (which founded the WTO and also gave 
birth to many of its treaties, including the WTO agreement and TRIPS, as 
discussed above). The declaration did not express a conflict clause, but instead 
established the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, and tasked it with 
the job of examining the relationship between WTO treaties and other treaties 
of international law. So far, however, the mandate of the committee has not 
resulted in any explicit conflict rules.1158 
 
Accordingly, neither TRIPS specifically nor the connecting Marrakesh 
Agreement contain conventional conflict clauses, with the exception of the 
reference to certain pre-existing intellectual property rights treaties in Article 
2(2) of TRIPS, as previously discussed. All there appears to be is an untested 
procedure for clarifying issues of application in relation to other treaties.  
 
 
1156 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law. 2003. 
1157 Decision on Trade and Environment. Adopted by ministers at the meeting of the Uruguay 
Round Trade Negotiations Committee in Marrakesh on 14 April 1994.  
1158 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 






Does this mean that TRIPS as well as WTO treaties in general simply do not 
relate to issues of application in relation to other treaties? In the sense of 
conventional treaty conflict clauses, the answer would be affirmative. 
However, it could be argued that WTO as a regime of international law 
approaches the issue of application differently. Whereas the international 
environmental law and the law of the sea (as will be discussed below) address 
the issue of application in relation to other treaties by formulating intricate 
conflict clause provisions in the treaties, WTO law provides for ad hoc 
solutions of application issues. The first of these, which is referred to as the 
procedural approach, has already been mentioned. There is also a second, 
judicial procedure for deciding issues of application. 
 
Under international trade law, the material content of WTO treaties has on 
many occasions been decided by the dispute settlement procedures of the 
WTO, which is mandated to deal with all issues encompassed by WTO treaties, 
including the elements of TRIPS relevant for this study. The mandate as well 
as procedure for this judicial resolution is provided in the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO1159 (hereinafter referred to as the DSU). Like the 
Marrakesh Agreement, the provisions of the DSU are thus relevant for deciding 
matters of all WTO treaties, including TRIPS. Among its provisions, two in 





2. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members 
recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under 
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or 






1159 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1 June 1995, 1869 U.N.T.S. 







Article 19  
Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations 
(…) 
2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and 
recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the 
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. 
 
In providing recommendations and rulings, Article 3(2) of the DSU mandates 
panels and the Appellate Body to “clarify the existing provisions of those 
agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public 
international law.” 
 
Although the provision is relating more directly to issues of interpretation, as 
discussed in section E.6, it makes clear that WTO law forms part of the broader 
system of public international law, and that common rules of public 
international law also apply to WTO disputes.1160 Not only does this dismiss 
the conception of WTO law as a sui generis regime that is different from 
general public international law;1161 it also obliges panels as well as the 
Appellate Body to apply the customary principles reflected in the Vienna 
Convention on how to relate to treaty conflicts.1162 Article 19(2) of the DSU 
also has important implications in a treaty conflict context by stating that the 
Panel and the Appellate Body “cannot add or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the WTO covered agreements.” In combination with 
the reference in Article 3(2), this has been regarded as a conflict clause, by 




1160 For an extensive discussion on the relationship between WTO law and general international 
law, see JACKSON, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law. 
2006. 
1161 As noted in other sections, the WTO Appellate Body has also ruled that WTO agreements 
should not be read “in clinical isolation from public international law”, United States – 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, Appellate Body 
Report (The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization 20 May), at 16. 
1162 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law. 2003, at 465. 
1163 L. Bartels, Applicable law in WTO dispute settlement proceedings § 35 (2001);Joel P. 
Trachtman, The domain of WTO dispute resolution.(World Trade Organization), 40 HARVARD 






Based on a strict reading of Article 19(2), there are arguments supporting such 
an interpretation; tribunals under the WTO can hardly give preference to the 
application of other treaties in cases of conflict, without affecting (and 
effectively downgrading) norms under WTO treaties, thus going against 
Article 19(2).1164 
 
However, other observers contest this view, claiming that Articles 3(2) and 
19(2) do not address the issue of applicable law relevant for a particular 
dispute. Rather, according to this understanding, based on a contextual reading, 
these provisions relate to the inherent limits of WTO dispute settlement 
procedures in interpreting WTO agreements.1165 This latter view thus claims 
that the instruction not to add or diminish rights and obligations is limited to 
issues of judicial interpretation, not of applicable law in general nor applicable 
treaties (in cases of conflict).1166 Another reason for objecting to an 
interpretation of Articles 3(2) and 19(2) as indicating priority in relation to all 
other treaties is that it would be unreasonable to assume that the parties to what 
would become the WTO intended to bestow the treaties of the new 
organization unconditional precedence before all other obligations of treaty 
law. Rather, the reference in Article 3(2) to customary rules of interpretation 
should be read in light of its context: indicating the creation of new rights and 
obligations as outer limits of the interpretative mandate of WTO judicial 
organs. 
 
Under this reading, the formulation in Article 19(2) also appears more rational: 
“cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the WTO 
covered agreements” should not be regarded as a conflict clause giving WTO 
treaties priority over all other treaty law, but rather as establishing the outer 
limits in interpretations of rights and obligations. 
 
 
1164 Van Damme. 2009. 
1165 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law. 2003, at 353, 465; Lorand Bartels, Applicable Law in WTO Dispute 
Settlement Proceedings, 35 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2001). 
1166 See, on the importance of maintaining the distinction between approaches of application and 
interpretation under treaty law, Gourgourinis, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (2011). In the Fragmentation Report, the ILC Study Group appears to consider that 
the difference between the two positions should not be exaggerated, Koskenniemi, 
Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the International Law 







In conclusion, for relevant purposes neither TRIPS nor connected WTO 
treaties can be regarded as containing explicit conflict clauses, in the meaning 
of Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention. In lack of formal conflict clauses 
in relation to treaties of other regimes, such issues of application are generally 
handled by judicial approaches in the WTO. For practical purposes, such 
judicial approaches may be a more pragmatic way of addressing treaty 
conflicts than conflict clauses. But even under an understanding where also 
more discrete elements are accepted as indications of priority in application in 
relation to other treaties, such procedures for making judicial decisions can 
hardly be regarded as qualifying as an expression of priority in the meaning of 
Article 30(2) of the Vienna Convention. Rather than functioning as conflict 
clauses, rulings in WTO dispute settlement procedures involving reasoning on 
application in relation to other treaties only apply on an ad hoc basis. The lack 
of clear conflict clauses further implies that regarded from the application 
approach under the Vienna Convention, there is no legal basis in TRIPS for 
arguing that other principles than lex posteriori should apply in cases of 
conflict. A consequence would be that unless the relevant state became party 
to the treaties involved in a different order in line with the subjective element 
suggested in section E.3.3, TRIPS would have priority before UNCLOS and 
the CBD in establishing application hierarchy between treaties involved.  
 
If the application approach provided by the Vienna Convention is set aside and 
the matter of conflict is regarded from the treaty conflict perspective of TRIPS, 
however, the matter could potentially be decided differently. As will be 
discussed in section E.6.2, the tendency of the WTO Appellate Body in US-
Shrimp to attempt to interpret provisions in WTO agreements so that they do 
not conflict with other treaty obligations indicates that at least in cases where 
conflicts between CBD and TRIPS would be decided along WTO dispute 
settlement practice, obligations in CBD could take precedence.1167 
Paradoxically, findings in WTO dispute settlement rulings involving questions 
of priority of treaties could thus indicate a more subordinate position for TRIPS 
than would be the consequence of basing the hierarchy on the provisions of 
TRIPS under the Vienna Convention. 
 
 
1167 ALAN E. BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford 
University Press. 2007). As is also further discussed below, the approach taken in Appellate 
Body, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products has arguably 






E.5.3.4 Conflict clauses of the CBD 
 
In the CBD, the central provision regulating the relation to other treaties is 
Article 22 paragraph 1. 
 
Article 22 
Relationship with Other International Conventions 
 
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations 
of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, 
except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious 
damage or threat to biological diversity. 
 
2. Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention with respect to the 
marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under 
the law of the sea. 
 
Thus, in the event of a conflict between the Convention and an earlier treaty, 
the latter would take precedence save for cases where “the exercise of the rights 
and obligations contained therein would cause a serious damage or threat to 
biological diversity.” As observed by Russo, the reference to a “serious threat” 
indicates that the clause was designed to “address the relation between treaties 
having different subject matter and to allow the States parties to implement 
protective measures in derogation of prior agreements if there was risk of a 
serious threat to biological diversity.”1168 
 
The provision combines many of the problems with conflict clauses, providing 
first that CBD provisions shall not affect the rights and obligations of any party 
deriving from any existing treaty. The provision suffers from a lack of precise 
language on the role or mandate in relation to specific treaties. Secondly, and 
arguably more problematic, the paragraph contains a qualification: an 
exception to the general priority of existing rights and obligations is contained 
in the subordinate clause of paragraph 1. The general priority of the other treaty 
does not apply where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause 
a serious damage or threat to biological diversity. The provision thus seemingly 
gives priority to previous treaties in the language of a conventional without 
prejudice clause.  
 







However, read from the exception, the priority is actually reversed, indicating 
priority for the CBD on all cases where exercise poses a threat to the interest 
of the CBD. The latter (and closer) reading is more in the spirit of a suppression 
clause, as discussed above. Another evidently problematic aspect of its 
formulation is the lack of criteria on what represents “serious damage or threat 
to biological diversity,” as is required to make an exception. In light of the aim 
of the CBD, it appears clear that existential threats to species would qualify. It 
is more difficult to ascertain what other risks could be considered.  
 
The complexities of the conflict clause of the CBD, however, do not end with 
the combined priority and subordination provided in paragraph 1 of Article 22. 
In paragraph 2 there is a specific reference to the law of the sea, declaring that 
the “Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention with respect to the 
marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under 
the law of the sea.”  
 
Two elements in this second paragraph are particularly noteworthy. Firstly, it 
relates to the law of the sea in general and not specifically to UNCLOS. 
Although UNCLOS is generally considered as the framework convention of 
the law of the sea, reflecting customary international law in central regards, 
this opens the door for making claims that obligations in other law of the sea 
treaties, as well as customary norms of the law of the sea, may have precedence 
in relation to the CBD. Secondly, the priority of the law of the sea according 
to paragraph 2 is not comprehensive but limited to rights and obligations. 
Thus, not all provisions of the law of the sea take precedence over the CBD. 
Arguably, more general elements of UNCLOS prescribing approaches, 
principles and organizational matters would not fall within the scope of rights 
and obligations and thus would not have priority before the CBD under this 
provision. Thereby, despite the reference to the law of the sea in paragraph 2, 
the CBD implicitly aspires for priority over UNCLOS on central matters such 
as the approaches and principles for the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment contained in Part XII of UNCLOS. Wolfrum and Matz 
consider the formulation in paragraph 2 as rational given the purpose of the 
CBD. In their view, a more general prejudice of UNCLOS on all matters of 
regulation would have made it impossible to complement the regulation of 







Formulations enabling a more complex interaction between the two treaties 
were necessary to enable supplementation by a new framework on biological 
resources of the CBD.1169 While it is correct to say that such an approach 
represents a pragmatic solution to this problem, the lack of guidance on the 
central rights and obligations criteria risks opening the door to other problems. 
 
The intricate conflict clause in paragraph 2 thus clarifies the relationship of the 
CBD to UNCLOS. Insofar as rights and obligations of UNCLOS are 
concerned, UNCLOS takes precedence. Where the conflict concerns law of the 
sea rules which do not amount to rights or obligations, CBD would claim 
priority. For the purposes of deep-sea bioprospecting, it appears clear that 
much of the overlap between the three treaties relates to central principles of 
UNCLOS which have the status as rights and obligations. In particular, this 
includes the common heritage of mankind principle, as discussed in section 
C.1, which is also the central conflicting element of UNCLOS. However, if 
read cautiously, it can be argued that paragraph 2 should in fact not be applied 
as a conflict clause but merely as an instruction in matters of interpretation, as 
will be discussed in section E.6. Even if this argument is supported, the 
paragraph can still be regarded as a clear declaration by the drafters of the CBD 
that in cases of conflict with UNCLOS, CBD takes a subordinate position 
according to the main rule. 
 
In relation to TRIPS, the conflict clause of the CBD provides less guidance 
since it merely applies to pre-existing treaties. Since TRIPS was adopted and 
entered into force subsequent to the CBD, the precedence for CBD in cases of 
serious damage or threat to biological diversity as expressed in Article 22(1) 
does not apply. In lack of provisions in CBD addressing the relationship, it thus 
appears that TRIPS would take precedence in line with the general lex 
posterior principle in the application rules of the Vienna Convention, unless 














E.5.3.5 Conflict clauses of UNCLOS 
 
In UNCLOS, the relationship to other treaties is established in Article 311, 
which provides an extensive and multifaceted conflict clause.  
 
Article 311 
Relation to other conventions and international agreements 
1. This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958. 
2. This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties 
which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention and which 
do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their rights or the 
performance of their obligations under this Convention. 
3. Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or 
suspending the operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to 
the relations between them, provided that such agreements do not relate to a 
provision derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution 
of the object and purpose of this Convention, and provided further that such 
agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles embodied 
herein, and that the provisions of such agreements do not affect the enjoyment 
by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations 
under this Convention. 
4. States Parties intending to conclude an agreement referred to in paragraph 3 
shall notify the other States Parties through the depositary of this Convention 
of their intention to conclude the agreement and of the modification or 
suspension for which it provides. 
5. This article does not affect international agreements expressly permitted or 
preserved by other articles of this Convention. 
6. States Parties agree that there shall be no amendments to the basic principle 
relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article 136 and that they 
shall not be party to any agreement in derogation thereof. 
 
Firstly, priority of UNCLOS is established in relation to the Geneva 
Conventions on the law of the sea. This is uncontroversial since these treaties 
are generally considered as predecessors of UNCLOS.  
 
Secondly, the relation to other treaties in general is established in a more 
complex manner. Paragraph 2 provides that the rights and obligations of states 
under other treaties are not altered. However, this general precedence for prior 






Firstly, the relevant norms must be compatible with UNCLOS. Secondly, the 
application of norms of other treaties must not “affect the enjoyment by other 
state parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations” under 
UNCLOS. Read conversely, paragraph 2 thus effectively only give priority to 
the application of other treaties over UNCLOS provided that both these criteria 
are fulfilled. Like the regulation in Article 22(2) of the CBD, Article 311 
paragraph 2 of UNCLOS contains a qualification, which entails that some but 
not all obligations under UNCLOS have precedence in relation to other 
treaties, provided also that the obligation in the other treaty is compatible with 
UNCLOS. The second criterion may appear superfluous, but includes potential 
cases where an obligation in another treaty affects other states’ rights or 
obligations under UNCLOS without necessarily being incompatible with 
UNCLOS. 
 
Thirdly, according to paragraph 5, Article 311 does not apply in relation to 
“agreements expressly permitted or preserved by other articles” of UNCLOS. 
This relates to the function of UNCLOS as a framework convention, and the 
commonly used method in the convention of mandating certain treaties the role 
of lex specialis in different fields. Examples of this is the reference to the 
International Whaling Commission provided in Article 65, to MARPOL in 
Article 211 and the London Convention in Article 210. Treaties referenced in 
these provisions, which effectively represent more specific conflict clauses, are 
thus generally prioritized under Article 311(5). Hence, the strict criteria 
provided in Article 311(2) do not need to be fulfilled in such cases of reference 
in UNCLOS to lex specialis treaties. 
 
Fourthly, there is no doubt that UNCLOS was drafted as a framework 
convention with supreme status in regulation of matters within its mandate. 
Yet paragraph 3 of Article 311 enables states to conclude agreements 
“modifying or suspending the operation” of provisions of UNCLOS, 
applicable in relation between them. However, the provision contains a number 
of qualifications and requirements, which effectively limit the possibilities for 
entering into such agreements. Firstly, provisions in the latter agreement are 
applicable solely in relation between the parties entering into that agreement. 
This is an expression of the fundamental pacta tertiis principle of treaty law. 
Secondly, the derogation must not be “incompatible with the effective 
execution of the object and purpose of” UNCLOS. Thirdly, it should not affect 







Fourthly, the derogation must not affect the enjoyment by other parties of their 
rights or the performance of their obligations under UNCLOS. Moreover, 
paragraph 4 provides that other parties to UNCLOS must be notified, not only 
of the relevant derogation agreement but also of their intention to conclude it. 
This provision thus to some extent enables the negotiation of lex specialis 
treaties intra se parties to UNCLOS. 
 
Fifthly, in paragraph 5 of Article 311, the parties “agree that there shall be no 
amendments to the basic principle relating to the common heritage of mankind 
set forth in article 136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in 
derogation thereof.” This provision thus represents a so-called suppression 
clause, as discussed above, by establishing priority over both existing and 
future agreements. The parties to UNCLOS thus curtail their sovereign treaty-
making capacity in future negotiations insofar as the common heritage to 
mankind is concerned.  
 
Article 311 is thus a complex provision, which combines many of the elements 
of conflict clauses discussed in the previous section. While the first two 
paragraphs establish priority in relation to previous treaties, paragraphs 3 to 5 
relate to lex specialis and inter se agreements. Paragraph 6 is a suppression 
clause. The instructions for application in relation to other treaties are 
articulated in two instructions. Firstly, that in cases of contention in relation to 
a prior treaty, lex anterior only applies if it effectively does not conflict with 
UNCLOS. Secondly, that lex specilis has precedence in the cases where 
UNCLOS provides for the elaboration of more detailed rules in specific 
treaties. These two rules may be helpful in relation to prior treaties and 
specialized instruments within the law of the sea, but provide little guidance in 
conflict with subsequent treaties, as is the case with the conflict in relation to 
CBD and TRIPS. Since no instruction is provided for application in such cases, 
the guidance provided by UNCLOS for solving norm conflicts in relation to 
other treaties in line with paragraph 2 of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention 
is limited.1170 Rather, the lack thereof is a signal of the position the drafters of 
UNCLOS wanted to endow the convention with: The status as the overriding 
framework for regulating all uses of the sea, as is also expressed in its 
preamble.  
 
1170 ALAN E. BOYLE, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Christine Chinkin ed., Oxford : 






The lack of references to the relationship between UNCLOS and treaties of 
other regimes of international law should thus not be regarded as coincidental. 
Rather, it makes clear that to the extent that other treaties overlap with 
UNCLOS, those other obligations will have to stand aside when conflicts arise.  
 
However, paragraph 5 provides an important exception, which is of particular 
interest in the case of deep-sea bioprospecting. The suppression clause 
contained therein provides detailed instructions for one particular type of 
conflict. Preventing its parties from entering into any amendment to the 
principle of common heritage of mankind, it relates directly to the heart of the 
conflict relating to deep-sea bioprospecting. If this obligation is to be 
respected, parties to UNCLOS are prevented from entering into other treaties, 
to the extent that they contain obligations which affect the principle of common 
heritage of mankind as regulated in UNCLOS. Under Part C.1, it was 
concluded that it would be difficult to interpret the principle as not 
encompassing deep-sea bioprospecting, at least to the extent that such activities 
are conducted in relation to organisms on the seabed. Moreover, as established 
in section E.1, the contentions to which this gives rise in relation to CBD and 
TRIPS ought to be regarded as a treaty conflict. Accordingly, under this 
interpretation, the parties to UNCLOS violated the obligation in Article 311(5) 
in this regard by entering into CBD and TRIPS, and the common heritage of 
mankind principle in its original form should remain applicable, without being 




It has now been discussed how the rules on treaty application relate to treaty 
conflicts generally, as well as in the particular context of deep-sea 
bioprospecting. It has first been established that there are arguments for 
rejecting a restrictive interpretation of the scope of Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention. As a result, it would be possible to use the rules on treaty 
application also in conflicts between treaties in different regimes. This would, 
however, require that there is not merely a material conflict of treaties, but that 
relevant states are party to treaties involved. Since state parties may vary 
considerably across treaties, this subjective element can be decisive in issues 
of application. The conflicting treaties must also apply to the relevant parties 
at the same time. The temporal element is particularly relevant in establishing 







Vienna Convention suggests lex posterior as the general rule for application in 
treaty conflicts. Yet, in practical cases, such as deep-sea bioprospecting, this 
approach would yield rigid consequences. 
 
If the subjective element is considered in applying lex posterior, as would be 
advisable considering that priority otherwise would be based merely on 
theoretical conflict, it would be most appropriate to base the chronology on 
when states became party to the relevant treaties. The resulting order would 
however differ significantly across states. This could create considerable 
problems in treaty conflicts involving states that have ratified relevant treaties 
in different orders, as in the case of deep-sea bioprospecting. Moreover, there 
is no indication that states in this case foresaw or intended that obligations in 
the other relevant treaties would become undermined when deciding in what 
order to ratify or accede to treaties involved.  
 
Establishing applicable treaty based on lex posterior would not result in less 
rigid consequences if the subjective element were set aside and priority were 
based merely on entry into force or date of adoption. This would result in 
complete suppression of relevant obligations in both CBD and UNCLOS in 
favor of TRIPS, even though all three treaties entered into force during a short 
period of three years 1993–1995. 
 
Accordingly, it is suggested that in cases of conflict between treaties in 
different regimes, lex posterior ought to be applied less categorically. A more 
pragmatic approach to application in such treaty conflicts would be to seek for 
instructions by parties on how the treaty should be applied in cases of conflict. 
Under the exception to lex posterior in Article 30(2), such conflict clauses may 
under treaty law take precedence over lex posterior. Conflict clauses may come 
in different forms and may have different functions. There are strong 
arguments in favor of interpreting such clauses pragmatically, based on the 
assumption that state parties strive for a functioning relationship with other 
instruments. An outer limit of what can be regarded as conflict clauses is, 
however, set by the requirement in the Vienna Convention that only formal 
treaty provisions can be regarded as conflict clauses. Conflict clauses must thus 
be formal instructions in treaties on the relation to other instruments. Neither 
subjective interpretations of perceived or implicit intentions, nor judicial 
procedures for deciding issues of application thus qualify as conflict clauses 






All three treaties in the present investigation contain explicit conflict clauses. 
However, as is often the case with conflict clauses, the instruction provided is 
of limited value in many practical cases. As regards the inconsistencies 
between UNCLOS, CBD and TRIPS in the case of deep-sea bioprospecting, 
relevant conflict clauses of the three treaties yield contradictory results. In 
UNCLOS, priority was claimed not only in relation to prior treaties, but also 
as regards future treaties, to the extent such undertakings affected the common 
heritage of mankind principle. This would effectively thwart the regulation of 
patentable subject matter of TRIPS to the extent that it conflicts with deep-sea 
genetic resources, which is most evident regarding deep-seabed micro-
organisms. In the CBD, the conflict clause in relation to UNCLOS was 
generally considered submissive as regards rights and obligations of 
UNCLOS. This would include many though not necessarily all of the elements 
of regulation relating to deep-sea bioprospecting. In relation to prior treaties 
generally, the CBD similarly let those take precedence, save for cases where 
the core interest of CBD would be impeded or where it would cause a serious 
damage or threat to biological diversity. It is difficult to ascertain whether 
deep-sea bioprospecting would qualify for this criterion. As discussed in Parts 
B and C, it is not unlikely that in some cases, limited sampling operations 
aiming to serve as the basis for patenting under TRIPS could also represent 
such risks. At first sight, it thus appears that there is a legal basis in CBD for 
claiming that it could take precedence over TRIPS. However, the conflict 
clause in CBD is limited to relations to pre-existing treaties. Since TRIPS was 
both adopted and entered into force subsequent to the CBD, the provision is 
arguably inapplicable in that relationship. 
 
In TRIPS as well as the other WTO treaties, conflict clauses in the sense of 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention are, for relevant purposes, lacking. 
Counterintuitively, this lack of conflict clauses, under the Vienna Convention 
application rules, would result in priority of TRIPS over the other two treaties 
investigated in this case, since Article 30 provides that resort should be made 
to lex posterior in cases where conflict clauses are lacking. If the Vienna 
Convention definition of conflict clauses, however, is set aside, and the matter 
is instead approached from the perspective of WTO jurisprudence, the result 
could be the contrary, in line with the tendency in WTO dispute settlement to 








In sum, the use of the treaty application principles expressed in Article 30 of 
the Vienna Convention would give preference to both UNCLOS (by virtue of 
its conflict clause) and TRIPS (by virtue of lex posterior, save for states that 
became party to CBD or UNCLOS subsequently, in line with the subjective 
element), but not to the CBD even in cases of serious damage or threat to 
biodiversity.  
 
It can thus be concluded that treaty application rules generally represent 
potentially helpful tools in solving treaty conflicts, also in cases with conflicts 
across regime boundaries. Where clearly expressed, conflict clauses appear to 
have a particular potential to clarify the hierarchies of treaty obligations in 
cases of irreconcilable conflict. In the case of deep-sea bioprospecting, 
however, the solutions to conflict suggested by the rules of application in the 
Vienna Convention would yield contradictory results. 
 
Whereas this settles the analysis of how the treaty law rules on application 
solve treaty conflicts by establishing priority between the treaties involved, it 
remains to be discussed how the rules on treaty interpretation apply to treaty 
conflicts. The general rule of interpretation in Article 31 addresses the matter 
differently, attempting to prevent the conflict from arising by addressing the 
interpretation as such generally, rather than the relationship between or 
hierarchies of the treaties specifically. In other words, whereas the above 
discussion concerned how to apply treaties in cases of conflict, the next section 
will focus on how approaches of interpretation can be used to read the same 
prima facie conflicting treaty provisions harmoniously, and thus prevent the 
conflict.  
 
E.6. Resolving norm conflicts by means of treaty 
interpretation 
 
Treaty application rules are not the only way to address issues of regime 
conflict. Whereas these principles would be the primary option for solving 
treaty conflict, treaty law also provides a second approach to such problems: 
To regard inconsistencies across treaties not as problems of application but as 







Compared to approaching inconsistencies across treaties under the principles 
of treaty application, addressing such problems by the rules of interpretation 
implies a different perspective. Where treaty application principles start out 
from the relationship between different treaties, as expressed in conflict clauses 
where such exist, the interpretative approach focuses on specific commitments, 
and calls for an interpretation which can coexist and function alongside 
obligations in other treaties.1171 
 
From a systemic standpoint, both the perspective of application and that of 
interpretation function as means to ensure the integrity of public international 
law as a functioning system. In fact, as discussed in section A.6, the systemic 
argument would claim that the objective to remain coherent is inherent to 
public international law. However, the approaches suggested by the two 
perspectives are different, as regards presumption as well as target for the 
analytical operation.  
 
Regarding treaty conflict as an issue of application implies a priori accepting 
the material treaty conflict. But rather than capitulating before the problem, 
effort is focused on how the conflicting obligations can be applied in concert 
to the extent that this is possible, and otherwise how priority should be 
established between obligations. From a treaty interpretation perspective, the 
prima facie conflict is not a priori accepted. Instead, treaty interpretation rules 
are used to prevent conflict. As already discussed, the International Law 
Commission Report on Fragmentation contends that this possibility of 
interpreting obligations in a manner which prevents conflict is not just an 
option under the rules of interpretation, but an obligation.1172 The ILC Study 
Group puts much emphasis on the possibility of using harmonizing treaty 
interpretation principles to prevent treaty conflict, and in particular considers 
the principle of systemic integration, which will be further discussed below, as 
a “master key” to the house of international law, which makes the system 
function coherently.1173 
 
1171 Borgen, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2005); Michaels & 
Pauwelyn, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 
1172 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Draft conclusions of the work of the Study 
Group Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. 2006., para. 43, at 15.  
1173 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 







What the ILC Study Group puts less weight on in its report is that even if 
harmonious interpretation is a rhetorically satisfactorily argument for 
defending the integrity of international law as a functioning system, it is in 
many (if not most) practical cases of norm overlap far from easy to maintain 
credible harmonious interpretations. To functionally interpret obligations 
harmoniously implies an attempt to focus on potential common ground in areas 
of contention while maintaining the material content of relevant obligations. 
The interpretive approach to treaty conflict thus attempts to navigate as far as 
possible within the linguistically maneuverable course provided by conflicting 
provisions. This endeavor may be complicated. Needless to say, the difficulty 
increases with the level of divergence between the relevant provisions. For the 
operation to be successful, at least some area of commonality is required. 
Logically, the difficulty of the exercise also correlates with the degree of 
specificity in the language of relevant provisions. Regularly, however, it is 
assumed, the commonly general language of international law treaties provides 
a considerable degree of discretion in interpretation. But the possibility to use 
treaty interpretation rules to prevent conflict is not limitless. The interpretation 
tools reflected in Part III Section III of the Vienna Convention can only be 
employed to address conflicts if the respective colliding provisions are unclear 
or vague in some respect. Moreover, as stated by Wolfrum, if the states parties 
to an agreement willfully establish provisions that collide with other 
agreements and express their intention in clear, unambiguous wording, 
interpretation cannot be used to conciliate the conflict, since this would go 
against the intention of the parties.1174 
 
Striving to establish harmonizing solutions based on treaty interpretation rules 
thus does not require any specific form of analysis, but uses standard rules of 
treaty interpretation, as expressed in Part III Section III of the Vienna 
Convention, primarily in Article 31 but also Articles 32 and 33. What is 
significant with treaty interpretation under the harmonizing approach is that it 
indicates a direction of interpretation that seeks out common ground and 
thereby promotes harmonization. By striving to find an interpretation which 










A major difference from the use of conflict clauses, lex posterior and the other, 
more categorical rules on application of treaties in Article 30 is that the use of 
interpretation principles does not aim to establish strict hierarchies and the 
disapplication of rules of either treaty. Instead, the interpretive perspective of 
apparent treaty inconsistencies uses a relatively soft approach in order to 
coordinate agreements.1175 In other words, approaches of application take 
conflicting obligations as a starting point, whereas treaty interpretation tools 
are used to prevent conflict.1176 
 
Accordingly, it may not be necessary to choose between the two approaches or 
regard them as conflicting. If coherence can be achieved by employing the 
treaty interpretation rules under Articles 31–33, the treaty conflict does not 
arise and the stricter rules on priority in Article 30 do not have to be invoked. 
There are thereby also practical arguments for attempting to use the softer 
harmonizing approach before resorting to the rules for application as means to 
address the treaty conflict. In the following sections, it will be evaluated how 
treaty interpretation principles can be used to prevent treaty conflict generally, 
as well as in the specific case of deep-sea bioprospecting. By using this 
example, the predictions of the ILC Study Group and other observers on the 
possibility of using treaty interpretation principles generally and the capability 
of the principle of harmonization in particular to preserve the coherence of 
international law will be tested. 
 
E.6.1. The general rule of treaty interpretation and treaty 
conflict 
In addition to the principles of treaty application, the general rule of 
interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention also provides rules 
relevant for addressing cases of norm conflict. Foremost, it establishes that 
treaties are to be interpreted in good faith and in light of their context, object 
and purpose. In addition, subsequent agreement or practice in the interpretation 
should be taken into account, as well as any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.  
  
 
1175 WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 133. 







Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31  
General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was 
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and 
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in 
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties 
so intended. 
 
In particular, the last point, referred to as the principle of systemic integration, 
provides a resort in difficult cases of contention between treaties. As expressed 
by the ILC Study Group, in case there is a systemic problem – an inconsistency, 
a conflict, an overlap between two or more norms – and no other interpretative 
means provides a resolution, then recourse may always be made to interpreting 
the conflicting norm in light of any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties as provided in Article 31(3)(c) 
in order to proceed in a reasoned way.1177 As discussed in Part D, each 
institution tends to favor the objectives of its own regime. In much of the 
academic debate on fragmentation, supporters of the systemic position have 
argued that the principle of systemic integration still ensures coherence in the 
end. This is rarely supported by evidence. Rather, systemic integration is 
expected to prevent fragmentation because theory says it should do so. This 
was essentially the ultimate message in the ILC Study Group Report, which 
concluded its discussion on a relatively positive note: Despite fragmentation, 
systemic integration will save the day for public international law.  
 
 






In the final paragraph of the draft conclusions of the ILC Study Group Report, 
this was also expressed as a general responsibility for actors in the international 
system:  
 
Irrespective of the special status or the designation (“fundamental”) 
enjoyed by some norms, conflicts between rules of international law 
should be resolved in accordance with the principle of harmonization, 
that is, by bearing in mind that in the event of a conflict, the norms 
should be interpreted as compatible to the extent possible.1178 
Even if regimes of international law will have different ethos, purposes and 
rationales, as also admitted by the ILC1179, it is thus claimed that they will work 
in concert because there are treaty interpretation rules ensuring coherence and 
it is a responsibility to interpret norms as compatible. In the following, the 
function of treaty interpretation rules in addressing norm conflicts will be 
discussed, and the validity of the suggestions by the International Law 
Commission tested. 
E.6.1.1. Interpretation in good faith and ordinary meaning 
 
Based on Article 31, the primary obligation in treaty interpretation is to 
establish what an interpretation in good faith provides, as well as the ordinary 
meaning of the relevant terms. Context as well as object and purpose are also 
clearly important. Taken together, this adds up to four elements: firstly, the 
obligation to undertake the interpretation in good faith; secondly, the 
importance of the ordinary meaning rule; thirdly, the relevance of the treaty’s 
context; and fourthly, the implications of the object and purpose of the 
treaty.1180 Among these four elements, interpretation in good faith appears to 
be the central element, or indeed the purpose of treaty interpretation exercises. 
In relation to this requisite, the other three elements appear to be assisting, 
supportive or guiding criteria.  
 
 
1178 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law - Draft conclusions of the work of the Study 
Group Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi. 2006., para. 43, at 15. 
1179 See id. at para. 13, at 7 as further discussed in Part D. 
1180 Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 21 EUROPEAN 







The obligation to interpret a treaty in good faith, as well as the general rule of 
treaty interpretation generally, has been explained as a logical consequence of 
pacta sunt servanda, as expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention. 
Accordingly, the reference to object and purpose has been regarded by 
Wolfrum as an explicit call for teleological interpretation: Interpreting treaty 
provisions should be no more difficult than establishing what the parties jointly 
intended.1181 This call for basing interpretation on the common will of parties, 
however, has considerable shortcomings. Foremost, it is often difficult to read 
treaty obligations as expressions of commonly shared intentions. Rather, the 
material content of treaties can be regarded as the result of trade-offs in 
negotiations between different positions. The text of provisions is also often 
intentionally left vague in order to facilitate different interpretations. Treaty 
interpretation is therefore regularly challenging and teleological interpretation 
may be problematic. 
 
The obligation to interpret treaties in good faith is also closely connected to the 
bona fides principle. This principle is often regarded as the fundament for 
pacta sunt servanda. For states, bona fides implies that “their will must 
produce the effects it has openly sought, and they must be considered 
effectively bound, in accordance with their declarations.”1182 However, it 
“means more than simply bona fides in the absence of mala fides, or rejection 
of an interpretation resulting in abuse of rights (…) It signifies an element of 
reasonableness qualifying the dogmatism that can result from purely verbal 
analysis.”1183 The obligation to interpret in good faith has also been defined as 
a baseline structure of international treaty law aimed to underpin and effectuate 
the universally recognized principle that parties should fulfill obligations, as 
expressed and declared in the treaty and that failure to do so represents a 
breach.1184 Moreover, the approach to treaty interpretation suggested in 
paragraph 1 underlines that it is the ordinary meaning, hence the objective 
meaning, of the text that is to be clarified.  
 
1181 WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 134-135. 
1182 Michel Virally, Review Essay: Good Faith in Public International Law, 77 THE AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983); JOHN O'CONNOR, THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH IN 
LEGAL THEORY (WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW) (ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing. 1987). 
1183 RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION (Oxford : Oxford University Press 2nd rev. 
edition. ed. 2015), at 171. 






Paragraph 1 of Article 31 is thus based on the assumption that the text of the 
treaty is the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties.1185 
 
It thus follows that in the interpretation of treaty provision terms which are 
contentious in relation to other instruments, an interpretation cannot be 
established that deviates from the intention of the parties, as expressed in the 
treaty. However, as will be discussed, interpretation can vary considerably 
without going against good faith and ordinary meaning. 
 
E.6.1.2. Interpretation based on the object and purpose of treaties  
 
Among the supportive elements of Article 31, the exercise of establishing the 
object and purpose is often determinative. Under conventional interpretation, 
“object and purpose” appears to be regarded as a singular concept, even if, 
strictly speaking, the “object” is about what the treaty covers and the “purpose” 
is about why the treaty covers an issue.1186 It is also clear that the object and 
purpose is not considered independently of other means of interpretation.1187 
The object and purpose should be considered in relation to conventional 
language (“the ordinary meaning”).1188 
 
Different considerations are possible when undertaking an assessment of the 
object and purpose of a treaty in the treaty interpretation context.1189  
 
1185 WOLFRUM & MATZ, Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 135. 
1186 Benn McGrady, Fragmentation of International Law or "Systemic Integration" of Treaty 
Regimes: EC-Biotech Products and the Proper Interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 42 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2008). 
1187 BJORGE. 2014, at 58. 
1188 ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES § 83 (Springer 
Netherlands, Dordrecht. 2007), at 203. 
1189 Among the great number of authors having dealt with the matter, see especially AUST. 2000; 
Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The "Object and Purpose" of a Treaty: An Enigma, 3 
AUSTRIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL & EUROPEAN LAW (1998); Jan Klabbers, Some Problems 
Regarding the Object and Propose of Treaties, in FINNISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Martti Koskenniemi & Kari Takamaa eds., 1998); Ulf Linderfalk, On the Meaning of the 'Object 
and Purpose' Criterion, in the Context of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 
19, 72 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention 
Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 THE AMERICAN 







The ICJ has stated that the purpose of treaty interpretation is not to revise 
treaties or to read into the text of treaties issues that they do not explicitly 
address or that cannot be drawn out of a reasonable understanding of the 
text.1190 
 
However, this leaves many questions unanswered. A first question is what 
ought to be the legal material subject for the interpretation in this regard: Is it 
the object and purpose of the conflicting treaty provision that is relevant, or is 
it more appropriate to investigate the general object and purpose of the treaty 
containing the conflicting provision? 1191 As noted by Linderfalk, “’the object 
and purpose’ of a treaty means those reasons for which the treaty exists – 
sometimes termed as the ratio legis or the treaty’s raison d’être.”1192 It is thus 
clear that it is general purpose of the treaty which should be considered, and 
the analysis should not be confined to the individual provision. This distinction 
is important since the overriding object and purpose of a treaty may differ 
significantly from the object and purpose of individual provisions. Framework 
conventions in particular, but more specific treaties too, may contain a broad 
range of obligations, some more mainstream or closer to the core of the treaty 
than others. Rather than expressing the general object and purpose of the treaty, 
individual provisions can express partial objectives. Limiting the analysis to 
the conflicting provisions risks blinkering the interpretation, resulting in the 
exaggeration of discrepancies in relation to other agreements. It can be 
assumed that in many cases, consideration of the purpose of the treaty provides 
indication of what interpretations are possible, and what potential readings can 
be ruled out due to incompatibility with the purpose. The overriding object and 
purpose of treaties can thereby be a supplement to the ordinary language of the 
individual provision, providing clearer guideline for harmonizing 
interpretation of different agreements.1193 
 
 
1190 See Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, ICJ Reports 
(1950). 229; Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, 
ICJ Reports (1952), 196; Certain expenses of the United Nations Case, ICJ Reports (1962), 159; 
South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), ICJ Reports (1966), 48 as cited in WOLFRUM & MATZ, 
Conflicts in International Environmental Law. 2003, at 134-135. 
1191 Klabbers, Some Problems Regarding the Object and Propose of Treaties. 1998. 
1192 LINDERFALK, On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed 
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2007, at 204. 






A second question concerns what perspective to apply in assessing the object 
and purpose; observers as well as states may have different understandings of 
the reasons for a treaty. According to Linderfalk, the term denotes a subjective 
teleological perspective, reflecting the purpose conferred on the law by the 
original lawmaker; the object and purpose the parties to the treaty mutually 
intended.1194  
 
The challenges with applying this rule of interpretation do however not end 
with establishing what is implied by object and purpose under Article 31. 
Similar to the meaning of individual provisions, the object and purpose of 
treaties generally can be ambiguous or not clearly articulated. In other cases, 
the purpose may be complex, including a broad range of objectives. In 
environmental treaties, objectives are regularly expressed in general terms, 
such as the promotion of sustainable development or protection of 
environment. Using such objectives, which are common to most modern 
environmental treaties, as the basis for treaty interpretation that seeks to 
harmonize conflicting norms runs the risk of bringing about the contrary 
problem, namely that the common denominator is too broad to be useful. 
 
In certain treaties, the object and purpose are explicitly stated in preambles or 
opening provisions. In others, the object appears to be more ambiguous.1195 
Whereas the former is the case with TRIPS and CBD, as discussed in Part D, 
UNCLOS appears to be less precise in this regard. Moreover, under the 
subjective teleological perspective there is reason for considering that object 
and purpose should not be interpreted solely based on explicit textual 
provisions, but should take into account broader rationales and logics 
underpinning treaties, as similarly discussed in Part D. Indeed, finding the 
“object and purpose” has been described as a matter of “extracting the 
‘essence,’ the overall ‘mission’ of the treaty.”1196 
 
 
1194 The subjective teleological interpretation can be distinguished from objective teleological 
interpretation, reflecting the views of the legal community or people in general. LINDERFALK, 
On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2007, 204-205. 
1195 Borgen, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2005). 
1196 David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The object and purpose of a treaty: three interpretive 







In sum, in cases of potential treaty conflicts, there is thus reason to conduct 
interpretation of contentious provisions in line with the overriding aim of the 
interpreted treaty, rather than individual provisions. It is also clear that the 
appropriate perspective to apply in this regard is that of the parties to the treaty, 
the relevant object and purpose is what they mutually intended.  
 
This may be helpful in promoting a harmonizing reading, but it can also 
prevent such attempts. Even if a contentious provision viewed in isolation can 
be interpreted so as to prevent conflict with other treaties, such a reading would 
not be in line with paragraph 1 if it goes against the object and purpose of the 
treaty. 
 
E.6.1.3 Contextual interpretation and the principle of systemic integration 
 
How, then, should the context of the relevant obligations be approached in 
potential treaty conflicts? This element appears to be determinative in many 
cases. Paragraph 2 of Article 31 addresses what ought to be regarded as the 
context for the purpose of the interpretation, as regulated in paragraph 1, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes.1197 It is important to 
note that similar to object and purpose, context should not be considered 
independently of other interpretative approaches.1198 Rather, context should be 
considered as a second step in the interpretative process, subsequent and in 
relation to conventional language.1199 
 
Firstly, context should include text of other parts of the same treaty, including 
preamble and annexes (paragraph 1). It goes without saying that ambiguous 
provisions should be interpreted in light of other parts of the same treaty. 
Secondly, agreements and instruments related to or made in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty (which is being interpreted), should according to 
paragraph 2(a–b) be considered as part of the “context for the purpose of the 
interpretation” (insofar as it has at least been accepted by the parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty).1200  
 
1197 GARDINER. 2015. 
1198 BJORGE. 2014, at 58. 
1199 LINDERFALK, On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed 
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2007, at 102. 







In at least one of the regimes examined, this is relevant: As previously 
mentioned, TRIPS was not negotiated in isolation, but as a part of the broader 
Uruguay round of WTO agreements1201, which among other agreements 
comprises the Marrakech Agreement establishing the World Trade 
Organization.1202 Formally, the other treaties of the Uruguay round are annexes 
to the Marrakech Agreement. This connection has important implications, 
which will be further explored below. 
 
Paragraph 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention seems to open the door to 
an even broader perspective of context – and hence a more transformative 
interpretation of relevant obligations. In essence, the paragraph supports the 
contention that obligations should be interpreted in light of other relevant rules 
of international law.1203  
 
Firstly, paragraph 3(a) establishes that together with the context, any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions should be taken into account. At first 
glance, this may appear relevant in the context of several treaties within the 
same regime of international law regulating the same issue. In all three regimes 
examined in this investigation, there are such connecting agreements which 
could be considered as developing the interpretation of the treaties. As 
discussed in Part A, the UNFSA and the Nagoya Protocol are explicitly 
referred to as implementing agreements and appear to have almost identical 
connections in this regard. Both are closely connected to their framework 
conventions, UNCLOS and the CBD respectively. Although TRIPS can hardly 
be regarded as having the same relationship to other treaties, it is, as already 
stated, clearly part of the broader family of WTO law. Perhaps 
counterintuitively, in spite of the close institutional relationships, such cases of 
treaties part of the same family of agreements or regimes of international law 
fall outside of the scope of the Paragraph 3(a).  
 
1201 For a comprehensive collection of the outcome of the round, see THE WTO AGREEMENTS - 
THE MARRAKESH AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND ITS 
ANNEXES (2017). A comprehensive commentary has been compiled by TERENCE P. STEWART, 
THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND : A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992). 1, COMMENTARY (Deventer 
: Kluwer. 1993). 
1202 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 







This is because for an agreement to qualify for paragraph 3(a), all parties to the 
interpreted treaty must be parties to the agreement indicating its meaning. This 
strict application of the subjective criterion disqualifies most relations between 
treaties from the scope of paragraph 3(a). No matter how close the material 
kinship is between a treaty and a subsequent agreement, the latter cannot be 
considered as guiding the interpretation of the former unless the same states 
are parties. If the requirement of subjective overlap is to be interpreted strictly, 
the formal requirement for the agreement guiding the interpretation is loser. 
There appears to be no requirement with regard to form of the agreement. 
States must however have had the intention to create law.1204 Consequently, it 
appears that paragraph 3(a) primarily is aimed to regulate situations where the 
same group of states first have concluded a treaty, then realized that a provision 
is ambiguous and clarified it. The provision thus appears to lack relevance for 
the relationships between the treaties investigated in this study. 
 
Paragraph 3(b) makes clear that subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation 
similarly is relevant when interpreting treaties, together with the context. All 
states applying a treaty could be regarded as creators of practice in this context, 
and practice does not have to be positive actions.1205 Practice may also be 
represented by omissions.1206 As discussed in previous parts, deep-sea 
bioprospecting is a new activity, and practical application of treaty provisions 
relating to deep-sea bioprospecting is so far limited. It seems that in most cases, 
relevant conduct, such as granting patents connected to deep-sea genetic 
resources, has been carried out without considering the international legal 
implications. Linderfalk appears to consider that more direct reference to the 
relevant obligations or treaties is necessary for an act to represent practice in 
the meaning of paragraph 3(b). He mentions formal references to the relevant 
obligations, invoking a provision in a legal dispute, to support a position in a 
diplomatic conference or referring to it in official communication as examples 
 
1204 LINDERFALK, On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed 
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2007), at 162-163. 
1205 Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach, Article 31. General rule of interpretation, in VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach 
eds., 2012), at 76-89. 
1206 VILLIGER, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2009; 
LINDERFALK, On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in 






of relevant actions.1207 Under these requisites, many of the declarations by 
states in the lively debate on the relevant legal rules for marine genetic 
resources in the BBNJ-process would however qualify. Similarly, as also 
discussed in Part C, many states have expressed how they interpret the 
patentability criteria of TRIPS. Others have adopted national legislation 
referring to the relevant treaties. Even if all of these activities could be 
considered relevant for purposes of paragraph 3(b), they fall short of creating 
practice on interpretation of the relevant provisions. This is because they 
express different positions. For a practice on interpretation to develop under 
paragraph 3(b), it must establish agreement.1208 Such a uniform interpretation 
of the provisions relating to deep-sea bioprospecting is highly unlikely to 
develop. 
 
Last but certainly not least, paragraph 3(c) opens a multitude of new reference 
points by stating that in treaty interpretation, such rules applicable in the 
relations between the parties should be taken into account together with the 
context. In essence, Article 31 thus contains an element that is similar to the 
problematic heading of Article 30, as discussed under section E.5.1. What, 
then, are considered rules applicable in the relations between the parties? 
Should the criterion in paragraph 3(c) be interpreted liberally, akin to what was 
established in the discussion on the heading of Article 30? 
  
As previously discussed in section E.5.1, the applicable in between the parties 
criterion has traditionally been interpreted as implying rules binding on all the 
parties to the treaty at issue.1209 Although ITLOS in Bluefin Tuna as well as the 
Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case had made more liberal use of references 
to other treaties (also to treaties where the lists of parties were not overlapping 
in the latter case), the view requiring full parallelism1210 of parties has been 
considered to have gained support in the ruling of the WTO panel in EC-
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.  
 
1207 LINDERFALK, On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed 
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2007), at 166-167. 
1208 Dörr & Schmalenbach. 2012, at 76-89. 
1209 VILLIGER, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2009; 
LINDERFALK, On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2007, at 178. 
1210 The notion that a treaty norm can only be taken into account as an interpretative guideline 
in a dispute when all parties to that dispute—or even all parties to the WTO Agreement which 







As observed by Peters, under the restrictive reading of the requirement for 
parallelism applied in EC-Biotech, Article 31(3) would however be rendered 
largely meaningless.1211 Indeed, it could also be claimed that the applicable in 
between the parties criterion rather ought to be read as rules binding for the 
parties to the relevant dispute. This position was supported by the ILC Study 
Group in the Fragmentation report and has become recognized by an increasing 
group of observers.1212 This represents a dispute-based perspective of 
interpretation, where the principle expressed in paragraph 31(c) is not regarded 
as an abstract way of solving issues of interpretation, but rather as a way of 
establishing the valid interpretation in cases where two or more states have 
conflicting views. The contentious provision, according to this understanding, 
should then be interpreted in light of other treaties applicable between the 
parties to the dispute.1213 Although this view at first glance may appear difficult 
to reconcile with the ruling in EC-Biotech, it is fully compatible with the use 
of other treaties in the analysis of ITLOS in the Bluefin Tuna case as well as 
that of the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp (as similarly discussed in section 
E.5.2). Moreover, despite the restrictive approach to the “applicable in 
relations between the parties” element applied in EC-Biotech, the Panel also 
noted that even if there is no obligation to take other agreements into account, 
such considerations could nevertheless be made by using other treaties as 
references when interpreting “ordinary meaning” of terms, in light of their 
object and purpose, under paragraphs 1–2. The other agreement would thus not 
be referenced as a legally binding rule, but rather for being linguistically 
informative.1214  
 
1211 Essentially, if a complete parallelism of parties is required it would in most cases treaties 
would be non-usable for the interpretation of treaties with a broad membership, such as the WTO 
Agreement (which, moreover, has also non-state members which cannot accede to most other 
international treaties). The narrow reading would in addition have the paradoxical result that the 
more universal a treaty is, the smaller the chance that it could “meet” other treaties would be. 
Peters, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2017). 
1212 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission. 2006., at 237; McLachlan, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW QUARTERLY (2005); PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How 
WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law. 2003, at 261; Marceau, JOURNAL OF 
WORLD TRADE (2001), at 1087; Duncan French, Treaty Interpretation And The Incorporation 
Of Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY (2006), at 
305-307. 
1213 McGrady, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2008). 
1214 As declared by the Panel in paragraphs 7.92-93: “We think that, in addition to dictionaries, 






As explained in the ruling, interpretation in good faith requires choosing the 
interpretation that is “more in accord with other applicable rules of 
international law.”1215 Although it is difficult to dispute that the Panel took a 
generally restrictive approach to the applicable in the relations between the 
parties criterion, this part of the finding has been regarded as a somewhat 
paradoxical opening to harmonious interpretation, at least insofar as other 
treaties are used as reference points.1216 Essentially, it appears that the Panel in 
EC-Biotech rejected the use of other treaties in systemic integration (save for 
cases of full treaty parallelism) while accepting reference to other treaties 
under the first two paragraphs of Article 31.  
 
Accordingly, the EC-Biotech ruling can be read as leaving the door open to the 
possibility of using other treaties as points of references in interpretation and 
may thus not be as inconsistent with US-Shrimp as some observers have 
claimed.1217 Moreover, it could be argued that it merely represents a panel 
decision, and as such it should not be considered to have the same weight as 
decisions by the Appellate Body. However, subsequent cases also seem to 
support the findings in EC-Biotech. In Mexico-Soft Drinks1218, the Appellate 
Body itself took a more restrictive view on using norms originating outside the 
remits of WTO treaties in making decisions. Although it was not decisive in 
the case, the Appellate Body in its ruling implied that dispute settlement under 
the WTO should not make determinations based on compliance with 
international legal norms outside WTO treaties.1219  
 
ing, or confirming, the ordinary meaning of treaty terms in the specific context in which they are 
used. Such rules would not be considered because they are legal rules, but rather because they 
may provide evidence of the ordinary meaning of terms in the same way that dictionaries do. 
They would be considered for their informative character. It follows that when a treaty inter-
preter does not consider another rule of international law to be informative, he or she need not 
rely on it. In the light of the foregoing, we consider that a panel may consider other relevant 
rules of international law when interpreting the terms of WTO agreements if it deems such rules 
to be informative. But a panel need not necessarily rely on other rules of international law.”, 
Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products. 
1215 Id. at para 7.69. 
1216 Van Damme, Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation. 2009, at 335. 
1217 See in particular the position of Howse, as referred in section E.5.2. 
1218 Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, Appellate 
Body Report (The Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization 6 March), at 3. 
1219 “We see no basis in the DSU for panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO 







WTO jurisprudence thus appears to have applied a gradually more restrictive 
reading of the applicable in the relations between the parties criterion. Since 
the ruling in US-Shrimp, the institutions of WTO dispute settlement appear to 
have had at best lukewarm feelings about using treaties beyond the remits of 
the WTO regime in interpretation in the spirit of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention.1220 
 
Even if the practice on Article 31(3)(c) is limited from general international 
law, outside of WTO dispute settlement, it appears clear that irrespective of 
what requirement is set for the relation between treaties involved in 
interpretation, applicability in this context, according to conventional 
understanding, should be read as excluding non-binding norms.1221 The 
relevant binding rules may, however, come in different forms: The relevant 
rules to be used as references may be general, regional or local customary rules, 
as well as bilateral or multilateral treaties, and even general principles of 
international law.1222 Yet, the rules have to be rules of international law, not 
broader principles or considerations which may not be firmly established.1223 
Importantly, it is assumed that in entering treaty obligations, the parties did not 
intend to act inconsistently with other previous obligations.  
 
Furthermore, Article 31(3)(c) sets as a criterion that the rules must be relevant. 
This has been interpreted by Villiger as concerning the subject matter of the 
treaty term at issue.1224  
 
 
the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements’ (emphasis added). Accepting Mexico's interpretation would 
imply that the WTO dispute settlement system could be used to determine rights and obligations 
outside the covered agreements.”, id, at para. 56.  
1220 Van Damme, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
1221 Lagomarsino Jeffrey, WTO Dispute Settlement and Sustainable Development: Legitimacy 
Through Holistic Treaty Interpretation, 28 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW (2011) 
1222 Ulf Linderfalk, Who Are ’The Parties’? Article 31 3(c), Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention and the ’Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited, 55 NETHERLANDS 
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2008); Jonas & Saunders, VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
1223 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission. 2006., at 215. 







Pauwelyn has summarized the relevance criterion by stating that an extraneous 
treaty is relevant where it “sheds light on the meaning” of a term and will not 
be relevant where it “has no bearing upon it.”1225 In comparison with the same 
subject matter criterion, which is a central element of the preceding Article 30, 
the relevance criterion has been considered “much looser” by French.1226 Other 
scholars, such as McGrady, have claimed that the relevance criterion appears 
to be at least similar if not identical to the same subject matter reference in 
Article 30, discussed under section A.4.1. Under the latter understanding, the 
same challenges in applying the criterion are valid for Article 31(3)(c), as for 
the heading of Article 30.1227 
 
Provided that these conditions are also met, a relatively liberal interpretation 
of the applicable between the parties criterion is enabled, prescribing that the 
relevant rules should be read in light of one another, with the explicit aim of 
bridging differences and preventing conflicts.1228 This approach to 
interpretation, which appears to be supported by most observers, is commonly 
referred to as the principle of systemic integration. The International Law 
Commission Study Group appears to perceive this principle as a natural 
consequence of the functioning of international law:  
 
All treaty provisions receive their force and validity from general law 
and set up rights and obligations that exist alongside rights and 
obligations established by other treaty provisions and rules of 
customary international law. None of such rights or obligations has any 
intrinsic priority against the others. The question of their relationship 
can only be approached through a process of reasoning that makes them 





1225 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 
Rules of International Law. 2003, at 264. 
1226 French, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY (2006). 
1227 McGrady, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2008). 
1228 Jonas & Saunders, VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
1229 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 







This points to the need to carry out the interpretation so as to see the rules in 
view of some comprehensible and coherent objective, to prioritize concerns 
that are more important at the cost of less important objectives. Again, in the 
words of the ILC:  
 
This is all that article 31 (3) (c) requires; the integration into the process 
of legal reasoning – including reasoning by courts and tribunals – of a 
sense of coherence and meaningfulness. Success or failure here is 
measured by how the legal world will view the outcome (…) The 
systemic nature of international law has received clearest formal 
expression in that article.1230 
	
This technique of interpretation, taking account of one treaty or legal norm in 
order to assist in the interpretation or application of another treaty or norm is 
thus one of the most important approaches to the integration of different bodies 
of law. Systemic integration can thus be regarded as a principle whereby the 
system of public international law confronts the challenges represented by 
fragmentation, as discussed in section A.6. 
 
The reading of particular instruments in a “mutually supportive” light in line 
with the principle of systemic integration is sometimes referred to as the 
doctrine of “treaty parallelism.”1231 As pointed out by Boyle, this also connects 
to the theory on the organic growth of public international law.1232  
 
1230 Id. at 211, 313-315. However, it should be admitted that this standard interpretation of Article 
31(3)(c) has been criticized by other observers, who contend that the principle of systemic 
integration is built on a misunderstanding. According to these observers, the term “the parties” 
in Article 31 should not be read as referring to all the parties to the interpreted treaty. Rather, the 
correct meaning of ‘the parties’ is the two or more parties to a specific dispute (concerning the 
interpretation or application of the treaty). This strain of argumentation, has been extensively 
discussed by PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law 
Relates to Other Rules of International Law. 2003, at 254; Michaels & Pauwelyn, DUKE JOURNAL 
OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); VILLIGER, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2009, at 432-434 and will not be developed further in this 
context. 
1231 McLachlan, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY (2005). 
1232 Boyle, Relationship Between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of 






Under the principle of harmonization, treaties can be subject to dynamic or 
living interpretation. What is central is their meaning at the time of 
interpretation, as established by the ICJ in the Namibia case.1233 
 
The principle thus facilitates maintaining coherence in international law. Under 
the systemic perspective, this idea that the coherence across different treaties 
and regimes is maintained by dynamic or living interpretation is a central 
element of international law. As an interpretative technique, systemic 
integration thus helps to avoid conflicts between agreed norms, and can save 
negotiated agreements from premature obsolescence or from the need for 
constant amendment.1234 Instead, systemic integration enables an evolutionary 
interpretation which permits changing values and social context to be reflected 
in the jurisprudence. As also observed by Boyle, evolutionary interpretation 
has generally been more common in some areas, such as international human 
rights law, and less relevant in other treaties, such as UNCLOS.1235 
 
The International Law Commission Study Group highlights the importance of 
regarding the applicable rules as those in force at the time of the interpretation 
of the treaty.1236 Not only does this underline the temporal element, as discussed 
in section E.3.3; it also accepts the notion of evolutionary interpretation of 
treaties. The notion of evolutionary development is closely connected to the 
organic element of international law, as discussed in section A.6.1. It also 
opens the door for regarding terms of treaties differently over time, as the 
meaning of relevant terms changes in response to external developments. 
 
Whereas Boyle seems to regard evolutionary interpretation as closely 
connected to systemic integration as expressed in Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention, Bjorge considers evolutionary interpretation as a distinct 
approach, less connected to these specific elements of the rules of treaty 
interpretation.  
 
1233 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
1971, at 31; also Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), ICJ Rep 125, ICGJ 
173, 1957, at 142. 
1234 Boyle, Relationship Between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of 
International Law. 2008. 
1235 Ibid. 
1236 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 







Instead, as argued by Bjorge,  
 
evolutionary interpretation can be explained by a proper understanding 
of the intention of the parties, the intention of the parties being the most 
important thread running through the law of treaties. As such, the 
evolutionary interpretation of treaties is not a separate method of 
interpretation; it is rather the result of a proper application of the usual 
means of interpretation, as means by which to establish the intention of 
the parties.1237  
 
Accordingly, where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties 
have necessarily been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve 
over time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period, 
the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms 
to have an evolving meaning.1238 
 
From a practical standpoint, there are also reasons for considering evolutionary 
interpretation as distinct from systemic integration. Whereas the latter ap-
proach strives for focusing on areas of commonality across treaties (without 
focusing on which came first), the former would rather focus on how new rules 
relating to similar concepts (or any other external development) have trans-
formed the understanding and hence meaning of treaties.1239 Both approaches, 
however, in principle strive to fulfill the same purpose: to prevent fragmenta-
tion and maintain a functional and integrated system of public international 
law, in line with the systemic perspective, as discussed in sections A.6 and E.4. 
 
Irrespective of whether the two approaches are regarded as distinct, a broad 
range of scholars agree that when two states have concluded two treaties on 
the same subject matter, but have said nothing of their mutual relationship, it 
is not only advisable to try to read them as compatible, but in most cases it is 
possible to succeed in such endeavors.1240  
 
1237 BJORGE. 2014, at 2. 
1238 ICJ, Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) 2009. 
1239 Gabrielle Marceau, Evolutive Interpretation by the WTO Adjudicator, 21 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2018). 
1240 Czapliński & Danilenko, NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990), at 474., 
PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 






In practical terms, Borgen has explained this as undertaking a simple 
examination of party intent, drawn from the various available readings of the 
treaty texts. Among possible readings of contentious provisions, the 
interpretation is selected which is most in line with other treaties.1241 
 
The idea suggested by the principle of harmonization that a treaty should be 
read in harmony and consistency with the broader context of international 
customary and conventional law has also, as already indicated, received 
support in case law.1242 In the words of the ICJ in the Namibia case, “an 
international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the 
interpretation.”1243 This opens the door to adjusting the reading of treaty 
provisions when relevant new norms have been added in other treaties, in line 
with evolutionary interpretation.  
 
However, the possibility for thus adjusting interpretation according to changed 
circumstances and development in other treaties has also been circumscribed 
in jurisprudence. As similarly pointed out in the Namibia case, the ICJ 
maintains “the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance 
with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion.” The ICJ has thus 
not accepted the application of evolutionary interpretation without discretion. 
Rather, a precondition has been that the concepts and terms in question “were 
by definition evolutionary,” as in the Namibia case as well as the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf case.1244 Thus, such evolutionary interpretation is not 
applicable to all treaties, but requires a certain element of transformability in 
relevant treaty provisions.1245  
 
 
1241 Borgen, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW (2005), at 583. 
1242 Van Damme, Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation. 2009, at 330. 
1243 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 
1971, at 31; also Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), ICJ Rep 125, ICGJ 
173, 1957, at 142. 
1244 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey) ICJ Rep 3, ICGJ 128 (International 
Court of Justice 19 December), at 32–3. The ICJ's approach, combining both an evolutionary 
and an inter-temporal element, reflects the ILC's commentary to what became Article 31(3)(c). 
See Arthur Watts, The Law of Treaties, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998. 
THE TREATIES (Arthur Watts ed. 1999), at 690. 
1245 This point has been made by Boyle, see Boyle, Relationship Between International 







In addition, other international tribunals than the ICJ have applied evolutionary 
interpretation. In the previously discussed US-Shrimp case1246, the WTO 
Appellate Body undertook such an analysis in order to determine the present 
meaning of “exhaustible natural resources” in the GATT Agreement. After 
first establishing that the objective of sustainable development informs the 
meaning of the generic term (“natural resources”), the Appellate Body focused 
on textual interpretation of the term natural resources. 
 
As observed by Van Damme, it is not entirely clear whether it was the generic 
term applied in the textual interpretation of the term “natural resource” or 
interpretation in light of the objective of sustainable development in the 
preamble that was decisive in the ruling.1247 It should also be noted that in the 
decision, the Appellate Body did not refer to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention. Instead, it declared that the interpretation was justified on the 
basis of the principle of effectiveness. Still, the Appellate Body concluded that 
“measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-
living, may fall within Article XX(g).”1248 The decision was thus not explicitly 
based on application of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, but availed 
itself of the possibility for decisions to be based on such motivations.1249 The 
decision held not only that the term in question was not static, but that it was 
evolutionary.1250 
 
The Appellate Body also opened up for a transformative interpretation and 
made clear that contentious elements of WTO law ought to be interpreted in 
light of other treaties of public international law, beyond WTO law. In the 
decision, it established that a number of environmental treaties drafted after the 
GATT should be regarded in interpreting the term. The references included not 
only UNCLOS and the CBD but also the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), and the 1979 Convention on the 
 
1246 Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products, 
1998. 
1247 Van Damme, Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation. 2009, at 334. 
1248 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R 
(1998), at para. 131. 
1249 NORDQUIST, et al. 2002. 







Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.1251 The case thus opened 
the door to interpreting contentious elements of WTO treaties in light of 
agreements beyond WTO law.  
 
Does this imply that there are no constraints on harmonious readings aiming to 
prevent conflict in relation to other treaties? The ruling in US-Shrimp appears 
to impose little restraint in this regard. As noted by Pauwelyn, the 
environmental treaties cited by the Appellate Body as guiding in interpretation 
were not binding on all WTO members, not even in relation to all disputing 
parties in the case.1252 Based on this finding, it appears that the subjective 
element of norm conflict has little importance for norm conflict under the 
interpretative approach generally and the principle of systemic integration in 
particular. The dissimilarities as regards the lists of parties between TRIPS, 
UNCLOS and CBD would thus not necessarily represent a problem for 
interpretation purposes under the approach taken in US-Shrimp.1253 
 
It should, however, be noted that the ruling in the case did not amount to 
general revision or reinterpretation of a treaty. Rather, as pointed out by Boyle, 
it “was concerned with the interpretation of particular provisions or phrases, 
such as ‘natural resources’ or ‘jurisdiction’, which necessarily import – or at 
least suggest – a reference to current general international law.” This supports 
the notion that evolutionary interpretation can be regarded as a relatively 
limited task, which has to be consistent with the intention of the parties. As 
similarly concluded by Boyle,  
 
it does not entitle a court or tribunal to engage in a process of constant 
revision or updating of treaties every time a newer one comes along (…) 
The result must remain faithful to the ordinary meaning and context of 
the treaty “in the light of its object and purpose.”1254  
  
 
1251 Id. at 48-49, paras. 130-131. 
1252 See, as similarly previously referred, for a thorough discussion of the case in the context of 
interpretation of contentious concepts in relation between treaties PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms 
in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law. 2003, 
chapter 5 as well as at 484-486. 
1253 Again, provided that the more restrictive approach in EC-Biotech is disregarded. 
1254 Boyle, Relationship Between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of 







It generally appears difficult to establish what degree of flexibility is required 
in the interpreted provision. States involved in WTO disputes have 
increasingly referred to Article 31(3)(c) as justification for involving creative 
interpretations of terms relating to similar concepts across treaties.1255 But so 
far, the Appellate Body has not fully declared its position in relation to such 
arguments. The previously discussed panel findings in EC-Biotech and 
Mexico-Telecoms support these conclusions: Provided that there is sufficient 
parallelism it may be accepted or even suggested by WTO jurisprudence to 
apply the principle of systemic integration where there is norm overlap 
between WTO obligations and other treaties. However, uncertainty persists as 
regards how different the terminologies between different treaties may be. 
 
There are also cases where arguments suggesting cross-fertilization between 
treaties have failed to gain acceptance by tribunals. In the Mox Plant Case1256, 
an evolutionary interpretation of UNCLOS in light of subsequent treaties 
suggested by Ireland fell on deaf ears. In the case, Ireland had claimed that the 
Aarhus Convention and EC law should be considered under Article 31(3)(c) in 
interpreting the definition of how “information” in the OSPAR Convention 
should be interpreted. Instead of accepting evolutionary interpretation, the 
tribunal ordered the parties to cooperate. 
 
This case can, however, be contrasted with another example concerning 
evolutionary interpretation of UNCLOS. The precautionary approach, which 
was adopted as Principle 15 in the 1992 Rio Declaration is absent in the ten 
years older UNCLOS. Nevertheless, under the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, 
the living resources conservation articles of UNCLOS have been given a 
precautionary interpretation.1257 There appears to be support for the notion that 
other relatively recent concerns such as the protection of biological diversity 
or the sustainable use of resources similarly may be able to transform 
interpretation of concepts in UNCLOS.1258  
 
1255 BETHLEHEM, et al. 2009, at 334. 
1256 MOX Plant Case, Ireland v United Kingdom, Order, Request for Provisional Measures, 
ITLOS Case No 10, ICGJ 343 (International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea). 
1257 See ICJ, Southern Bluefin Tuna, 1999, paras. 77–9; and Judges Laing at paras. 16–19; and 
Treves at para. 9. 
1258 Boyle, Relationship Between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of 






But more than discussing the specific element of precaution, the arbitral 
tribunal expressed general support for systemic integration in the case:1259 
 
(…) it is a commonplace of international law and State practice for more 
than one treaty to bear upon a particular dispute … There is frequently 
a parallelism of treaties … The universal range of international legal 
obligations benefits from a process of accretion and accumulation.1260 
 
The concept is thus not merely a theoretical construction but has been affirmed 
in the practice of international law. However, the implications of the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna Case award should not be overstretched. After all, at issue in the 
case was the relationship between the 1982 UNCLOS and a fisheries treaty 
concluded for the implementation of the former. To claim that the same can be 
applied when interpreting treaties across different regimes based on the ruling 
could be considered as going too far. But at least the decision opens up for 
applying systemic integration in principle.  
 
As already stated, the principle of systemic integration on the theoretical side 
thus appears as an appealing way of preserving the integrity of public 
international law that also has gained some support in case law. But does it 
function in real cases? The International Law Commission Report on 
Fragmentation appears to praise the principle for its intellectual beauty but 
shies away from investigating it empirically. 
 
The principle of systemic integration has also been subject to criticism by many 
observers for the risk of exaggerating areas of commonality.1261 Under this 
criticism, the principle is built on the presumption that by using a shoehorn, all 
feet can fit into the same shoe. By simply seeing norms in light of one another, 
it is presumed that an integrated set of norms can be provided. It is difficult to 
dispute that much of the support for the principle of systemic integration can 
be questioned. In particular, it is striking that most discussions on the principle 
revolve around theoretical arguments of interpretation.  
 
1259 NORDQUIST, et al. 2002. 
1260 ICJ, Southern Bluefin Tuna, 1999, para. 52. 
1261 JAN KLABBERS, et al., THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press - Special. 2009); Borgen, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON 







In the absence of more practical examples supporting the functioning of the 
principle in practical cases of overlap between treaties, it appears difficult to 
accept that it would have unlimited potential to prevent conflicts. Rather, as 
observed by Pauwelyn, there is reason to suspect that in many (if not most) 
cases of norm conflicts across regime boundaries in international law, the 
differences are so fundamental that employing the principle of systemic 
integration cannot bridge them.1262 Simply based on semantic logic, conflict 
between completely contrary positions cannot be prevented by merely 
regarding how different obligations affect one another. Like the report of the 
ILC, the analysis of many observers appears to go no further than establishing 
that a harmonious interpretation provides a solution to the problem of 
fragmentation, seemingly mainly on rhetorical grounds. Indeed, basic practical 
implications of systemic integration have been granted surprisingly little 
attention in the discussion. 
 
The prima facie conflict between treaties in different regimes in the case of 
deep-sea genetic resources has the potential to form the basis for a more 
practically oriented evaluation of the principle of systemic integration. 
Applying Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention to the context of deep-sea 
bioprospecting would involve actively promoting the harmonization of 
different treaties regulating deep-sea bioprospecting, irrespective of their 
origin in different regimes of international law, so far as is possible under other 
requisites of Article 31 in order to find common ground. In comparison with 
the application approach, which primarily consisted of investigating explicit 
conflict clauses, the principle of systemic integration thus has a wider scope: 
It calls for (1) considering broadly what other obligations than the one 
interpreted the state in question is bound by, and (2) an evaluation of how those 
obligations affect the norm under interpretation.1263 
 
E.6.2. Reference points for harmonizing interpretations 
 
In section E.5.2, the relationship between the rules on treaty application and 
conflict clauses in the three treaties regulating deep-seabed mining was exam-
ined. A similar exercise will now be undertaken to investigate how the rules 
on treaty interpretation may be used in the three treaties, to promote harmoni-
 
1262 Michaels & Pauwelyn, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 






zation and prevent treaty conflict. In the examination in section E.1 of the po-
tential inconsistencies between treaties involved, it was obvious that there was 
a considerable degree of commonality in the rules of UNCLOS and the CBD 
relating to deep-sea bioprospecting. The rules of TRIPS, by contrast, implied 
a fundamentally different view, in particular relating to the bioprospecting of 
deep-seabed micro-organisms. It therefore appears rational to first examine 




The interpretation of WTO law in relation to other treaties 
 
Whereas the TRIPS agreement itself does not express how it relates to other 
treaties of international law, the treaty forms part of a broader family of WTO 
agreements, as discussed under section C.3.2. Issues of interpretation relating 
to these treaties are generally decided by the WTO dispute settlement body. In 
so doing, Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO1264 
requires panels and the Appellate Body to “clarify the existing provisions of 
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law.” 
 
In part, Article 3(2) merely confirms the principle of jura novit curia. Panels 
and the Appellate Body can decide themselves how to interpret the WTO 
covered agreements.1265 But it also entails that these judicial bodies cannot 
make such decisions independently, disregarding general international law. 
Interpretation of WTO agreements must follow customary principles of treaty 
interpretation.1266 This is a powerful argument for not exaggerating the fear, 
which has been expressed by some observers, that WTO law could develop 
into an independent legal system, distinct from general public international 
law.1267 Article 3(2) shows that even under its own merits, the interpretation of 
WTO law follows the same rules for interpretation as any other treaty. 
 
 
1264 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
1265 Jeffrey, PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW (2011); Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by 
the WTO Appellate Body, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), at 322. 
1266 Ibid. 
1267 PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other 







Like in other interpretation cases in international law, the fundamental rules 
for treaty interpretation are provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. However, rather than making explicit references, the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding refers to the customary rules on interpretation. This 
is most likely the result of not all WTO members being parties to the Vienna 
Convention.1268 This is, however, of limited practical relevance. In its first 
reports, the Appellate Body confirmed what had already been established in 
other areas of public international law, namely that Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention have attained the status of “customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law.”1269 
 
All this may seem self-evident. But that judicial decision would become com-
mon in interpretation matters was far from predicted when the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding as well as TRIPS and the Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization1270 were negotiated as part of the same genera-
tion of WTO agreements. Indeed, the interpretations of the WTO covered 
agreements by panels and the Appellate Body are formally authoritative only 
for the dispute being decided.1271 When the Uruguay round was negotiated, the 
parties rather tried to prevent judicial resolution from becoming a standard-
practice way of resolving matters of interpretation relating to these agreements. 
This can be explained by the reluctance among the negotiators to allow the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism to decide universal interpretations of cen-
tral concepts by means of practice.  
 
 
1268 Van Damme, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), at 605-648. 
1269 Appellate Body, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 
16-17; Appellate Body, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, at para. 114; Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (The Appellate 
Body of the World Trade Organization 1 November), at 104; European Communities – Customs 
Classification of Certain Computer Equipment (EC – Computer Equipment), WT/DS62/AB/R, 
WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (The Appellate Body of the World 
Trade Organization 22 June), at para. 84; Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products (Korea – Dairy), WT/DS98/AB/R, Appellate Body Report (The 
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization 14 December), at para. 81. 
1270 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994). 






Accusations against the Appellate Body of engaging in ultra vires actions and 
considering elements obiter dicta beyond its mandate have also been central in 
the refusal of the United States to allow the appointment of new Appellate 
Body members.1272 
 
Instead, the WTO Agreement reserved the ultimate interpretative authority to 
WTO members. From the Agreement’s Article IX:2, it follows that decision-
making on interpretative matters should be decided by means of 
recommendations by a qualified majority among state parties. This was not 
only designed as the default mechanism for deciding on interpretation; indeed, 
it was foreseen by the parties to function as such in a pragmatic manner. By 
means of a series of recommendations, the parties would gradually clarify the 
ambiguities left in the agreements.1273 Authoritative interpretations were 
designed to be “binding on the parties and any organ which decides on their 
rights and duties on a basis of delegated authority.”1274 
 
However, the practical functioning of the WTO system turned out very 
differently once the Uruguay round of agreements had been signed in 
Marrakesh in 1994. As a symptom of the general deadlock of the organization, 
WTO members with few exceptions1275 have been incapable of adopting such 
authoritative interpretations. Thus, the systemically important tool of 
authoritative interpretations has remained almost completely unused.1276  
 
1272 Report on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization. (2020). 
1273 See, for an extensive discussion on this matter Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, 
The Authoritative Interpretation Under Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization: Current Law, Practice and Possible Improvements, 8 JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2005). 
1274 Van Damme, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), at 611. 
1275 On one occasion in 1999, the European Communities made requests for authoritative 
interpretations, see General Council, Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to 
Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Communication from the European Communities, WT/GC/W/133, 25 Jan. 1999; General 
Council, Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Communication from the European 
Communities, WT/GC/W/143, 5 Feb. 1999.  
1276 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-making in the World Trade 
Organization: is the consensus practice of the World Trade Organization adequate for making, 
revising and implementing rules on international trade?, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 







It is also worth noting that members can give interpretive guidance tools to the 
Appellate Body in a “subsequent agreement.” For example, WTO members 
agreed in the Doha Ministerial Declaration that the TRIPS Agreement “can 
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access 
to medicines for all.”1277 
 
The general picture is thus that despite it being envisaged as a last resort in the 
limited number of cases where the parties would be unable to come up with 
authoritative interpretations, judicial decision has become the established way 
of deciding interpretation matters in WTO agreements.1278 In exercising this 
role of deciding the valid rule in interpretation cases, both panels and the 
Appellate Body have exercised considerable autonomy.1279  
 
Consequently, and perhaps surprisingly from the perspective of the negotiators 
of the Uruguay round, a practice has been developed under WTO dispute 
settlement practice on the interpretation of ambiguous terms in the different 
WTO treaties. Importantly, for the purposes of this investigation, panels and 
the Appellate Body have not only established interpretations of contentious 
issues in relation between WTO agreements, but also expressed how these 
agreements ought to be interpreted in relation to other treaties of public 
international law. On this issue, the Appellate Body has declared that WTO 
Agreements shall not be interpreted in “clinical isolation.” Quite the contrary, 
based on the findings of the Appellate Body in the United States Gasoline case, 
it seems clear that undertakings in such instruments ought to be read in light of 
subsequent practice and obligations in other WTO agreements.1280  
 
1277 Ministerial Conference, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 
November 2001, WT/ MIN(01)/Dec/2 at para. 4. 
1278 As one observer has put it, ‘the (lack of) practice under Article IX:2 has meant that ‘decisions 
[of the Appellate Body] are likely to have a kind of de facto finality as interpretations of law, 
even if they lack de jure finality’, Robert Howse, The Most Dangerous Branch? WTO Appellate 
Body Jurisprudence on the Nature and Limits of the Judicial Power, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE 
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO (Thomas 
Cottier, et al. eds., 2003), at 11, 15. 
1279 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The (Non) Use of Treaty Object and Purpose in Intellectual 
Property Disputes in the WTO, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & 
COMPETITION LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 11-15. (2011). 
1280 Appellate Body, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 






If the United States Gasoline case thus opened up the door to interpreting 
contentious elements of WTO treaties in light of other WTO treaties, then the 
door to also including treaties beyond the WTO in interpretation matters was 
fully blown open in subsequent cases. As discussed in sections E.4.2 and E.5.1, 
the US-Shrimp case1281 made clear that interpretations of contentious elements 
of WTO treaties should also consider treaties beyond WTO law. The case 
concerned interpretation of the term “natural resources” in the context of 
Article XX(g) of the GATT treaty from 1994. In its decision, the connection 
to the object of sustainable development, as called for by the “object and 
purpose” criteria in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention was first discussed 
by the Appellate Body. Initially, the Appellate Body established that the 
objective of sustainable development informs the meaning of the generic term 
(“natural resources”). But after having established this connection, the 
Appellate Body focused on textual interpretation of the term natural resources. 
The term was, in the consideration of the Appellate Body, “not ‘static’ in its 
content or reference but (…) rather by definition, evolutionary.”1282 Moreover, 
“it must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns 
of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the 
environment.”1283 This decision of the Appellate Body thus opened up the way 
for a transformative interpretation, supporting the perspective of international 
law as organically growing, as discussed in section A.6.1.1284 But even more 
importantly, the Appellate Body made clear that contentious elements of WTO 
law ought to be interpreted in light of non-WTO rules of public international 
law. In its findings, the Appellate Body refereed to a number of multilateral 
environmental treaties.1285 
 
1281 Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products, 
1998. 
1282 Ibid. 
1283 Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products, 
at para 130. 
1284 Similarly, the ICJ has considered the concept of terms in treaty obligations changing 
meaning in light of external factors. The court has declared that a generic term implies “a known 
legal term, whose content the Parties expected would change through time” or a term whose 
“meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the law”, Declaration Judge Higgins, 1113, at 
paras 2–3 in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey) ICJ Rep 3, ICGJ 128. See 
also Bosselmann, COLORADO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
(1996); KEVLES. 2002. 
1285 Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products, 







As noted by Pauwelyn, it is worth observing that “none of these were binding 
on all WTO members and some of them were not binding even on all the dis-
puting parties in the particular case.”1286 In the ruling, the Appellate Body did 
not just open the possibility of changing the interpretation of terms over time, 
as law evolves;1287 it also established that interpretation of a treaty obligation 
can be decided by referring to relevant provisions in other treaties. At least 
implicitly, the Appellate Body’s decision can be interpreted as promoting the 
principle of harmonization in general. Similarly, it supports the notion that the 
principle that a treaty should be read in harmony and consistent with the 
broader context of international customary and treaty law applies also to WTO 
law. 
 
The principle of harmonization, as previously discussed, was further 
scrutinized in the decision by the Panel in the EC-Biotech Products case1288. In 
the case, the EC claimed that the scope of a provision in another WTO 
agreement, the SPS Agreement1289, should be interpreted in light of the CBD 
as well as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the CBD1290. In its decision, 
the Panel assumed that Article 31(3)(c) does not only grant the interpreter 
discretion over whether or not to apply other rules of international law. If the 
conditions are met, the Panel established, the interpreter has no other option 
than to take account of general international law.1291 On the other hand, as 
previously discussed, the Panel also imposed a requirement for a complete 
parallelism as regards parties to treaties involved for applying Article 31(3)(c), 
a standard which the invoked references by the EC failed to meet. The Panel, 
however, did not rule out using other treaties as points of references, but more 
in order to establish the meaning of terms. The Panel in the Mexico-Telecoms 
case made a parallel finding, regarding provisions in other treaties as context 
 
1286 See, for a thorough discussion of the case in the context of interpretation of contentious 
concepts in relation between treaties chapter 5 as well as pp. 484-486 in PAUWELYN, Conflict of 
Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International 
Law. 2003. 
1287 BOYLE, The making of international law. 2007, at 244-247. 
1288 Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products, ; McGrady, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2008). 
1289 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 493 (SPS Agreement). 
1290 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 
1291 Panel Reports, European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing 






for the interpretation of the meaning of a term central for the dispute.1292 The 
WTO Panels in these decisions thus essentially confirmed what is called for by 
Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement Understanding – namely that the panels 
and the Appellate Body can clarify the existing provisions of those agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law. Finally, as previously noted, in the subsequent decision in Mexico-Soft 
Drinks1293, the Appellate Body itself drew a line by declaring that it was not its 
role to determine rights and obligations originating outside the remits of WTO 
treaties.1294  
 
The increasingly reluctant position within WTO dispute settlement on using 
treaties beyond its own regime in decisions may be explained by the notion 
that it is still not wholeheartedly accepted within the international trade law 
community that the WTO treaties could have equal standing with other treaties, 
outside the WTO regime, as observed by Simma and Pulkowski.1295 WTO law, 
it is often argued by insiders, has its unique characteristics which are sufficient 
to distinguish it from other branches of international law, and the Appellate 
Body in the US-Shrimp case was erroneous in disregarding this fact.1296  
 
This is in line with the discussion in Part D on the inclination of observers of 
international law regimes to regard “their” particular regime as unique, with 
preference in relation to other areas of international law. To be fair, it may 
indeed be questioned whether it would be reasonable for a tribunal primarily 
designed to handle international trade disputes to take on the task of making 
decisions on the relation between WTO agreements and other norms of general 
 
1292 Mexico – Measures affecting Telecommunications Services (WT/DS204/R), Panel Report 
(World Trade Organization Panel 2 April), at para 7.236. 
1293 Appellate Body, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages. 
1294 As previously noted in section E.6.1, although it was not decisive in the case, the Appellate 
Body in its ruling implied that dispute settlement under the WTO should not make 
determinations based on compliance with international legal norms outside WTO treaties. “We 
see no basis in the DSU for panels and the Appellate Body to adjudicate non-WTO disputes. 
Article 3.2 of the DSU states that the WTO dispute settlement system ‘serves to preserve the 
rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements’ (emphasis added). Accepting Mexico's interpretation would 
imply that the WTO dispute settlement system could be used to determine rights and obligations 
outside the covered agreements.”, id. at para. 56. 
1295 Simma & Pulkowski, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006). 
1296 This reasoning can be illustrated by for instance Jiaxiang Hu, The Role of International Law 







international law. It could be suspected that the point of departure of the 
Appellate Body as well as the background of its judges may create a bias, 
which makes it more likely to favor the interests and the underlying rationale 
of the WTO agreements in relation to other treaties. The US-Shrimp ruling, 
where environmental treaties beyond WTO were considered indicative in the 
interpretation of a WTO treaty is, however, evidence against the suspicion that 
the Appellate Body would be guilty of such bias. Another way to approach the 
differences between the rulings in US-Shrimp and subsequent cases is to 
consider the difference in the disputed terms. In US-Shrimp the disputed term 
natural resource was a generic term, which was also used in other treaties. In 
EC-Biotech, on the other hand, the EC invoked a legal principle with disputed 
status.  
 
In any event, it is clear that WTO dispute settlement practice has severely 
constrained the formal use of harmonious interpretation under the principle of 
systemic integration in Article 31(3)(c) since the Appellate Body’s decision in 
US-Shrimp that WTO undertakings should be read in conjunction (and aim to 
build bridges) with treaties of other regimes. Yet, it could be argued that the 
practical implications of this rejection should not be exaggerated. This is 
because even if the findings in these latter two cases do not formally support 
interpretation based on Article 31(3)(c) save for the few cases which meet the 
requirement for complete overlap of parties, they nevertheless confirm that 
other treaties of international law can be considered as context for the purpose 
of interpretation.1297 There appears to be general support in the practice of 
WTO dispute settlement (implicit in the Appellate Body ruling in US-Shrimp 
and more explicit in the panel cases) for building references to the object of a 
connecting agreement in order to facilitate interpretation.1298 Indeed, none of 
these cases appear to preclude a liberal use of references to other treaties as 
context and object within the meaning of paragraphs 1–2 of the same Article. 
What, then, would be the difference between this referencing approach and 
systemic integration? The major difference seems to be whether the other 
treaties are regarded as legally binding or merely linguistically indicative in 
interpretation.  
 
1297 BETHLEHEM, et al. 2009, at 336; JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, AND CHANGING 
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press. 2011), at 182-192. 






In fact, it does not appear certain that the consequence in practical cases of 
interpretating conflicting terms by freely using terms, contexts, objects and 
purposes of other treaties as points of references would be much different 
compared to using Article 31(3)(c). Both methods could amount to letting the 
use of terms in other treaties decide the meaning of terms in the contentious 
(WTO) obligation.  
 
Based on the rulings in the WTO dispute settlement decisions examined above, 
it actually appears that the Appellate Body is inclined to favor interpretations 
which give more weight to the aim behind agreements in other areas of 
international law, possibly even in cases where it would be on the verge of 
compromising the purpose of the WTO agreements.  
 
Taken together, this shows how the view of how WTO obligations, including 
those of TRIPS, should be interpreted in relation to other treaties has evolved 
in WTO dispute settlement. An initial generous support of systemic 
interpretation has become more restrictive in subsequent cases, while still 
leaving the door open for using other treaties as points of reference as context, 
objects or purpose for deciding the meaning of ambiguous terms. Thereby, its 
own dispute settlement body has confirmed that even if the WTO may 
represent a family of closely related agreements (a “regime” in the sense laid 
out in section A.6) with obligations whose meaning should not necessarily be 
decided by treaties of other regimes, the ordinary meaning of terms in other 
treaties as well as the context, object and purpose of those other treaties could 
be used to establish the meaning of obligations.  
 
Assessing the relationship of TRIPS to other treaties under the rules for treaty 
interpretation 
 
Even if the formal use of systemic integration would be controversial under 
WTO practice in lack of full parallelism of parties to the relevant treaties, there 
is support for the notion that ambiguities in WTO agreements should be 
interpreted in light of other relevant rules of international law.1299  
 
 
1299 This is also since the “same subject-matter”-criterion appears to be fulfilled in the present 







From the perspective of WTO jurisprudence, it thus appears uncontroversial to 
use overlapping norms in other treaties as points of references in interpreting 
contentious elements of TRIPS. Accordingly, it will now be explored if the 
conflict in relation to UNCLOS and the CBD could be prevented by using the 
relevant provisions in these treaties as reference points when defining the 
meaning of prima facie conflicting elements of TRIPS, thereby potentially 
establishing a harmonious interpretation (without formally applying systemic 
integration) and preventing conflict. 
 
It seems natural to focus the examination on the provision of TRIPS deviating 
most from the other two regimes as regards appropriation of deep-sea 
resources: The controversial Article 27, which generally establishes that 
bioresources should be patentable, with no possibilities for states to make 
exceptions for the deep-seabed micro-organisms which are important in 
bioprospecting. As discussed in section E.6, the rules of treaty interpretation in 
the Vienna Convention call for interpreting difficult concepts in line with a 
number of elements. These elements, which can be regarded as the outer limits 
for interpretations, are equally relevant in relation to the reading of both the 
provision that is being interpreted and the treaty that is being used as a point of 
reference. Any interpretation of TRIPS Article 27 aiming to prevent conflict in 
relation to UNCLOS and the CBD must thus not go beyond what is permitted 
under Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention. 
 
In order to assess if Article 27 of TRIPS can be interpreted in a manner which 
prevents conflict, it is thus necessary to first investigate how flexible a reading 
can be under these interpretation principles. In line with Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention, it is necessary to establish what an interpretation in good 
faith provides, as well as the ordinary meaning of the relevant terms. It has 
furthermore been established that context as well as object and purpose are 
important. As previously noted, under conventional interpretation of this part 
of TRIPS, the “object and purpose” criterion appears to be regarded as a 
singular concept, even if, strictly speaking, the “object” is about what the treaty 
covers and the “purpose” is about why the treaty covers an issue.1300  
 
Finding the “object and purpose” has been described as a matter of extracting 
the “essence,” the overall “mission” of the treaty, as was noted in section 
 






E.5.1301 The notion that objectives ought to be guiding in the interpretation of 
contentious elements of treaties has been unequivocally supported by WTO 
jurisprudence. As discussed in the previous section, the Appellate Body in the 
US-Shrimp case established that the objective of sustainable development 
informs the meaning of the generic term (“natural resources”), and subsequent 
cases did not dispute making references to other treaties in establishing 
meaning of ambiguous terms. This raises the question if a declaration of an 
objective of a treaty represents “object and purpose” as called for by the criteria 
in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. As identified in section E.6.1, “’the 
object and purpose’ of a treaty means those reasons for which the treaty exists 
– sometimes termed as the ratio legis or the treaty’s raison d’être.”1302 It cannot 
be taken for granted that declarations of objectives qualify for this requisite. 
Sometimes the object and purpose may be multifaceted or ambiguous, and only 
partly reflected in explicit provisions on objectives. 
 
Indeed, in many cases, this exercise of assessing what object and purpose a 
certain treaty has may be burdensome and difficult. In the case of the TRIPS, 
however, it appears to be considerably easier. This is because the declaration 
of objectives of the TRIPS Agreement in Article 7 appear to represent an 
explicit textual expression reflecting the actual reason for negotiating the 
treaty, as identified in section D.3.1303 
	
TRIPS Article 7 
Objectives 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
 
 
1301 Van Damme, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), at 631; Jonas & 
Saunders, VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
1302 LINDERFALK, On The Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed 
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 2007, at 204. 
1303 At the same time, TRIPS may be considered as containing plenty of rules with ambiguities 








Given that all WTO members stressed the role of Article 7 for interpreting 
TRIPS in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health1304, one might 
expect this provision declaring the objective of the treaty to play a major role 
in establishing valid interpretation in ambiguous cases. However, some 
observers of intellectual property related disputes in the WTO have claimed 
that this is not the case. Rather, as shown in an investigation of WTO case law 
by Ruse-Khan, other references such as “ordinary meaning” and “context” 
appear to be more determinant than references to the objective of the treaty, as 
formulated in this article.1305 This practice indicates that even if the objectives 
of the agreement are spelled out in other parts of TRIPS, it carries less weight 
than ordinary meaning and context, in the interpretation of the relationship 
between Article 27 and obligations in other regimes of international law.1306 
This is not surprising, as discussed in section E.6.1 ordinary meaning has a 
central role in treaty interpretation. If it is correct that ordinary meaning and 
context have been more influential than object and purpose in WTO practice, 
would an interpretation of TRIPS Article 27 focusing on the former elements 
differ from one based on the latter? 
 
Considering how context is defined in the Vienna Convention, it seems that 
the consequences for interpreting TRIPS would yield the same result, 
irrespective of what element is prioritized. This is because the context for the 
purpose of the interpretation according to paragraph 2 of Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention should include other parts of the same agreement, 
including preamble and annexes, as previously discussed.  
 
1304 Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health Adopted on 14 November 2001 
DOHA WTO MINISTERIAL 2001: TRIPS WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 20 November 2001. 
1305 While there is only a comparable limited number of TRIPS cases (7% of all WTO 
complaints), the 12 decisions issued contain in total 60 instances where individual TRIPS 
provisions or terms where subject to interpretation. In only 14 cases WTO adjudicators have 
relied on ‘object and purpose’ – compared to 42 times where ‘ordinary meaning’ and 37 times 
where ‘context’ where utilised. Those 14 cases break down in only two cases were Articles 7 
and 8 have been applied; another three where they have been merely acknowledged; and nine 
where other objectives (of TRIPS or its provisions) have been applied. In addition, there are 13 
cases where object and purpose of a treaty are merely mentioned as being relevant for the 
interpretation exercise. This paints, as one observer has put it “a picture of a quantitatively 
limited, and qualitatively rather arbitrary use of TRIPS object and purpose in the interpretation 
exercise,” see Grosse Ruse-Khan, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & 
COMPETITION LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 11-15. (2011), at 2. 






This means that where object and purpose are declared in treaties, as is often 
the case, those elements should be considered as part of the context. In TRIPS, 
this would highlight Article 7, similar to an interpretation focusing on object 
and purpose, albeit for identifying the context rather than the object and 
purpose.1307 This demonstrates that it would matter little what element is 
highlighted. 
 
That said, there are also differences. Whereas an interpretation focusing on 
object and purpose would focus on those elements as expressed in Article 7, a 
contextual interpretation would render other parts of TRIPS equally relevant. 
However, considering the central role of Article 7 in expressing the idea and 
function of TRIPS, even under a contextual interpretation this provision would 
provide most support in determining the meaning of other parts of the treaty. 
It thus appears that irrespective of whether object and purpose or ordinary 
meaning and context are considered the most central elements, the result would 
be the same. Under both approaches, the objectives articulated in Article 7 
would guide the interpretation. 
 
What values, then, are reflected in these objectives? Article 7 of TRIPS 
provides that the protection and enforcement of IPRs  
 
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to 
the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage 
of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare.  
 
The provision thus clearly highlights economic and development interests of 
technological development as central purposes of the protection of intellectual 
property rights provided by TRIPS. These references appear to be of limited 
use in facilitating harmonizing interpretations of Article 27, in line with CBD 
and UNCLOS. The lack of references in Article 7 to environmental protection, 
for regarding certain resources as global commons or other values more similar 
to the purposes of conflicting treaties could be read as preventing 
interpretations of TRIPS that are not consistent with the agreement’s rather 
simplistically expressed objective. 
 
1307 Or in other words: Even if the practice of the Appellate Body downplays the importance of 
objective and purpose in favor of context, the provisions on objectives in TRIPS Article 7-8 is 







There are, however, other documents that could provide additional guidance in 
interpreting the purposes of central obligations, in addition to the objectives 
being prescribed for in TRIPS itself. Agreements and instruments related to 
the treaty (which is being interpreted) should under Article 31(2) of the Vienna 
Convention be considered as part of the “context for the purpose of the 
interpretation” (insofar as it has at least been accepted by the parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty). This is particularly relevant in the context of 
WTO law, where the relationship between different treaties may be closer than 
is normally the case in other regimes of international law. As previously 
discussed in section C.3, this is the result of WTO treaties having been adopted 
in concert, as components of the same Uruguay round of trade agreements. 
WTO treaties, including TRIPS, can be considered as not only belonging to the 
same regime but also part of the same “family” of trade agreements. The 
Marrakesh Agreement, functioning as a connecting framework convention for 
the other WTO agreements which are also formally annexes to the former, is 
particularly relevant. In the Marrakesh Agreement, general guidance is 
provided on the position, role and objective of WTO law. In its first preambular 
paragraph, the WTO Agreement declares that  
 
their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted (…) while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs 
and concerns at different levels of economic development.1308 
 
Can the objectives expressed in this provision be regarded as indicative for the 
purpose of interpreting the contentious elements of Article 27 of TRIPS in 
relation to other treaties? Essentially, this depends on whether interpretation 
under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention should be based on object and 
purposes, not only as expressed in the relevant treaty but also as declared in 
other, connecting treaties. In light of the declaration in Article 31(2)(a) that the 
context for the purpose of interpreting treaties should include “any agreement 
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty,” this appears uncontroversial.  
 
1308 WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 






After all, as previously stated, the relevant WTO treaties were concluded 
simultaneously. It can thus be established that in light of Article 31(3)(2)(a) of 
the Vienna Convention, objectives expressed in the WTO Agreement including 
elements such as “sustainable development” and “preservation of the 
environment” may be indicative in interpretations of not only that agreement, 
but also other WTO treaties, including TRIPS.1309  
 
It is not certain that a generally expressed objective, as in the WTO Agreement, 
could determine the content of a specific material obligation, such as Article 
27 of TRIPS. The Appellate Body has declared that more specific applicable 
agreements take precedence over more general ones.1310 Moreover, broadly 
described objects and purposes of a treaty, including references to aims such 
as preservation of the environment and sustainable development, as in the 
preamble of the WTO Agreement, do not mean that environmental treaties, 
such as the CBD, automatically become decisive in the interpretation of WTO 
obligations, such as Article 27 of TRIPS.1311 Still, at the very least, Article 
31(2) of the Vienna Convention, in combination with the objectives expressed 
in the WTO Agreement, provides a basis for arguing that interpretation of 
TRIPS does not necessarily have to be confined to the purposes expressed in 
its Article 7. References to the wider elements expressed in the objectives of 
the WTO Agreement broaden the scope of possible interpretations.  
 
Some indication for how TRIPS Article 27 could be interpreted in relation to 
conflicting obligations on deep-sea bioresources in CBD and UNCLOS can 
thus be established already on the basis of the first two paragraphs of Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention. Central requisites calling for interpretation in 
line with good faith, ordinary meaning and object and purpose, as well as how 
the contextual criterion has evolved, impose constraints on how far readings of 
problematic provisions can be stretched.  
 
1309 BETHLEHEM, et al. 2009, at 333. 
1310 In EC-Bananas III, the Appellate Body criticized the Panel for not having applied a more 
specific agreement before the GATT, since the matter dealt specifically and in detail with the 
relevant procedures, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, WT/ DS27/R(US) (EC—Bananas III) (Appellate Body Report 25 
September). See also LANGLET. 2009;Claude Chase, Norm Conflict Between WTO Covered 
Agreements—real, Apparent or Avoided?, 61 (2012), at 248. 







Even if the objectives of TRIPS are formulated in narrow terms, the wider 
purposes of the connecting WTO Agreement can serve as the basis for arguing 
that Article 27 of TRIPS should be interpreted in line with objectives closer to 
those of conflicting treaties. In this manner, these implications of the first two 
paragraphs of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention can be regarded as the outer 
limits when approaching interpretation of Article 27 of TRIPS.  
 
Would these flexibilities then enable an interpretation of TRIPS Article 27 
which prevents conflict in relation to the other treaties? 
 
 
TRIPS Article 27 
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for 
any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of 
industrial application. (5) Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of 
Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of 
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced. 
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention within 
their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to 
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life 
or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that such 
exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their 
law. 
3. Members may also exclude from patentability: 
(…) 
 (b) plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection 
of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by 
any combination thereof. The provisions of this subparagraph shall be reviewed 
four years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
 
At first sight, it appears that the legitimate grounds for exclusion in paragraph 
2 may provide a basis for preventing conflict in relation to both the calls in 
CBD for protecting biological diversity beyond national jurisdiction and 
UNCLOS with its principle of common heritage of mankind and the connected 







However, the explicit exclusion in paragraph 3(b) of micro-organisms from 
what states may exclude from patentability makes it considerably more diffi-
cult to reconcile TRIPS with the other treaties. As was discussed in Part B and 
C, a considerable number of bioresources relevant for deep-sea bioprospecting 
fall outside the scope of the categories for which the possibility to make ex-
ception from patentability applies. As similarly discussed, the explicit excep-
tions from the categories which may be excluded from patentability ought to 
be interpreted as conversely entailing an obligation to enable patents relating 
to the same resources. It is also difficult to dispute that the distinction between 
micro-organisms and organisms eligible for exception from patentability on 
the other, leaves little room for making arguments that it should be allowed to 
prevent patentability of the former types of bioresources too.  
 
Interpreting Article 27 of TRIPS as not conflicting with UNCLOS and the 
CBD would require a reading whereby it would be possible to exclude “micro-
organisms” from patentability. Alternatively, it would call for interpreting 
these terms as excluding genetic resources of the deep seabed. The problem 
with attempting to read the provision in this manner is that based on logical 
semantics, it would be directly contrary to what is provided according to a 
standard reading of the provision. Indeed, the interpretation necessary for 
preventing conflict would require going against the ordinary meaning of terms 
involved. As discussed in the previous section, this would be in direct violation 
of Article 31(1), which provides that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty. 
Since the attempt to prevent conflict would stumble on these basic elements of 
treaty interpretation law, it would not matter how much the terms used as 
references in other treaties can be stretched. Nor would the object, purpose and 
context of treaties involved be able to change the meaning of the terms. In 
essence, the limitations to interpretation provided by treaty law prevent 
readings that go against basic logical semantics, as would be required for 
preventing TRIPS from conflicting with UNCLOS and the CBD in the case of 
deep-sea bioprospecting. 
 
Would it, then, be possible to prevent conflict if the matter were addressed 
under systemic integration, in line with paragraph 3(c) of Article 31 and its call 
for taking into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 







As discussed in the previous section, more recent WTO practice prevents the 
application of this approach in interpretation of WTO agreements unless there 
is full parallelism of parties to treaties involved.1312 If these findings are set 
aside for a moment and the more permissive approach suggested by the US-
Shrimp case1313 is followed, would such an interpretation of Article 27 of 
TRIPS be able to harmonize the prima facie conflicting provisions? As 
previously discussed in section E.5.1, under the approach suggested in this 
decision, rules in UNCLOS and the CBD should represent context for the 
purposes of the interpretation of Article 27 of TRIPS and not merely serve as 
linguistic reference points in interpretation of TRIPS. 
 
If CBD and UNCLOS accordingly were to be considered as contexts for the 
purposes of interpreting Article 27 of TRIPS, it could be argued that this 
context makes clear that the requirement for patentability includes an implicit 
exception for deep-sea genetic resources, at least for deep-seabed micro-
organisms. Indeed, this is all that would be required to make TRIPS compatible 
with other treaties involved. But even under the liberal approach to 
interpretation taken in US-Shrimp case, interpreting Article 27 accordingly 
would be highly controversial. To start with, even if the decision in US-Shrimp 
did not clarify how generic interpreted terms would have to be to qualify in 
harmonious interpretations, the term for interpretation in that case, “natural 
resource,” was relatively generic, and more or less directly linguistically 
overlapping with the provisions in the other treaties referred in the harmonizing 
approach taken by the Appellate Body. In the case of deep-seabed 
bioprospecting, the contentious terms in TRIPS consist of many elements and 
are considerably more precise, hence less elastic from an interpretative 
standpoint. To make matters more difficult, the terminology in CBD and 
UNCLOS that would be used to promote a harmonizing interpretation is 
different from that in TRIPS. Rather than integrating similar terms from 
different treaties, the interpretation of Article 27 necessary to prevent conflict 
in relation to CBD and UNCLOS would imply a fundamental transformation 
of the provision. As noted in section E.6.1, the ruling in US-Shrimp did not 
amount to general revision or reinterpretation of a treaty.1314  
 
1312 See in particular the discussion on EC-Biotech in section E.5.2. 
1313 Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition Of Certain Shrimp And Shrimp Products. 
1314 As noted in the previous section and as pointed out by Boyle “each case was concerned with 
the interpretation of particular provisions or phrases, such as ‘natural resources’ or 






Even more problematic from a systemic standpoint is that the outer limits to 
treaty interpretation, as discussed in the previous section, remain equally 
binding. This means that also interpretation under the principle of systemic 
integration must respect the obligation in Article 31(1) to interpret treaties in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. Respecting 
these obligations is equally difficult when adjusting the meaning of terms in 
Article 27 under the principle of systemic integration, as when the other treaties 
were used as reference points. Under an interpretation in good faith based on 
the ordinary meaning of terms, new treaty terms cannot be given a meaning 
that is incompatible with logical semantics, nor can exceptions be introduced 
to treaty provisions which go against existing language. 
 
Accordingly, if the criticism against applying systemic integration in recent 
cases is set aside, arguments can be made for accepting far-reaching harmoniz-
ing interpretations in cases where the contentious provisions relate to the same 
concept. However, not even this would suffice to prevent the norm conflict 
relating to deep-seabed bioprospecting from the perspective of TRIPS. This is 
because it is not the legal means to build linkages between treaties and regimes 
that is lacking; it is the language of central provisions that sets boundaries. 
Harmonization in this case would not be possible without linguistically stretch-
ing the meaning of conflicting terms beyond what would be allowed under the 
requirements in the rules on treaty interpretation for interpretation to be con-
ducted in good faith, and in line with ordinary meaning and object and purpose 
as well as the contextual criterion, as discussed in section E.6.1. 
 
In conclusion, addressing norm conflicts from the perspective of WTO law by 
means of treaty interpretation tools, as provided in the Vienna Convention, 
may provide important means to prevent treaty conflict and maintain the 
coherence of public international law as a system. Such use of treaty 
interpretation principles has also become accepted in WTO jurisprudence. 
 
international law.” This supports the notion that evolutionary interpretation can be regarded as a 
relatively limited task, which has to be consistent with the intention of the parties. As similarly 
concluded by Boyle, “it does not entitle a court or tribunal to engage in a process of constant 
revision or updating of treaties every time a newer one comes along(…) The result must remain 
faithful to the ordinary meaning and context of the treaty ‘in the light of its object and purpose.” 
Boyle, Relationship Between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of 







Under the practice of WTO dispute settlement, it appears uncontroversial to 
use treaties of other regimes as references for establishing the meaning of 
ambiguous terms when interpreting WTO treaties appears uncontroversial. 
Systemic integration was accepted under the US-Shrimp decision, but it has 
come to be rejected in subsequent cases. 
 
As has been illustrated by the inability to apply these approaches to promote 
harmonization and prevent conflict in the case of deep-seabed bioprospecting, 
these principles are much more difficult to apply in real cases than what is 
assumed in theoretical discussions. In real cases, irreconcilable language of 
treaty provisions can be expected to prevent harmonization in difficult cases, 
as has been demonstrated in the relationship between the TRIPS rules on 
patentable subject matter and the overlapping norms of the CBD and 
UNCLOS. This conclusion goes against the prediction of the International Law 
Commission Report, namely that treaty interpretation and systemic integration 
will prevent norm conflict and fragmentation, thereby ensuring coherence of 
the system of public international law. Even if this problem of deep-seabed 
bioresources may be regarded as anecdotal evidence and far from sufficient for 
disproving preconceived ideas, at the very least it calls for a renewed 
discussion on the principle of systemic integration from the perspective of 




Approaching the norm conflict on deep-seabed bioprospecting by means of 
treaty interpretation from the perspective of UNCLOS involves challenges 
similar to the ones discussed under TRIPS. In order to prevent conflict, 
UNCLOS would have to be interpreted in a manner conducive to patenting of 
genetic resources, not only in the high seas but also in the deep seabed of the 
Area. As discussed in section E.1, the contentious provisions foremost relate 
to the common heritage of mankind principle. Since this principle according to 
Article 136 applies to the Area and its resources, it appears that there are two 
ways in which UNCLOS could be read if it is to be regarded as not conflicting 
with the other treaties. Preventing conflict would require an interpretation 
which excludes genetic resources in general and micro-organisms in particular 







Reinterpreting the scope of the Area 
 
The rationale of the former option follows that of the restrictive position, as 
examined in Part C.1.4. As discussed in that context, the main argument in 
support of this position is based on the definition of resources in Article 133, 
which refers to resources as including “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral 
resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetallic 
nodules,” but it also states that “(b) resources, when recovered from the Area, 
are referred to as ‘minerals’.” Under the restrictive position, it was argued that 
if the Area had been meant to encompass also non-mineral resources, it appears 
counterintuitive to refer to resources as minerals. Emphasizing the wording of 
the resource definition, the restrictive position claims that if genetic resources 
as non-minerals do not fall within the resources of the Area, based on an e 
contrario reading of Article 136 they should not be considered as encompassed 
by the common heritage of mankind principle. The result would be, it has been 
argued, that genetic resources represent a legal lacuna under UNCLOS.1315 
Consequently, in lack of rules applicable to deep-sea genetic resources in 
UNCLOS, the rules of other regimes applying to these resources would not be 
incompatible. Alternatively, it has been claimed, whereas Part XI regulates 
mineral resources, the use of other resources in the Area falls under the regime 
of the freedom of the high seas and is excluded from the scope of application 
of Part XI.1316  
 
Reinterpreting the principle of common heritage of mankind 
 
The second option would suggest interpreting the scope of the principle of 
common heritage of mankind, rather than the Area, as excluding genetic 
resources and hence avoid conflict with TRIPS.  
 
1315 As discussed in Part C.1, the legal lacuna or legal gap-theory has also been referred to in 
Secretary-General reports on the Oceans and the Law of the Sea, such as that of 2003 and 2004, 
Oceans and the law of the sea. Report by the Secretary-General (A/58/65) (3 March 2003), at 
paras. 18, 147 and 195; Report of the UN Secretary-General on Oceans and Law of the Sea, 
advance unedited document of 4 Mar 2004, at para. 267. For some states, this has also been one 
of the premises for the so-called BBNJ-process for the negotiation of a new implementing 
agreement on the law of the sea. See also ARICO & SALPIN. 2005; Scovazzi, Bioprospecting on 
the Deep Seabed: a Legal Gap Requiring to be Filled. 2006. 
1316 Both the so-called Virginia Commentary and Churchill & Lowe’s ‘The law of The Sea’ 
appears to take this position (NORDQUIST, et al. 1995, 29; CHURCHILL & LOWE. 1999 p. 239 and 
fn. 49. This view was also supported by Glowka in the publication which initiated the debate on 







This would accept the notion of the Area as a maritime zone which like other 
zones encompasses all resources geographically located in it. It would, 
however, require reconsidering the interpretation of several others of the 
previously discussed rules of Part XI, apart from the already mentioned Article 
136. This in particular includes the principle of non-appropriation in Article 
1371317 which prevents any legal claim to any part of the Area or its resources, 
as well as the general obligation that activities in the Area shall be carried out 
for the benefit of mankind as a whole, as provided in Article 140. It would most 
likely also require an exclusion of bioprospecting from the exclusive mandate 
of the International Seabed Authority, which in Article 157 is formulated as 
encompassing the organization and control of activities in the Area. 
Considering the exclusive rights involved in patenting, it would also 
additionally, or possibly alternatively, call for a new understanding of Article 
150, which provides instrumental rules for how activities may be carried out 
in the Area, with a strong emphasis on promoting the economy in developing 
states.  
 
Both ways of interpreting UNCLOS in order to promote harmonization with 
the other treaties may be further supported by arguments relating to systemic 
integration. Similar to the discussion under TRIPS above, systemic integration 
could be used as the basis for arguing that a relationship between UNCLOS, 
TRIPS and CBD which prevents conflict would require an interpretation that 
excludes genetic resources from the scope of the Area and/or the common 
heritage of mankind principle. Since it is considered an inherent value to 




1317 Article 137 provides which provides the that “No state shall claim or exercise sovereignty 
or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or 
juridical person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or 
sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized. 2. All rights in the resources of the 
Area are vested in mankind as a whole on whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources 
are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be 
alienated in accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority. 
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to 
the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance with this Part. Otherwise, no such 
claim, acquisition or exercise of such rights shall be recognized.” 








Treaty law limitations to harmonizing interpretations of UNCLOS 
 
Two ways of interpreting UNCLOS which could prevent conflict in relation to 
TRIPS have thus been identified. Would these readings be compatible with 
international law? Not unlike WTO law, UNCLOS explicitly positions itself 
in relation to general international law, by affirming in its preamble 8 “that 
matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules 
and principles of general international law.”  
 
Like the WTO law provisions clarifying its relationship to public international 
law discussed in the previous section, this reference reaffirms that also from 
the perspective of UNCLOS, the Vienna Convention provides the relevant 
rules for treaty interpretation.1319 Proelss considers that UNCLOS opens for 
harmonizing obligations in the convention with norms in other treaties by 
means of interpretation, so long as the treaty interpretation rules of the Vienna 
Convention are respected.1320 This connects to the concept of evolutionary 
interpretation, as discussed in section E.6. Compared to the other treaties 
regulating deep-sea bioprospecting, it is particularly relevant to consider that 
contentious elements of UNCLOS may have developed by means of 
evolutionary interpretation. This is not only because the other treaties have 
been negotiated more recently, but also since the negotiation of relevant parts 
of UNCLOS predates the commercial interest of deep-sea genetic resources.  
 
As previously discussed, different positions have been voiced on the specific 
legal basis for evolutionary interpretation in the Vienna Convention. Some 
consider the approach as more generally based on the intention of the parties 
and not specifically connected to any of the different elements of the Vienna 
Convention rules on treaty interpretation.1321 Others appear to view it as closely 
connected to systemic integration.1322 In any event, this approach must be 
compatible with the outer limits of interpretation, as defined by the rules on 
treaty interpretation.  
 
1319 This also follows from the customary nature of the Vienna Convention rules on treaty 
interpretation, as discussed in section E.4. 
1320 PROELSS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Commentary. 2017, at 15. 
1321 BJORGE. 2014, at 2. 
1322 Boyle, Relationship Between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of 







Evolutionary interpretation can thus only be accepted insofar as the parties 
have used generic terms in a treaty in awareness of the potential for 
development of their meaning.1323 Accordingly, any attempt to harmonize the 
contentious elements of UNCLOS must foremost be in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in light of its object and purpose, as well as respecting the 
other elements of Part III Section III of the Vienna Convention. Similar to what 
was conducted under the previous heading focusing on TRIPS, it is therefore 
necessary to examine if the two approaches to interpretation of the prima facie 
conflicting elements of UNCLOS would be compatible with the Vienna 
Convention rules on treaty interpretation. 
 
As discussed in section E.6.1, different approaches may be used in establishing 
what obligations a treaty entails. One understanding may be favored over other 
possible readings. Terms may be interpreted in line with similar concepts of 
other treaties.1324 Conflicting treaties may be interpreted so as to prevent 
conflict under systemic integration. Irrespective of how the reading is 
conducted, the rules on treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention remain 
binding. Like the investigation of possible readings of TRIPS to avoid conflict 
under the previous heading, the requirement that a treaty shall be interpreted in 
line with the Vienna Convention thus sets the outer limits for possible 
understandings of contentious terms.  
 
To start with the first approach of interpreting UNCLOS in order to prevent 
conflict, it seems feasible from a semantic standpoint to interpret Article 133 
as excluding genetic resources from the definition of resources of the Area. 
The wording of the definition of resources of the Area is paradoxical. But if 
emphasis is put on paragraph (a), it appears unproblematic to interpret the 
definition as limited to mineral resources. Indeed, such a reading would be in 
line with the ordinary meaning of the terms, as called for by paragraph 1 of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. However, as discussed in Part C.1.4, even 
if this restrictive perspective of the definition is accepted (and resources of the 
Area are understood as including only mineral resources), it would not follow 
logically that the common heritage of mankind principle is inapplicable.  
 
1323 ICJ, Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) 2009. 
1324 It is worth noting that the Bluefin Tuna Case where this approach was undertaken concerned 






This is because Article 136 puts not merely the resources of the Area, but the 
Area per se within the scope of the common heritage of mankind principle. 
Thereby, it would not be sufficient to exclude genetic resources from the 
definition of resources of the Area to avoid applicability of the common 
heritage of mankind principle. In order to claim that there is a legal lacuna (or 
that genetic resources fall within the high seas regime), it would also be 
necessary to interpret the Area as altogether excluding genetic resources from 
its scope. There is reason for considering such a reading as going against the 
first paragraph of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. This is because, as 
discussed in Part C.1.4, Article 1 of UNCLOS defines the Area not as a specific 
concept for mineral resources, but as a geographically defined space, similar 
to other maritime areas: “‘Area’ means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” As pointed out by Oude 
Elferink, “in principle, the ordinary meaning of the terms ‘seabed’, ‘ocean 
floor’ and ‘subsoil’, comprises the living and non-living resources that are 
found in those areas.”1325 As similarly discussed in Part C.1.4, this is further 
confirmed by the reference to “the natural resources of the Area” in Article 
145(b) of the Convention as well as the inclusion of sedentary species in the 
continental shelf regime, which has been claimed to apply to the deep seabed 
by analogy. 
 
Other provisions on the Area would also be difficult to reconcile with an 
interpretation of deep-sea bioprospecting as representing a legal lacuna or 
forming part of the high seas regime. In particular, Article 134 claims that 
“Activities in the Area shall be governed by the provisions of this Part,” and 
Article 140, that “Activities in the Area shall, as specifically provided for in 
this Part, be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole.”1326 Generally, 
the legal lacuna argument would also be problematic to reconcile with the 
explicit intention of the negotiators of UNCLOS to establish a comprehensive 
convention.1327  
 
1325 As further observed by Oude Elferink, “These are general terms that have a specific spatial 
application that does not exclude certain natural components from that spatial scope of 
application because they differ from surrounding areas. The same applies to all other maritime 
zones. All resources located in a zone form part of that zone.” Oude Elferink, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2007), at 150. See also Scovazzi, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2004), at 391. 
1326 Oude Elferink, THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2007), at 152. 
1327 As expressed in the preamble, UNCLOS “establishes a comprehensive framework for the 







In contrast with this ambition, the interpretation excluding genetic resources 
from the Area would imply that there are rules applying to living resources in 
all maritime zones except for the Area. As discussed in Part C.1.4, based on 
negotiation documents there are strong indications that the concept of 
sedentary species as regulated in the continental shelf was intended to 
encompass all seabed organisms, and that the reason for not explicitly referring 
to living resources in the Area regime was that such species were considered 
insignificant at the time of negotiation. The references to both living and 
mineral resources in the drafting history of Part XI also support this notion.  
 
The second option, in addition, suggesting that the common heritage of 
mankind principle rather than the Area should be interpreted as excluding the 
bioprospecting of genetic resources, would be difficult to reconcile with the 
notion of UNCLOS as a comprehensive convention, since the alternative 
would be that this activity is left unregulated, which would clearly go against 
the will of the negotiators.1328 There are also functional arguments against 
excluding genetic resources connected to the mandate of the International 
Seabed Authority. The broad and general responsibility of the ISA to activities 
in the deep seabed, with no relevant exclusions, also appears to be a clear 
indication that the negotiators aimed to include all activities and resources in 
the regime of the Area.1329  
 
Taken together, these indications from the negotiation documents make it 
difficult to reconcile any interpretation of the Area or the common heritage of 
mankind principle as excluding genetic resources with the first paragraph of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.  
 
considered as a whole.” As observed by Armas-Pfirter (and previously discussed in Part C.1.4), 
“pursuant to the convention, ocean space is divided into jurisdictional zones and different issues 
are governed on a geographical basis. This “zonal approach” means that a specific legal regime 
applies, geographically, only to a given marine area.” Armas-Pfirter, THE INTERNATIONAL 
JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2009), at 281. 
1328 As argued by Francioni, the practical difference of bioprospecting to fisheries makes the 
freedom of fishing inapplicable to genetic resources of the Area. Similarly, the legal claims 
involved renders the regime on marine scientific resources inapplicable. Sovereignty is excluded 
in both the Area and the high seas. Thereby, the common heritage of mankind principle is the 
only principle which could be applicable to genetic resources. Since the convention aims to 
encompass all uses of the oceans, this principle must be regarded as applicable. See section C.1.4 
and Francioni, International Law for Biotechnology: Basic Principles. 2006, at 12. 






Generally, an interpretation of the conflicting elements of UNCLOS enabling 
patentability, as required by TRIPS, would face the same problems as those 
found in the converse relation, discussed under the previous heading. It would 
go against the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty to 
interpret the common heritage of mankind principle as permitting the patenting 
of genetic resources of the Area. Both ways of interpreting the convention 
restrictively, and thereby avoiding this problem, seem to be incompatible with 
the requirement to reflect the intention of the negotiation parties, which is 
connected to the good faith criterion, as discussed in section E.6.1. 
 
These restrictive readings can also be challenged based on the contextual 
criterion for not considering the implications of connecting parts of the 
convention. As has been made clear, individual provisions cannot be read in 
isolation, but must be interpreted in light of connecting provisions and the 
overriding purpose of the treaty. As regards the subsequent element in Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention, calling for interpreting treaties in light of their 
object and purpose, there is no equivalent in the law of the sea to the connection 
in TRIPS to the provision in the Agreement establishing the WTO, upon which 
arguments can be built for making harmonious interpretation in relation to 
treaties of other regimes. Instead, UNCLOS declares the objective of the 
convention in the preamble, reflecting a limited ambition to consider values or 
objectives of other treaties in interpretation of its provisions. This is not 
surprising since UNCLOS was drafted as the supreme and central framework 
convention within the law of the sea. 
 
Among the objectives formulated in the preamble, the express reference in 
recital 6 to the common heritage of mankind principle in particular raises 
challenges when attempting to prevent treaty conflict in the case of deep-sea 
bioresources by means of interpretation:  
 
Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in 
resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General 
Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the 
area of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common 
heritage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be 








This direct reference as an objective of UNCLOS to promote the very concept 
that conflicts with other treaties in the context of deep-sea bioprospecting 
seemingly raises barriers to any harmonizing interpretation which would 
involve redefining the same concept. This is particularly relevant since 
Resolution 2749, which is referred to unequivocally, regards the common 
heritage of mankind principle as extending to all resources of the seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction.1330  
 
Indeed, the reference to the resolution among the objectives of UNCLOS 
indicates that this resolution, rather than any other treaty, should be considered 
in interpretation of UNCLOS. This supports the notion of genetic resources as 
included in the regime of the Area and falling within the common heritage of 
mankind principle. The special status of the common heritage of mankind 
principle in UNCLOS also follows from how it is formulated in the operative 
provisions, in particular Articles 136 and 137, as discussed in Part C. Recital 6 
of the preamble expresses only part of the objective of the convention, which 
as discussed in section E.6.1 not necessarily is the same thing as the full reason 
for which the treaty exists. Still, it appears difficult to reconcile an 
interpretation going against this clearly expressed objective, excluding 
important commercial relevant deep seabed resources from the scope of the 
principle, with the requirement to interpret the treaty in light of its object and 
purpose. 
 
Indeed, the requirements for interpretations to respect the object and purpose 
of the treaty would render it difficult to read any provision in the treaty in a 
way that modifies the function of or excludes certain resources from the scope 





1330 In paragraph 1, Resolution 2749 “solemnly declares that: The sea-bed and ocean floor, and 
the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction hereinafter referred to as the area), 
as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.”, United Nations 
General Assembly resolution 2749 (XXV), Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and 
the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 
A/RES/25/2749 (12 December 1970). 1970.; Konrad Jan Marciniak, Marine Genetic Resources: 
Do They Form Part of the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle?, in NATURAL RESOURCES 
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: EXPLORATION, ALLOCATION, EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 






Equally relevant in this context is Article 311(6) which declares that  
 
States Parties agree that there shall be no amendments to the basic 
principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article 
136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation 
thereof. 
 
This clearly implies that under the perspective of UNCLOS, the common 
heritage of mankind principle ought not to evolve organically in light of 
provisions in other treaties. The declaration in Article 311(6) thus severely 
circumscribes the possibilities for preventing treaty conflict by arguing that the 
principle or the regime of the Area has developed into allowing for the 
bioprospecting of deep-sea genetic resources. As discussed in section E.6.1, a 
necessary requirement for evolutionary interpretation is that the parties 
implicitly or explicitly allowed for terms in the treaty to develop. The 
declaration in Article 311(6) makes clear that the negotiators of UNCLOS 
explicitly wanted the contrary, to prevent a development which undermines the 
common heritage of mankind principle.1331 There thus seems to be little room 
for arguments that the scope of the principle has come to exclude genetic 
resources. It appears more in line with Article 311(6) and the notion of the 
convention as comprehensive to claim that relevant terms have developed by 
means of evolutionary interpretation into reaffirming the scope as including 
genetic resources. Since the principle of common heritage of mankind was 
drafted to include the seabed resources which during the negotiation were 
considered most valuable, and the genetic resources which were unknown at 
the time have subsequently turned out to be more valuable than mineral 
resources, it would appear more reasonable to consider the definition as having 
developed evolutionarily to include genetic resources, as discussed in C.1.4. 
 
 
1331 Michael W. Lodge, The Common Heritage of Mankind, 27 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 
OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW (2012); Pauwelyn disputes the notion that Article 311(6) 
effectively can prevent any subsequent modification of the principle, claiming that “the 
contractual freedom of states parties to UNCLOS should allow them to amend Article 311(6) 
itself, e.g. by concluding a deviation from Article 136 and explicitly stating that this deviation is 
not subject to Article 311(6).” Even if this observation would be correct, no such references 
which potentially could take precedence over this provision of UNCLOS have been declared in 
connection with conflicting treaties, or any other agreement. PAUWELYN, Conflict of Norms in 








In conclusion, under the Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation, it 
does not appear that the formulation of the regime of the Area and the common 
heritage of mankind principle, including relevant negotiating documents, 
enable the degree of adjustment which would be necessary in order to interpret 
relevant parts of UNCLOS so as to prevent conflict with applicable rules on 
deep-sea bioprospecting in TRIPS, in particular relating to the bioprospecting 
of deep-seabed micro-organisms.  
 
Even if these constraints imposed by treaty law were disregarded, and the 
problem were addressed only as a matter of systemic interpretation in line with 
other relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties, it is unlikely that the problem could be solved. It thus appears just as 
difficult as from the perspective of TRIPS to linguistically interpret the 
conflicting rules in UNCLOS in a manner that prevents conflict. 
 
Yet, this does not imply that it is impossible to prevent treaty conflict by using 
the principle of systemic integration or evolutionary interpretation in all 
conflicts involving UNCLOS. As already established in section E.1, there does 
not appear to be any inconsistency between the rules of TRIPS and UNCLOS 
relating to bioprospecting in the high seas. In the case of deep-sea bioresources, 
the material overlap between UNCLOS and CBD appears considerably less 
difficult to bridge compared to that of TRIPS.1332  
 
Rather than imposing contradictory obligations on states, the conservationist 
and benefit-sharing obligations of CBD applying to activities in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction conflict with the deep-sea rules of UNCLOS by adding an 
additional layer of restriction. It appears fully possible to conduct a 
harmonizing reading of the relevant provisions of UNCLOS which adjusts the 
interpretation to also include the conservationist and benefit-sharing elements 
of the CBD without violating the obligations to interpret treaties in good faith, 
and in line with ordinary meaning and object and purpose as well as the 
contextual criterion provided. Seen from the perspective of states bound by 
both treaties, implementing the relevant provisions of CBD does not render it 










This illustrates that the principle of systemic integration can help to facilitate 
coherence in norm conflicts, even in cases involving treaties such as UNCLOS, 
which contain little of express regard or concern for provisions in treaties of 
other regimes. Examining the conflicting elements of UNCLOS under the 
general rule of treaty interpretation thus yields different answers, depending on 
the magnitude of conflict. Contrary to the relation between UNCLOS and 
TRIPS, a harmonizing interpretation would be able to prevent conflict between 
UNCLOS and CBD. This illustrates that systemic integration may be capable 
of preventing conflict between treaties where the conflict consists of an overlap 
between norms where relevant terms are flexible enough to enable a 
reconciliatory reading. But in cases of incompatibility between fundamentally 





As already discussed in the context of application of conflicting treaties under 
section E.5, Article 22 of the CBD provides a comparatively straightforward 
instruction on how the convention is to be regarded in relationship to other 
treaties, which is equally relevant for treaty interpretation purposes as for 
application. In fact, paragraph 2 of Article 22 of CBD does not refer to 
application or interpretation, but rather to implementation, which can be 
considered as encompassing both aspects.  
 
Accordingly, the CBD should be applied and interpreted in light of the law of 
the sea. For interpretation purposes, however, it is not necessary to regard 
paragraph 2 as an indication of priority for the law of the sea. Rather, it stresses 
that the CBD should be read in a manner that is compatible with UNCLOS. 
The provision can thus be regarded as an explicit call for harmonizing 
interpretations, much in line with the principle of systemic integration in 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. 
 
The qualification to implement the CBD with respect to the marine 
environment consistently with the “rights and obligations of states under the 
law of the sea,” however, as previously discussed, raises questions about how 
to relate to provisions in UNCLOS which cannot be considered as representing 
rights and obligations. Arguably, the instruction in paragraph 2 lacks relevance 







In the case of deep-sea genetic resources, however, this is of limited relevance 
since the conflict involves central elements in UNCLOS of clearly binding 
character. 
 
Since the scope of paragraph 2 of Article 22 is limited to the law of the sea, 
and corresponding specific instructions on the relation to other areas of 
international law are lacking in CBD, the convention provides less guidance 
for interpretation of cases of potential conflict in relation to other treaties, 
including TRIPS.1333 As discussed under section E.5, the preceding paragraph 
1 essentially represents a conflict clause and is of limited value beyond 
decisions of applicable treaties. 
 
Article 22 
Relationship with Other International Conventions  
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations 
of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, 
except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious 
damage or threat to biological diversity.  
2. Contracting Parties shall implement this Convention with respect to the 
marine environment consistently with the rights and obligations of States under 
the law of the sea. 
 
The lack of explicit calls for harmonizing interpretation in relation to other 
treaties than UNCLOS does not imply that such approaches cannot be pursued 
to prevent conflicts involving CBD. General rules for treaty interpretation 
apply, including the principle of systemic integration, as well as other treaty 
interpretation criteria provided by Section III of the Vienna Convention’s Part 
III. 
 
Similar to the investigation of TRIPS and UNCLOS, this calls for an 
examination of how the object and purpose of the treaty is formulated, in order 
to assess the outer limits of harmonizing interpretations. These are expressed 
in Article 1 of the CBD, which reflects a threefold ambition: Conservation of 
biological diversity; sustainable use of biodiversity; and fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits.1334  
 
1333 Id. at 248-255. 
1334 OLA DAJANI, GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER THE CBD AND TRIPS: ISSUES ON SOVEREIGNTY AND 






In essence, this reflects the trade-off in the negotiation of the CBD of ensuring 
the conservation of biological diversity in return for a more equitable sharing 




The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its relevant 
provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of 
its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of 
the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access to genetic 
resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into 
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate 
funding. 
 
What constraints does this objective of the treaty impose when attempting to 
harmonize the obligations of CBD relevant for deep-sea bioresources with 
overlapping norms in UNCLOS and TRIPS? As discussed in Part E.1, it is 
essentially the obligations in the CBD relating to conservation and benefit-
sharing which overlap with the other treaties in the context of deep-sea 
bioprospecting. These in particular include the obligations in Articles 6, 8 and 
10 to protect biological diversity in situ and ensure sustainable use.1335 
According to the jurisdictional scope formulated in Article 4, these obligations 
apply in areas beyond national jurisdiction as regards processes and activities.  
 
Would it, then, be logically possible and consistent with object and purpose of 
the CBD, as well as other elements of the treaty interpretation rules of the 
Vienna Convention, to read these obligations of the CBD in harmony with the 
requirement for patentability under TRIPS and the principle of common 
heritage of mankind and connected obligations of UNCLOS? Under the 
previous heading, it has already been established that there are no logical or 
linguistic arguments against reconciling the relevant provisions of UNCLOS 
with those of the CBD. Conversely, it appears fully possible for states to 
implement the CBD obligations to prevent processes and activities under their 
 
1335 Amongst other aspects, the convention requires its parties to, as far as possible and as 
appropriate, maintain viable populations in natural surroundings. As discussed in Part C.2, a 
“viable” population can be defined as one which maintains its genetic diversity, its potential for 
evolutionary adaptation and faces minimal risk of extinction from demographic fluctuations, 
environmental variation and potential catastrophe, including over-use. See Doc. 







jurisdiction from negatively affecting biological conservation in the deep seas 
under an interpretation which is compatible with the principle of common 
heritage of mankind, without violating treaty law obligations on interpretation. 
 
It appears more difficult to reconcile these interests of the CBD with the 
obligation to enable patentability under TRIPS, at least in some cases. As noted 
in Part B, there are indications that many deep-sea ecosystems are so sensitive 
and endemic that even the limited sampling operations necessary for patenting 
may represent threats to conservation. If large-scale bioprospecting operations 
were conducted in these locations, the environmental impact would be 
considerable. The requirements of CBD to share information from findings 
appear less problematic in this context, since publication of patent data is a 
central requirement for patenting. As such, it seems that the obligation of 
conserving deep-sea organisms could only be interpreted as harmonious with 
patentability insofar as detrimental effects of sampling operations are 
prevented. This would require an implementation of TRIPS which prevents 
patentability of deep-sea bioresources in locations where such operations could 
represent a threat to conservation.  
 
Indeed, based on the objective of the CBD as set out in Article 1, the obligation 
to ensure that activities are compatible with the obligation to ensure 
conservation of deep-sea species may be interpreted as allowing appropriation 
of elements of biological resources beyond national jurisdiction by means of 
patenting, provided that such activities are not detrimental to the environmental 
interests pursued by the CBD. Such a harmonious reading under the principle 
of systemic integration, which prevents conflict in relation to TRIPS, appears 
to be possible under the CBD, without going beyond the limitations for treaty 
interpretation set by the Vienna Convention. However, it should be noted that 
considering the rigid requirement to enable patenting under TRIPS, even such 
limited exceptions could be considered as representing an inconsistency in 
relation to the Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation. If, on the other 
hand, the relevant obligations of the CBD were interpreted as allowing 
patentability in line with TRIPS in all deep-sea locations, it would go against 
the objective of CBD and hence violate basic obligations of treaty 
interpretation. It thus appears that arguments could be made for interpreting 
the contentious areas of the CBD in a manner which avoids conflict with 
UNCLOS. However, it is not certain that the measures necessary for ensuring 






patentability for some categories of biogenetic resources in all locations, 
irrespective of such considerations. If, however, exceptions for bioprospecting 
are imposed in certain sensitive locations, conflict could be prevented. 
 
In conclusion, the treaty conflict that comprises the focus of this investigation 
provides a representation of the challenges in applying systemic integration in 
practical cases. Taken together, it can be concluded that states cannot 
implement obligations to ensure the conservation and enable patenting of deep-
seabed bioresources, while at the same time fulfilling their obligations relating 
to the principle of common heritage of mankind. This inconsistency cannot 
reasonably be fully bridged by harmonizing interpretations under the principle 
of systemic integration, without going against other obligations under treaty 
law, thereby violating the object and purpose of the treaties. In the specific case 
of deep-sea bioresources, the notion that treaty interpretation principles and the 
principle of systemic integration ensure the coherence of public international 
law has been disproven.  
 
In practical cases, the degree of material conflict between provisions involved, 
as well as the rigidity of objects, purposes and other elements of treaties 
involved, may hamper efforts to prevent conflict and maintain a coherent 
system of public international law. 
 
In this case, systemic integration could prevent conflict in the relation between 
UNCLOS and CBD, as well as the relationship between CBD and TRIPS, save 
for some cases where the potential for conflict between conservation and 
patenting interests would persist. As regards bioprospecting of genetic 
resources of the high seas, there does not even appear to be an inconsistency 
between TRIPS and UNCLOS. If the same activity is carried out in the deep 
seabed of the Area, by contrast, the conflicting norms provide contrary 
obligations, which cannot be reconciled by means of treaty interpretation. 
 
E.7. Concluding observations on the interaction of rules 
 
The relationship between treaties that belong to different regimes has long been 
identified as a general problem in international law. As discussed in preceding 
parts of this investigation, the bioprospecting of marine genetic resources is 
not only regulated differently; it is also regarded as a fundamentally dissimilar 







The widely different perspectives of legal claims relating to deep-sea genetic 
resources have resulted in the development of rules in the law of the sea, 
international environmental law and international trade law which prima facie 
involve areas of conflict. The apparent inconsistencies have become more 
relevant as a result of the growing interest in deep-sea bioprospecting, 
involving technological aspects and novel uses of genetic resources, which 
poses some challenges to the application of international law rules.  
 
In this part, an attempt has been made to bridge this problem by means of treaty 
law, first by rules on application aiming to resolve the conflict, and thereafter 
on the basis of treaty interpretation, including evolutionary interpretation and 
systemic integration, under the rules aiming to prevent the conflict. 
 
Approaching the matter as a problem of application, it has been established 
that conflict clauses generally represent a pragmatic approach to treaty conflict, 
based on the recognition that it is inadvisable to produce a general rule on treaty 
priority. Indeed, an unconditional application of principles such as lex 
posteriori are likely to yield more rigid consequences and irrational results. 
This is particularly the case in conflicts across regime boundaries where norm 
conflicts have rarely been anticipated and the consequences of applying 
principles of priority would lead to results disconnected from widely shared 
intentions of parties. It was also established that there is support in the Vienna 
Convention for giving conflict clauses priority over other approaches to treaty 
inconsistencies.  
 
Two of the treaties regulating deep-sea bioprospecting contain explicit conflict 
clauses. However, the implication of the clauses was found to be contradictory. 
In UNCLOS, priority was claimed not only in relation to prior treaties but also 
as regards future treaties, to the extent that such undertakings affected the 
common heritage of mankind principle. This could be considered as effectively 
blocking the obligation for patentability under TRIPS to the extent that it 
encompasses deep-seabed genetic resources. In the CBD, the conflict clause in 
relation to UNCLOS was generally considered submissive as regards rights 









This would include many, but not necessarily all, elements of regulation 
relating to deep-sea bioprospecting. In relation to prior treaties generally, the 
CBD similarly let those take precedence, save for cases where the core interest 
of CBD would be impeded, i.e. where it would cause a serious damage or threat 
to biological diversity. It may thus seem that there is a legal basis in CBD for 
claiming that it could take precedence over TRIPS. Since TRIPS was both 
adopted and entered into force subsequent to the CBD, the limitation of the 
conflict clause in CBD to existing treaties was, however, found to be an 
argument against this notion. 
 
In TRIPS as in WTO treaties generally, conventional conflict clauses were 
found to be lacking. However, and perhaps counterintuitively, it was 
established that this lack of conflict clauses would not necessarily result in a 
priority in application of the two other relevant treaties. Since treaty application 
rules provide that resort should be made to lex posterior in cases where conflict 
clauses are lacking, the result would be that under its own merits, TRIPS 
implicitly would claim unconditional priority in relation to previous treaties, 
including UNCLOS and the CBD.  
 
In sum, approaching the problem by means of treaty application rules would 
give preference both to UNCLOS (by virtue of its conflict clause) and TRIPS 
(by virtue of lex posterior in lack of conflict clause) but not to CBD even in 
cases of serious damage or threat to biodiversity. This clearly does not provide 
a functional relationship between relevant norms. 
 
In such cases, where rules of application fail to resolve conflict, the ILC 
Fragmentation Report emphasizes harmonizing interpretations under the treaty 
law principle of systemic integration as a means of preventing fragmentation 
and maintaining a coherent system of public international law. Indeed, this may 
represent an efficient way of preventing conflict between treaties that are part 
of the same regime, share a similar objective or carry a comparable kinship.  
 
But there are also other treaty law obligations that must be considered. These 
include the obligations to interpret a treaty in respect of elements such as good 
faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 










Many observers supporting a systemic view of public international law appear 
to overlook the fact that these other elements of treaty law set boundaries for 
how far harmonizing interpretations can stretch conflicting terms. Moreover, 
in cases with a high degree of material inconsistency between norms, logical 
semantics and insufficient flexibility of conflicting elements of treaties 
involved raise barriers to systemic integration. 
 
From an interpretation perspective, it may be compatible with treaty law rules 
on interpretation to regard the obligations in the CBD for in situ conservation 
as circumscribing the requirement for patentability under TRIPS and the 
common heritage of mankind principle under UNCLOS, thereby enabling the 
obligations in CBD to function in concert with the other treaties. Systemic 
integration could thus prevent conflict in relation to the CBD. In the relation 
between UNCLOS and TRIPS, on the other hand, it generally appears difficult 
to prevent conflict between rules applying to deep-seabed bioprospecting by 
means of harmonizing interpretation, in particular for deep seabed micro-
organisms. This is not only because the treaty law rules on interpretation set 
limits to possible understandings. The rules for the Area in UNCLOS, 
including the common heritage of mankind principle, provide contrary material 
obligations compared to the requirement for patentability in TRIPS. Since no 
area of commonality exists between these obligations, it is linguistically 








F. Concluding remarks 
 
The case of deep-sea bioprospecting supports the contention that intra se (e.g. 
between several environmental or trade instruments) harmonization can be 
expected to be crafted out relatively painlessly. But it cannot be assumed a 
priori that a similar readiness exists as between parties to treaties across 
regimes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is difficult to find mutually satisfying 
solutions for the harmonization of treaties that seek to achieve physically 
incompatible purposes or that are inspired by very different (perhaps opposing) 
objectives.1336  
 
The case of deep-sea bioprospecting thus provides a rather pessimistic outlook 
on the possibility for harmonization as a general cure to fragmentation. In some 
cases, where the treaties involved provide an area of commonality which would 
also be an acceptable interpretation under the rules on treaty interpretation, 
systemic integration may prevent conflict, as in the relation of the CBD to the 
other treaties. But in cases such as the relation between UNCLOS and TRIPS 
– where either the material obligations are too conflicting to enable a 
harmonizing interpretation, or such an understanding would require going 
beyond what is permitted under treaty interpretation rules – international law 
is unable to prevent conflict. In such cases, states that are parties to all treaties 
cannot simultaneously fully implement all relevant obligations but will have to 
exercise discretion as to what treaty to favor under domestic law. However, in 
doing so, they risk breaching obligations under the other treaties. In the case of 
deep-seabed bioprospecting, states are thus essentially facing a dilemma 
whereby they will violate international law, irrespective of how they act. 
Accordingly, in this case, public international law does not manage to function 
as a coherent system for its primary subjects. 
 
The inability of treaty law rules to fully prevent or resolve the problem of 
contradictory obligations relating to deep-sea bioprospecting indicates that 
when the theoretical discussion on fragmentation is contextualized in concrete 
cases, it may be difficult to uphold systemic predictions of treaty law rules as 
ensuring that international law remains a coherent system.  
 
1336 Compare Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of 







On many issues where seemingly incoherent rules apply, the systemic elements 
of treaty law are able to resolve conflict. In the case of deep-sea genetic 
resources, however, the fragmentation of international law has resulted in 
conflicts between rules of three different regimes, which treaty law is unable 
to fully dissolve. 
 
In this study, fragmentation and norm conflict have primarily been discussed 
from a systemic standpoint. The difference between the rules relating to deep-
sea bioprospecting of regimes involved has been discussed, as well as how 
underlying divergences in ideology and purpose across regimes explain these 
differences, which become particularly relevant in light of the increasing 
interest in deep-sea bioprospecting. Focus has thus been put on the relationship 
between an activity and relevant rules, in particular on the causes of the conflict 
between the rules and consequences for application and interpretation of 
obligations involved. 
 
In academic debate, fragmentation has first and foremost been discussed as a 
threat to the coherence of international law as a system. This was also the spirit 
of the speeches delivered to the General Assembly by the presidents of the ICJ 
during three consecutive years around the turn of the century, which ignited 
the fragmentation debate.  
 
The then president of the ICJ Gilbert Guillaume declared that increasing 
fragmentation risked leading to forum- shopping and “unwanted confusion,” 
threatening to “distort the operation of justice” which “exacerbated the risk of 
conflicting judgments.”1337 This reflects a focus on the impact of fragmentation 
on courts and international jurisprudence, which has remained the emphasis in 
the debate and also appears to have been the predominant perspective in the 
ILC Study Group Report, as discussed in previous parts. In international 
debate, with its emphasis on problems for courts and jurisprudence, many 
observers such as Spelliscy have feared that the incoherence resulting from 
fragmentation will erode “the legitimacy of international judicial system.”1338 
 
1337 Address to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Judge 
Stephen M. Schwebel, President of the International Court of Justice, 26 October 1999 and Judge 
Guillaume’s speech to the Assembly’s Sixth Committee, as cited in Koskenniemi & Leino, 
LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 
1338 See for instance Shane Spelliscy, The proliferation of international tribunals: a chink in the 






Charney first appears to agree, declaring that “Not only may a cacophony of 
views on the norms of international law undermine the perception that an 
international legal system exists, but if like cases are not treated alike, the very 
essence of a normative system of law will be lost.” After a closer examination 
of case law, Charney downplays the risks, observing that “Although differences 
exist, these tribunals are clearly engaged in the same dialectic. The 
fundamentals of this general international law remain the same regardless of 
which tribunal decides the case.”1339  
 
Koskenniemi and Leino go much further, referring to the problem of 
fragmentation as theoretical, or even esoteric, reflecting a postmodern anxiety 
about a loss of overall control, born of a frustrated expectation that 
international law would eventually govern international society in the same 
way as domestic law governs domestic society. Instead, the authors imply, the 
institutional proliferation causing fragmentation is “an unavoidable minor 
problem in a rapidly transforming international system, or even a rather 
positive demonstration of legal imagination to social change.”1340 
 
In the ILC Study Group Report on fragmentation, chaired by Koskenniemi, the 
same arguments were repeated, describing coherence as only “a formal and 
abstract virtue. For a legal system that is regarded in some respects as unjust 
or unworkable, no added value is brought by the fact of its being coherently 
so.”1341 Even when setting aside the perspective on courts, and instead looking 
more closely at the impact of fragmentation and norm conflicts among treaties 
observers have given little weight to the negative impact.  
 
 
observations on norm conflict in relation international courts include Rosalyn Higgins, The ICJ, 
the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law, 52 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY (2003); Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals 
and Conflicting Jurisdiction - Problems and Possible Solutions, 5 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF 
UNITED NATIONS LAW (2001); PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND 
FRAGMENTATION (Oxford University Press. 2016). 
1339 Jonathan I. Charney, The impact on the international legal system of the growth of 
international courts and tribunals, 31 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND POLITICS (1999), at 699; CHARNEY, Is international law threatened by multiple international 
tribunals? 1999. 
1340 Koskenniemi & Leino, LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 
1341 Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law - Report of the Study Group of the 







In the words of Peters, when summarizing the positive effects of fragmenta-
tion, “The resulting ‘regime collisions’ are praiseworthy because they manifest 
and further promote pluralism, contestation, and politicization – but it remains 
to be discussed what this means in normative terms.” Moreover, “competition 
between regimes, organizations, courts, and any other institutions may 
promote productive exploration and experimentation, enhances creativity, 
allows for correcting mistakes, reduces the risk of failure of one single 
institution, and thus overall leads to improved performance, notably to better 
lawmaking and law-application.” Among the virtues of fragmentation, Peters 
further notes that fragmentation may prevent the concentration of power and 
claims that institutional dispersal constitutes a separation of power with the 
possibility of checks and balances.1342 
 
 A problem with these arguments is that they presuppose a dialogue between 
regimes, which this study has found little evidence of. To the contrary, in the 
case of deep-sea bioprospecting, there appears to have been surprisingly little 
consideration of other relevant regimes during the negotiation stages of the 
treaties involved. Even where treaties have been negotiated in parallel, as was 
the case with the CBD and TRIPS, no attempt has been made to coordinate 
discussions. 
 
While courts indeed may face tough choices in dealing with overlapping 
obligations from different regimes of international law, there is reason to 
consider the preoccupation with the impact on courts and jurisprudence as 
being misguided. After all, with some exceptions, courts have shown a 
willingness to approach cases involving obligations from different areas of 




1342 Peters, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2017), at 681. See also Bruno 
Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2004). 
1343 In the said speech, Judge Guillaume referred to how the European Court of Human Rights 
decision in 1995 in the Loizidou-case had gone against the established jurisprudence of the ICJ 
concerning the effect of territorial reservation, as well as how the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’) decision in the Tadic-case had deviated from the application 
of the ‘effective control’ test in the 1986 Nicaragua-case of the ICJ, see Koskenniemi & Leino, 






Moreover, twenty years after these fears were expressed by Judge Guillaume, 
few disputes involving norm conflicts have actually arisen and international 
courts seem to have been able to cross-fertilize jurisprudence and consider 
case-law developed by other tribunals.1344 This led Judge Greenwood, 
Guillaume’s colleague, to declare in 2016 that the fear of fragmentation at the 
start of the millennium, “appears eerily reminiscent of the panic with which 
the dawn of the previous millennium was greeted by those who believed that 
the end of the world was nigh.”1345 Indeed, a lack of empirical findings of 
conflicts among cases facing international courts has led many observers to 
consider that the problem of fragmentation has been overstated.1346 But perhaps 
this is because these observers have been looking in the wrong places?  
 
Rather than manifesting itself in spectacular clashes between treaties in court-
rooms in the Hague, Hamburg and Geneva, there is reason to suspect that frag-
mentation has its most important expressions in the arena of domestic-level 
implementation of international law. Where rules in different treaties provide 
conflicting obligations relating to practical activities, it is the primary subject 
of international law, the state, rather than international tribunals, which is most 
likely to end up in situations in which they face the difficult choices of frag-
mentation. When confronted with irreconcilable norm conflicts, as in the case 
of deep-seabed bioprospecting of micro-organisms, states end up in a dilemma 
where they effectively cannot avoid violating one of the obligations involved. 
 
1344 Paine. 2020; Andrew Lang, Twenty years of the WTO Appellate Body’s “fragmentation 
jurisprudence”, 14 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY (2015); Andrew Lang, 
The Role of the International Court of Justice in a Context of Fragmentation, 62 INTERNATIONAL 
& COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY (2013); WEBB. 2016; Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, 
A century of international justice and prospects for future, at 77-86; Magdalena Forowicz, 
Factors influencing the reception of international law in the ECtHR's case law: an overview; 
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne, Just another case of treaty interpretation? Reconciling humanitarian 
law and human rights law in the ICJ; Dean Spielmann, Fragmentation or partnership? The 
reception of ICJ case-law by the European Court of Human Rights; Philippa Webb, Factors 
influencing fragmentation and convergence in international courts in BJORGE. 2014; WEBB. 
2016. 
1345 Christopher Greenwood, Unity and diversity in international law, in A FAREWELL TO 
FRAGMENTATION: REASSERTION AND CONVERGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mads Andenas & 
Eirik Bjørge eds., 2015), at 37. 
1346 Peters, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2017), at 698.; See also Mads 
Andenæs & Eirik Bjorge, Introduction: from fragmenation to convergence in international law, 
in A FAREWELL TO FRAGMENTATION: REASSERTION AND CONVERGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 







Under international law, states are obliged to implement all of its obligations 
in good faith, insofar their jurisdiction applies. However, in such situations, 
they are unable to do so.  
 
Whereas only a small fraction of breaches of international law result in 
international disputes, norm conflicts concerning issues relevant to practical 
state behavior are not merely hypothetical problems for states. In the context 
of more abstract obligations, norm conflicts may never practically materialize, 
allowing states to ignore the area of contention. But in cases such as deep-sea 
bioprospecting, where an increasing commercial interest is coupled with rapid 
technological development, the norm conflict is likely to become highlighted, 
either in the drafting of domestic law applicable to deep-sea bioprospecting, or 
when subjects of the states are involved in such activities.  
 
How, then, do states act when faced with norm conflicts? Even if states are 
able to avoid norm conflicts insofar as the conflicting obligations are provided 
in treaties by simply withdrawing or refraining from becoming party to one of 
the treaties involved, it appears that states are unlikely to do so. In the case of 
deep-sea bioprospecting, an overwhelming majority of states are party to all 
three central treaties. The inconsistencies between the norms involved have so 
far not made any state withdraw from either one of the treaties, although 
discontent with the seabed regime has influenced the United States’ decision 
not to ratify UNCLOS. Still, the overwhelming number of states have become 
and remain parties to all three treaties investigated. So, how do states legally 
consider norm conflicts such as the one discussed in this study, whether in 
relation to individual projects or in the drafting of domestic law? 
 
To fully answer this question requires detailed investigations of domestic 
approaches. Based on what has been established in this study, however, there 
are clear indications that when facing such dilemmas, states effectively 
prioritize the fulfillment of one obligation over another. This enables them to 
favor treaty obligations aligned with domestic interests over others. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that it is mostly the developing countries that 
were reluctant to accept the approach to patentability under TRIPS, which has 








States more open to the patenting of biological resources have instead chosen 
to implement a much more liberal approach to patentability, as reflected in the 
European Union’s approach in the Biotech Directive.1347 Effectively, states 
may in this manner circumvent prohibitive rules with reference to permissive 
rules. Indeed, fragmentation appears more likely to result in states engaging in 
treaty shopping than forum shopping. 
 
The case of deep-sea bioprospecting thereby shows that viewed from the 
perspective of the state, fragmentation appears as a much more real, and 
practically relevant problem than when viewed as a problem for courts or as 
friction between treaties. Although states may address norm conflicts 
differently, it is clear that in a time when the relevance of international law is 
increasingly questioned, this dilemma does not enhance the credibility of 
international law as a normative system. If states are put in situations where 
they have no other choice than to go against obligations in central framework 
conventions, it is not far-fetched to suspect that breaches of international law 
obligations in general would be considered less serious. The credibility of rules 
requires an element of logical function, and if this is lacking then the legitimacy 
of the system risks becoming questioned. Moreover, selective adherence to 
treaties where norm conflict arises undermines predictability and the very basis 
of the contractual element of treaties: namely that parties can expect other 
parties to implement their obligations in good faith. Indeed, the legitimacy of 
international law is connected to its logical function.  
 
For any state perceiving international law as more than an abstract theoretical 
construction, there is a high likelihood that it would take obligations less 
serious in an incoherent system providing no other solution than breaching one 
of several obligations. As discussed above, the risk of fragmentation has often 
been portrayed as a loss of harmony and unity in the system of international 
law (and it has also been downplayed because such virtues have not been 
considered necessary).1348  
 
1347 As discussed in section C.3 has an open-ended approach to the patentability of bioresources, 
with no exceptions relating to the seabed rules of UNCLOS or the obligations relating to 
conservation established in the CBD. 
1348 Compare, on the one hand, Peters’ identification of the negative elements of fragmentation, 
as “a loss of coherence implies the loss of international law’s quality as a legal order (or sys-
tem)” (…) “what is at stake in fragmentation is unity, harmony, cohesion, order, and—concom-







The findings in this study, however, indicate that the impact of fragmentation 
is not merely a loss of systemic coherence of esoteric concern. Whereas it is 
correct that an increasing diversity of treaties in international law does not per 
se undermine the latter’s normative value, as observed by Andenas and 
Bjorge1349, it can hardly be disputed that a lack of function for its primary 
subjects represents a problem. 
 
Rather, fragmentation implies a real risk that international law in general loses 
credibility from the perspective of its primary subjects, namely the states. 
There is thus reason to take fragmentation seriously and turn the debate from 
the limited focus on dispute settlement and instead further investigate the 
impact on states. How then, should states facing norm conflicts, as in the case 
of deep-sea bioprospecting, act? 
 
Lang and Leathley have proposed similar solutions to fragmentation. For Lang, 
a natural recourse in norm conflicts would be to ask the ICJ for advisory 
opinions.1350 For Leathley, the ideal solution would be to create an institutional 
hierarchy among courts and tribunals. However, since that would be unrealistic 
he instead suggests an “organically” established hierarchy, whereby all courts 
defer to the ICJ and its jurisprudence.1351 In line with the general emphasis in 
the debate, both these solutions focus on the role of courts in fragmentation. 
From the perspective of states facing norm conflicts, neither strategy provides 
a viable recourse. Bringing norm conflicts before international adjudication 
would require states to act as watchdogs in relation to other states which choose 
to disregard one of the obligations involved in norm conflicts.  
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Generally, states are reluctant to initiate proceedings against one another, and 
it requires more fundamental interests than general concern for the systemic 
aspects of international law for states to invest in such a process. To use 
advisory opinions to resolve norm conflicts is formally not possible under 
current ICJ rules. Only five named UN organs, 15 specialized agencies and one 
related organization can initiate such procedures.1352 
 
For political, practical, and formal reasons, then, it does not appear realistic for 
states to turn to international courts whenever they are faced with conflicting 
obligations. The findings in the case of deep-sea bioprospecting suggest that 
rather than advisory opinions and new hierarchical structures among courts or 
other measures at the international institutional level, the norm conflict must 
be addressed by the subject affected by these dilemmas: the states themselves. 
 
Turning the debate from the limited focus on dispute settlement and instead 
further studying the impact on states calls both for investigating how states can 
apply existing treaties and for the development of new rules to prevent 
irresolvable treaty conflicts. Indeed, long-term, systematic use of more holistic 
approaches in conventional application and development of international law 
may contribute to maintain a functional relationship between different regimes 
of international law. As observed by Pauwelyn, 
 
What must be avoided, however, is this fragmentation leading to self-
contained islands of international law, de-linked from other branches of 
international law. Put differently, the specialized institutions should 
continue to make and enforce their specialized law, but in doing so they 
should also take account of general international law and the law made 
in other institutions.1353 
 
As already indicated, the most rational way to address the dilemma from the 
perspective of states may appear to be to withdraw from one of the conflicting 
obligations. From a purely systemic viewpoint, this would be desirable since it 
from a subjective perspective would resolve the norm conflict and maintain the 
coherence of international law. Yet there are considerable side-effects with 
such a solution.  
 
1352 See Chapter IV, Statute of the International Court of Justice. 







Not only does the material element of the norm conflict between the relevant 
treaties persist, even if it does not apply in relation to the withdrawing state.1354  
Withdrawal from central treaties as a solution to norm conflict would also mark 
a step back for a rules-based international order. An alternative would be to 
follow the priority between treaties involved following from the rules on treaty 
application in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If lex posterior 
is applied, this would yield different results across states, depending on in what 
order they became parties to the treaties involved, and thus only lead to 
confusion as discussed in section E.5.2. Moreover, the approach appears rigid 
and risks resulting in deciding priority between treaties based on elements not 
considered by state parties. Similar to addressing norm conflict by withdrawing 
from conflicting obligations, solving the problem by means of lex posterior 
also fails to address the problem of lack of communication across regime 
boundaries. Rather than addressing material inconsistencies, both solutions 
builds on favoring one treaty over another. 
 
It would be preferable to address the problem under the more flexible approach 
provided by conflict clauses. As shown in this section E.5.3, such clauses are 
however in many relationships difficult to apply in practice since conflict 
clauses of different treaties may provide conflicting instructions and not all 
treaties contain such clauses. For conflict clauses to effectively resolve treaty 
conflicts, more effort has to be invested in drafting them in manner which 
enables their instructions to function coherently, also in relation to treaties of 
other regimes. 
 
Generally, in the application of existing rules, the norms of individual regimes 
should not be implemented in isolation but in recognition that other areas of 
international law may provide relevant rules which also have to be taken into 
account, and which may limit the scope of possible interpretations. Such 
consideration of rules beyond regime boundaries could prevent conflict in 
ordinary cases of contention, as suggested in the relationship between the rules 
on conservation of biodiversity under the CBD, on the one hand and the rules 
relevant for deep-sea bioprospecting in the law of the sea and WTO law on the 
other, as discussed in section E.7.  
 
 






In cases of irreconcilable norm conflicts, however, such as the relation between 
the rule on patentability of micro-organisms in TRIPS and the common 
heritage of mankind-principle, where two obligations provide contrary 
instructions in relation to states, not even holistic application provides a 
recourse. 
 
Such cases may be resolved by the development of lex specialis, which 
addresses the area of material conflict. This, however, requires that the 
development of clarifying rules is not confined to one regime, but fully 
considers relevant pre-existing norms in all areas of international law and 
involves actors from regimes with overlapping mandate, which otherwise risk 
developing conflicting norms. Such holistic and integrative treaties have the 
potential to function as a mechanism which prevents that “the special regime 
becomes a legal order unto itself – a kind of legal Frankenstein” that “no 
longer partakes in the same basis of legitimacy and formal standards of 
pertinence” as feared by ICJ Judge Abi-Saab.1355 
 
The development of such holistic lex specialis-treaties should be particularly 
prioritized in areas where there is a high degree of normative pluralism, where 
several regimes converge, or where there is an overlap of institutional 
mandates. Nowhere does this appear more relevant than in the management of 
the common resources of the oceans, where the lack of sovereign authority, the 
converging mandates of several regimes, and increased human involvement 
raise the risk of conflict. 
 
Accordingly, the process of negotiating a new treaty on biological diversity 
beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) in general, at first glance appears to 
represent a good example of such a lex specialis-negotiation. As discussed in 
previous parts, the negotiation is directly relevant to deep sea bioprospecting 
as well as the management of the high seas and the Area and encompasses a 
range of issues which transcend different regimes. 
 
 
1355 Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or unification: some concluding remark (The 
Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing Together the Puzzle), 31 NEW YORK 







Throughout the process, considerations of international environmental law 
rules have been made. Such references have been most frequent in discussions 
on marine protected areas and environmental impact assessments.1356  
 
In the draft text on definitions in the expected new BBNJ treaty, there is, 
however, congruency also in relation to the CBD and Nagoya in the use of 
central terms connected to marine genetic resources.1357 The proposed rules on 
benefit sharing also builds on corresponding approaches in these treaties.1358 
 
That said, surprisingly little regard has been paid to the perspective of genetic 
resources of WTO-law.1359 Rather than attempting to address the divide in 
relation to TRIPS, the proposed text on intellectual property suggests new 
criteria on patentability which appear difficult to apply in relation to WTO 
law.1360 Article 12 of the draft text of the BBNJ agreement would oblige states 
to “ensure that intellectual property rights are supportive of and do not run 
counter” to the BBNJ agreement.  
 
1356 Fran Humphries & Harriet Harden-Davies, Practical policy solutions for the final stage of 
BBNJ treaty negotiations, 122 MARINE POLICY (2020). 
1357 See foremost Article 1 of the Revised draft text of an agreement under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction. where terms such as access, genetic resources, as 
well as the distinction between ex situ, in situ and in silico has been re-used from international 
environmental law. 
1358 See part 2 of the Revised draft text. 
1359 The relationship between a new potential BBNJ treaty and TRIPS was considered during the 
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Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, 
Intersessional workshops aimed at improving understanding of the issues and clarifying key 
questions as an input to the work of the Working Group in accordance with the terms of reference 
annexed to General Assembly resolution 67/78 - Summary of proceedings prepared by the Co-
Chairs of the Working Group (United Nations General Assembly ed. 2013). 
1360 Article 12 of the Revised draft text provides that “[1. States Parties shall cooperate to ensure 
that intellectual property rights are supportive of and do not run counter to the objectives of this 
Agreement [, and that no action is taken in the context of intellectual property rights that would 
undermine benefit-sharing and the traceability of marine genetic resources of areas beyond 
national jurisdiction].] [2. [Marine genetic resources [collected] [accessed] [utilized] in 
accordance with this Agreement shall not be subject to patents except where such resources are 
modified by human intervention resulting in a product capable of industrial application.] [Unless 
otherwise stated in a patent application or other official filing or recognized public registry, the 
origin of marine genetic resources utilized in patented applications shall be presumed to be of 






Furthermore, according to the draft text, marine genetic resources “shall not be 
subject to patents except where such resources are modified by human 
intervention resulting in a product capable of industrial application.”  
 
This would represent a considerable deviation from the corresponding 
requirement in TRIPS, which does not include a formal requirement for human 
involvement and covers not only products but also processes.1361 Under the 
same provision, states would be bound to ensure that intellectual property 
rights “are not provided to genetic resources of areas beyond national 
jurisdiction that do not comply” (with the BBNJ agreement).  
 
Compared with the rules on patentability in TRIPS, it is clear that the more 
restrictive rule proposed in the BBNJ agreement would repeat the conflict in 
relation to WTO law.1362 Judging from these negotiation texts, there thus 
appears to be limited prospects for the new BBNJ agreement to resolve the 
norm conflict between the rules applying to deep-sea bioprospecting. It should 
however, be borne in mind that these texts are not yet agreed. It remains to be 
seen if and how the proposal will materialize. 
 
The lack of congruency of this part of the proposed BBNJ agreement in relation 
to pre-existing rules in TRIPS can be understood as the result of a confined 
perspective, reflecting an exclusive basis of the negotiation in the law of the 
sea. Indeed, the process is based on an ambition to negotiate an implementing 
agreement to fill a perceived legal lacuna or need to develop existing rules 
(depending on interpretation1363) in UNCLOS rather than to develop the 
relationship between this convention and other treaties.1364  
 
1361 The first paragraph of TRIPS, as further discussed in section C.3.3 provides that Patents 
shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, 
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. 
1362 As discussed in section C.3, Article 27 of TRIPS not only enables states to apply a more 
generous policy on patentability, but actually puts states under an obligation to enable 
patentability for genetic resources in all areas, qualified for the possibility of states to make 
exceptions from patentability under paragraph 2-3 of TRIPS Article 27. The possibility to make 
exception from patentability does however not extend to micro-organisms. 
1363 Also these positions are further discussed in Part C. 
1364 As discussed in Part C.1 the legal lacuna or legal gap-theory was referred to in Secretary-
General reports on the Oceans and the Law of the Sea, such as that of 2003 and 2004, Oceans 
and the law of the sea. Report by the Secretary-General (A/58/65) (3 March 2003)., at paras. 18, 
147 and 195; Report of the UN Secretary-General on Oceans and Law of the Sea, advance 







Thereby, the negotiation risks becoming a missed opportunity to bridge 
differences between regimes, as discussed in Part D. In spite of encompassing 
issues which transcend such boundaries, regime differences could become 
solidified in lack of a holistic basis. 
 
From the perspective of states facing conflicting obligations, it would be 
preferable to negotiate lex specialis treaties without regime bias, in 
consideration of the full spectra of international law rules applicable to the 
issues involved. In the case of deep-sea bioprospecting, this would call for 
drafting a holistic treaty on the use of genetic resources in oceans commons 
based on a coordinative endeavor, setting out to bridge the gap between all 
different regimes providing relevant rules. The lack of such ambitions reflects 
not only a lack of consideration of the conflict between treaties regarding the 
issues involved; it can also be seen as a symptom of the fragmentation of 
international law, where the law of the sea has developed into a distinct 
domain, based on its own logics. Where international law is developed by 
means of narrow, regime-specific lex specialis, conflicts across treaty 







premises for the so-called BBNJ-process for the negotiation of a new implementing agreement 
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